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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 22

PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION

Printed for the use of the
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

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COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

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NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

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² Sworn statement presented to committee.

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JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 143

ROBERTS COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS

[a] NOTE.—The following are brief transcripts of statements made by officers to the Commission during their meetings in the Munitions Building in Washington on December 18 and 19, 1941. The Commission's expressed purpose in consulting these officers before leaving for Honolulu was to get a preliminary outline of the questions involved in the inquiry, and to learn to what extent data on this subject would be available in Hawaii.

DECEMBER 18, 1941.

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, was invited to make a statement.

General Marshall outlined a number of informative or warning messages sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. These were habitually sent after conferences between the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. Sometimes only one message was sent to reach both the military and naval commanders in Hawaii. This was principally to protect the code. The despatches referred to coincided closely with critical developments in the course of negotiations with Japan. General Marshall mentioned such a message shortly before sanctions were imposed on Japan by the United States in July, 1941, and again on October 16, 1941, November 24 and November 27, 1941. The last two messages were warnings in connection with a forecast of the breakdown of [b] negotiations.

General Marshall said that copies of paraphrases of these despatches would be found by the Commission in Hawaii. General Marshall spoke at some length about a message sent by him to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on the morning of December 7. It was not delivered and decoded until after the attack.

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, was present while General Marshall was making his statement. He concurred in General Marshall's description of the close liaison between these two officers, and commented on the despatches sent to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet on the same or nearby dates as the messages sent by General Marshall. Both General Marshall and Admiral Stark referred to the situation in the eastern Pacific before December 7, and both mentioned the titles of certain key plans and joint plans in effect on and before December 7 and obligatory upon the officers in command in Hawaii in both services.

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director of War Plans Division in the office of Naval Operations, was present with Admiral Stark, and when called upon supplemented Admiral Stark's statement with particulars concerning the joint plans and subsidiary orders and agreements.

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, was present, and mentioned the Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, the Joint Coastal Frontier [c] Defense Plan

prepared by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant 14th Naval District, and General Gerow said this was in course of revision on December 7. It appeared also that consistent with these plans and joint plans the commanding officers of both services in Hawaii had by agreement drawn joint operating plans of their own. The Commission was assured that copies of these and similar documents would be available to the Commission in Hawaii.

None of the officers who appeared was sworn.

DECEMBER 19, 1941.

General Sherman Miles, Chief of the Military Intelligence, made a statement to the Commission. He was not sworn.

General Miles described the function of the intelligence service, which is to inform the high command of the War Department of the existing situation and furnish it with estimates of the situation. He spoke in some detail of the several messages sent July to December, 1941, which were mentioned in the statements of officers yesterday. General Miles also spoke of methods and means of obtaining intelligence of Japanese plans and movements. By direction of the Commission, however, no notation was made of General Miles' statements under this head.

Captain Theodore Wilkinson, U. S. N., Chief of the [d] Office of Naval Intelligence, supplemented the statement of General Miles. Captain Wilkinson was asked to describe the extent of liaison between the Navy Department and the State Department and did so, but by direction this was not noted. Captain Wilkinson was asked about information received in his office from Hawaii. He stated that information received by the Army and the Navy intelligence services were as a matter of course exchanged between them.

Colonel Bratton, U. S. A., and Lieutenant Colonel French, U. S. A., made unsworn statements having to do with the sending and method of sending of the despatch mentioned yesterday by General Marshall as having been sent by him on the morning of December 7 to General Short, to be imparted also to Admiral Kimmel. This was the message which was not received until after the attack. Colonel French's statement went into the details of sending from Washington via San Francisco and covered such information as the War Department has of the circumstances surrounding the receipt and delivery of the message in Hawaii.

Major General Charles D. Herron, retired, was invited to appear. He was not sworn. General Herron preceded General Short in command of the Hawaiian Department. He was interrogated on the subject of maneuvers, training, and joint maneuvers. He stated among other things that the cooperation between Army and Navy was close in Hawaii, and the interchange of information and views was increasingly complete during the time of his command. He also mentioned cooperation with the [e] civil authorities there. He spoke of his special interest in intercepting devices to detect the approach of airplanes and surface craft, and mentioned his reliance upon frequent personal inspections. He was questioned as to his views of the possibility of attack by Japan without warning and of such an attack by air. He said this subject was a matter of constant thought and frequent consultation with the Navy.

Owing to the tentative and preliminary nature of the hearings on December 18 and 19, 1941, the Commission decided that it was unnecessary to have the statements of the above mentioned officers noted stenographically and verbatim. The foregoing condensed statements have been prepared by the Recorder and the Secretary to the Commission from stenographic notes taken by him at the time, showing mainly topics taken up in the several statements.

[f] Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, having examined the transcript of his testimony given before this Commission on December 27, 1941, and December 29, 1941, and having on January 5, 1942, by letter to the Commission (See transcript page 1470 et seq.) recommended certain revisions of that transcript, the Commission approved each of those recommendations and incorporated each of them in the transcript by interleaving the text of each suggested revision on a page immediately following each page referred to in the said letter. The Commission directed that the transcript thus revised is the transcript of Rear Admiral Kimmel's testimony on the dates above mentioned. Nevertheless, in compliance with Rear Admiral Kimmel's further request, it directed that his testimony of December 27, 1941, and December 29, 1941, be copied with each of the revisions incorporated in the copied text to effect a clean copy without interleaved errata. That copy has been made in one volume, in duplicate, pages S-1 to S-226, inclusive, and on January 24, 1942, verified by the Recorder to the Commission as to the correctness of each revision, and it is annexed to each of the two sets of 16 volumes each of the transcript, to be deposited respectively in the secret archives of the Departments of War and Navy, but by direction of the Commission not made a part of said transcript. The said annexed volume accompanies the 16 volumes of the transcripts and is marked "Annex to transcript and not a part thereof: A copy of the transcribed testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel given before the Commission to Investigate the Attack on the Territory of Hawaii, and revised by authority of the Commission in compliance with Rear Admiral Kimmel's request."

WALTER BRUCE HOWE.
Recorder to the Commission.



[1]

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[2] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

MONDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1941

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

The Commission met at 10:45 o'clock a. m., Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission;

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

There was a brief informal discussion outside the record, following which Lieutenant Colonel William E. Donegan was called into the hearing room.)

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM E. DONEGAN

The CHAIRMAN. What have you there, Colonel?

Colonel DONEGAN. I have here——

General McCoy. Let us get the colonel's name, rank, and position.

The CHAIRMAN. Your name?

Colonel DONEGAN. William B. Donegan, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff Corps.

General McCoy. May I ask, Colonel, before you begin, how long you have been in this position?

Colonel DONEGAN. To give the background, General, I was detailed down here as an infantry officer in April, 1940. From September, 1940, to July, 1941, I was on detached service, infantry, in G-3. In July, 1941, I was placed on general staff as assistant, G-3. On November 5, [3] 1941, I was detailed as G-3 Hawaiian Department.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were about to say, "I have here——"

General McCoy. May I ask if there is any specific section of G-3 charged with the war plans?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. I would like to stress strongly, to save the time of the Commission, that Major Lawton, General Staff Corps,

is directly in charge of joint Army-Navy activities and is the Army liaison officer with the Navy. He has the background of this study. He is present outside.

General McCoy. Could we have him in with the Colonel? and that would save time.

The CHAIRMAN. You may have him in, sir.

General McCoy. And we can request them both then together.

(At this point Major William S. Lawton entered the hearing room.)

Colonel DONEGAN. Gentlemen, this is Major Lawton.

The CHAIRMAN. Major, glad to see you. What is the full name, Major?

Major LAWTON. William S. Lawton, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Sit down, if you will, sir. We have asked you to come in with the Colonel so that we may ask you indifferently questions; that will save time, enlighten us.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, what is the first paper you have produced?

Colonel DONEGAN. I hadn't planned any presentation.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I understand that.

Colonel DONEGAN. First, I have the joint coastal frontier defense plan.

General McCoy. That is the one that Major Lawton is in charge of?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. It is signed by General Short and Admiral Block, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. How had we better go through this?

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, I personally want to look at those plans.

Colonel DONEGAN. I have the official record I can get.

General McNARNEY. If you have two or three copies we can glance through them.

Admiral REEVES. He can give you a list of what he has.

[4] The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Now, what have you there in addition to that document?

Colonel DONEGAN. I brought in field order No. 1, which is the operations order for the Hawaiian Department.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it dated?

Colonel DONEGAN. Dated the 28th of November, 1941. And standing operating procedure of the Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir. I have notes, resume of the activities of the major echelons of the Department as of December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. That is only as of the day in question?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. It is a periodic report of G-3 and activities for that day.

General McCoy. Those were all in effect on the day of December 7, were they?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And the latest?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with the joint plan, Colonel?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you undertake to tell us briefly what the Army's responsibilities were under that joint plan?

Colonel DONEGAN. I would prefer to have Major Lawton do it, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Let Major Lawton do it.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR WILLIAM S. LAWTON

Major LAWTON. These are very definitely stated in the plan, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think it unwise to attempt to summarize? Would it be better for us to study the plan ourselves?

Major LAWTON. Well, they are listed here in the plan very briefly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Major LAWTON. I think I could read them, and right from the plan would be very exact, sir, and brief.

[5] The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.

Major LAWTON. First, the method of coordination. The commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the commandant of the 14 Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked. That is the basis of operation of the plan.

As to tasks, the joint task is to hold Oahu and the main outlying naval base and to control and protect shipping in the coastal zone. The Army task is to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces and against hostile sympathizers, to support the naval forces; Navy task, to patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein and to support the Army forces.

Under the Army there are definite missions assigned. The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for the beach and land, seacoast, and anti-aircraft defense of Oahu, with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor naval base and naval forces present, and at Honolulu Harbor, City of Honolulu, and the Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Field, Lualualei. Lualualei is the munition depot. The increasing importance of Kanoche area is recognized.

General McCox. Of the what?

Major LAWTON. Kanoche. That is the naval air station at Ulupau Peninsula.

The next mission of the Army provides for an anti-aircraft and gas defense, intelligence and warning services, protection of landing field and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces, defense of installations on Oahu vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, water, power, and for interior guard and sabotage except within naval establishments, defense against sabotage within the Hawaiian Islands except within naval shore establishments, establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of Oahu defensive coastal area in cooperation with the naval inshore patrol, and an aerial [6] observation system on outlying islands, and an aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands, support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers, provide personnel for and Army communications facilities to harbor patrol posts provided for in paragraph 18.

[7] The next paragraph, briefly: to provide a system of land communications by teletype, telegraph loops, and also radio intercepts;

an intelligence service which in addition to normal function will gather, evaluate, and distribute, both to the Army and the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the Hawaiian Islands, counterespionage within the Islands, control of dangerous aliens within the Islands, Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communications system, supply of all Army and civil population in the Hawaiian Islands, hospitalization of the same, reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civilian population.

Colonel BROWN. Let me suggest, sir, he is just reading; this is all in writing, and he could just get a note of the page read and get it that way.

Admiral REEVES. We do not want to take them.

The CHAIRMAN. We do not want to take these papers.

Colonel BROWN. But you are taking the full data there.

The CHAIRMAN. We would rather not take the papers, and leave it in the hands of the stenographer and copy them; do you not think so?

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Major LAWTON. That completes the provisions for the Army.

Admiral REEVES. Those are the tasks of the Army?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I think you read one that said warning devices, operation of warning devices on the Islands?

Major LAWTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that include the operation and responsibility for the use of these detectors that had been set up on the Islands?

Major LAWTON. The radio detectors of the aircraft warning service, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it was the Army's task to operate these detecting stations?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. That is including antiaircraft warning [8] services for the Hawaiian Islands.

Colonel DONEGAN. Probably the Navy.

Major LAWTON. The Navy's responsibility is as follows:

- (a) An inshore patrol;
- (b) An offshore patrol;
- (c) An escort force;
- (d) An attack force;
- (e) To provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of Pearl and Honolulu Harbors;
- (f) Installation and operation of underwater defense for Pearl and Honolulu Harbors;
- (g) Support of Army forces in the Oahu defensive coastal area and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of Oahu defensive coastal area, as may be deemed necessary and practicable;
- (h) Sweeping channels and mine fields;
- (i) Distant reconnaissance;
- (j) Attacking enemy naval forces;
- (k) Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments;

(l) In conjunction with the Army and local communications service—I will brief some of these here instead of reading them complete, as they are not sufficiently pertinent;

(m) Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communications systems, in conformity with joint Action Army and Navy 1935;

(n) Operation of a naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information;

(o) Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces; and

(p) Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto.

[9] As pertinent to the discussion, I would like to emphasize in that particular paragraph, paragraph (i), the responsibility for distant reconnaissance, which was made a responsibility of the Navy, sir.

Colonel DONEGAN. We have a letter I would like to present to the Commission.

General McCoy. Before you get off of that I would like to ask, Mr. Justice, a question or two in regard to these plans.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Go ahead, sir.

General McCoy. Colonel, these joint plans were plans agreed to by the commanding general and the commandant of the district?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. What responsibility, if any, did the commander-in-chief U. S. Fleet have in this connection?

Colonel DONEGAN. He was not included in this joint plan.

General McCoy. In the joint plan.

Colonel DONEGAN. Which is a plan signed by Admiral Block and General Short. Admiral Block is the base defense commander.

General McCoy. In other words, it was necessary—

Colonel DONEGAN. Did not pertain to the fleet.

General McCoy. That was on the general idea, I imagine, that the fleet itself had freedom of action?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And that the particular plan here was that the fleet could go and come without being concerned about the safety—

Colonel DONEGAN (interposing). Yes, sir; exactly, sir.

General McCoy. Of the defense excepting the broader strategy of operations?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Complete operations.

That is all.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, these plans, joint plans: Were they approved by the Chief of Staff?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

[10] Admiral STANDLEY. And the Chief of Naval Operations?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir, they were. I have the data.

Admiral STANDLEY. They were approved before being put into effect?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And do you know: are they based on the general or are they based on the basic Army-Navy basic joint plans for national defense?

Colonel DONEGAN. Based on the Joint Action Army and Navy 1935, which is the basic document.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The basic document was presented to us.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is the one that assigns the task.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly.

Admiral STANDLEY. This is based on that.

The CHAIRMAN. On that.

Admiral STANDLEY. And then it is approved by the Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. By the Chief of Staff.

General McNARNEY. Was a copy of Rainbow No. 5 operations order of the Army, of the War Department, available when this plan was drawn?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir.

Major LAWTON. No, sir. This plan is dated 11 April, 1941, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. 1941?

Major LAWTON. 11 April, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. 11 April, 1941?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel DONEGAN. I think it was dated March. We got it sometime around July. We can check it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Colonel's statement ought to be taken on that.

Colonel DONEGAN. I can check outside, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just hold that answer open until he checks.

Admiral STANDLEY. On those basic plans dated April, had there been any changes up to December 7 in those plans?

[11] Major LAWTON. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Those were the plans as of that day?

Major LAWTON. Yes.

General McCoy. There were no changes made after the warning orders came, then?

Major LAWTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume the files produced here, Major, do not include the warning orders from the Chief of Staff's office?

Major LAWTON. Between November 27 and December 7, no, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have those, have you not, your office? They are under your cognizance, are they not?

Major LAWTON. I haven't them, no, sir. I believe the Chief of Staff has them.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who is the officer that would have cognizance of operations as a result of those orders?

Major LAWTON. That would be G-3, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. G-3. Is that the Chief of Staff?

Major LAWTON. No. Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall have to wait until he comes back. Had you any questions?

General McNARNEY. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. You have before you and you have produced here a chart defining the sea areas and the coastal areas, and that chart indi-

cates that the coastal area is a belt 20 miles out to sea from the outermost point of any island, roughly drawn 20 miles outside the shore line; is that right?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Army had functions in connection with the 20-mile belt, as I understand you: first, to use its artillery for the protection of that zone?

Major LAWTON. Around Oahu the area is covered.

The CHAIRMAN. Around Oahu?

[12] Major LAWTON. We have an Oahu defensive coastal area.

The CHAIRMAN. And does that extend more than 20 miles to sea?

Major LAWTON. No, sir. There are a number of various areas that are described. They are quite confusing in description.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we are interested particularly in Oahu.

Major LAWTON. Oahu.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have a 20-mile zone or belt outside of Oahu for which the Army has some task, has some responsibility, is that right or not?

Major LAWTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now tell me what is the fact.

Major LAWTON. We have an Oahu defensive coastal area.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Major LAWTON. Which is described in this document as comprising all water areas within the areas of circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and respective radii as follows. I think maybe I had better read them into the record:

Keahu Point, 49,000 yards;

Puu Kapolei, 45,000 yards;

Puuiki Station and Kahuku Point, each 23,000 yards.

Those are the limits to which our gunfire can reach on the Island of Oahu. The 49,000-yard and 45,000-yard arcs are those bounded by swing of arc of the 16-inch gun position. The Puuiki Station and the Kahuku arcs are determined by ranges of 8-inch railway guns in the vicinity of those localities.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I interrupt you there a moment, Major? You say that is a defensive sea area.

Major LAWTON. What?

Admiral STANDLEY. I say, you have the defensive sea area. Is that in accordance with the definition of "defensive sea area" as prescribed in the basic plans, and has it the same significance?

Major LAWTON. The defensive sea area. I believe I read this defensive sea area as being this 20-mile limit. The defensive sea area [13] has been recently changed to a limit within three miles of the shores, to come within the sea area controlled by the Government of the United States, I think it is. I believe that is why it was changed. But the defensive sea area is now three miles from the shores of the various points.

Admiral STANDLEY. In our basic plans we have a defensive sea area.

Major LAWTON. That is right, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the definition of it.

Major LAWTON. That is right, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, is that the same as the sea area that has been prescribed by the Navy Department as the defensive sea area for the Hawaiian Islands?

Major LAWTON. This area that I described was, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is described by the Navy Department?

Major LAWTON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, recently that has been changed?

Major LAWTON. It has recently been changed.

Admiral STANDLEY. By the Navy Department?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Isn't that the definition of "defensive sea area"?

Major LAWTON. Yes. The Joint Action Army-Navy 1935, that was changed.

Admiral STANDLEY. That means that area in which all shipping must be controlled by the Navy?

Major LAWTON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Isn't that the only significance that the defensive sea area has?

Major LAWTON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the fact that you have defensive artillery for shore batteries has nothing to do with it?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is what I intended to bring out.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, with respect to the coastal area, [14] did the aircraft of the Army have any task?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir, under this Oahu defensive coastal area, which is the area I am speaking of now within gun range of our batteries.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Major LAWTON. And one of the items I read under the responsibilities of the Army was: establishment of an inshore patrol of the waters of the Oahu defensive coastal area in cooperation with the naval inshore patrol.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, what do you mean by an inshore patrol?

Major LAWTON. That is the patrol by the Navy of the waters—of the approaches to the harbors.

The CHAIRMAN. So there was a joint task for Army and Navy fliers in that area?

Major LAWTON. Well, Army fliers to do the flying in that area in conjunction with the Navy inshore patrol, which is a surface patrol.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Oh, the naval patrol is a surface patrol?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Army's was an air patrol jointly with it?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the farthest to sea the Army fliers were to go except in emergency where they were to aid Navy fliers in an actual fight; is that right?

Major LAWTON. Well, I have a letter here in that regard, sir, that I intend to bring up next, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Major LAWTON. I think that will explain that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.

Major LAWTON. This is an agreement between Admiral Block, as commandant of the 14 Naval District, and General [15] Short, as commanding the Hawaiian Department (reading):

Subject: Joint air operations. Dated 20 March, 1941. With respect to distant reconnaissance, paragraph 3: When naval forces are insufficient for long-distance

patrol and search operation and Army aircrafts are made available these aircrafts will be under the tactical control of the Navy commander directing the operation.

In other words, on call the commandant 14 Naval District could request assistance from the Army, in which case, if they did, these airplanes were turned over to the Navy and are operated directly under their command and control. They were completely out of the hands of the commandant of the Hawaiian Department and became part of the Navy's system of long-range or distant reconnaissance. The fact that we might give them planes would in no way interfere with the responsibility laid down in this document.

The CHAIRMAN. How is that?

Major LAWTON. The fact that we might give the Navy or loan the Navy planes would in no way change the responsibilities as laid down in this document.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

General McCoy. Was that in effect on the 7th of November?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Seventh of December.

Major LAWTON. It was in effect. This document was in effect—it is dated the 20th of March, 1941, but between the 27th of November and the 6th of December or prior to the 7th, including the 6th of December, no request was made upon the Army for airplanes for this purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McCoy. Is there anything in those appendices resulting from the installation by the Army of the detector [16] service and the method by which that warning should be quickly relayed to the Navy?

Colonel DONEGAN. In the separate command.

Major LAWTON. No, sir. That is generally covered in this document on the interchange of information, but no definite system established in these agreements.

General McCoy. There is nothing there definitely referring in any of the appendices to the new method of detection by this system that was established when?

Major LAWTON. No, sir, not in detail; merely the fact that the Army is responsible for the aircraft warning service.

General McCoy. Yes, but how did they get the result of that service to the Navy?

Major LAWTON. As it has been established, as it has been built up, as material and equipment have become available, we have established an information center to which this information from the aircraft warning service comes. In there there is a representative of the Commandant 14 Naval District, who is an officer from Patrol Wing 2 to give them the information regarding any airplanes, ships, and so forth, that may be picked up on the board, and relay it directly and immediately to the Navy.

General McCoy. That is the responsibility, then, of the naval officer in the information service, is it?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir; he is given the information right there, and it is his responsibility to relay it.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I continue the questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And what is the status of that order, sir, of the officer's duties? Is he ordered to report to the commanding general or whoever is in charge of the post as liaison officer? What are his orders; do you know?

Major LAWTON. I have never seen his orders.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would those be found?

[17] Admiral STANDLEY. The commandant.

The CHAIRMAN. The commandant.

Major LAWTON. I would believe at the 14 Naval District, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The orders with respect to your representative in the information post are available, I take it, here?

Major LAWTON. Just in the establishment of the aircraft warning service information center; it is a general order establishing that service, which includes all the elements that go to make it up, sir.

General McCoy. I think that might be furnished us.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would like to see the order, please.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you make a note of that, Mr. Recorder, that we want the general order establishing the aircraft warning service of the Army.

Major LAWTON. Well, that is, I think its primary establishment is in our standing operating procedure in this document, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you look and see?

Major LAWTON. There are two documents here. One is Field Order No. 1 and the other the standing operating procedure. Under Field Order No. 1, the interceptor command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, 53 Coast Artillery Brigade, anti-aircraft, and attached units, including available Naval and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery and the aircraft warning service in the anti-aircraft defense of Oahu. Now, that is the basis for the establishment of the aircraft warning service and its responsibility.

General McCoy. Who is responsible for that service in the Army, and to whom does it operate?

Major LAWTON. The interceptor command operates with an air officer in command. The actual operation of the sets is [18] a Signal Corps function, sir, and is supervised by the Department Signal Officer, Colonel Powell.

General McCoy. What is the name of the officer who was in command of it and in charge of it and responsible for it on that day?

Major LAWTON. Colonel Powell is the Department Signal Officer who controls the operation of the aircraft warning service sets. The interceptor command was operated by General Davidson of the Air Force on the day in question.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you had part of another order, you said, that applied.

Colonel DONEGAN. S. O. P.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. Under "Standing Operating Procedure": The interceptor command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircrafts, anti-aircraft artillery, including available Naval and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, Aircraft Warning Service

and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

- (1) arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft;
- (2) the coordination of the anti-aircraft fire from naval ships in Pearl and/or Honolulu Harbors;
- (3) transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, were the same officers you have named——

Major LAWTON. General Davidson.

The CHAIRMAN. ——responsible under that order?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. This is merely an amplification of the Field Order 1, and this part of the document is restricted. That document is secret. This is put out to give it the greatest dissemination to the troops.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the first document from which you read is secret?

[19] Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Second is a general order to go to troops?

Colonel DONEGAN. Well——

Major LAWTON. It is a——

Colonel DONEGAN. Go ahead.

It is restricted so that we can give a greater distribution on Field Order No. 1. We gave those to the major echelon commanders: division commanders, air force commanders, and Coast Artillery commanders.

The CHAIRMAN. Referring now to No. 1?

Colonel DONEGAN. No. 1, yes, sir. This (indicating)——

The CHAIRMAN. Referring now to the general operations?

Colonel DONEGAN. S. O. P., "Standing Operating Procedure," which is a break-down of Field Order No. 1, and a lot of the secret information, particularly concerning ammunition, C. P.'s, and other secret information, is deleted.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel DONEGAN. In order that it could get down to the regiments and battalions, lower echelons.

The CHAIRMAN. Four echelons?

Colonel DONEGAN. Lower echelons, lower units.

Admiral REEVES. Major, referring to the Aircraft Warning Service, was it part of their duty to transmit these warnings to all concerned, both Army and Navy? Was that part of the Aircraft Warning Service?

Major LAWTON. No, sir. They got the information at the information center.

The CHAIRMAN. "They" meaning the Navy or other——

Major LAWTON. The Aircraft Warning Service got the information at the information center. These stations are set up at various points around the Island. They are connected by telephone to this center, where there is a large map board. As information comes in it is plotted on the map board. Various tellers sit above this board on a raised platform and can see [20] the information as it comes in plotted on the board. If there are many airplanes moving in a certain direction, or one airplane, unknown or friendly, that information is available to each one of these tellers the minute it is placed on

the board. There is an evaluator or control officer there, who, in case of doubt of a flight, attempts to evaluate the information. Each officer—the naval officer present and the pursuit and bombardment officers present are expected to keep track of all the planes they have in the air and know where they are, so that when a flight appears on the board the controller briefly will ask if anyone claims that flight; and if it is a Navy flight in that area he claims it, and it is immediately marked “Friendly.” If it is an Army flight, why, it is also so claimed. Any flights that are not claimed are put down as “Unknown,” which is practically synonymous with “Enemy” if enemy forces are known to be capable of being in the vicinity.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I think Admiral Reeves wanted to know in a little more detail what your arrangement was whereby the naval commander got that information.

Major LAWTON. That was transmitted by this naval——

The CHAIRMAN. Teller?

Major LAWTON. Naval representative from Patrol Wing 2, who had a direct line to Patrol Wing 2. From there it was relayed to the harbor control post.

Admiral REEVES. All I wanted to know, specifically, was not who did this duty but whose responsibility it was. An Aircraft Warning Service is of no value if the information is not transmitted to those who are interested.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Was that part of the responsibility of the Aircraft Warning Service?

General MCCOY. Isn't that covered in your order there that you just read?

[21] Admiral REEVES. Yes, sir, if you read the Order No. 1. I think it covers that point, and I wanted to clear it up.

Major LAWTON. I think I know that. “The interceptor command will”—in the third item, transmission of——

Admiral REEVES. That is the item.

Major LAWTON. Let me see how it is worded—“will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies”?

Admiral STANDLEY. That is the answer.

[22] Admiral REEVES. Yes. All I wanted to know is whose responsibility it is to transmit the aircraft warning to the proper people, both Army and Navy. Is that a part of the aircraft warning service?

You see what I want to know?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Major LAWTON. I hesitate to say, sir, definitely. This order here is purely an Army order. This is not a joint order here. It says he is responsible for transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies. That is an Army order.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, an Army order, but the Army had the duty and responsibility of this aircraft warning service, did it not?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And did that duty include the transmission of the warning? The warning is not a warning unless it is transmitted to somebody.

Major LAWTON.^e Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Did this aircraft warning service include the transmission of the warning to Army and Navy people concerned?

Major LAWTON. I would sooner have General Davidson, the Interceptor Commander, answer that question, sir, but I would like to say that I believe that the way that responsibility was set up was for the Army to get the information, tell immediately or see immediately that his naval officer present in the information center got it. It was then his responsibility to telephone that to the Navy, to the Pat. Wing 2, which in turn transmitted it to the Harbor Patrol Board.

Admiral REEVES. Such an arrangement would be an information rather than a warning service, would it not? The Army would collect the information, but if they didn't transmit that it would not be a warning.

Major LAWTON. That is right.

[23] General McNARNEY. It would be a warning once it was turned over to the proper naval officer.

Admiral REEVES. Well, what I am trying to clear up is whose responsibility it is to transmit this warning for the Army.

Major LAWTON. I think it is the Army's responsibility to give it to the naval officer in the Naval Information Center. It is then his responsibility to transmit it farther than that. It is given to the Navy, to that officer in the Information Center. What he does with it thereafter is purely his naval function.

Admiral REEVES. Well, he then becomes a part of Army's aircraft warning service, doesn't he?

Major LAWTON. He is a liaison officer, yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. He is a member of the aircraft Army warning service?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel DONEGAN. He is a liaison officer at the information center representing Pat. Wing 2. He is there to watch the board, as I understand it. He is not there under control of General Davidson.

Major LAWTON. No, he is not under control of the Army officer, if that is what the Admiral means.

The CHAIRMAN. As I get your statement, Major, it is that whatever the order may spell out itself, the officers in command worked out a system whereby those who were interested, whether Army or Navy, sat at this board.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And obtained the information, and it was their responsibility to transmit it either to the Army or to the Navy, as the case might be.

Major LAWTON. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Whatever the order might spell, that was [24] the practice that was in vogue at the time?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a common service?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And those individuals, whether Army or Navy, were really carrying out the duty of this aircraft warning service, because that is a part of the duty?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. I think that is correct, sir.

Admiral REEVES. This naval officer, then, was serving in the Army aircraft warning service by transmitting the warnings?

Major LAWTON. He was serving within it, yes, sir, but not under the command of the Interceptor Commander at all, sir. He is merely in there to get that information.

General McCoy. You speak of the Information Center. Whom was that under?

Major LAWTON. That comes under the Interceptor Commander, sir. That is the aircraft warning service Interceptor Commander. The aircraft warning service is under the Interceptor Commander, as stated in those orders.

Colonel DONEGAN. That is General Davidson.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. That office and all those serving in that office were under this Army officer who had control of this warning office?

The CHAIRMAN. So I take it.

Major LAWTON. Except, Admiral, that General Davidson did not direct this naval officer to do anything particularly with this information. He had it and could send it to any naval agencies that he saw fit to send it to.

General McCoy. In other words, he was a liaison officer, instead of being there to report to the commander, General Davidson?

[25] Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. He was not under General Davidson's command at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if he did not appear on a given morning it was not a matter of discipline for General Davidson to handle?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a Navy function?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To see that he was there; is that right?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And then this system of aircraft warning, so far as the Army was concerned, stopped dead in this office and never reached the Navy unless the Navy did something about it?

Major LAWTON. Under the normal setup, yes, sir. However, if the naval officer was not there during drills and an officer was available, he would relay such information as he could, but the Army did not feel the responsibility for warning that naval function, sir.

Admiral REEVES. For warning the Navy?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And the aircraft warning service, for which the Army was responsible, did not feel responsible for notifying or warning the Navy of any aircraft?

Colonel DONEGAN. Are you qualified to state that at all? It is General Davidson's function.

Major LAWTON. The operation actually within the intelligence or the interceptor command actual operation as it was carried out, I would prefer that General Davidson answered those questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Major LAWTON. I can say how it functioned, but what responsibilities were prescribed within there I cannot say, sir.

[26] Admiral REEVES. You do not feel qualified to interpret this order?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That is not part of it?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir. We supervise the operation of the interceptor command and the Information Center as an echelon of the Hawaiian air force and under the Department, and General Davidson has been designated as the Interceptor Commander.

General MCCOY. I would like to ask that note be made to have the order produced that sent the naval officer, by name, to the Information Center. That would be a Navy order. Because we can question General Davidson, and he may say, "Well, he was sent to me by the Navy." I think it would be well to have the order which sent the naval officer to the information service.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be added to your requests, Mr. Recorder.

General MCCOY. Yes, by name; and a copy of the instructions that he had, whether he was to report to General Davidson as a liaison officer or what responsibility General Davidson had for him.

Colonel DONEGAN. May I make a statement off the record for the information of the Commission?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General MCCOY. I think that ought to be a matter of record.

Colonel DONEGAN. What I was trying to get away from, General, is, the operations are within General Davidson's interceptor command. I don't know what orders he put out, but I thought the Commission had the picture that a Navy officer was supposed to be there that morning. To my knowledge I don't believe it was expected that a Navy officer be there [27] at the time of the attack on December 7. Do you agree to that?

Major LAWTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. We are a little ahead of what we are trying to get now.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think we are.

General McNARNEY. Yes, finally.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have got enough on the record now so that we shall not forget to go into this matter, but perhaps we ought to get those in command to tell us about the situation.

General MCCOY. Yes.

General McNARNEY. If I might make a suggestion, I would suggest the Commission study the Joint Basic Plan, the Field Order No. 1, and the Standing Operating Procedure, and the military members determine whether or not in their opinion they are tactically and strategically sound, clear, and concise and in sufficient detail so that if carried out they would have provided a reasonable defense for Oahu. I think we should determine that before we ask a lot of questions. In other words, at the present moment, unless I know what the standing orders and procedure were, I cannot really ask an intelligent question. I can get a lot of details and a mass of data, but I cannot apply them. I would like to study these documents before we go ahead.

[28] The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, is there anything else that these gentlemen need bring us for study at the moment, or have you got what you need, General?

General McNARNEY. Well, this will do for the time being, and of course as we get further along we should go into the standing orders of the Air Force particularly. We are not particularly concerned with the ground troops because they did not come into the picture, but we are very much concerned with the operations of the Air Force, and I would like to have the detailed orders issued by General Martin, by General Davidson, and by the bomber command also.

The CHAIRMAN. Now have we called for this note before?

General McNARNEY. No, sir, we have not called for the detailed Air Force orders yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it time to call for them now so as to have them ready when we get to them?

General McNARNEY. Well, we should first study this. I do not want to take on too much at one time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Just keep it in mind, what you need secondarily.

General McNARNEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, can these gentlemen leave these here for study for the time being?

General McNARNEY. I see no reason why they should not. If you happen to have some more copies around here it might be well to furnish them.

Colonel DONEGAN. You can get the official copies at the adjutant general's office.

The CHAIRMAN. That would give one copy all around.

Major LAWTON. May I make a statement in connection with the question of Admiral Reeves, which I am not quite sure of the purpose of his question, but I would like to state that in the Aircraft Warning Service and the interceptor command we have had joint drills twice a month for some little while, and [29] the naval representative was there, and the Army commander with his staff, and we actually went through all the motions, including the sending out of airplanes to intercept—to locate and bomb sleds which were towed by carriers, and bombers, in accordance with joint agreement, acting under control of Pat. Wing 2, and our pursuit ships were sent out by the interceptor command to intercept the attacking planes coming in. The system actually worked, and the information relayed, and has been operated through drills, relayed by the naval liaison officer to the proper naval agency. As to details of those, I think General Davidson can give much more than I can, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, while you were out it was asked whether the warnings of November 24 and 27 were received by the Army.

Colonel DONEGAN. Referring to radios from the War Department?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Colonel DONEGAN. Generally they were.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom would they go when received?

Colonel DONEGAN. They came in here to the signal officer. In sequence they were decoded, sent by officer messenger to our department adjutant general, who personally takes secret messages of that type up to the chief of staff, and the chief of staff presented them immediately to the department commander. It is a standard routine.

The CHAIRMAN. Standard procedure?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. How long does that routine generally take?

Colonel DONEGAN. With the exception, sir, the message of—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, how did those messages come to you? By radio from Washington?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir; in code.

The CHAIRMAN. In code?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

[30] The Chairman. Over the Army's radio?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. All messages came over the Army radio except the message of December 6-7 which came over R. C. A.

The CHAIRMAN. We know that. Well, now, perhaps following General McNarney's suggestion we can excuse these gentlemen now and discuss these orders. Is that satisfactory to the Commissioners?

Admiral STANDLEY. Ask him one more question.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Admiral STANDLEY. Does he know why that message of December 7 came over R. C. A.?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why that message came over R. C. A.?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir. We were on the receiving end.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you were.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know the reason why that did not come by radio?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir. We have never had a break in our communications.

Admiral STANDLEY. In your radio?

Colonel DONEGAN. It has been functioning continuously.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Colonel, who is the signal officer who was responsible for the operation of your receiving station on the morning of December 7?

Colonel DONEGAN. Colonel Powell is the Department signal officer who is responsible for all signal activities.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now shall we excuse these gentlemen and keep these papers for the time being?

Major LAWTON. I would like to call the attention of the Commission to Annex No. 7 in this plan, which provides for joint security measures, protection of fleet and Pearl Harbor base.

[31] The CHAIRMAN. Annex 7?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. This provision was not actually in effect that morning, but it was a provision—an agreement that was made to take care of such an event.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not in effect that morning?

Major LAWTON. It was not in effect, no, sir.

Admiral REEVES. When was it made?

Major LAWTON. It was made the 28th of March, 1941, and signed the 2d of April, 1941, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why it was not in effect that morning?

Major LAWTON. Because there was no indication whatsoever here that there was an outside threat.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, you said that the alert that was in effect was Alert No. 1?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not an alert, if I understood you correctly, against airplane raid?

Colonel DONEGAN. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But was against sabotage only?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And, of course, what state of alert you were in depended upon the orders issued by the commander here?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir; also depended upon the information that the commander had.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Colonel DONEGAN. We had no information of any kind that there was a threat from without, and our radios from the War Department on October 16, which I think the Commission has seen,—

The CHAIRMAN. We have seen them.

Colonel DONEGAN. —27, and 28, all referred to sabotage and not to take any action to arouse.

The CHAIRMAN. We are familiar with those, October 16, [32] 27, and 28.

General McCoy. Well, the Army furnished the Navy warning of November 27 where it said, "This is a war warning"?

Colonel DONEGAN. Not to my knowledge, sir. I didn't see it. If the Department commander did, I didn't see it. The general mentioned the date November 27, on November 28 the commander sent a radio to the adjutant general stating that this Department was on alert for sabotage and in liaison with the Navy, but there was nothing in—the radio you refer to I have no knowledge of.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we will excuse you gentlemen for the time being. I hardly need say to you that on your honor as officers I request that nothing that takes place here be disclosed outside.

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Please do not discuss it with anyone.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel DONEGAN. Do you want the other witnesses to remain outside?

The CHAIRMAN. Who are they, and for what purpose are they?

Colonel DONEGAN. G-2 was here; he is gone.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will send for them if we need them. They are easily available, I take it?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

(Thereupon Colonel Donegan and Major Lawton left the hearing room.)

[33]

VII, par. 6

Upon establishment of aircraft warning service, provision will be made for their transmission of information of the location of distant hostile and unfriendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of the naval liaison officers so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. The information relating to the presence or movement of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu, which is secured through naval channels will be transmitted without delay to the aircraft warning service information center.

VII, par. 7.

The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 (these are the wire and radio systems on the Island) after establishment will be manned and operated, No. 2 alerts, joint exercises which involve these communications systems and such other facilities as may be agreed upon by the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the naval base defense officer.

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will be under the necessity of explaining in its report in some way how the injunctions of the Army and Navy defense plan, the local Hawaiian defense plan, made pursuant to the over-all plan of the two departments and other subsidiary plans, which were obligated on both commanders, are to be summarized and stated so as to indicate the propriety of the commanders' following the injunctions in these various plans.

The Army and Navy probably will not consent to our quoting the plans in extenso or naming them so as to identify them.

After the Recorder has submitted to the Commission a form and the Commission has agreed upon the form, the consent of the War and Navy Departments to the use of the form will have to be obtained before it can be embodied in our report.

(There is attached summary dated 22 December, 1941, signed by Kendall J. Felder, Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.)

[33a]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FORT SHAFTER, T. H., 22 December 1941.

1. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION AS OF 7:30 A. M., 7 DECEMBER 1941:

A. *Naval Operations*: No knowledge of Japanese naval vessels in waters farther East than the China sea, although it was known that they had bases in the Mandate Islands and in all probability had naval craft in those waters. Nothing had been received from the Naval Intelligence, between November 27th and December 7th, to indicate any movement of carriers east of the Mandate Islands.

B. *Air Operations*: No information to indicate operations of Japanese aircraft other than on the Asiatic mainland and areas adjacent thereto. It was known that no land based Japanese aircraft could operate from nearer than the Mandate Islands (approximately 2100 miles). It was also known that no nation possessed aircraft which could operate from that distance and return to its base.

C. *Local Situation*: Instructions from the War Department announced that the international situation was critical and directed precautions be taken against possible sabotage and subversive acts.

(1) *Diplomatic Activities*: On Saturday, December 6th, it was learned through local investigative agencies that papers at the Japanese consulate were being destroyed by burning.

(2) *Concentration & Movements of Local Aliens*: None. The entire local population was quiet and no indications of domestic unrest appeared.

(3) *Sabotage*: Warnings were prevalent that acts of sabotage were impending but no action on the part of the residents of the Territory indicated that subversive acts would be committed.

On Saturday evening, December 6, at about 6:00 P. M., a transcription and translation of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between a local alien and an unknown party in Tokyo was received. This conversation had taken place on December 5th. There were certain features about this conversation which were suspicious, although the communication in its entirety appeared innocuous. Efforts were made Saturday night to evaluate this conversation but it was impossible to reach any specific conclusion as to the meaning thereof.

[33b] D. *Precautions Taken*: Alert No. 1 was in operation and had been since November 27, 1941, with the counter-subversive section of the G-2 Office in a fully alerted condition. In addition thereto the Aircraft Warning Service was in operation from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn each day.

Conclusion:

A. *Capabilities*:

1. There was a possibility that disruption of relations, or war, might result at any time from overt acts by Japan either in the form of military action in the Far East, sinking of transports enroute to the Philippines or other similar acts.

2. With the large part of the American Navy based in the Hawaiian waters the probability of an attack by the Japanese carriers was believed to be negligible.

Kendall J. Fielder,
KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

[34] The Commission examined the joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaiian coastal frontier, short title HCF 41, dated 11 April, 1941. This document establishes the responsibility for the preparation of plans and orders as a basis for their protection, the method of coordination between the Army and Navy, delimits the areas of responsibility and assigns tasks and forces.

The Commission also examined Field Order No. 1 (tentative) Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, 28 November, 1941. This document states the mission of the Army forces, distribution of troops and missions of the 24 Infantry Division and 25 Infantry Division, the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, Hawaiian air force, Department preserve, Company A First Chemical, and the 11 Tank Company.

The Commission also examined the Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, 5 November, 1941. This document covers tactical principles, security, liaison, issuance of orders, movement, anti-aircraft defense, and alarm systems. It defines the different categories of alerts under which the defense will be conducted, the various categories of readiness for aircraft, intelligence operating procedures, essential elements of enemy information, measures to obtain and handle information, the method of supply, evacuation, and traffic control.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn at this time until tomorrow morning at nine o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 4:15 o'clock p. m., the hearing was adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, December 23, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m.)

[34-A] The Commission considered the following extracts from a brief estimate of the situation contained in Section II of the Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision of 1940, dated 1st December, 1940.

3. The Enemy.

a. Probable Enemy. Any war in the Pacific involving the United States, in so far as can now be foreseen, will be with Orange, which is rated as a first class world power.

b. Orange Nation. The capability of the Orange Nation for waging warfare is as outlined in Current War Department Combat, Economic and Political Estimates and amplified in the War Department Digest of Information.

c. Orange Population in Hawaiian Islands. A tabulation as of June 30, 1938, shows the Orange population of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS and the ISLAND OF OAHU.

(1) Hawaiian Islands.

	Aliens	Citizens	Total	Dual Citizens	Orange % of Total Population (411,485)
Male	19,845	62,605	82,450	(39,441)	-----
Female.....	17,111	53,978	71,089	(34,096)	-----
Total.....	36,956	116,583	153,539	(73,447)	*37.31

(2) Island of Oahu.

	Aliens	Citizens	Total	Dual Citizens	Orange % of Total Population (227,140)
Male.....	9,922	31,302	41,224	(19,720)	-----
Female.....	8,555	26,990	35,545	(17,003)	*33.8

*Percentages of other groups by racial extractions: Filipino, 12.83; Chinese 6.9; Hawaiian and Part Hawaiian 15.1; [34-B] Portuguese 7.4; Porto-Rican 1.8; Korean 1.6; Other Caucasian 16.5 (of which almost half are Army and Navy personnel and their dependents).

d. Forms of hostile attacks. The basis of the forms of attack listed below is the War Department assignment of Category "D" to this Department.

(1) Possibly enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability are:

- (a) Submarine—torpedo and mine.
- (b) Sabotage.
- (c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air or surface craft.
- (d) Air raids, carrier based.
- (e) Surface ship raids.
- (f) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet.

(2) *Sabotage and Internal Dissension.*

(a) It is believed that the Orange population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, in event of war, will divide itself as follows:

(1) Loyal to the United States. This group will certainly include some American citizens of Japanese origin.

(2) Passive until developments indicate definitely the probable victor, when it will join that side. This group will probably include a fair proportion of the aliens and many citizens.

(b) Sabotage may include one or more of the following acts:

- [34-C] (1) Destruction of electric light plants, works, and water supply reservoirs.
- (2) Destruction of food supplies.
- (3) Destruction of means of transportation, roads and railroads.
- (4) Arousing inhabitants to insurrection.

5. *a. Basis for Planning.*

(1) *Missions and Conditions.*

(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions: The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D (see par. 1 b).

The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange (see par. 1 a).

(b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:

(1) That sea lanes from continental United States to Hawaii are open and, that the garrison of Hawaii will be reinforced from continental United States.

(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.

(3) That the sea lanes from continental United States will be closed and that there may be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the War Department point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will make [34-D] no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is commonly referred to as the "cut-off from the Mainland situation".

(4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all inclusive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their training.

b. Conclusion.

To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort. This plan is outlined in the next paragraph.

c. Scheme of defense, command organization, and missions assigned to major echelons upon initial deployment:

(1) The defense of Oahu combines an air, naval, antiaircraft, seacoast and beach and land defense, together with the supervision and utilization of civilian activities and utilities and, under martial law, their control. To effectively accomplish this defense, particularly when its elements must be controlled simultaneously, the Department Commander decentralizes his command function by assignment of definite missions of responsibility to major echelon commanders, as follows:

(a) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division.*

The beach and land defense of Oahu. (For details, see paragraph 6).

The beach and land defense is based upon the principle of the "position in readiness", which permits concentration of forces in critical areas and assures flexibility to meet external and [34-E] internal attacks.

(b) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade:* The antiaircraft and seacoast defense of Oahu and in addition furnishing the necessary support to the beach and land defense and the naval forces. (See paragraph 6).

(c) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force:* In carrying out the air defense, he may conduct independent operations or may operate in conjunction with, supported by, or in support of naval air forces, or temporarily under the direction of the Naval Air Force Commander as provided in Chapter II, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and will cooperate with all forces in direct defense of Oahu.

d. *Assignment of reinforcements received in this Department:* Reinforcements as received will be assigned to commanders to assist them in the missions assigned in paragraph c. above. Reinforcements will be trained in organizations.

e. *Defense of Islands other than Oahu:* Forces available preclude a determined defense of Islands other than OAHU. Units of the Hawaii National Guard, stationed on those Islands will prevent civil disturbances, protect landing fields used by our troops and resist landing attacks. The Hawaiian Air Force will resist use of airports on outlying fields by an enemy.

f. *Supplies for the defense.* See paragraph 11, below.

[35]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[36] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1941

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

The Commission met at 9 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Adviser to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will come to order. Call General Short.

(Thereupon General Walter C. Short entered the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, General?

You do swear by Almighty God, the Searcher of all hearts, that the evidence you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and so you shall answer at the last great day?

General SHORT. I do.

[37] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT

The CHAIRMAN. What is your name, sir?

General SHORT. Walter C. Short.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your rank?

General SHORT. Major General, United States Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Briefly, what had been your service record in the Army, General?

General SHORT. I was commissioned from civilian life as second lieutenant in March, 1902, and as rank from February 2, 1901. I have been in service continuously since that time.

During that period I have had service in the Philippines, Alaska, Mexico, Germany, Puerto Rico, Hawaii. I had approximately 11 months with the Pershing Expedition in Mexico. I went overseas and was gone altogether a little over two years.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you appointed to the post of commander in the Hawaiian Islands, General?

General SHORT. On February 7. I arrived here February 5, but General Herron left on the 7th.

The CHAIRMAN. 1941?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask for this command?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any influence that was brought to bear or occasioned to obtain the command for you?

General SHORT. I specifically, after the Chief of Staff told me that he was going to designate me, I asked him if there was nothing better than a routine peace-time assignment, then not to do so on account of the health of my wife's father, but he considered it important and ordered me here.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been in continuous command of this department since February 7, 1941?

General SHORT. I have, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the period of the emergency, General, how many times were there warnings which caused alerts to be ordered here? Give us your [38] best memory.

General SHORT. We had some practice alerts without any warning. I am inclined to believe that there was one alert that I cannot give you the date of, but about the date, after the freezing of the assets in the banks. I had a warning that caused me to go on alert against sabotage because I realized that the people were much more restless than they had been any time before.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that No. 1 alert ordered?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. No. 1 was the only alert that has been ordered?

General SHORT. Except in connection with maneuvers.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

General SHORT. Except in connection with maneuvers.

In May I had a No. 3 alert and we carried right straight on for 12 days with construction of fortifications and maneuvers.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you happen to remember whether the Navy communicated to you a telegram of October 16, 1941, relating to the status of the negotiations with Japan?

General SHORT. Yes, they did, but from the time I put on alert No. 1, after the banks were closed, I do know I kept a close guard on straight through all over utilities, but I did not think that it was necessary to do anything more at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. You refer in your report, which we have had the opportunity to read, to the communication of November 27.

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That, I believe, was from the Chief of Staff?

General SHORT. That was direct from the Chief of Staff, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you at that time also obtain from the Navy, or was there sent to you from the Navy, a copy of a telegraphic com-

munication by the Secretary of the Navy to the, I think, Commander in Chief of the Fleet here?

General SHORT. I don't remember. I perhaps saw it in that I was in conference with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Block on the 27th for two or three hours. I was in conference with him on December 1—Admiral Kimmel [39] on December 1 and with both of them on December 3; so in all probability I did see the one to which you refer. I am not sure whether it was sent to me officially.

The CHAIRMAN. We made a call upon your staff to produce any copy that the Navy may have furnished to you.

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That call was made only yesterday afternoon and has not yet been answered, so it does not appear yet whether you officially were apprised.

General SHORT. I unquestionably knew anything of serious import because I was in repeated contact with them at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. There was also a telegraphic communication from the Chief of Naval Operations, I think, to the Commander in Chief of the naval force here about November 24 which had to do with the same subject, the tenuous character of the negotiations. Do you remember that?

General SHORT. I don't remember that specifically.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose the same answer applies to that, also.

General SHORT. Very frequently if Admiral Kimmel had something I should see he would send someone from the staff over and then let me read his copy but not give me a copy.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you ordered No. 1 alert on November 27?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I have examined you just in a preliminary way thus far. The Commission has thought perhaps that you cared to make a running statement of the situation.

General SHORT. I would like that very much.

[40] I have drawn up a very complete statement in writing, and there are certain points that I would like to emphasize, and if it not taking too much time of the Commission I would like very much to orally go through a number of things.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we have every bit of time necessary to give you an opportunity to state everything you have on your mind about this matter.

General SHORT. Yes. I think I can emphasize, make some points much plainer, by talking to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, without questioning you further—I have developed merely preliminary to bring us up to date—

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like you in your own way and at our own leisure to make a very full statement of whatever occurs to you as important to this investigation. Before you do that, I presume that this folder you have handed us is a folder of supporting documents in connection with your statement?

General SHORT. It is a complete statement and supporting documents, both.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a statement here?

General SHORT. The first 50 pages is a statement, and the others are supporting documents.

The CHAIRMAN. This (indicating) is the statement?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And under your oath as a witness you state that this statement is as if you had given the testimony here under oath?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, and I have signed the statement, and every exhibit has been true copied, I think, by an officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. Now you may proceed.

General SHORT. I would first of all like to read the message that I received from the Navy of October 16, because of the last paragraph:

The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have been directed to pass to you. Quote:

[41] "Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic. If the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the U. S. are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack those two powers. View of these possibilities you will take due precaution including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan."

I wish to call attention to that last paragraph:

"* * * take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan."

Now I would like also to read the one I received from the Chief of Staff, radiogram, on the 27th, because it is the same tenor:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop. If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop. This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent stop. Report measures taken stop. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks [42] assigned the rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

I want to call attention to that last clause, to limit it, the dissemination of this, and I think that I limited it to the Chief of Staff and G-2. I think I am correct. But you have the same thing in here "not to alarm civil population or disclose intent." I want to call particularly attention to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it disturb your statement if one or another of us interrupted you?

General SHORT. Not in the least.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask at that point—

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. —whether you did report the measures taken to your superior?

General SHORT. I did. I will come to that a little later.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General SHORT. I reported very specifically exactly what I had done.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General SHORT. When I got this wire I talked the matter over with my Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is your Chief of Staff?

General SHORT. Colonel Walter C. Phillips. I did not call in my G-3.

The CHAIRMAN. Is G-3 operations?

General SHORT. Operations, yes, sir.

I did not call in my operations officer as Colonel Phillips had been operations officer up to a very short time before, just a few days, and I thought he and I knew enough about the situation that we did not need to get advice of G-3. G-2 did see the message.

Now, I want to explain—and at that time, then, immediately Alert No. 1 was ordered into effect. I will explain just very briefly, not go into what Alert No. 1 meant—

[43] The CHAIRMAN. I think from the S. O. P. here we know about that.

General SHORT. You think you know, and that you don't even need a general presentation?

The CHAIRMAN. Do we need it, gentlemen?

General McCoy. I do not think so. We discussed that very carefully.

The CHAIRMAN. We discussed it very carefully yesterday. We have been over the orders.

General SHORT. I was going to point out that 2 included defense against air attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. And 3, defense against an all-out attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

General SHORT. The first was sabotage, uprisings, and subversive action.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.

General SHORT. Now, in addition to ordering Alert No. 1, I ordered the Aircraft Warning Service to work daily two hours before dawn and until one hour after dawn. Now, this was a new service that we had. At that time we had just gotten in the machines and set up. I thought this was fine training for them. I was trying to get training and was doing it for training more than any idea that it would be real. But that was the time of day when they should get the training, as it is the most dangerous time of day. So they were ordered to work from four; they worked from four o'clock to seven. They construed six o'clock as dawn, which was about right, and worked from four to seven daily.

The CHAIRMAN. How long had any of those mobile units been available, how long before December 7?

General SHORT. I think about November first.

The CHAIRMAN. And some of the mobile units, then, if I understand your testimony, had been in operation three hours each morning?

General SHORT. All—

The CHAIRMAN. Since about November first?

General SHORT. No, no. They had been in operation all day long, but they hadn't been in operation from four o'clock in the morning. On [44] November 27 I started them operating at from four to seven.

The CHAIRMAN. From four to seven.

General SHORT. They had been working with them, getting them set up and trying to learn something about them for probably three or four weeks before that time. Our fixed stations were not yet installed, as we had to build roads to the top of two or three mountains, one of them 10,000 feet high, in order to get them up there.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, when I interrupted, you said you had issued orders to have those stations——

General SHORT. We issued the order by telephone, and there were three reasons why I decided to issue the order for Alert No. 1 rather than for Alert No. 2 or 3. In the first place, with the population we have here there was a very strong possibility of sabotage. Individual sabotage was the thing that I feared more than anything else. I didn't fear uprisings; I didn't think that they would dare take a chance on that.

In the second place, I had no information to indicate an attack, so it did not appear essential to prepare against a real attack. The sabotage was a direct possibility.

In the third place, if I ordered Alert 2 or 3, I interfered very seriously with the training. No. 2 would have interfered seriously, particularly with the air and anti-aircraft training; 3 would interfere seriously with all training. It was impossible to do any orderly training with them on.

The CHAIRMAN. Were your troops really in need of training?

General SHORT. We have thousands of new men. Some of them had not completed the 13 weeks' training when we got them over. We have a complete regiment of anti-aircraft that is all draft. We have a regiment of engineers that is very largely draft. Some of them had six or seven weeks when they came over. And we have men that have come and gone through the reception center, draftees from the Territory that had gone in the two Hawaiian National Guard regiments here. So that there was a decided necessity for real training. I will cover that with regard to the air corps a little more.

Now, in the carrying out of anti-sabotage measures it can be done [45] very much better and with less men if the planes and the command are not dispersed too widely. With the Alert No. 1 where we were carrying it out for sabotage the planes were kept in the vicinity of the landing mat or the apron in groups, so they could be guarded very closely. If we had gone to Alert No. 2, then some bombers would have been sent to outlying islands where our garrisons are extremely small, or put in the air, and you cannot keep them in the air indefinitely. The pursuit planes would have been distributed in their bunker all around the perimeter of Wheeler Field and around the perimeter of Bellows Field, and it would take maybe hundreds of men to protect them reasonably well from sabotage.

Now, this was especially true because we had not constructed man-proof fencing with floodlights around these fields. I put in for money on the 15th day of May for putting manproof fences and floodlights around all of the critical installations. That part of the money was

approved, some on July 11, and on August 12 we got approval for some more. I had asked for \$240,000. We got about \$200,000. The orders were placed on the mainland for the material because it simply was not available in Honolulu. The defense work has cleaned out practically all essential material here. Up to the time of the attack a small amount of this wire, not all the parts, had been received by constructing quartermaster for the Chemical Warfare, and some ordnance staples. The District Engineer, who does the work for the airfields, had not received any material for fencing on the airfields.

You understand, this is a question of priority. We were not given the top priority. The Navy in certain construction work had the top priority and could get their things through at once. We had to take our turn to get the material. Then we had to take our turn to get it on the boats, and in spite of repeated following up it had not arrived at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand, then, that Hickam Field was open to the road and the adjoining land?

General SHORT. The back part of Hickam Field was fenced, but there was no fencing off, which we wanted very much to do, of the hangar line from all of the living part of the field, which made the guarding extremely difficult.

[46] And another thing, at Hickam Field it was impossible to completely disperse the planes there on account of the nature of the soil. That is all filled ground, and with those heavy planes that when they are loaded weigh up to 50,000 pounds you didn't dare get them off there. I had asked in February for money to put in runways and bunkers. It could only be done with heavy material. My engineers with their equipment could not do that. I had asked for money for that, and it had been going back and forth ever since that time. I had gone ahead without any money at Wheeler Field and built the bunkers with my aviation engineering troops. I could not do that on account of the nature of the conditions. You can't dig ground there; you run into water. You have to bring in the earth and build it up.

Now, to take up the question of having no information to indicate an attack, as I say, I was in constant communications with the 14th Naval District. I had nothing in the way of alarming news. In our coastal frontier defense plan we coordinate the work of the Army and Navy by mutual cooperation. In paragraph 18 (i) of that plan—you will find it exactly in there, anyway—it provides definitely that the Navy is responsible for distant reconnaissance. That has been in effect for some time. Then on March 21 we had a board with the idea of making this cooperation closer, and Admiral Bloch and I signed an agreement that went into effect at once, providing that if the Navy did not have enough long range patrol planes to make reconnaissance they could call on the Army, and that when they did call on the Army the planes acted under the tactical control of the Navy. In other words, the Navy gave them their mission, gave them their full instructions, told them where they would probably find American boats, so that they would not by any chance fire upon them or bomb them, and exactly what they wanted them to look for. The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never known by me. If they called on us for a squadron of planes they would assign it to

a certain sector, say maybe from zero to 70 degrees, to search out 600 miles, or whatever it was. I assumed that the Navy planes were searching all the other critical areas, and they probably were. I say, that was a matter that was not under my control.

[47] The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt you there a moment?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On or about December 7 had the Navy called on you for any additional detail of reconnaissance planes?

General SHORT. They had not. From November 27 they had at no time called on me for additional reconnaissance.

The CHAIRMAN. Under that agreement?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I will bring that out.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Perhaps I am jumping ahead of you.

General SHORT. From March 21 on we had repeatedly carried out exercises along that line. We had a minimum of one exercise a week, and sometimes exercises more frequently than that, but we were working constantly to perfect that coordination. This has no direct bearing, but to show what we were trying to do, that some agreement provided that when we were using fighters over the Island of Oahu then they turned their fighters over to my command. We were trying to get coordinated whole in that.

The CHAIRMAN. We are quite familiar with that agreement.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We studied it yesterday.

General SHORT. Now, to go into the question of the interference with training if I ordered Alert No. 2 or 3, this was particularly true with reference to the training of the air corps and particularly important. As you know, this B-17, the Flying Fortress, is a plane that has not been distributed to the Army generally very long. We have had some for a few months, and training a complete combat team for that plane, including bombers, takes a very considerable time. We have been required to send nine out of twenty-one bombers to the Philippines with the trained crews. Then we had been told that we were going to have to carry on a large ferrying operation of planes to the Philippines. We had previous to November 27 sent 18 trained combat teams for these ships to the mainland ferry. We had 17 more ready to send. We had also been told that we would get 12 additional planes to make up very soon, so we were trying to train those.

Now, we have to train those crews only six B-17's. We had twelve here [48] but in order to keep the planes going, that were ready, through to the Philippines, we didn't dare let them go on without part replaced. Well, they kept our minimum of spares down to where we could use only six planes. In other words, to train all these extra crews we had only six planes that we could use. So if we put those six planes in a state of readiness and dispersed them and kept them warmed up most of the day, it completely stopped the training and we definitely would not be able to carry out the ferrying mission that we had been ordered to carry out to the Philippines. We were constantly mindful of the fact that we might have to give up our route bases of Midway and Wake and were working just as rapidly as possible to develop an alternate route down by either Palmyra or Christmas and Canton and Suva and Townsville, Australia. We had all of those fields well under construction and were pushing everything

to the limit, and we felt like we had to push the training of our combat teams in exactly the same way. So that had a decided influence on deciding to not order an alert that put the air out where they could not train.

This is the reply that I sent in answer to that radiogram of November 27:

Re your radiogram number four seven two twenty seventh report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period liaison with Navy.

Now, that should have given the War Department very exact information of just what I was doing, of the nature of the alert. I did not say "Alert No. 1." I didn't want anybody to have to run and look up and find out what it was. I said, "Alert against sabotage."

I got a reply back from the Adjutant General the next day:

[49] 28th. Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department Paren see paragraph 3 Mid SC30-45 end paren stop. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

They thought that the question of sabotage, subversive activities, and espionage were so important when they sent me this that they sent a copy right on to the individual air stations to impress them all the more. You will notice here that there was the question that nothing was said about anything but sabotage, subversive activities, and espionage.

I received three message up to that date, October 16, November 27, and November 28. They emphasized right straight through that we must not disclose our stand and that we must not alarm the population and that we must take measures to protect against sabotage, against espionage, and against subversive action. Nowhere did they indicate in any way the necessity for protecting against attack. They also did indicate definitely that we must avoid publicity and avoid alarming the public. If I ordered a complete alert against attack, it would have alarmed at least the Japanese population.

You will also notice they made no objection whatever to my wire where I stated I was alerted for sabotage. If they had any idea that that was not a correct order, they had all the opportunity from November 27 to December 7 to come back and say, "We do not consider the action taken by you as sufficient and that you should instead take action to defend yourself against air attack."

[50] In other words, I took it as a tacit agreement with the course I had taken and that there was no objection raised, and I cannot see how I could draw any other conclusion.

Now, to show that I was carrying out exactly their instructions in regard to sabotage, on November 29 I sent another wire. I said:

Full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department. Paragraph 3 Mid SC30-45—

That applies entirely to the delineation between the actions of the FBI, ONI, and G-2 respectively of the military forces, and of the FBI carrying out the work with respect to the civilian population. The three worked very close together.

(Continuing:)

Military establishments including personnel and equipment stop. As regards protection telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June 19 1941 requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by Section 67 of the Organic Act which provides comma in effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection et cetera stop. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June 20th confidentially made a formal written demand of this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory stop. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now afforded vital civilian installations stop. In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June 30th 1941 enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and the city and county of Honolulu on June 30th 1941 enacted an ordinance which county of Honolulu comma [51] whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense stop. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised stop. Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

I want to explain my reason for some time at least—say the last year and a half or two years when during perhaps tests or certain alarming conditions that they have been placing sentinels over essential utilities without any legal authority. I felt that if these sentinels who are protecting transformer stations or waterworks should fire upon someone that I had no legal protection whatever, and that was my reason for calling upon the Governor to make this request. That placed the military command in a much better situation.

Also I had no authority to close roads, and for that reason I asked the City and County Council to give me that authority and assured them that I would only use that when necessary. So I thought that I was in a much better legal status than they had been theretofore.

I will now take up what happened from November 27 to December 6. Alert No. 1 remained in effect. Troops went on with their routine training. The Aircraft Warning Service worked, as part of the interceptor command, was working every morning until 4 and 7 and was working each station on its own from 7 to 11 and was making necessary reports and so forth from 1 to 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

I might explain what we mean by the interceptor command. We have for the purpose of combat, we place pursuit airplanes, anti-aircraft artillery, Aircraft Warning Service, under the command of what we call the interceptor commander.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you read that part back to me?

The REPORTER (reading):

We have for the purpose of combat, we place pursuit airplanes, anti-aircraft artillery, Aircraft Warning Service, under the command of what we call the interceptor commander.

General McCoy. Who was that commander?

General SHORT. General Davidson.

[52] General McCoy. Of the Air Service?

General SHORT. Yes. The purpose of this is that it is necessary in air combat, anti-aircraft defense, that they are supposed to stop in a split second. It may be that otherwise you may be firing upon your own airplanes because they are following the enemy so closely in the fight.

During this work from 4 to 7 there was always the interceptor control officer working with the Aircraft Warning Service and getting their work coordinated.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was General Davidson also authorized to coordinate anti-aircraft fire of the district under that command?

General SHORT. Yes. As a matter of fact, I think it was an excellent idea having the Navy here, and if you gentlemen have an opportunity to visit that interceptor command, I think it would be good to do so. They will be moving their underground station in just a few days, and you will see how it works, carrying all marine anti-aircraft ashore because under the anti-aircraft command, he controls the whole of the anti-aircraft fire here.

Admiral STANDLEY. You mean in the Navy Yard?

General SHORT. Yes. We have many of our people in the Navy Yard now. If a ship is in the harbor, we do not get our coordination to a point where he would order the ship to fire.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is intended to be the case?

General SHORT. Yes. It may be extremely difficult to develop it, but that would have to go on through the Navy Yard, all the way through in one extra step.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is provided in the plan? Is that what you mean?

General SHORT. We do not say in the plan that we would control the fire on the ship, but unquestionably that would be the next step in the coordination.

General McCoy. The reason was to get a quick warning to the ship?

General SHORT. Yes, because otherwise they would be firing on their own ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you read that last statement of the general?

[53] (The reporter read the last statement of General Short.)

The CHAIRMAN. You mean because otherwise they would be firing on their own planes?

General SHORT. Yes. We say ship sometimes for a plane. I probably should not do it in this case.

General McCoy. That coordination was not in effect on November 27?

General SHORT. No. For the guns manned by the Marines inshore it was in effect.

I was also working quite repeatedly with the Chief of Air Service because the Marines ashore were changing constantly. They would bring an outfit in here from Midway and then send the force out, and the result would be that they did not fit in as a team, not quite so closely, but the purpose was the same. The performance was not quite so perfect.

To go ahead with what took place, as I said, on the 27th of November I had a conference with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Block, which lasted two or three hours, with reference to the reinforcement

of the naval commands of Midway and Wake by Army pursuit planes. General Martin, commander of the Air Force, with his chief of staff, Colonel Mollison, were with me. We talked over every phase of the subject. They had already ordered the Marine planes out and felt at that time that it was better, better to let that move continue and to delay any taking over or reinforcement by the Army. Admiral Kimmel sent in a recommendation to that effect, and I was in full accord with it as long as I was able to do so.

On December 1 I had a conference which lasted for some time. We had another wire with reference to the possibility of the Army relieving the garrison completely at Midway and Wake; so we had a long conference that morning. On the morning of the 2d he came to my quarters and I went over an eight-page letter that he had written to the Chief of Naval Operations explaining his stand in this matter. We had a conference on the morning of the 3d, as I remember.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the purport of this letter?

General SHORT. In regard to the relieving of this situation. I did not want it effective at that time. I did that because of these air fields that were in the process of construction. Then they had a lot of [54] civilians at Wake and also at Midway. The question of supplies was difficult because it was a complicated situation. I put in a recommendation that the relief should not take place now and to hold up until the construction was completed, and if it took place anyway that they should send in the same five garrisons that they had so as not to deplete the water supply.

The CHAIRMAN. The proposed operation was to send other troops there and to bring back those who were there?

General SHORT. The idea was to make the Marines definitely available for any fleet and land exercises that they wanted or were going to operate so as to take bases in the mandated islands. It was to let the Marines act as an expeditionary force.

The CHAIRMAN. By substituting the Army?

General SHORT. Yes. They told us they would send replacements, and we had instructions that the Army should take the defense of Canton Island also. That was to take over the defense of Canton Island.

On December 4 one of my staff officers, Major Fleming, had a conference with the Fleet Marine Officer, Colonel Pfeiffer, relating to the use of Marine five-inch guns at Canton Island.

I am bringing out these conferences to show that I was in constant touch with the Navy, and to show the character of the conferences because if they had information of Japanese carriers in that part of the water and were worried about a possible attack I would certainly have become aware of it when we were talking about the possibility of sending an expeditionary force to the relief of the Marines. We would not have talked about transporting them out there without clearing out the carriers first.

So, while I do not remember exactly asking a specific question as to the location of the Japanese carriers, I had a very decided impression that at that time there was nothing in the situation that the location of the Japanese carriers was worrying us at that time. In fact, the question came up very definitely by a question of Admiral

Kimmel's. During this conference on the 27th with General Martin, his chief of Staff, Colonel Mollison, the question was asked, and I would like to read it since his [55] statement is more definite than my recollection:

I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defense of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

Admiral KIMMEL. "McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu?"

Captain McMORRIS. "I should say none, Admiral."

At that time there was no exception taken to that statement by either Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Block, and apparently the Navy felt that they had definite information of the location of carriers and major ships of the Japanese and that there was no question in their minds of the possibility or probability of a surprise attack upon Oahu.

At this time they had at no time requested the Army planes to assist in distant reconnaissance. The whole combination convinced me that the Navy had definitely enough information as to the location of the Japanese carriers and that they did not think it was necessary to make distant reconnaissance or that they be sent planes for making such reconnaissance because they did not call on me.

I want to point out also that the Hawaiian Department has no information service for locating Japanese or other foreign ships. We are dependent wholly on the information that we get from the 14th Naval District or from the War Department in Washington which gets its information through the Navy Department. The Navy does have an intelligence service for obtaining this information, and we are dependent on them for that kind of information.

General McCoy. Was there any definite arrangement on that between the Army and the Navy?

General SHORT. Possibly in Washington. I do not know. I have no agents outside the Hawaiian Islands. There is no possibility or way for me to know except through the District here or through the War Department because I maintain no agents anywhere in the world.

[56] General McCoy. I am clear about these frequent conferences which are followed by signed agreements, but was there any agreement that they would furnish you this information?

General SHORT. They made themselves definitely responsible for distant reconnaissance and for locations. We were in constant touch with G-2 and ONI. There was a complete exchange of information. If we picked up any information we gave it to them and they gave it to us. If I picked up information through channels coming from Japan we would put this information that we felt was first-hand immediately at the Navy's disposal and I gave it to them as quickly as possible. We frequently had no way to verify that information, but we gave the information, and I am sure that they were just as liberal with us.

If probably certain groups of Japanese ships were seen near the Philippine Islands or the mandated islands they would not have repeated it to us, not thinking it affected us like it did the Navy, but it unquestionably would have gone into Washington and would have been reported by Washington to the Philippine Army.

The CHAIRMAN. The only thing that the joint agreement between you seems to cover is distant reconnaissance?

General SHORT. Yes. That was very definitely placed upon the Army even to the point of controlling the plans, which is the only logical way because otherwise if two people are made responsible they may be making reconnaissance in the same sector and another sector may be forgotten.

On December 5 a B-24, which is a new type of bomber plane, came into Hickam Field from the mainland on its way to the Philippine Islands, and it was to carry en route, I believe, a photographic machine over the mandated islands.

General McCox. What date was that?

General SHORT. December 5. It is in there. When this plane came in it was not sufficiently armed for combat but had only one .30-caliber gun and only two .50-caliber guns in the tail. It had no ammunition. It could not even have fired if it wanted to. In spite of coming in that condition, the War Department sent that ship in that condition, and the telegram that followed—from that they realized it was coming in [57] without proper armament from this wire which they sent:

Reference to B-dash 24 airplanes for special photo mission stop. It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photograph Truk Island in the Caroline group Jaluit in the Marshall group stop. Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously stop. Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines comma air fields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps stop. Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned stop. Photograph and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity stop. Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed stop. Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self-preservation stop. The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice stop. If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash 24 proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while en route Moresby stop. Advise pilots best time of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit stop. Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department stop.

This next sentence is the sentence that is important from my point of view.

Insure that both B dash 24 airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu.

Now, the fact is that they sent them to Honolulu without being properly equipped. In other words they considered that the hazard of carrying the extra weight between the mainland and Honolulu was greater than the possibility of a Japanese attack. They apparently did not consider it likely to be attacked in that they sent the plane out in that way.

I sent the message back when I got this message on the same day. I told them that the planes had arrived without guns and without ammunition. I told them that I was going to hold them until they got the proper [58] equipment and asked for a delay for the proper equipment and that it was not safe to proceed, a safe procedure for them to carry out.

Incidentally, I said with respect to our operations to the Philippines that in ferrying our planes, that when our planes left here they had instructions to fly over the mandate islands at 20,000 feet and leave Wake at night and be prepared to defend themselves.

I had given instructions two months before I had this because I did not think it safe to send a man out where he would be murdered without having a chance to fight.

In spite of the fact that I wired the War Department on the 5th about this plane coming in in that manner, they continued to send planes from the mainland without being properly armed and equipped.

On the morning of November 7—

The CHAIRMAN. December 7.

General SHORT. December 7.

The plane left from Hamilton Field, and I am going to give Eastern Standard Time, because that would be the hour the War Department would have knowledge of it. There were two scout planes left the mainland, one at 12:30 December 7 Eastern Standard Time, and one at 1:30 December 7 Eastern Standard Time. These planes were B-17's, 12 of them.

General MCCOY. These are four-engined bombers?

General SHORT. Yes, big planes, B-17's. They had no ammunition. The guns were cosmolined so they could not have been fired. The guns were not bore sighted. In other words, if they fired they could not count on making their hits. The crews were skeleton crews. In these skeleton crews they had a pilot, a copilot, an engineer, navigator, and radio operator, but these crews would not be enough to man the guns even if the guns had been in shape to be fired and even if they had ammunition, which they did not have. I am bringing this out to indicate that in the mind of the War Department that they were not thinking in terms of an attack on Honolulu even as late as 1:30 on the morning of December 7. They still considered that the hazard of carrying the additional weight in ammunition was greater than the hazard of the possibility of a Japanese attack.

[59] General McNARNEY. In the last sentence of your statement you say:

Up to that moment the War Department had given me no indication of a crisis in the American-Japanese relations.

General SHORT. That is correct. I will go ahead with that. I had nothing from the War Department since November 27 as I had nothing except what was in the daily newspapers. The reports in the papers and the statement of the President did not give any indication that there was going to be any sudden stoppage like that, and if the War Department had any such communication it did not indicate it to me.

General McNARNEY. You did not consider the cable of November 27 a warning?

General SHORT. Yes, it was a warning, but the fact that the negotiations had been resumed and Mr. Kurusu had gone on there that there was a serious attempt being made to get together. I considered that the War Department if they were aware that there was some crisis in our relations, would have let me know.

We had the warning of the 27th in the way of avoiding publicity and alarm, but nothing from the War Department that there was any

warning of any sudden split-second stop. I think if they had some information they would have given it to me and let it go out. What happened later in the morning indicates they would have given it to me.

I did not state that these 12 ships that they sent from the mainland without ammunition arrived right in the midst of the first attack. It was not a theoretical thing at all. The first planes that landed at Hickam Field—the first plane was destroyed by the attack of a Japanese plane just as it hit and landed. Four out of those 12 planes were destroyed before getting to the ground without any possibility of replying to the Japanese attack. It was not a theoretical thing because it happened to them as they arrived and it was a very vital thing.

Apparently later that morning the War Department got some alarming information. I have no way of knowing how they got the information. However, they filed at 12:18, Eastern Standard Time, December 7, which is 6:45 our time here, Honolulu—they filed a message with the R. C. A. to ask me and General Martin—that message had to be encoded before it was filed. [60] I think the estimate of an hour would be an extremely short time for the encoding of the message and filing it with R. C. A. Our experience would indicate a great deal more time for that. We cut that down as a minimum.

Here is what the message said, and this to my mind is the most important thing I received from the War Department:

529 7th Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop. Inform naval authorities of this communication.

In view of what happened it is perfectly apparent that they destroyed their code machines in order to put into use a new code that they knew nobody had broken or could get their information.

That message, as I say, was filed at 6:48 in Washington. It was received here by the R. C. A. at 7:33. I do not know what caused the R. C. A. to delay delivering the message immediately because it would have to be delivered by a messenger, but I suspect that at the time the messenger was getting under way, the attack, which was at 7:55, had started, and the messenger did not care to be roaming around during an attack, and it was brought to the Signal Office at 11:45. It was decoded and delivered to the Adjutant General of the Department at 2:58 in the afternoon. You can see the time it took to decode it, so I do not think I am very much wrong when I say that it must have taken at least one hour to decode it; so that if we assume that they started to encode it that they had the information as early as 5:45 Honolulu Time. If they had telephoned me urgent, telephoned the corps in the clear, I could have had the information at 6 o'clock in the morning without any question at all because we talk repeatedly and when we get the call through I receive these things in around 15 minutes.

On that point also we have one of these *speech scramblers*, and there is one in the office of the Chief of Staff. While they are not considered as safe as code, they are reasonably safe.

If they had felt this was a probability of an attack on Honolulu, they could have put the call through, and if they felt there was a

possibility of an attack certainly then they had *every great duty* to get that information [61] to me as rapidly as possible, and if that call was put through to me and got to me as early as 2 o'clock, or I should say 6 o'clock, which was two hours in which to arrange everything and make absolutely ready for a Japanese attack.

As I say, that reached me seven hours after the attack. During the attack that morning I had gone to our defense command post and told Colonel Phillips to call the Chief of Staff and get the information as soon as it was decoded. He asked if we had received a message, but we had not received it even then.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me at what hour Phillips telephoned?

General SHORT. I left this office sometime around 8:35 or 8:40 and Colonel Phillips put in the call and I went to the command post. I don't know how long it took to get the call through but my feeling is sometime around, it must have been around 9 o'clock. Anyway it was before 2:58 in the afternoon. That was all that was said at that time. Apparently the War Department became aware a little later of the significance of the message and of our not getting it until seven hours after the attack.

On December 9 they sent a message.

[62] Five four nine ninth please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time described message transmitted by Signal Corps staff and by what staff officer received.

I sent the following reply to that:

Re your five four nine radio five two nine—

That is their radio.

delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh stop. Received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh. This time approximate but within five minutes.

It might have been eleven-forty or eleven-fifty, but it is within five minutes of being correct.

Deciphered message received by Adjutant General Hawaiian Department two fifty eight afternoon.

Now, even at this late date it appears to me that when the War Department sent this message they still had the feeling that *extreme secrecy in not letting the Japanese know that they had broken their code*, or how they had gotten this information, was more important than the speed of transmission of this message to me, because otherwise they wouldn't send it by code, which anybody knows takes hours longer; that they were trying to maintain secrecy, and in attempting to maintain secrecy they did not get the message to me until seven hours after the attack. I think it an extremely important point to consider.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt you there?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had a War Department radio communication system?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you made any inquiry as to whether that was in [63] working order on the day in question.

General SHORT. Oh, it was in working order all the time. They may have thought ours was loaded up and that the RCA would be faster. I don't know why they sent it RCA. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you and had the Navy Department, the Army staff in Washington, knowledge of a radio communications system installed by the F. B. I.?

General SHORT. I don't know whether the War Department had or not, but they definitely knew that I have that secret phone and with connections to the secret phone right in the Chief of Staff's office, the fastest thing that could possibly come through.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know that the F. B. I. had its own direct line of radio communication?

General SHORT. I knew that they had communication, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With Washington?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. We at times got messages, but most of our messages were over the Army net. I don't know why they could have used it.

The CHAIRMAN. You had at times gotten messages over the RCA hook-up, hadn't you?

General SHORT. Oh, yes, probably because our net was badly loaded up. So I didn't think anything of it. I haven't been in Washington since the emergency, and I don't know whether the RCA has an office right alongside of radio in the Munition Building. I imagine they have, and that they probably would send it whichever one was least loaded at the time. I don't know. That would just be an inference.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you ever received any communication from Washington or had you ever sent any communication to Washington over the F. B. I. net?

General SHORT. I don't think so. I have talked with Mr. Shivers, the head of the F. B. I., a number of times, [64] and when he told me that he would—talked over with him the proposition of his communicating with his Department something that I felt was better for him to take up, instead of my taking up officially through the War Department. We had very frequent conferences. My G-2 was very close to him, and I will say that the F. B. I. had always worked a hundred percent in every way. There never was any difference of opinion, and anything he had we had.

There were two—I may be taking up a good deal of your time.

The CHAIRMAN. I want you to be very full in your statement, General.

General SHORT. I would like to paint the whole picture, and I can make it a little plainer orally. There were two instances—

General MCCOY. We might take a five minute recess.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, suppose we take a five minute recess.

General SHORT. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a long stretch.

General SHORT. It does not bother me; it is just up to you gentlemen.

General MCCOY. We will stretch ourselves.

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess, at the conclusion of which the hearing was resumed as follows:)

The CHAIRMAN. We are ready to resume, General. Perhaps the General wants to know what the last question and answer are, Mr. Reporter.

General SHORT. I think I am perfectly straight.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead.

General SHORT. I think I am perfectly straight. Thank you.

There were two incidents that occurred Sunday morning, [65] the 7th, that might have had a very great result if they had been interpreted differently at the time. About seven-fifteen a submarine entered Pearl Harbor, got inside the net, apparently followed a ship in. It was attacked immediately by naval ships and was sunk. They did not apparently draw the conclusion that this was the forerunner of an air attack or a general attack, and I was not notified until after the attack had taken place. In fact, the information came out to me in a discussion between Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel and Secretary Knox and myself. If they had drawn the conclusion that it might be the forerunner of an air attack or a general attack, unquestionably I would have been notified at once. There would not have been time to get the planes in the air, all of them, probably, because they were not warmed up, but there would have been time to disperse them in the bunkers, because they could be taxied without being fully ready to go in the air, and it probably would have saved a considerable number of planes. I think it would not have prevented the attack at Pearl Harbor. We couldn't have met the enemy out at sea somewhere and stopped them.

The other incident was in connection with our Aircraft Warning Service. They had worked from four to seven that morning and closed the interceptor command station at seven o'clock. There was one of the stations, the Opana Station, on the high ground south of Kahuku Point,—

General McCoy. Let us get that fixed, will you?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. There is a map.

(A map was produced.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is that last point?

General SHORT. Kahuku Point. That is up to the—

The CHAIRMAN. Spell it, please.

General SHORT. K-a-h-u-k-u. Kahuku Point is up there (indicating). This Opana Station is along on the right here, [66] somewhere along in here (indicating). It isn't marked on the map, up to the north. That station, just on its own—they worked normally for training from seven to eleven every day, and apparently they just thought they wouldn't knock off just because it was Sunday, and the station went ahead and worked; and at seven-twenty the noncommissioned officer in charge of the detector station picked up a considerable flight of planes at 132 miles distance and three degrees east of north. Apparently there was enough movement of his detector that it rather excited him, and he called in the Aircraft Warning Information Center, got the operator, and the operator got Lieutenant Tyler, who was the control officer for the interceptor command. He had not left. While the station was closed he was still there. The operator told him to investigate—

The CHAIRMAN. Was he an Army officer?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. He was an air officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Air officer.

General SHORT. From the pursuit outfit, because they exercised the control of the fighting planes at Wheeler Field. He talked with the operator, and then the operator called the Opana and talked with

the Opana Station. The operator was rather impressed by the Opana Station because they seemed a little excited about it, and he asked Lieutenant Tyler if he should order the rest of the men back immediately to the interceptor station. Lieutenant Tyler in his affidavit, which you will have in your records, stated that he thought it was one of three things:

That there were naval ships making flights from carriers. And, incidentally, there were two carriers out that morning, one going up towards Midway and the other down towards Johnston Island, with task forces. It was not unusual to pick up a group of planes some distance out that were operating [67] off of carriers.

The other thing, he thought that it might be a flight of planes out of Hickam. We started flying normally around four o'clock in the morning, and it was not unusual for the station to pick them up.

The third thing that he assumed it might be was a flight of bombers from the mainland. He had noticed during his tour that morning Hawaiian music on the air all the time from four o'clock on through, and ordinarily they don't broadcast music at that time of the morning on KMG. He knew from experience that when a flight of planes was coming in from the mainland they played the Hawaiian music, and it was understood that that acted as a beam to lead them in. And he was right in that assumption that it did mean a flight coming in from the mainland, and the flight, as I say, arrived within five minutes of the opening of the attack, arrived right in the midst of the attack; so that it was pretty hard to say that he was illogical in his conclusions. He had no information that definitely should frighten him. He figured there were three things that might be. He didn't figure that it might be a Japanese attack, so he did not alert the Hawaiian air force. If he had called the Hawaiian air force right then and alerted them there would have been time to disperse the planes just the same as there would after the seven-fifteen attack, but not to get them in the air. It was just one of those errors in judgment that it would be pretty hard to blame the Lieutenant for, because he had three perfectly logical things to give him that; and, as he says in his affidavit, he had seen the board look like that before when the carriers were out training, and that he didn't get excited about it, didn't think much about it, and that might have made a very great change if he had taken different action.

General McCoy. That was not passed on to you or your [68] immediate staff?

General SHORR. Not until afterwards. I mean he stayed right at the control station then, and the minute the first bomb was dropped he realized what was going on, and he gave—he alerted Wheeler Field then, but there were so many things that I was looking after that morning that I didn't discover that incident, I don't think, until the next day. It wasn't of any importance after the thing had happened, anyway, then, and I don't believe it came to my attention until the following day.

General McCoy. Would it naturally come to you, or would it come to someone else?

General SHORR. Well, if he had been sure that it was enemy planes it would have gone first of all to Wheeler Field, and then it would have come right to our station. It should have been to me in the course of a minute or two if they had taken it—

General McCox. Seriously.

General SHORT. Seriously.

The CHAIRMAN. To get it clear in my own mind, this operator at the Opana Station got this information from the sea. He called the—

General SHORT. Immediately the operator.

The CHAIRMAN. He called the interceptor command station?

General SHORT. Yes; and the operator was on duty there. He was always kept on duty there, and Lieutenant Tyler—

The CHAIRMAN. And Lieutenant Tyler happened to linger there at the closure of the station?

General SHORT. After. He was there.

The CHAIRMAN. If the thing had been hooked up for emergency there would have been a Navy liaison officer there at the board?

General SHORT. Oh, yes. About thirty people would have [69] been there.

The CHAIRMAN. And it just happened that Tyler, of those thirty people, lingered on after the station had closed?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Of course we didn't have as big a setup on that training side as we would now when you are with a battle condition.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. Because it would be conducted virtually for the training of these new mobile stations. We had the interceptor command and anti-aircraft tied in to just get everybody working together, but they were not in full force like they would be under battle conditions.

General McCox. Could you state whether there was a naval officer there that morning?

General SHORT. There was not, for some reason, a naval officer there during the period four to seven. There had been on previous days, and as a matter of fact the Navy had felt that it would be a good idea to have a little more of that, and they had arranged—the interceptor command and the Navy and the whole group had worked out, on just a volunteer basis, of continuing that training every day until four o'clock in the afternoon, but decided that on Sunday they would only work until seven, but the Navy had been instrumental in even extending that period, and it had been agreed that they would work right through until four o'clock. I had not ordered that, but that was just something they were doing on their own.

The CHAIRMAN. And under working conditions when the interceptor command station was open there would be a lieutenant from your command?

General SHORT. Well, of course under battle conditions General Davidson would be right there himself, and the anti- [70] aircraft commander, and there would be a total group of about thirty officers there.

The CHAIRMAN. Including the naval officer?

General SHORT. Including the naval officer. I think three naval officers is the normal quota that they have there.

The CHAIRMAN. That they have in that office?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All under the general command of General Davidson?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, would he have any command over the naval officers?

General SHORT. Only that they would be responsible for getting the information to the Navy. That was their only function, would be to get the information to the Navy in the minimum of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Of time.

General McCoy. In other words, the information service would have—

General SHORT. Oh, yes.

General McCoy. It went there, did it?

General SHORT. It would have any—

General McCoy. Did it go to the information service center?

General SHORT. It goes into the information service in the interceptor command, and it goes right from there to the two air fields—three air fields, and then it goes on what we call the G-2 net and is distributed to the Navy and to our staff.

General McCoy. But it didn't this morning?

General SHORT. No, it wasn't—as a matter of fact, what they would have done right then and what they did do just a little while later, would have called the—we had one general [71] staff officer immediately on duty answering telephone call, staying all night in the office to answer them. It would have gone right to him if he had gotten it immediately and then transmitted it. You see, we were not set up with our battle command post at that time, so it would have come in right here to the general staff officer immediately on duty, and it would have taken a minute or two longer to get to me.

General McCoy. It is not clear to me yet how far along that went. You speak of the fact that Lieutenant Tyler evaluated it to whom?

General SHORT. To himself. He was the officer of the interceptor command that was in charge of the interceptor station during this practice, don't you see?

General McCoy. Yes. But you said he called up somebody?

General SHORT. No, he did not. He had not done it until after the attack came. Then he immediately called Wheeler Field, alerted Wheeler Field, which was the thing that would have been very valuable if he had done it to start with.

Admiral STANDLEY. He called the Opana Station?

General SHORT. Oh, he called Opana Station and talked with Opana Station to verify what they had, don't you see? So he would have that understanding. He talked it over with them.

General McCoy. Where was he?

General SHORT. He was right over here in this interceptor command post that I said I would have you to see.

General McCoy. In the information center?

General SHORT. Well, they have a combination, and the aircraft information center is part of the interceptor command. The pursuit, the interceptor commander commands the pursuit planes, the Aircraft Warning Service, and the anti-aircraft battery. They are all tied in in one place.

General McCoy. And that you call the information center [72] interceptor information center?

General SHORT. We call it the interceptor command, and the information center pertains to what the signal people bring in. You see, they have these mobile stations, and of course when we are operating in battle conditions all of the searchlight posts and all of the O. P.'s of the Coast Artillery—everything of that kind comes in, so that—

General McCoy. Where is that center?

General SHORT. It is just over here about 300 yards in the signal depot.

General McCoy. In this post?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. In the next probably four or five days—we have built—it will be moved into its underground station. It is almost completed. We have been working for some months on an underground station that would stand any kind of bombing, and it will be moved in there. Right now it is very vulnerable.

General McCoy. That naval officer was a liaison officer? He wasn't sent over to be under the command?

General SHORT. Well, it worked out that he is really strictly, you might say, under the command, because it isn't just the same as an ordinary liaison officer is at a headquarters and when something of importance turns up he takes it to his headquarters or goes and gets something that they wanted, but that man takes a phone, a headset there, and he sits right there and sits where he can watch the board, so he can report in split seconds to the Navy Information Center, so for all intents and purposes you might say he is more nearly a part of the command than a liaison officer.

General McCoy. Do you happen to know what Navy orders were given to those officers when they reported there?

General SHORT. I do not. General Davidson could probably give you that much more definitely, the exact mission.

[73] General McCoy. All right.

General SHORT. And I think that you will have a clear picture, if you will go take a look at the interceptor command with its full force.

General McCoy. Yes. Is it in actual operation today?

General SHORT. Oh, yes; 24 hours of the day.

General McCoy. Yes. And we could go there any time?

General SHORT. You could go there any time. There is normally a little more to see at night, but I don't imagine there is now because we are not flying at night except for business. I think it would be highly beneficial if you would take a look. You would see exactly how they work, and I think when they move to their new station underground that there is going to be room there for the Navy to set up a corresponding information service on their surface ships, and it would be highly beneficial, because sometimes when we send out on distant patrol there has been a little discrepancy in the information that they had about our own ships. On that board, with use of the aircraft warning service, you see just exactly what is going on all the time.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Go ahead.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did I understand you to say that there was no naval officer present from four to seven that morning?

General SHORT. There was not.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was General Davidson there from four to seven that morning?

General SHORT. I don't think General Davidson was there.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know what crew was there?

General SHORT. Lieutenant Tyler was the officer that was officially detailed.

Admiral STANDLEY. He was there afterwards?

General SHORT. Well, he was there during the period four [74] to seven; he was in charge.

Admiral STANDLEY. But you don't know—

General SHORT. He was in charge, I am sure, was the officer in charge.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

General SHORT. See?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Now, General Davidson can tell us that, then.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. Yes, sir. And I think that you will find in Lieutenant Tyler's affidavit here he states definitely that he was in charge. There wasn't any reason why General Davidson should have been there personally just at that time, because it was not a battle condition.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, as a general proposition, General Short, the defense of the Island is a coordinated defense, a coordination of the Navy and the Army facilities?

General SHORT. It was.

Admiral STANDLEY. The facilities here?

General SHORT. It was.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. I mean up to December 7.

General SHORT. 17th; yes, it was.

Admiral STANDLEY. And it was by cooperation that those various stations were operated?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that was by agreement of the general and the commandant of the district?

General SHORT. The commandant of the district was supposed to be the channels of communication, and when things were drawn up formally and signed Admiral Bloch and I signed them,—

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

General SHORT. But Admiral Kimmel was in on the thing [75] just as much as Admiral Bloch.

Admiral STANDLEY. But when an agreement was signed, for instance, that the warning station should be under the Army, wasn't it understood that the Navy's cooperation there in the way of officers, and so forth—

General SHORT. Oh, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would he in charge of that officer? That is, if it were a Navy responsibility?

General SHORT. I would say there would be no question about it at all. I don't know that that detail ever came up. I don't remember it ever being discussed. Now, we have discussed, something like—oh—probably a month ago, the desirability of getting what you might say would amount to common command posts right alongside of each other, and I had taken Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch over

our whole system of underground command posts. My command post was up in the Aliamanu Crater.

General McCox. Where is that?

General SHORT. That is where the ammunition—it's about a mile and a half out to the west towards Pearl Harbor. We had considered—

General McCox. That's where the reserve ammunition is?

General SHORT. That is where the reserve ammunition is, in the same general crater. There is room enough—I had men up there and showed Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch that there was room enough for them to develop the tunnel—rooms right across our tunnel so they could have their command post there, and there was room enough where we were putting in this interceptor command that by a little more excavation they could have their air command right there to work with them; and we felt that the bomber command post, which is just to the south of the crater, right very close to Pearl Harbor and Hickam was an appropriate place for them to put their command of what they call the Pat. Wing 2. That's their patrol planes. That he [76] should have been—because they worked in very close touch with our bombers. We felt that that would have been a very excellent place for them to construct their underground command post right alongside, because our bombers come under command of Pat. Wing 2 when they go out on distant reconnaissance. And that had been under consideration. We had our command posts either fully built or well along, so we didn't figure we could change our plan very well, but that they could go right in and develop right alongside of us. And it would be highly desirable; it would make things work much faster in a fight.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me ask this, General Short: In all of these developments here in recent years hasn't it been the policy to thoroughly consider the functions of any station, like your warning signal station, and decide between you and the proper naval officials where that responsibility and command should lie, and place it there? Isn't that correct?

General SHORT. I think that there has been closer cooperation in the last eight or ten months here than there ever has before. There have been times in the last twenty years where the cooperation was not very close. Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and I have been very frank with each other. We have talked things over, and we have usually been able to agree fully on important things. And as I say, on this question of the command post, before, up to recently, I don't believe that the Navy had considered that it was necessary; and I can see from the point of view of the fleet commander he had expected when the fight came on that he wouldn't be down here in the harbor; that he would be on the high seas fighting. So Admiral Bloch's 14th District was the one that would have been most interested in joining up with us on command posts.

Admiral STANDLEY. From your experience, when it was finally settled as to where the post should be, and so forth, it would be perfectly definite, with a definite responsibility?

[77] General SHORT. Well, the way we had divided the responsibility, when the fighting was on land it would be my responsibility; when the fighting was on sea it would be his.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was a fairly definite understanding, however, between you and Admiral Bloch? That is what I mean.

General SHORT. Oh, yes. And it was laid out pretty much in the plan drawn up: if we fought at land I would control; if we fought at sea I would turn my bombers over to him and they would control it.

General McNARNEY. General, in view of the fact that our radio detectors cannot distinguish between friend and foe, was there any normal routine operating procedure by which the Navy and our bombardment units and our pursuit units kept the information center informed as to the location of friendly flights?

General SHORT. The commander of the interceptor station was the same man who commands the pursuit aviation. He would know about his pursuit. He was in instant touch, just a direct line—just pick up a phone—with the bomber outfit, and he could verify, and they would—no matter how much information, every time we picked up a group of planes we verified, because we didn't want to be firing on our own planes. We verified instantly where there was a group of planes, and we verified with the Navy.

General McNARNEY. The verification was after the fact, though.

General SHORT. We didn't have—just in ordinary times that were considered peace around here, when those detector stations were working, that verification was not carried out. What they were trying to do then was to become expert in picking up planes, because the man out on that station is never going to know whether it is friend or foe. All he can [78] do is report it into the information center. It is immediately verified whether there are friendly planes at that place, and that should not take but just a minute to get the verification. And even if you had your plot ahead of time I still feel that you could verify, because it is always possible for a mistake to have been made, and you wouldn't want to fire on your own planes. So if you picked up planes a hundred miles out or fifty miles out, before you would send someone out after them you would get a verification.

General McNARNEY. There was no attempt to verify on the morning of December 7, as I understand.

General SHORT. No. As a matter of fact, if he had he would have gotten a verification, very definitely, that planes were coming in from San Francisco, and they arrived within five minutes after. They undoubtedly would have told him yes, there were planes coming in, and Lieutenant Tyler thought he knew they were coming in on account of this broadcasting of Hawaiian music at that time of the morning, which was only done to serve as a beam, so he probably—and also Admiral Halsey had an airplane carrier up to the north, and Admiral Brown's task force down towards Johnston Island had out a carrier force, so of course verification with the task forces would have required more time, because they would have to send out to the fleet and see if the fleet was participating in any kind of operations; I mean in any routine training. I mean when the task forces went out I don't think the people at fleet headquarters would know just when Admiral Halsey was going to send some of his planes into the air as a matter of practice. I think that would be correct. Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves probably could tell definitely about that: that I don't think he would be limited, when he started out here, to just sending planes at a certain time; I think he could send them any time he wanted to.

[79] Is that correct, Admiral Standley?

Admiral STANDLEY. Right.

General SHORT. No, that was not verified. Apparently Lieutenant Tyler did not consider the possibility at all of it being enemy ships.

General MCCOY. In the first place, as far as he knew there was no enemy.

General SHORT. No, there was no enemy as far as he knew, definitely no enemy.

I will take up now what happened at the time of the attack. The first attack at Hickam and Pearl Harbor hit about 7:55. I heard the first bombs, and my first idea was that the Navy was having some battle practice, either that they hadn't told me about or that I had forgotten that they had told me about: that the report might have come in, just routine, and that I hadn't remembered the battle practice. When some more dropped I went out on the back porch to take a look what was going on, and about that time the chief of staff came running over to my quarters about three minutes after eight, said he had just received a message from Wheeler or Hickam, or both—I have forgotten which—that it was the real thing.

I immediately told him to put into effect Alert No. 3. That's all the order we needed. And by 8:10 that had been given. It showed immediately the value of having definite plans. They were all worked out right down to the company, where everybody knew exactly what his job was, because there was no confusion; we didn't have to issue a long-winded order; we didn't have to take any time except just to phone to the four major units and put into effect Alert No. 3.

Now, when I did that I just knew there was an attack; I didn't know how serious the attack might develop. If they would take a chance like that, they might even take a chance on a landing of troops, and so I sent everybody to his battle position. If they had been in alert for an air attack the two [80] divisions, the 24th and 25th, would have gotten on their battle positions. They still would have had to have been sent. We would have had to say, "Put Alert No. 3 into effect." I thought it was important to get completely prepared as long as there was attack of any kind, and that went out.

At the time that the attack started, all of the anti-aircraft batteries had skeleton crews right at their battery positions. They all had small arms ammunition, .30 caliber and .50 caliber and pistol ammunition, in their immediate possession. All but four of the batteries had their ammunition for the three-inch guns immediately accessible. For instance, down at De Russy the ammunition was in the casemate. They had to carry it probably 75 yards, but their men were right there, and the guns were all set up and in position, but the ammunition was not right alongside of the guns. There were four batteries that had to go further for their ammunition. There were four batteries of the 64th infantry; they were Batteries B, C, D, and F. The first one of those batteries started drawing its ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater, where we had our ammunition in caves, at 8:15, to show how promptly that they got into action. And by 10:15 they had all drawn what we call a day of fire, which for that particular battery is 300 rounds per gun. So there was no lost motion. There wasn't any confusion as to what should be done. They moved out, and they had about a thousand yards to go, and by 8:15 they were actually drawing the ammunition, the first battery to arrive.

General McCoy. And the batteries you say all had the ammunition at the——

General SHORT. Immediately accessible. They were not right alongside the gun. I say they had to step into the casemate and probably carry the ammunition 75 yards. Down at Fort Kamehameha they probably didn't have to carry it that [81] far, and they were in action very quickly as a result of that. The casemate was closer to the position.

General McNARNEY. Under Alert No. 2 would ammunition have been present at all times?

General SHORT. Under Alert No. 2 the ammunition would have been right alongside of the guns, but if we had put our anti-aircraft guns all out and started carrying ammunition, like, say, at Fort De Russy, which is right in the city where everybody could see it, and putting live ammunition out alongside of the gun, we knew we would not have been carrying out the War Department's intentions to not alarm the population. We could turn out for maneuvers under ordinary times and nobody would be alarmed at all; but under the strain they had, when you got to the point of putting live ammunition right at the gun, that they could see—the small arms ammunition in the boxes; they couldn't tell. But the live ammunition for the three-inch guns would have been very apparent if we had had it there ready for immediate use, and unquestionably would have caused a certain amount of publicity that would have alarmed the people to a certain extent.

The first firing by automatic weapons, guns of the anti-aircraft, was at 8:05, a battery at Camp Malekole out at the west end of the Island. Apparently a plane came over there and they brought it down.

In the south group—that is the group protecting Pearl Harbor and Fort Kamehameha—all of the automatic weapons were in action by about 8:20. The first of the three-inch guns to fire down there was at 8:30, and all of the three-inch guns were in action by 10 o'clock. Whether some of them were not in action earlier because they didn't have a target I don't know. Naturally they wouldn't fire if they didn't have a target.

The east group, which would include Fort Ruger, De Russy, out in there, apparently had no guns or was slower in getting [82] the three-inch into action.

Now, in the statement that you gentlemen have there is a detailed report there in one of the annexes from every battery, showing just when it was alerted, ready for action, and when it actually did its first firing. The detail is very definitely there.

The Hawaiian air force when the attack hit——

General McCoy. Before you leave that may I put in the record, then, that there was no anti-aircraft fire in action against the first attack?

General SHORT. Yes. Oh, yes, the first attack lasted, took—practically the whole of the south group got in action during that first attack. The attack lasted—it hit at 7:55, and it lasted apparently—there were stray planes around there up to 8:30 or a little bit—maybe even later than 8:30. The second attack took place at 9 o'clock. We brought down several planes in that first attack. As early as 8:05 we brought down a plane at Malekole, and the 98th Anti-Aircraft Coast Artillery up at Schofield brought down a plane I think at 8:15.

General McCoy. But we might say that the attack was delivered first?

General SHORR. First, yes. As a matter of fact, nobody would have fired if they had seen it, because they didn't expect—the only officer of any rank who observed the planes before they actually dropped a bomb, Colonel Potts, commanding the 98th Field Artillery, just happened to be out near his organization and saw this group of planes as they came over Wheeler before they started their dive, and he thought it was some—they looked very much like the Marine fighters in appearance, and he thought it was a bunch of Navy or Marine dive bombers just doing a little practice, until he saw a bomb meet a ship, and then of course a second later an [83] explosion, and his outfit—he alerted it at once, and it got a plane very early there. But, as I say, he watched those for a minute or two in the sky thinking they were friendly planes. They were too far up to see any insignia on them, and in general profile, why, they are very much like the fighters of the Navy and Marines, not like the Army planes. He knew they were not Army planes.

The other planes, however, the ones that attacked Pearl Harbor, from all descriptions, especially the torpedo planes, came in so low that nobody could have seen them at any distance. As I understand, they came in at about 200 feet, so that they were practically upon the ships there before they were observed. They were very close to them.

General McCoy. Coming from what direction?

General SHORR. Coming from Diamond—along Diamond Head. Apparently, from the plotting of the detectors, they came in from the north towards Kahuku, and then Kahuku lost them. I mean Opana Station lost them, probably when they got the Koolau Mountains between the planes and the station. They couldn't detect them, and they apparently skirted the east side of the Island, came around Diamond Head and headed right for Hickam and Pearl Harbor. That is just estimate, but that is the way it looked, considering the fact that they lost them, and they must have been low from the time they started along the east side of the Island because if they had been up in the air at all the detectors would have picked them up. So they were probably flying at a very low altitude so as not to be picked up.

[84] Is that all you want?

To go on to the Hawaiian Air Force, then, the pursuit planes were on three fields that morning. They were at Wheeler Field and at Bellows Field and an emergency field that we use for never more than a squadron, at Haleiwa up on the north side of the Island. We had no buildings there; we just had a landing mat, and we kept them up there in camp for certain training, and we had a squadron there.

General McCoy. That is just north of Wheeler Field, is it?

General SHORR. It is right—yes, practically straight north, about 7 miles north of—I can show you.

Admiral REEVES. Can you point that out there?

General SHORR. I can show you. Wheeler Field is right here south of Schofield. Bellows Field is about in here (indicating on map). About in here. The Haleiwa Beach is right—the field is about here (indicating). You can see there are three different points on the Island. Now, on each one of those fields those planes were not dis-

persed; they were grouped because the protection for sabotage was more complete. We had bunkers enough at Wheeler that we had constructed with our engineer troops starting along about May or June, as I remember, in the middle of May, that we could have put approximately 120 of our pursuit planes in those bunkers if we had felt as though the condition made it essential.

The bombers at Hickam were all just off of the mat or on the landing aprons. The ones that were not in commission for flying, like the six B-17's that we had had to take parts out of, were probably in the hangars where the work would be difficult. I think that those were all in the hangars. The heavy planes, as I said earlier, couldn't be scattered very far up on the runways because of the nature of the ground, and we had not built bunkers there because we had been trying for nine months to get money from the War Department—and you will find all the papers, all the documents in here on that subject [85] (indicating)—and we had not succeeded in doing it.

The result was that out of the six B-17's that were really in operation I think two of those were put out of commission, and some of the others that were damaged were planes that were not in commission anyway, and then of course some of them that came in from the mainland were put out of commission. We had heavy losses there with the old B-18's also. For some reason, we had 10 A-20's and they were not touched. Why they were not touched it is just almost impossible to say, but they were at the north—off the north end of the runway and not as plain as the others, and they were not touched at all.

Immediately that the first attack was over, the aviation engineer troops stationed at Hickam and Wheeler started clearing the runways so that they could get the planes in the air, and by 8:50 all of the pursuit that was serviceable were in the air. Some at Haleiwa, when attacked—some of those planes were in the air earlier, and one lieutenant up there brought down four planes; another brought down two planes. By 11:40 all of the bombers that were still serviceable were in the air under Navy command. They were turned over immediately to the Navy according to the plan, and they were in the air and sent out on distant reconnaissance at 11:40 in the morning, all that were still available.

Now, I have got a tabulation; there is a detailed tabulation in the study there, in my statement, that shows just what the condition of the planes was immediately before the attack, what damage was done, and then the planes that we had in commission on December 20. In other words, we had been able to put a great many back into commission.

[86] We thought when we first looked at our Hawaiian Air Depot that things were completely wrecked, but we found that we were able to salvage approximately 80% of the machines, and the new machines that had been constructed had not been damaged and that those in the machine shop should be put in different places because we cannot afford to take another chance of having them damaged.

As far back as February, or two weeks after I came in, I tried to get money from the War Department to put the maintenance underground, and it was something like \$3,800,000, and the War Department said that it cost too much money. Now they have already started on

that. We got practically what amounts to a blank check after the attack, and the work has actually started.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you said you salvaged 8%?

General SHORT. 80% of the repair machines.

The CHAIRMAN. 80%?

General SHORT. 80%, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I misunderstood you.

General SHORT. 80%. That is important because without that we would not be able to put our machines back in commission, to get our planes like that without that. Immediately before the attack we had 80 pursuit planes in commission. We had a lot of old planes. I do not know for certain how many, but we had six reconnaissance in commission and seven out of commission; 39 bombers actually in commission and 33 out. Many of these were seven years old, and there were always considerable pursuits getting out of commission.

During the raid there was some degree of damage. Eighty-eight pursuits were damaged and six reconnaissance and thirty-four bombers.

On December 20, to show how the maintenance had succeeded in getting into the work, we had 61 pursuits in commission and 22, just small ones that could be used by their squadron. [87] I believe 83 that could fly probably within 24 hours where they had only 80 in commission before that time; in other words, the maintenance has been keener since the attack. They have been working 24 hours a day, and with respect to the Hawaiian Air Depot, machine shop, we have the reconnaissance planes, six in flight condition, commissioned, and two that could be repaired; 50 bombers in commission and 13 that could be put in commission, but we received 29 in the meantime, large bombers from the mainland. I don't know whether that 29 included four that were destroyed or not. I could not say definitely on that, but it shows that our repair work got under way very fast, but of the eight we got, we were pretty well set up for repair work.

Of the planes the Army brought down we made a very careful and detailed study, and there is in the book there a statement of every plane that any battery or any individual brought down and the statement as to whether it was verified. It shows 38 planes brought down, but Colonel Fielder said that to be conservative 9 planes we should not have which we claimed. The Army brought down 29.

General McCoy. Is that what the Army brought down?

General SHORT. The Army brought down 29 or possibly 38. I do not know what the Navy did. You can get the facts from them as to what the Navy brought down. We have reason to believe that they possibly lost a complete squadron on account of the message the Navy picked up from a squadron commander sent in to his carrier saying that he was lost and he was out of gas: so there is a possibility that there was a complete squadron lost in addition to what was brought down.

To take up what happened to the ground forces, the 24th Division, which is in battle position in the north area (indicating on map), north of Schofield, it started fighting at 8:10. It was assembling and it was attacked and returned the [88] fire of the enemy machine guns. It was attacking also with machine guns and it returned the fire with automatic rifles. The division had no antiaircraft battery as such but were using fire on the enemy planes as early as 8:11.

They move to battle position about 8:30, and at 5 o'clock in the afternoon all troops in this group were in battle position and had one day fire. During the night a second unit of fire was issued. They make it a practice to have two days of fire at a battle position. We think that is as much as we should distribute here.

The 25th Division also started moving to its battle position at 8:30, and by 4 in the afternoon was on its battle position with one day of fire.

General McCoy. Where was this battle position?

General SHORT. The 25th, all through the southern sector out through the beaches and getting some behind, in the rear of the beaches and the reserves over back there and just this side of Schofield. If it had not been for the anti-aircraft it would have taken them more time for these divisions to move out. It is a question of the roads and how many people you could put on the road, and when we moved them out during the air attack we do not permit them to move closer than 200 yards between trucks because you take too much of a chance of having big losses during an air attack. That is what causes a great deal of time in moving out, not having them bunched. We insisted they not bunch.

General McCoy. Are they kept in battle position now?

General SHORT. Yes. Not only that, but they are perfecting their field fortifications. We started in last May. We had maneuvers on May 12, and for one week I had the troops digging in battle position. For years they have gone along saying, "There is where we would dig," but I got the authority from the War Department to get some money to put in machine gun replacements, positions for 75's, and got them actually [89] digging in. We did not clear the fields where they would destroy the cane fields because that is a small job, but in places dug right out the coral, which is quite a long job and takes pressure and engineering equipment.

The first week we dug and then moved into the 24th of May and then dug from the 24th of May until the 30th of June. After the 1st of July the War Department would not let me spend the training money. Up to the 30th of June I could have used the training money, but I went back after that to get as little as \$125,000 for making that construction, field fortifications, and was constantly turned down; so we did not accomplish much in perfecting the field fortifications from the 1st of July until this happened.

On the 8th the engineers were distributing—we just went ahead and bought the materials and they were distributing the revetting material. The troops were working constantly over the field fortifications from the time they took up these positions on December 7.

I may say this: that the fire data for machine guns and artillery had been very carefully calculated and even before we started digging digging at all. That applies for both machine guns and artillery, and they were check for fire data. All guns were checked on the 8th and 9th and corrections made, so they should have been able to use their fire and know they are going to hit what they are firing at.

Right after this attack the value of our organization with the civilians for defense became very apparent. They had organized 20 civilian emergency aid station groups. They got into action very rapidly and helped evacuate the casualties from Hickam Field.

We had 16 surgical groups organized of the leading surgeons in town, all completely set up with instruments and so forth by 9 o'clock, and they started reporting at Tripler Hospital, and by 9:30 they had all routine operations going on.

[90] General McCox. Are they under the Reserve or under the Red Cross?

General Short. We have an M-Day Bill which was put through here that gives the Governor the power to do this ahead of time, and we had a great deal of trouble pushing it through, and I finally went down and made a talk to the Senate and we got that bill pushed through some two or three months ago. They gave certain money to the Governor to go ahead and do these things and it authorized him to do different kinds of things, and if he wanted to he could declare an emergency.

He never declared an emergency but he organized committees and things of that nature, and the medical society was extremely active here, and our medical work is highly organized, and the Red Cross also.

I had many conferences with him, and a man came from Washington and he convinced him that we should have \$200,000 worth of medicine and a regular course of supplies, and many of them had come in or we had them on hand.

These people got into action very quickly. We had the evacuation business worked out, and the evacuation of Hickam Field and Wheeler Field began at 12 o'clock by these civilian evacuation outfits. They were moved mostly to school buildings, and we set up cots and so forth.

As a matter of fact, some women and children came here because we were constructing two underground places, one for the interceptor command that was not in use, and one for the cold storage plant that is still being used in case of an air raid alarm because they just stopped work temporarily. The civilian agencies under the direction of G-1 carried out these functions. Some of them moved in their own vehicles, and they were operating several busses which were sent to move them out quite rapidly.

That showed the value of having civilian units interested in that thing. Their interest is much keener now than it was [91] before, but they have been going ahead in the work.

The FBI and G-2 started immediately rounding up all the elements we had on the list. We had the list all prepared of all aliens that we considered dangerous, consular agents, and shinto priests particularly, and they rounded up 370 Japanese, 98 Germans, and 14 Italians.

We made plans ahead of time for the use of the Immigration Station and of the Quarantine Station. They started at the Immigration Station and as they got crowded moved to the Quarantine Station on Sand Island and used the Immigration Station as a reception center and then moved them across.

As far as I know, most of these people are still there. They had hearings and they will be released if they are able to prove absolutely that they are not dangerous and should be released. I do not know what the number is out there.

Very soon Governor Poindexter put the M-Day Bill into effect. He talked to me at that time and told me he would put that into effect, and then on the next day he said we would declare and put martial law in just as soon as I felt it was necessary. I thought the thing over a while, and while they could do a great deal under the M-Day Bill—he could do practically everything except that he could not use the funds as freely as I could under martial law, and we decided the next morning that it would be better to declare martial law, and he declared martial law and asked me to take over the responsibilities for carrying it out.

To show how the work went on, the District Engineer had the work organized to repair the broken water main at Hickman Field, which was serious because we used this aqua system to flow the gasoline on water on all airfields, so without the air pressure we had to use hand pumps, and that means that effects a great deal of difference as well as the fire hazard that existed at that time. They made most of the repairs at night and they got to it quickly.

[92] As soon as martial law was declared I had the District Engineer take over all civilian supplies and equipment on the Island. He also took charge of the contracts and told them to drop all work that was not defense work and got them organized, and our first effort was on the air fields.

We had only one field that really was satisfactory for the largest bombers, and that was Hickam Field. We had only 2,750-foot runway at Bellows Field, and within four days we had 5,000 feet, to show how rapidly the District Engineer did his work.

On Wheeler Field they had less than is necessary for heavy bombers. He started right in building bunkers at Hickam Field and doing that by contract with heavy equipment. He started a new air field at Kahuku Point.

General McCoy. Where is that?

General Short. That is up in the northern part of the Island [indicating on map]. We had to go back and forth to the War Department and the Navy Department, and the Navy had some bombing range, so we were delayed getting the money, getting the thing started.

We improved, however, putting bunkers in, and we tried one three miles south of Kipapa, and I think that is the choice place on the Island for an air field, but the War Department overruled it. That has since been started so as to have sufficient air fields here with runways of not less than 6,000 feet so that they really can employ a large number of planes. We never had the planes that we should have nor what the program called for.

Our program if carried out would have given us 184 B-17's by June 30 next and 360 pursuit planes. Whether it would have been carried out on time I do not know, but these fields have to be acquired anyway. There was also a field at Maui, but it was only about 3,500 feet long, and we agreed that field should be used by the Navy for carrier planes because they used that position at Lahaina Road. After [93] this attack I had a conference with Admiral Block and Admiral Kimmel and they agreed to put a squadron of B-17's there.

That field has been under way and definitely will be completed and have about 5,000 feet rather than 1,000. So we will be able to develop that field for the outlying islands.

We had also one at Barking Sands on Kauai, but that is not paved, only rough, and cannot be used by the large bombers. All that work is being put under way as rapidly as possible, and as of the end of the month we will have plenty of fields because of the fact that many we can use now. After turning us down on many things for months we have practically a blank check now.

We were building air fields that in the appropriation bill that was up they had something like \$20,000,000, so we expect that at the end of December we would have the money anyhow. So we started immediately without waiting for anything, and everything is going along as rapidly as possible.

I took the following action as soon as martial law was declared: The courts were closed. Later on we opened up the courts for civilian things, equity cases, and things of that kind, but not the criminal court. The officials were all asked to continue in their official positions, and all did so. An advisory committee was appointed, headed by the Governor.

The sale of liquor, including wine and beer, was stopped. That was about all the action that taken at the time.

Now, I would like to give, just to show that I have not been asleep since I have been here commanding, that I have been working seriously, and just to give you a little indication of some of the things that I have done and that I have attempted to do. Frequently I could not carry them on because I could not get the money for them, but at least it shows the way I have been trying to conduct my command.

I took command on the 7th of February. On the 19th I wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff, which you will find in [94] there, and we made a survey of the things that I thought were most important. I told him what we had been doing and gave the estimates and took up the question of the coordination with the Navy, which was not as complete as it should have been, but I think we made great strides during that time. I believe the Navy will tell you that coordination is much closer than we had it before.

With respect to the question of distribution and protection of aircraft, I asked for funds for bunkers at these air fields and runways and so forth. I asked for improvements for the anti-aircraft defense. I was considerably interested in improving the weapons and getting enough personnel. We were having to have our personnel perform dual missions of heavy battery and coast defense battery and perform anti-aircraft mission, and the thing got to a point where they needed to fire on enemy ships, and then make up their minds which was more important in the mission of fighting.

I was trying to get personnel. The Navy was very much interested in anti-aircraft defense and air. Their keen interest was in those two things.

I took up the question of improving the harbor defense guns. They had no splinterproof at any of the guns. In modern guns they are protected against air and we had gotten some money on that.

The searchlights in many cases needed modernizing, and we put in a project on that.

We needed arrangements for moving our supplies and reserves more quickly. We did not get much for motor trails during the period, as a total for the last year, and we did not have the motor trails and

roads that would enable us to get to our positions as quickly as possible.

In Manuaha Road, which is a critical point, it would take to move from our reserve position two hours and 26 minutes. After we built the motor trail there we could move the same [95] reserves in 26 minutes. Without the money, we could not carry out this work.

I took up the question of bombproofing of the vital installations like the command post, and we practically completed our job in Aliamanu Crater; our interceptor command control operated in a week, and our bombproofing is 30% complete. The command post for the 24th Division is just started. I took these things upon February 29.

I particularly recommended getting the Hawaiian Air Depot underground because I foresaw it was the biggest building in sight except the barracks and was sure to be an object of attack, and apparently it was the first thing hit on Hickam Field, and according to eyewitnesses, the first plane that hit it just plowed straight into it. It was a suicide proposition, and whether it was that or not I don't know, but the eyewitness said that and perhaps he knew exactly what he was heading for.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say the air depots, do you mean the hangars?

General SHORT. No. The Hawaiian Air Depot controls all supplies and all heavy maintenance, parts of material and all mechanical work. There are certain types of mechanical work which are done at Schofield, and some of the heavy work is done at the post, but when they come to the more serious operations they have to go down to the Hawaiian Air Depot, where they have excellent mechanics, and the heavy work is done there.

I think that if they lost that we would be in a very bad way, or if they lost the machines we would be in a very bad way.

I wanted to put it in the gulch where we would get a runway of 4,000 feet, and get the maintenance underground, because maintenance was a most serious thing. You could disperse your planes, but this question of dispersing the [96] maintenance in four places because it is too dangerous to leave them all in one place.

General MCCOY. Were any of these skilled mechanics casualties?

General SHORT. I do not know, frankly. I doubt if there were many, because it was Sunday morning. If it was Monday morning or any other morning they would have been considerably, but I do not think it would be many. We did not have any great push of work, and I do not think they were working Sunday morning. Some of them may have been killed on returning back if they went down there and started to help, but they probably were not in the first attack, because I do not think they were in operation except for the watchmen.

General MCCOY. Are they civilians?

General SHORT. Almost all civilians, and men with a great deal of experience.

I took up later the question of antisabotage, the question of supplies, vital installations, ammunition, depots, gasoline storage of all kinds and that I largely got.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that not all taken care of?

General SHORT. No, because while we actually had the money since August, getting priorities is an entirely different thing. I had writ-

ten to the War Department and had gone to the Governor to try to get a priorities office established here. I think it was approved in principle before December but not actually established so far as an office here was concerned; so we had no use out of it.

I had no luck in getting authority to bombproof the gasoline storage. The War Department wanted to disperse that rather than bombproof it, and it probably would be splinterproof. We did not receive the money for that, although there was correspondence on it since February.

General McCoy. Did you lose any?

General Short. No, we lost none.

[97] General McCoy. It is all underground now?

General Short. It is not exactly underground.

The Chairman. Now the gasoline is underground?

General Short. No. It will be six to nine months before it is completed. Maybe they can make it by April, but on Red Hill Bridge they have been working 24 hours a day for months. It is all above.

The Chairman. It is still in the big tanks, sticking up?

General Short. Those are largely oil. Do not misunderstand me, Mr. Justice. We have some gasoline underground, under the air fields, but it is not bombproof. It is more than splinterproof; it is halfway in between. We did not lose any of that, but there were some 4,000,000 gallons. Aviation gasoline was in the hands of various oil companies, which is all above ground where it can be hit.

The only underground gasoline we have is the aqua system in the field, and we have put in some 50,000-gallon tanks that are safe. If we get our reserve gas bombproof both for motors and for aviation, it would be good, because it would be bad to lose the gasoline here. We have carried on some experiments recently with alcohol. There are two breweries in town and they worked it so we could use alcohol up to 80%.

I took inventory on the 8th of the gasoline in town and started rationing it right away. We found we had four months supply of gasoline on the island for the normal rate of use.

I have made during the last few months a considerable number of requests for an increase in planes, and there have been definite indications of planes. If the program that had been set up was carried out, it would give us an increase in planes by June 30—which depends on the manufacturer—but the War Department was very favorable to it.

I thought when I got here that while the Navy had developed the new facility at Kaneohe Bay, where they put in a channel to bring the cruisers in, that the war plans still [98] provided that the Army would not assume the responsibility for defense.

I wrote the War Department that I would assume the responsibility and asked that the war plans be changed.

I talked with Admiral Block and he agreed. I asked for a garrison. They cut the garrison to half of what I asked for, but when we suggested getting 2,300 men in the garrison about the 1st of September, they told me I had to start the theatre operating type of barracks out there.

I got most of them constructed out there. Then I got word that the troops would not be sent until sometime in January.

General McCoy. Just where is that?

General Short. That is this position (indicating on map). The Navy position is here; the Army post is in here (indicating). You will find 8-inch guns there; not what we should have. When these troops come in they will increase the number of guns there, and I think eventually they will be sending some new 8-inch guns. That is important because with that channel the enemy can now run his ships in, whereas before he could not do anything.

The War Department plan has never provided any defense for the outlying islands. When I got here I started to construct these emergency landing fields, as I felt we had to have some defense. So I sent one regiment without asking any authority. I sent a battalion to Hawaii, a battalion to Kauai, a battalion less a company to Maui, and a company to Molokai.

I sent 75 guns to each which could be used on the beach or moved around, and a considerable number of guns, machine guns.

I felt that was the thing to do that I could consider it without having any authority for it and not waiting to get some increases. The War Department has indicated since I told [99] them that we should have the proper garrisons there. They indicated since December 7 that they will furnish the troops there. It has not been a matter of any importance so far, but it is just a picture of the things I was trying to do to maintain the defenses here and to show that I was really working at it. I made recommendations that I have submitted since February and which have been authorized since December 7, and they have gone further in a number of cases.

Soon after I got here I looked into the question of civilian defense, and one thing of particular importance at this island is that is not growing the food to feed itself; probably not over 15 or 20% is grown here. It seems that the main proposition is to grow cane and pineapples.

I decided I would start a program of getting the food situation in better shape and a number of other things. I had expected to talk before the Chamber of Commerce on April 6, so I decided I would wait until then and lay the program before the people at that time, because I thought that probably every businessman in the Island of Oahu would be present at that meeting.

I took up four different items at this time for the production and the supply of food.

For years they had been working on a question simply of what would be done if the production of food decreased in an emergency. The Department of Agriculture was carrying on some experiments, and the University of Hawaii also at that time. We got a committee working on this particular work. This committee was largely representative of the sugar-plantation people and the pineapple-plantation people and the large plantation people, representatives from the University and the Department of Agriculture.

We got a report on the number of these sugar plantations and allotted so many acres to each different plantation so that they would have some truck gardening. We divided up this ground so that one plantation would grow 300 acres of [100] potatoes or maybe 5 of tomatoes and another would grow something else.

We made up a list of seed required for that and placed these orders in the mainland with proper seed companies subject to telegraphic order.

We made up a list of the tools that each plantation would need to switch from heavy agriculture like cane to truck gardening.

From the 10th or the 11th, three or four days after the attack, I had a meeting of all of the big companies, and they act as factors for all the plantations, and I had a meeting of them and with the Governor's Food Control Committee and certain other leaders interested in this thing.

We had an inventory taken of food beginning on the 8th. We tried to get an inventory for the last two or three months because we had attempted to get out of Congress \$3,400,000 for food storage and \$2,500,000 for the supply of vital necessities for human consumption and \$900,000 for feed, largely for cattle and poultry, and they did not even grow the feed for that. It was held up by that body and apparently there was no chance to get any action on it without taking inventory because someone in Congress said:

For nine months they have been getting their supplies through, so there is no use worrying about it.

When we got this inventory, it was a disappointment even to me. I figured on 50 or 60 days of supplies in the hands of the retailers and wholesalers, and it turned out that we had only 37 days. I had only one day of rice and 18 days of flour. We did not want to start rationing the people. The big companies were perfectly capable of handling the distribution when they could get the shipping to take it in.

I had this meeting and I told them the plan which I had prepared and asked the War Department to guarantee 20,000 pounds a month to supply the current needs of food and as an [101] opening for that suggested \$3,400,000. That is all that was asked at that time, and I asked these people to get in touch with them and try to get that money for that purpose.

These people agreed that they would start on the production. This was the 10th or the 11th. I had the District Engineer order a supply of seed and tools because we had tried to have each plantation do the work. These orders were placed at any rate. The engineering office was tied up, but he bought them. So the War Department indicated that should be done and have it straightened out.

At this time I emphasized the organization of doctors and nurses and Red Cross, and that was extremely well carried out and in good shape.

I advocated the organization of an auxiliary police force and fire department. There was an actual organization effected of these men of an actual police force and they turned out several times for training a day or so, and they took hold very well when things happened.

I also organized at that time plans for the evacuation of women and children, not only of the Army post but along the docks, and practically the whole of that line is a proper military objective. The gasoline and oil is right down there in plain sight. If they put the docks out of commission it would be a very serious thing because practically everything the island is using is brought in from there. So it meant 40,000 people had to be moved out, and if they started bombing these it would be a very serious situation. We made at this time plans for the complete evacuation and had detailed plans for shelters, and we asked the

War Department and the Governor also to ask through the Civilian Defense organization that Mayor La Guardia is the head of—the Office of Defense, I think it is—for \$2,800,000. We received that since December 7. We got it since December 7. These are some of the items that were taken up at that time.

[102] On the question of the M-Day Bill, I do not know whether you are familiar with the form of that or not, but I believe this is the only place that it is in effect, and I do not think there is any other place where the state has passed an M-Day Bill giving the Governor the authority to protect the organization and to get so many things done during an emergency. We have it here. We got that bill through.

The Governor made little use of it until later, and I should say he would have made it if he had know what was going to take place, but it was of considerable advantage and I would say practically that I do not think it would have gone through at all except for being pushed by the Army. I went down there and talked to them.

We got a Home Guard Bill for the purpose of helping out in place of the National Guard group that went out in the service. These can man the guard groups, guard the utilities, and release the Army soldiers for combat work. That was put through at the last meeting and it went into effect since December 7; the Governor had not seen fit to call them out because they made an appropriation of only \$50,000,000. Now they have 1,200 men in that fort actually employed in guarding the utilities. [103] You may not think it has a very direct bearing, but I feel that I would like to have you know that the civil community does not think that I have let them down.

The CHAIRMAN. Does not what?

Admiral STANDLEY. What?

General SHORT. Does not think that I have let them down. Here is a letter that was brought out to me yesterday, a copy of a letter that has been to the President and has been signed by almost every leader of importance in town. I would like to read this letter to you if you don't mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT (reading):

We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the decision to increase stored food and to produce food; [104] and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be.

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very best respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly,

The gentlemen signing this:

Lester Petrie, Mayor of the City of Honolulu, [105] C. R. Hemenway, President, Hawaiian Trust Company, A. L. Dean, Vice-President, Alexander & Baldwin Company, Walter F. Dillingham, President of Oahu Railway & Land Co., F. D. Lowrey, President, Lowers & Cook, H. H. Warner, Assistant Food Administrator, J. B. Poindestexter, Governor of Hawaii, S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice, Supreme Court, T. G. S. Walker, Director of Civilian Defense of Oahu, John E. Russell, President of T. H. Davies & Company, George S. Waterhouse, Executive Vice-President, Bishop National Bank, Cyril F. Damon, Executive Vice-President of Bishop Trust Company, Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice-President, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, H. A. Walker, President, American Factors, Limited, S. M. Lowrey, Treasurer, American Factors, P. E. Spalding, President of C. Brewer & Company, Frank E. Midkiff, Trustee of the Bishop Estate, Edouard R. L. Doty, Territorial Director of Civilian Defense, James Winne, Manager Merchandise Department, Alexander & Baldwin.

Those represent most of the financial interests of the Islands, and that is a more definite statement than it would be almost any other place I know, on account of the way that business is conducted here, and I believe that that should indicate to you that the leaders in this community don't feel that I have been laying down on the job.

Here is a letter here from the Director of Civilian Defense that I would like to read to you:

Please allow me to express my sincere regret that [106] our contact through Civilian Defense Plans has terminated.

It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the attack.

You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and Soldiers through the organized effort of our Civilian Defense Medical committee and the many trucks that we had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minute's notice.

Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your many friends here who realize the distress you saved by urging and helping us to be prepared.

Yours very sincerely,

T. G. S. WALKER,
Director, Civilian Defense.

I would appreciate it if the Commission would see fit to call before it some of the senior officers of my command who know what I have done. They have had the responsible positions enough to know what I have been doing. General Martin you will have before you anyway. I would like to suggest that you call General Burgin, commanding the—

The CHAIRMAN. What is the name?

General SHORT. General Burgin, commanding the Coast Artillery. H. T. Burgin. General Maxwell Murray, commanding the 25th Division.

General D. R. Wilson, commanding the 24th Division.

And Colonel E. M. Wilson, commanding the post of Fort Schofield. That is our one big post.

All of these officers have had enough to do with my [107] planning and carrying it out that they can give you a correct picture of what my work has been like.

I would also like, if you feel that you could do it, to call the Governor, and he has indicated that he is perfectly willing to be called in spite of the fact that he has been sick. Possibly Mr. T. G. S. Walker, the Director of Civilian Defense; Mr. Frank Locey, who is the Commissioner of Agriculture and the head of the Governor's Food Control Committee. He knows more about my work than most people. And some of the prominent business leaders. In Honolulu you can almost say that the heads of the five big companies and Mr. Walter Dillingham, those six men, practically control the business of the Island. Any of them will know the work I have done.

Gentlemen, that is about everything that I have to present, and I appreciate very much your consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you some questions you would like to ask?

General McNARNEY. I have a number of questions I would like to ask.

General, the cable of October 16 directed that (1) to take due precaution; (2) to prepare deployments. That of November 27 stated that hostile action is possible, and to undertake reconnaissance. Do you feel that ordering Alert No. 1 was carrying out these directives?

General SHORT. My reconnaissance under the plan with the Navy is limited to just the immediate offshore of the Island, ordinarily limited to 15 miles. The Navy have assumed full responsibility for the distant reconnaissance.

General McNARNEY. Was the inshore reconnaissance undertaken?

General SHORT. The inshore reconnaissance was a daily thing. We had planes all around the Islands just constantly. [108] And if we had had them in the air 24 hours of the day, that inshore would not have accomplished anything, because the attack started from much further out.

General McNARNEY. As I remember, you stated in your statement that you assumed that the Navy was sending out the proper reconnaissance covering the proper areas. Did you know that they were?

General SHORT. I knew it was their full responsibility, that if they could not do it they would call on me for bombers to assist them. That was in the definite agreement. I didn't think that I had a right to call on them for a daily report of what they were doing. They had task forces out all the time. I don't know just where they went, and I don't know just what they did when they went out. That was a naval problem.

General McNARNEY. Didn't you feel it was part of your responsibility for the security of your command that you should have that information available?

General SHORT. I didn't feel that they had certain information in regards to the location of Japanese boats. I felt sure that if they had anything to indicate any Japanese carriers or anything within a thousand miles or probably closer than the Mandate Islands, which are 2,100 miles, they would have told me, and I did not feel that it

was my business to try to tell Admiral Kimmel how he would conduct his reconnaissance. I think he would have resented it very much. I knew definitely that there were no land bases of the Japanese closer than about 2,100 miles, and that from all information available there were not bombers that can go 2,100 miles and bomb and return.

General McNARNEY. At any time during the operation of the Information Center up here was anything shown on the board as to the location of the Navy patrols?

[109] General SHORT. Oh, you couldn't go over there any time of the day—you couldn't go to any one of the stations at any time and watch for 15 minutes and not see planes. There were always planes in the air here. The only time that there wouldn't be planes in the air would probably be about between 11 o'clock and 4. They didn't do much flying between 11 o'clock at night and 4 in the morning. But you couldn't tell whether they were Navy planes or Army planes, or both. Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly ever step out of his house without hearing planes, and the stations would pick up every one of them. All you had to do was watch any station, just drop in one of them any time and they would see a plane that's 35 miles out or 50 miles out, or whatever it was, and you would watch the course that they were taking. They could pick them up almost any time except between 11 and 4.

General McNARNEY. I think in your statement you said that you thought Alerts Nos. 2 and 3 would interfere with training. Don't you believe that the actual occupation of battle positions is better training than the normal routine of peacetime training?

General SHORT. Not in this particular case with the air corps. The air corps had a very specific mission assigned to them of preparing so many combat teams to ferry planes to the Philippines. You can't afford to start half-trained men taking planes all the way from San Francisco to the Philippine Islands. They have got to be trained.

General McNARNEY. Would not the best training be actual reconnaissance out over the water?

General SHORT. No, because you have to do this, and you know, General, enough about the training of workmen, when you are going to make a B-17 pilot you have got to step him up; you can't just jump him right from his training ship [110] to a B-17. Ordinarily they have been putting them on the B-18's for a certain period and then putting them on the A-20's and then putting them as a copilot on the B-17.

Now, that is just the pilot business, and you have got your bombers, which is a very slow proposition, and we had a total of six ships to do all this training, and you couldn't—if you sent this out, if I played fair with the Navy, if I agreed with them that I would turn my bombers over to them any time that they asked for them for reconnaissance, I had no business rushing out there on my own on distant reconnaissance. I would just be covering probably the same sector they covered, using up my planes when they needed them, and they wouldn't be available; and if I put them down there and kept them warmed up 24 hours of the day, scattered them out and kept them warmed up ready to go in the air 24 hours a day, I couldn't use them for training these pilots for ferrying missions, and the situation didn't look to me like it justified that. And you know that you can only work so many hours a day on the thing.

General McNARNEY. Now, on your anti-sabotage measures were there insufficient men available to protect the planes if they were dispersed?

General SHORT. No, if we wanted to put our whole command on that kind of business, but it didn't look like it was necessary. I did not believe—from the wires of the War Department, they said nothing whatever about an attack by air; and when I told them what I was doing on the 28th day of November they never came back and said, "Well, this sabotage business you are doing all right, but you need to carry it a step further and protect against attack." If they had said that I would have gone ahead immediately, but they apparently accepted my decision as to what to do, and they were there where they should know more about the inter- [111] national situation than I did.

There was one thing I didn't cover, gentlemen; I would like to. It has been brought out a good deal by the questions of the General. I would like to read my conclusions to you.

1. The radiogram from the War Department of October 16th emphasized that measures taken by me during the grave situation of the Japanese negotiations should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out so as "not repeat not to disclose intent", not alarm civil population, and avoid unnecessary publicity.

When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Department was alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive measures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned, indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by the Hawaiian Department.

2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth Naval District or from the War Department.

The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" places upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Annex #7 to the "Joint [112] Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance.

During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made no request for army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. To me this meant that they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make the necessary reconnaissance without assistance from the army. During this period I was in frequent conferences with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack by the Japanese by air. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the possibility of an air attack.

[113] 3. Action of the War Department on December 5th, and as late as 1:30 A. M., Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the

mainland to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department did not believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu.

I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish me by the most rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in Japanese relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for secrecy would be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code books been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have had approximately two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack.

4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on February 7th until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable importance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to be the desires of the War Department unless I was supposed to know more than the War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the Navy Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken more steps in preparation against a Japanese [114] attack than I did would certainly have alarmed the civil population and caused publicity contrary to War Department instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact.

General McNARNEY. I have a few questions on this operating procedure, and maybe you could clear up a few things for me on that.

General SHORT. All right, sir. I would be glad to.

General McNARNEY. First, on the covering letter distributing this it states: General and special staff sections and commanders of major echelons also will submit their standing operating procedures.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. I suppose that they are slightly in more detail?

General SHORT. A great deal more in detail. What happened when the division got this—and this had been in the course of preparation for two or three months; we had put out tentative ones, and we had made changes suggested through lower echelons, and they had worked along the same line. When we got ours in final shape and it went out, then the division commander of the 24th and 25th divisions, commander of the harbor defense troops and of the Hawaiian Air Force drew up theirs and submitted them. Their subdivision units, taking for instance in the division of regiment, drew up a plan of standing operating procedure [115] that would conform to the others. So right down to the company everybody knew what he was going to do. Before we could put this into effect it had always been necessary to get out a long order to do things, because they had been making a point of maintaining a lot of things secret that I felt should not be kept secret. If you maintained it a secret you could not expect the company commander or the noncommissioned officer down in the company to know what to do when the thing arose. Our idea was to draw the thing up so as a matter of training it would get clear down to the private in the organization, so if you said Alert No. 1 he would know what his part was. And it really worked, because we had no confusion, and I think it is the only sound way to do it.

General McNARNEY. I ask the Recorder, when we call the other heads of departments and the commanding officers, generals, of the

major units, that they be asked to bring their copies of their standing operating procedure with them. Some of these might sound like repetition, but I still would like to ask them again.

General SHORT. I think you will find this: not with the divisions because they are pretty definitely set; I think you will find if you ask the air force that they would say they would change or that they would prescribe more in detail some of the things that were prescribed before. I mean we have developed since December 7 certain routine of putting so many pursuit in the air an hour before daylight. Every time a bomber squadron is ordered off the ground we get the pursuit over to the air field before it goes. Those details may not be in their standing operating procedure. I say if they would rewrite them today they would be more detailed, but that is a question they are bound to learn and put in more detail.

[115] General McNARNEY. Paragraph 6 of the standing operating procedure says:

Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces.

You felt that Alert No. 1 took care of that particular paragraph under the existing situation?

General SHORT. Under the existing situation I felt definitely it did. I didn't think there was any possibility of a ground attack. Of course there would always be the possibility of an air attack, but from the information I had I thought it was highly improbable.

General McNARNEY. Paragraph 7 states:

During all operations and alerts, a liaison officer with motor transportation will be sent from each of the following units to Department Headquarters and will remain thereat except when on a mission to their own headquarters:

Those are the 24th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, Hawaiian Air Force, the 86th Observation Squadron, and each department reserve unit. Were those liaison officers actually present?

General SHORT. I am quite sure they were actually present from both sides in the 25th Division. The 25th Division command post had been changed so it was right in the tunnel with us, and there was no occasion for their having a liaison officer. I could step down there or they could step up to my headquarters in walking a hundred feet.

General McNARNEY. Were they on duty 24 hours a day?

General SHORT. Someone is always there, and that is particularly true—has been—during this period with the air and the anti-aircraft harbor defense. Now, the Hawaiian Air Force, they would be in—they changed the command post until they are just like being from here to there (indi- [117] cating), so it has not been necessary for them to have a liaison officer because we were in immediate touch with them.

General McNARNEY. Did Alert No. 1 provide for any exchange of liaison officers to be made?

General SHORT. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Paragraph 10 covers anti-aircraft defense. Subparagraph d. states the responsibilities of unit commanders for the maintenance of air guards to give timely warning, adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation, and the reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and matériel when in bivouac.

General SHORT. Now, what alert are you reading under?

General McNARNEY. This is the general paragraph on anti-aircraft defense.

General SHORT. Yes. Well, that is depending on the type of alert.

General McNARNEY. And my question is, Does paragraph 10 apply to Alert No. 1?

General SHORT. It would not apply to Alert No. 1 because the troops are not out on their positions.

General McNARNEY. Paragraph 11 states that an adequate alarm system will be established in connection with protecting of important installations. Was that alarm system ever completed?

General SHORT. We have an alarm system. We have 1400 klaxons. They are not as loud as they should be. They are the type that we used in France as gas warnings. At all these installations there are telephones, so that they can give an alarm system that way. On account particularly of the civil population we should have—and money has been requested for that—we have been trying to get them on our own for some time—some large sirens that could be heard all [118] over the city. We haven't sufficient of them. I have given the City 300 of the small klaxons, but they don't work very well. They do pretty well in posts and out in the open, and they don't do very well in the city.

General McNARNEY. Under paragraph 15, which covers Alert No. 2, it is really not pertinent to what we are talking about, but I would like to ask one or two questions:

Subparagraph d.(6) states:

Place 240-millimeter howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

General SHORT. Well, I will tell you why that is. Those are manned by the Field Artillery, and it is done that way because there is not enough personnel. Those are extra guns above organizational equipment, and we figure on sending those out, when Alert No. 2 goes, before the rest—before the division ever moves to its position, because when the division starts moving to its position there are not men available to take out the 240's. So on Alert No. 2 they go out and go into position and just leave enough men there to guard them. That is the thing that takes time; and, as I say, we had not the men to man those that we probably have now because we got in a lot of men day before yesterday, but that was a provision for manning equipment over and above organizational equipment, doing the best we could to get the heavy guns in position before the third alert was necessary. Incidentally, General, we manned about on the average two or three times the fire equipment here that is provided for as standard equipment.

General McNARNEY. Yes, I know about that.

General SHORT. For instance, in the rifle companies that have as many as 24 heavy machine guns issued to them we are manning a tremendous fire power.

General McNARNEY. Subparagraph e. says:

Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that [119] railway batteries will remain at Fort Kamehameha or where emplaced.

General SHORT. We have changed that as a matter of safety because at Kamehameha—it is so close to Hickam Field—they were all on tracks there ready to be dispatched wherever there was a threat. We had actually sent all of them away from there on account of the fact

that they are too close to Hickam Field. We put one at Browns Mill on the West Coast; we put two up on the north coast because we haven't the harbor defense guns up there to protect it that we have on the south. We put one out at Kaneohe Bay. We just took it off the railroad tracks and moved it out there on trucks and put it just on rails, so that we provided some long range fire power there, because it was the only way to do it, so that now there is not a one of those batteries at Fort Kam. Three all are ready and can be moved anywhere by rail. Incidentally, we have probably by this time completed a track going up through the middle of the Island. There was a stretch there of about four miles that was not joined up, and we couldn't move except by the track around the perimeter of the Island. We got money some little time ago, and I think that has been completed in the last four or five days so that we can move our railroad guns now either by the regular railroad around the perimeter of the Island or by coming down through the center where we connected up.

General McNARNEY. Now, as I understand, Alert No. 1 does not require either the occupation of battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service, its releasing the—

General SHORT. It does not, but in this particular case I did require it because those people needed training.

General McNARNEY. Yes, but what I wanted to ask you, to restate the additional—

General SHORT. The requirement was made—it was using [120] this instance where we turned out an Alert No. 1 to train this new organization, was the real purpose of it. It is not part of Alert No. 1.

General McNARNEY. That is, you went beyond Alert No. 1?

General SHORT. We went beyond Alert No. 1, to the extent of ordering the Aircraft Warning Service to work two hours before dawn and one hour after dawn, the most dangerous part of the day, I think you will agree, as far as any air attack is concerned. If I had made it up to about eight or nine o'clock it would have been immensely better.

General McNARNEY. Paragraph 14g. states, District Commanders, assisted by air corps troops, will defend the air fields.

General SHORT. That is on the outlying islands. We have a district commander of the Island of Kauai, and we have two air fields there, one at Barking Sands and one at Burns Field at Port Allen. There is a company of infantry at each air field and then two companies that are held as a reserve. There is an air detachment of probably 60 men at each place, and the district commander, since he is the air officer—that is, at any one of the fields there is no air officer there permanently; the district commander is responsible for the defense.

General McCoy. Were any of those district troops in action?

General SHORT. No, sir. There was no attack at all except shelling of one of the towns in Maui by submarine three or four days later. We have a setup of a district commander at Maui and one at the large island of Hawaii also.

General McNARNEY. That does not apply to the mainland or to Oahu, then? Oahu?

General SHORT. No, there is not any district command. The department command has the responsibility here, but those [121] people are separated. The Island of Hawaii is 200 miles away.

General McNARNEY. I mean on the Island of Oahu the protection of the air fields is the air corps function?

General SHORT. The immediate protection of the air field is the function of the air field commander, supervised by the Hawaiian Air Force.

Now, we have asked eventually to put a battalion of infantry at each one of those air field, but there were plenty of men, especially at Hickam Field, corresponding to number of planes. They had between five and six thousand men there, and when you consider the total number of planes they had to operate, it gave them two or three thousand left over that could have been used for immediate defense. They actually had two battalions of five hundred men each trained with machine guns and rifles for the immediate defense. They had been required to train those. We had sent infantry officers down there to give them that training, for defense against parachute troops and landing by gliders, air transports, or anything of that kind. I figured, in the last analysis, that when the time came that they were trying to land it would mean that we would not have many airplanes to be operating and that the air troops ought to be able to fight for their own protection, in the last analysis, and ought to have enough men trained as infantry to take guns and fight, and that training had been given to them. And in the last maneuvers, in the last exercise, we assumed that the planes had been put out of commission, and we even took 500 of those men and put them down to take over a section of the beach, so that—at least figured to make a final counter attack, just to carry out the idea that any man, when his weapons were gone, could still fight as an individual; if his planes had been knocked out by the enemy, that he didn't sit down with his arms folded and say to somebody, "Come protect me."

[122] General McNARNEY. Did they ever actually set up any espionage or counterespionage organization here?

General SHORT. Oh, yes. We have got a very elaborate—it has been in effect for years.

General McNARNEY. Under the Army?

General SHORT. Yes, and works very closely with the F. B. I. and also with O. N. I., and practically everything that F. B. I. knows, my G-2 knows. I don't think they hold out at all. And the same way, if we have anything we give it to them. Their offices are as close as from here to the window (indicating) to each other downtown, our contact office and Mr. Shivers' office, and they are in constant touch.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

General SHORT. May I—I just received a letter from the Governor of Hawaii here, if I may impose on you long enough.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you may.

General SHORT. I have not read it myself, and I would like to read it to you:

Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would

[123] play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of

these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:

(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of Legislation called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

Now that is what we call the M-day Bill.

(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent.

Incidentally, that was not included in the inventory taken on the 8th and 9th.

Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, [124] since December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of those crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

(3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of shelters for workers [125] in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases

of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. [126] I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.

Very sincerely yours,

J. B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii.

Now, if it is satisfactory, I would like to have a copy of this made and placed in your folders.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think you may.

General SHORT. I will get those copies made, and if you can spare your folders for a few minutes some time I will furnish the copies.

The CHAIRMAN. Make them, if you please, and one of your aides can bring them over.

General SHORT. An hour after I leave here it will be ready to be put in here.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably you had better let the stenographer have it for incorporation in his minutes, and then he will return it to any officer you will designate.

General SHORT. Well, I have a copy of it here. That is not a true copy (indicating), but I will have the ones that go in your book made a true copy.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves, have you any questions?

Admiral REEVES. I have only one or two questions.

You gave, General, three reasons why you ordered Alert No. 1—

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. —instead of Alert No. 2. One of those [127] reasons was that Alert No. 2 would interfere with certain training.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Specifically, with the training on B-17's?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, more than anything else.

Admiral REEVES. More than anything else.

General SHORT. It would have interfered with the training of thousands of new men also.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. Would the sending aloft during the dawn period, when you had the interceptor system in operation, of your pursuit planes, have interfered seriously with training?

General SHORT. I doubt, Admiral, if there was ever a day when there wasn't a very considerable amount of pursuit in the air every morning, I mean habitually.

General McCoy. At that time, you mean?

General SHORT. Yes, habitually there were planes in the air from four o'clock on. There were planes in the air almost all the time except from about eleven o'clock at night until four o'clock in the morning. As I said before, you couldn't step out of your house and look in the air without seeing planes. They were just constantly—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they were the planes of your inshore patrol?

General SHORT. Well, they were planes that were in training, but they would see just as much as—yes, they would have only been in

shore patrol; they wouldn't have gone over 15 miles; they wouldn't have seen anything that those training planes wouldn't have seen constantly.

General McCoy. Well, they were apparently not up on that Sunday morning.

General SHORT. That Sunday morning they were not up, most unusual. Each Sunday morning you are likely to——

[128] General McCoy. How do you explain that?

General SHORT. I wouldn't be able to explain it without asking General Davidson just why; but if they had been up and training they wouldn't have had ammunition, for normally in the training they did not carry ammunition.

Admiral REEVES. I was not referring so much, General, to training measures. Alert No. 1 did not require your planes to be in the air?

General SHORT. No, sir. Alert No. 1 did not cover preparation against an air attack at all. It's sabotage, uprisings, and subversive measures.

Admiral REEVES. Had our pursuit planes been in the air, ordered there as a security measure during the dawn daylight period, they would have been an added security, would they not?

General SHORT. They probably would have been back on their fields about seven o'clock. I mean, you can't just keep them in the air constantly. We had decided that some two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn was the dangerous time, and just as we were working our interceptor station the chances are that if we had had a dawn patrol out it would have returned before eight o'clock. There is no question, if we had had pursuit in the air fully armed and expected this attack at eight o'clock, why, we probably would have—we might have been able to stop it to a very considerable extent, at any rate. Some of them would have gotten through. We think they had approximately 160 to 180 planes in the attack.

Admiral REEVES. But had that contingent of armed pursuit planes been aloft, opposition to a surprise raid would have been possible?

[129] General SHORT. Oh, yes.

Admiral REEVES. Now, in addition to that, and in addition to the conditions prescribed by alert No. 1, had you had the anti-aircraft batteries manned during the morning period, that would have added security, wouldn't it?

General SHORT. Well, it would have added security, the anti-aircraft batteries. They were in action as soon as ten minutes after the—some of them as early as ten minutes after the attack.

Admiral REEVES. For planes——

General SHORT. It would have been an added value.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General SHORT. No argument about it at all.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General SHORT. If we had known——

Admiral REEVES. If you, instead of limiting your dawn daylight alert to two hours after dawn, had placed the limit a little later on, it would also——

General SHORT. It would have been an added factor.

Admiral REEVES. It would have been an added factor.

General SHORT. Of course, you have got to take this into consideration: just like Colonel Potts looking right at this group, with a con-

dition of peace, he had no idea, looking right at the squadron, that it was not friendly planes until he saw the first bomb drop. I mean the condition was such. Now, if we had had that wire that was turned over to R. C. A. at 6:48, then we would have been expecting attack. That was the thing that would have made the difference. But without that wire, if we had had nothing else and if we had had troops in the air, they still probably wouldn't have thought they were enemy planes.

Admiral REEVES. Of course you would adopt security measures at other times than a time when you were expecting an attack, wouldn't you?

[130] General SHORT. Oh, if you were at war, yes. If you were at war you would carry—you would carry——

Admiral REEVES. Or in case of possibility of war?

General SHORT. It is determined absolutely by your estimate. My estimate of the situation here was that the only thing that could seriously be expected was sabotage. I was fully prepared against sabotage, and there has been no sabotage from November 27 to this date. Now, there have been people who have been stationed here in years past who have felt that serious things would happen. We have had complete control of that. That was my estimate. My estimate was that the War Department would let me know of a crisis and that the Navy would let me know of the presence of any carriers in Hawaiian waters, and without that there couldn't be an air attack.

Admiral REEVES. In reference to this distant reconnaissance, a carrier operating at high speed, say 30 knots, might have been several hundred miles, perhaps 500 miles away, the night before?

General SHORT. Oh, yes. No question about that.

Admiral REEVES. So that distant reconnaissance covering the circumference of a circle 500 miles——

General SHORT. Wouldn't do any good.

The CHAIRMAN. If what?

General SHORT. We had planes.

Admiral REEVES. (Continuing)——did not guarantee that you would be notified of the approach of that carrier?

General SHORT. Not if it stopped at 500 miles, no. Our plan and the plans we had sent in to the War Department called for reconnaissance out to a thousand and fifty miles, based on very accurate study as to how close they could come, making the most of the use of darkness, don't you see, to get in, and we figured that the distant reconnaissance should go to a thousand and fifty miles. That was as far as our B-17's [131] could carry it; and that that was the—and there is a very long study in the War Department that we put in on that. But as I understand it the Navy is not limited to reconnaissance for their information of hostile ships, and we had a definite line of Mandate Islands, that that was the closest land base that the Japanese could have, and that was 2,100 miles.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is convenient we shall adjourn until 2 o'clock. I do not want to interrupt you, Admiral. You may go on.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Shall we adjourn, then, to 2 o'clock, and you will return then at 2 o'clock?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Now may I collect these (indicating) and put in that letter then?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. We will leave them right here at the desk so you can have an officer collect them.

General SHORT. I will have them collected, and I will get that communication in.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[132]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves, any questions?

Admiral REEVES. No, I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you referred to several conferences you had with the Commander in Chief of the Fleet and the Commander of the 14th District in the period from November 27 to December 7.

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any estimate of the situation discussed between you at those conferences?

General SHORT. We discussed the estimate in this way, particularly in reference to the relief. If a relief was sent to any of these islands, there are no harbors at Wake or Johnston or, I do not think any, at Palmyra, where large transports could pull up and begin discharging troops, and we discussed the danger that would exist during the period when the troops were discharging because it would take some hours to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. That means that you were discussing a possible danger?

General SHORT. A possible danger.

The CHAIRMAN. Due to Japanese hostilities?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Within a period of a few days these transports would be going across?

General SHORT. I don't know when they would be going across. We recommended that it be put off till the completion of these fields, which would mean 2 or 3 months, but it was always a possible danger.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not referring so much to that as I am referring to these telegrams with respect to the strategy indicating that the War Department and the Navy Department [133] were progressing before the outbreak of hostilities?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Or the severance of diplomatic relations. Did you discuss that situation with your naval colleagues?

General SHORT. I did not go into detail. Admiral Kimmel at one time—I don't remember his words—but he expressed the idea that he was handicapped by having to absolutely maintain a defensive attitude. May I say if I speak perfectly frank—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. May I say that the Navy, and I think Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves will bear me out, that the Navy are more careful about their secret information than any other department of the Government. They are possible more careful than the War Department. I would hesitate lots of times to ask for specific information because I knew the point of view they took about secrecy

and that they would not tell their staff officers as must as I told mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is not exactly what I am getting at. After all, I am only a layman, but reading the communications of the War and Navy Departments sent to you from the period of October 16 to November 27 I should have expected when I looked at them that there was a possibility of imminent danger of hostile attack from Japan, a surprise attack.

Did you get that impression, or was there any discussion between you and your Navy colleagues as to that?

General SHORT. The most positive expression we got over this period was that by—when Admiral Kimmel asked his War Plans Operations Officer what he considered was the possibility of a surprise attack on Oahu, and he said, "None."

If Admiral Kimmel did not agree with that conclusion he made no expression of it to the contrary.

The CHAIRMAN. If I get the right impression from your testimony, it is this: that while the force knew that Oahu [134] was subject to a surprise attack, none of you envisaged it within a period of days or weeks; is that right?

General SHORT. I had the feeling, and I know it was on my part and Admiral Kimmel's that as long as he had as much of his exercises of the fleet here in Hawaiian waters, that they would not try to take a chance with a carrier attack. If the fleet had been ordered away from the Hawaiian waters I would have been extremely apprehensive.

I knew that they had a force out constantly, carriers with perhaps 90 planes, scouring the seas, but I did not believe it was possible for them to actually carry through an attack without the Navy getting something and becoming suspicious.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless I am misinformed, the general understanding in both the Army and Navy has been for many years that a surprise airplane attack might be the method of Japanese attack on Oahu?

General SHORT. I definitely would have expected it if the fleet had not been here.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, wouldn't the fleet in Pearl Harbor be a very fine target for such an attack?

General SHORT. That is true. There were two task forces out at that time with airplane carriers. I believe that is the first time since I came here in February when all the ships have been in the harbor. I did not know until the next day that they were in. They come in and they go out constantly on exercises. I cannot say this is correct, but I think they probably had more battleships here then than at any time since I have been here.

The CHAIRMAN. You say in your report to the War Department that because of the seriousness of the situation depicted in the Chief of Staff's telegram of November 27 that you ordered Alert No. 1?

General SHORT. Yes.

[135] The CHAIRMAN. What did you mean in your statement about "the seriousness of the situation"?

General SHORT. I figured that we were always in very great danger here from sabotage. Take for instance when they closed down the banks. I thought then that there was a very great possibility that there may be something of that kind, and I put an Alert No. 1 in. I felt that any change in the situation for the worse at all might cause

the Japanese agents—as there were some here—to attempt to carry out sabotage operations that would hurt us.

The CHAIRMAN. From the time you came into the command of this Department, sir, did you have any information of subversive activities of any kind on this island, furnished through your own intelligence, the Naval Intelligence, or the FBI?

General SHORT. We knew, and we had a list of probably something over 500 people. We had something over 300 we knew and also the consular agents.

I do not believe since I came here that there has been any act of sabotage of any importance at all, but the FBI and my intelligence outfit knew of a lot of these people and knew they probably would watch the opportunity to carry out something.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the military opinion as to the most dangerous time for an airplane raid on Oahu?

General SHORT. About dawn or maybe two hours before dawn, because we figure that they will do more damage if they can hit in the dark or just at dawn and get back to their ships. If they attacked entirely at night they might get back to their ships and not be able to land on them. Then they could not land without turning on their lights. I do not think any of them like to land on the ships at night, and we figured they would never attack so early that they would get back to their ships when it would not be daylight, but that they would always attack about dawn.

[136] The CHAIRMAN. Under the conditions prevailing since you came here, which dawn was the most dangerous dawn from the point of view of attack? Which day of the week?

General SHORT. Definitely figuring the day of the week, you would probably say they would figure Sunday would be the day that there would be more people off and that the command would be less on Sunday than any other time.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the condition with respect to leaves over that week-end?

General SHORT. No different from the other.

The CHAIRMAN. No different from any other week-end?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But different than week-days, though?

General SHORT. Our distance is so short that any man can get back to his post in an hour and can get back to their posts from town within 30 minutes. So with respect to the amount of time involved, the only reason is that Saturday night was the only night they could stay out, because on week-days we worked them hard. They would not have any way of going out because that was the difference between Sunday morning and other mornings.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the percentage of effectives on station on that Sunday morning?

General SHORT. I imagine that would run about——

The CHAIRMAN. Eighty percent?

General SHORT. Eighty percent or maybe more, because I would say probably 90% of them—they will not get home until 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning, so they are very much discouraged from staying in town.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the condition of the anti-aircraft crews on that Sunday morning? Were they skeleton crews?

General SHORT. Yes, skeleton crews at every gun.

General McCox. You mean available for manning?

General SHORT. No, on account of sabotage we had covered [137] every gun, covered every installation with the men right at the weapon, because we were taking no chance of sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. When you had your discussions, sir, from November 27 to December 7 with the Navy commanders, were you informed of what scouting forces they had out?

General SHORT. No, sir. I usually knew that they had task forces out. We usually talk about it.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no discussion about increasing the patrol?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any call upon you for additional planes?

General SHORT. No. There was no time when we refused planes to them. They understood perfectly well they would be made available if necessary, if we had them.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no information as to a message from the Island, either by the FBI or your own intelligence department, to some Japanese person in Japan?

General SHORT. The evening before they listened in to a telephone conversation in Japanese between a local man here and somebody in Japan. This was about 6:30 Saturday night, and it was a very good attempt so that we were not even able, even today reading it, there is nothing that you can tie to except a conversation about general conditions here among the Japanese people. The only thing that would arouse your suspicions now is about asking how many ships there were in Pearl Harbor. The reply from the man at this end was that ships were in and out all the time and there were some, but not so many in recently as there had been back in September or January last year, that the number was cut down. In other words, indicating that there was some withdrawals of ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you staying that night, Saturday night?

[138] General SHORT. I went up to Schofield Barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you on duty?

General SHORT. No, I went to a dinner and left there sometime after 10 o'clock. I was right here.

The CHAIRMAN. You slept here in your headquarters?

General SHORT. Not in my headquarters but in my home.

The CHAIRMAN. You said something about knowing that there was a Navy carrier working to the north?

General SHORT. Yes. Admiral Halsey had a task force in the direction of Midway. I did not have official notice, but from talks I knew definitely that they had a carrier and a task force to the south because I sent an officer. I asked permission to send one of my officers with that task force because they were carrying out fleet land exercises that I wanted information on. I did not have an officer with the forth to the north.

The CHAIRMAN. General, there was a third attack at 11 o'clock on the morning of December 7, was there not?

General SHORT. It depends. I think there was. It depends on the exact location. Some say the attacks were at 8, 9, and 10, and another

will say there is a definite attack at 11. I think it depends on the exact location. I would say at that time a definite attack was at 11:30.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it effective?

General SHORT. They all caused losses. The big losses were the torpedo-plane attack on the first attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Did greater losses occur in the 11 o'clock attack than the earlier ones?

General SHORT. They were greater than in the 8 o'clock attack. In the last two attacks we caused the most losses. We brought down two of their planes. I don't know if we brought down any more than that in the first attack.

In the records you have the planes destroyed and that will also show the exact time on every plane.

[139] The CHAIRMAN. There were some statements in the newspapers—whether responsible or not—that some of the general officers in charge of defense of the Island due to drinking were not in proper condition. What do you have to say about that?

General SHORT. I am sure it is absolutely wrong. In the first place General Martin, who is head of the Air Force, never takes a drink. I have never seen him take a drink. I don't think he has taken a drink in years, because he has some sort of stomach ulcers.

I have seen General Burgin take a cocktail. I take a cocktail myself. General Davidson, who handles the pursuits, never takes a drink. So when that question is raised, there are two of the three that I know never take a drink.

I think General Rudolph takes a drink before dinner, but I have never seen any general officer in this command who has ever shown up in the District at any time having been drinking too much.

The CHAIRMAN. Since you have been here, do you know of any general officer under your command who has ever been unfit for duty due to excessive drinking?

General SHORT. No, and I am sure that the condition has never existed. I know them all individually, and I am sure that it never has existed.

General MCCOY. I know them all and I can concur in that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that statement should be in the record.

General, Colonel Fielder furnished you, I suppose, under date of the 22d of December, 1941, a summary of the situation as of 7:30 a. m. December 7, 1941.

General SHORT. That would go to General Emmons, who has relieved me in command.

The CHAIRMAN. That was made up after the fact?

[140] General SHORT. Yes. We put out a daily summary of intelligence about being in combat.

General MCCOY. May I ask the General to look at that and see if he agrees with that estimate of the situation?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I would like to have him do that. I would be very glad if you would do so, General, and look over it carefully and slowly.

(The Chairman handed a report to General Short.)

The CHAIRMAN. At our request, a telephone conversation referred to in General Short's testimony has been furnish for the information of this Commission.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, you have looked over this estimate of conditions prepared by Colonel Fielder?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that expresses your view of the situation?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. There is only one thing I did not know until the next day. I did not know the FBI had discovered some papers were burned at the Japanese Consulate. I did not know that until the next day.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether the FBI reported that to some of your subordinates on the 5th or 6th?

General SHORT. They may have reported it on the 6th, because the officers were right alongside of each other. I knew it the next day. I talked with Mr. Shivers.

I knew there were some burned papers that they had actually arrested or interfered with the burning of papers and had gotten a complete file.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that the FBI rescued some papers from the fire?

General SHORT. That was the next day. They got almost a complete file.

[141] The CHAIRMAN. They did?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Neither your intelligence nor any other intelligence unit in touch with you knew anything about a secret code of blinker signals here?

General SHORT. No, sir. It was common practice with the fishermen in fishing offshore to have lights so that they can judge their return, and that has been largely true in Hawaiian waters from Japanese fishermen and that serves as a beacon light for them. Some of these may have been fakes and some of their signals bona fide to get the fishermen in.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that after the airplane attack these Japanese fishing boats started to talk on the radio so that they blurred out your signals so that you were not able to judge what was going on. Is that true?

General SHORT. I think that is rather an exaggeration. I think you can ask Colonel Fielder about it, because I do not know all about the details. I was quite busy after the attack.

General McCoy. Is this Colonel Fielder a G-2?

General SHORT. Yes. He can answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no other questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, since December 7 the principle here regarding the command has been changed?

General SHORT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is now under the principle of unity of command?

General SHORT. Yes, under the Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who is that officer?

General SHORT. Admiral Pye until Admiral Nimitz gets here.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is under the command of the United States fleet?

General SHORT. Yes.

[142] Admiral STANDLEY. Not the commandant of the District?

General SHORT. No. The commandant of the District is junior to the Army commander, and that is the way it is for tactical purposes. The Navy has taken over the military governorship.

Admiral STANDLEY. In that change in command or the principle of command, has there been any change in the organization or authority or responsibility for defense of the island?

General SHORT. That has happened since I was relieved from command.

Admiral STANDLEY. You would not know of that?

General SHORT. No, I would not. I know since the order was received that General Emmons had a long conference with Admiral Pye, but I do not know the details of any understanding of theirs. I doubt that it has affected the principle very much except that now in place of getting coordination, Admiral Pye would be able to order it.

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke in one case here of getting certain messages or a message from Admiral Kimmel?

General SHORT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then in other cases you got messages or an interchange of messages with Admiral Block?

General SHORT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Why is that?

General SHORT. Our prescribed channel for anything formal is Admiral Block, but if there is a formal agreement, they print it and Admiral Block would ordinarily sign that agreement. Very frequently I get word from the War Department to confer with the Commander in Chief of the fleet and Admiral Block practically always sat in one those conferences, too.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then would it be possible for Admiral Kimmel to get a message from the Chief of Naval Operations, relaying certain warnings and so forth, and you not receive that message?

[143] General SHORT. Yes, it would be possible without that message specifically telling him to furnish to to me, he would only give it to me as a matter of information.

Very frequently if he got any information that he thought was of importance and he knew it was not being furnished to me, he would send a staff officer to me to show it to me or else give me a paraphrased copy. Sometimes he did one and sometimes the other. It was voluntary on his part.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was there any sort of embarrassment or misunderstanding or anything untoward because of the fact that there were two officers down there to deal with?

General SHORT. No. We had very friendly relations. Most of the time we all three sat in on a discussion.

Admiral STANDLEY. You don't remember having seen or heard of a message that started out, "This is a war warning"?

General SHORT. No, sir, I didn't see it.

Admiral STANDLEY. That message never got to you?

General SHORT. No.

General McCox. Didn't it instruct the admiral to inform him?

General SHORT. May I ask the date of that message?

The CHAIRMAN. November 27.

General SHORT. It may have been the same. It may have been the same as my message of the 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. No. It started out, "This is a war warning."

General SHORT. I don't remember seeing it. I think I would remember seeing that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I asked you whether you thought you had been apprised of that message but you said you did not recall, that you had been in conference with the Navy officers and supposed you had seen it.

General SHORT. Oh, I was in conference for two or three hours. If they got that later in the day—

[144] The CHAIRMAN. You were in conference with them again later than this?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They may or may not have shown it to you, but that is the best you can say on that?

General SHORT. I do not know whether I saw it or not. I am not sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Have I asked your staff whether there is any report of the Navy having messaged it to you?

General SHORT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. We have not received any reply?

Mr. HOWE. There was some difficulty in the files.

General SHORT. I did get a message from the Chief of Staff on the same day.

General MCCOY. Did you show it to the admiral?

General SHORT. I think I did. We had the same procedure that anything that is important, I send a copy right over by the staff officer, and especially if the Chief of Staff said to give this information to the Navy, then I would send it over just as promptly as possible.

General MCCOY. I remember Admiral Stark read that to us and he said it instructed Admiral Kimmel to show it to the Army man.

General SHORT. I may have seen it. It may not have had any information that wasn't in mine of the 27th, in which case I would remember it.

Admiral STANDLEY. But you don't remember that statement? You say you don't remember the wording, "This is a war warning"?

General SHORT. That is correct. I don't remember.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, you made statements in regard to anti-aircraft. That is now installed here?

General SHORT. Yes. It is about six weeks since that work started.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is it entirely completed?

[145] General SHORT. No, sir. We were authorized to begin three fixed and six mobile stations. We started building these fixed stations. We had to build a road to the mount of Haleakelá, 10,000 feet high, and they are putting in a station there now. That is the highest mountain we are putting one on.

We started putting one, which is almost completed, on the Island of Kauai. The Navy has one force to the northwest.

They started putting one on Kahala that is almost completed. That is a steep grade. You have to use a cable. We have been four months trying to get a priority on a cable. So, of the fixed stations, none of them were in operation.

Later on, probably a month ago, we were authorized to build three additional fixed stations that have been started. Our mobile stations are working and six fixed stations are working.

Admiral STANDLEY. How long has it been since you first requested this detector material?

General SHORT. I would say it is probably back about March 6 that we knew about the attachment, because I made a serious effort to have some of these things operating by July 1. The parts did not arrive.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the reason for the delay in obtaining this material?

General SHORT. Of course, it is a new thing and it had to be manufactured. These electrical things take time. Apparently they could not get it out fast enough. That is the demand of electrical things in every way, not just aircraft warning.

Admiral STANDLEY. You referred to the possibility or the fact that certain alerts would interfere with your training? Is it also a fact that certain material which you have furnished to outlying stations has also been at the possible expense of your defense?

General SHORT. Yes, that is true. We had a total of [146] 21 B-17's. We sent nine of those to the Philippines and I have ready six more with parts to go. That order was cut down to six planes in operation. Then the War Department asked me if we could let them have 48 75-millimeter guns, and I think it was somewhere around 120 30-caliber machine guns. I wired back that we could spare the machine guns. We had to take the beach guns to spare the 75's, but I thought the Philippines were in a more difficult way and possibly needed them worse, and I told them they would be ready, and I put them in the boat and sent them to the Philippines in the next 24 or 48 hours.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, in the coordination plan, the general plan, you had time to deplete some of your own defenses?

General SHORT. Yes, but I thought if I informed the War Department about the 75's they might not have ordered them sent.

General McCoy. May I ask a question about the ammunition? Did you send at any time in the recent past aerial bombs or reserves of ammunition to the Philippines?

General SHORT. I know we haven't sent aerial bombs. I don't believe we sent off the ammunition with the 75's. If they told us to I would have sent it, because we had enough ammunition that we could have done it without depleting our supplies.

Admiral STANDLEY. You referred to the request for funds and your delays in obtaining money or materials, delays in building projects. Could you tell us what steps have been taken in the way of training and operations which would bring out and emphasize the needs of this command both for the Army and the Navy in order to secure the material for its protection and function as a secure base?

General SHORT. I think the Navy agreed with me in the building of the air and the anti-aircraft which were the first [147] things that we needed, and if the fleet left and took most of it for distant reconnaissance there would not be anything else to do about it. So we made a comprehensive study and had asked to have possibly 184 B-17's so that we could make a 360-degree patrol for a thousand miles.

Admiral STANDLEY. What I am trying to bring out is whether the Army and the Navy engaged in joint problems, in joint evaluations for the purpose of bringing out the needs for defense?

General SHORT. The Navy participated in May from the 12th to the 24th. We had maneuvers, and the Navy participated in the air

phase of those maneuvers and had fleet exercises. There were fleet exercises about the last week in March and the first week in April to get our two air forces working in coordination. We haven't had any exercises in land operations. With respect to the land forces getting land operations against this Island, the ground force would not get the same exercises, the same as against the Island of Kauai, because that represented the characteristics that he thought he might run into out in the Mandate Islands. I think that was the main purpose he took his task force there, and this was the reason they were away from 8 o'clock Sunday morning before this attack started. The reason I sent the officer along was to observe these land operations.

Admiral STANDLEY. From your knowledge or from the facts that you have, do you know how far back, how many years back the Navy and the Army have been building up on joint operations here, joint exercises or how long the joint exercises have been between the fleet and the Army?

General SHORT. I think it must be back to 1934, but I think we had more detailed exercises in recent months than ever before and in many exercises was just working as a team.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you here when the fleet came here in 1925?

[148] General SHORT. I was never stationed here until last February.

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke about going before the Senate here. How many members of that Senate are Japanese?

General SHORT. There is one or two. I think no more than two.

Admiral STANDLEY. Does the House have any greater number?

General SHORT. The House may have as many as four or five. I don't know exactly.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do not put this in the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

General McCoy. Does it show in your statement the description of the attacks as to the results and as to the effects and as to the time and the losses on both sides?

General SHORT. I have given the detailed studies there of the planes before the attack, the ones damaged, and the ones back in commission on December 20. I showed what damage we inflicted on the enemy in the way of planes. I do not believe I put in there the losses in men. I think I can probably give that to you from memory.

The dead up to December 20 was nine officers and 223 enlisted men; the wounded, 16 officers and 435 enlisted men. Some of those were slight wounds and some of them were serious.

General McCoy. Can you state where those occurred?

General SHORT. They occurred very largely at Hickam Field. There were 38 killed at Wheeler Field.

In Hickam Field most of the losses occurred there—there is a large barracks that houses 3,500 men, and they bombed that barracks, and practically anybody who was on the top floor in that barracks was killed or seriously wounded. The people on the first floor weren't injured at all. It is a three-story building. Most of the losses were taken right in that one barracks.

[149] General McCoy. Were there any losses in attempting to get the planes into the air?

General SHORT. Yes. There were some planes pulled right out of the fire. That started at Wheeler Field, where they succeeded in pulling the planes out of the fire.

General McCox. Have you made any investigation of these separate incidents at Hickam Field and at Wheeler Field and at other installations?

General SHORT. As to just exactly the details?

General McCox. As to what happened?

General SHORT. We have gotten in detailed reports, and I have gone over them and tried to arrive at what happened. Of course, there are always discrepancies. You get a difference of opinion as to just what happened.

I have gone over them and I have culled from the statements of the anti-aircraft and made a chart showing exactly when the battery started firing and what it thought it brought down.

I have a statement in there showing when the pursuit planes were put in the air, which was 8:50, and some of them earlier, and the bombers took off at 11:40 under naval control. I don't know if these bombers were actually in the air earlier than that or not.

General McCox. The commanding officers in each one of these places have made reports?

General SHORT. Yes.

General McCox. Did you make any investigation as to the conduct of the senior officers in these installations?

General SHORT. All the reports I have about the conduct indicate that everybody at the time was excellent in conduct. I know I talked with Colonel Fielder, who is commanding that post there, and he told me he was machine-gunned getting across the road from his quarters to the hangar while the first attack [150] was going on. He was not hit, but the Japanese planes came down the line and turned around and came back and had apparently figured the officers would be trying to get across the road to the hangar line, but I am not sure whether there were four officers, or whether they were killed in getting across the road by the planes.

General McCox. Do you know if all the commanding officers were present in the garrison?

General SHORT. Yes, I know they were all present.

Admiral STANDLEY. If I may, before we leave this there were some headlines in the papers before we left the States, charges and so forth, and among them I will start out with the newspaper account given out by the Secretary of the Navy on his return. He stated that, as I remember, the Army and Navy were not on the alert. Is that in his statement? Did he say the Army and the Navy, or the military and the naval forces? I think he said the Army and the Navy, but of that I am not certain.

General SHORT. I think he said the service. The first report I saw said "service", and then another report said "the Army and the Navy."

General McCox. What do you think that was based on?

Admiral STANDLEY. The one I saw said the Army and the Navy.

General McCox. What do you think that was based on, General?

General SHORT. I talked with Mr. Knox for probably an hour and a half or two hours. I gave him very largely but not in as great detail what I have told you gentlemen here this morning.

General McCoy. You did not present anything to him in writing?

General SHORT. None whatever, no. It was over at Admiral Kimmel's quarters.

[151] General McCoy. Were the admiral and you together at the time?

General SHORT. Yes. Secretary Knox, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Block, and Captain Smith, and I think Captain McMorris was there part of the time.

General McCoy. Do you know whether he made any other investigation?

General SHORT. He came over to my command post the following morning and wanted to get a picture of how we organized the fighting, and I had a conference arranged and I had all of our detailed moves, showing the whole location and the sea-coast fire and the location of the lines and the location of our observation posts and detailed maps showing the location of the air fields and everything of that kind, and of our communications.

Then I had a series of staff officers for three minutes, and of each of them he asked questions.

The conference was arranged by Colonel Phillips taking about three minutes to describe to him the general plan of defense of the Island. That was outlined by Colonel Powell next, the Signal Officer of the Department, explaining in detail our signal system with maps so that he could get a picture of what kind of communications we had. That was followed by Major Lawton describing the coast and artillery defenses and the location of the guns and the sea-coast fire and the range of the different guns, and things of that kind.

Then General Martin took up the question of the air work, the aircraft work, and the Secretary asked him many questions, and in place of what was to be three minutes for discussion, it probably went into ten minutes.

Following General Martin, the 24th Division operations, or the infantry, was described by General Brush presenting the ground defenses of the 24th Division. Then the operations officer of the 25th Division presented—no, it was the officer [152] of the 24th presenting the ground defenses and General Brush presented the 25th ground defenses.

We tried to give him a complete picture of just how we were organized to fight and how we carried it out.

When he told me what he wanted I asked him and he said that was all he wanted. Then Colonel Phillips was finished presenting that and he asked questions for about 15 minutes, largely of the air, about what was done at that time, and then he went through my command post, and I took him through.

So far as I know, that was the only investigation he made of what happened in the Army forces. I am quite sure that was all he saw.

General McCoy. So far as you know, did your subordinates all carry out their missions and duties?

General SHORT. Yes.

General McCoy. To your satisfaction?

General SHORT. I think without exception. I think there may have been some feeling in the War Department that maybe the air had been

a little asleep or something. General Arnold, the Chief of Staff of the air called me. He talked with Colonel Phillips. I was out at the time. He asked Colonel Phillips whether he was satisfied with General Martin's action, and he said he had somebody he could replace him with.

Colonel Phillips told him he thought I was, but he left word and told me to radio. I radioed as soon as I got in that I was completely satisfied with Martin's conduct.

General McCoy. Have you been conscious, as a responsible commander, of the way these Axis attacks have been carried out?

General SHORT. What is that?

General McCoy. Have you been conscious, as a responsible commander, of the way the Axis powers have successfully launched each attack without a declaration of war, a surprise attack, particularly in the air and against air fields?

General SHORT. Yes. I have realized that particularly. [153] As I say, if the fleets had not been present in Hawaiian waters I would have expected such a thing, but I did not think it was possible with the fleet here.

General McCoy. Do you remember the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War and the attack on the Russian fleet?

General SHORT. Yes, I remember that perfectly.

General McCoy. In other words, having that in mind, and what has happened during this war and things of that nature, these surprise attacks in each case, why did it happen that there remained in your mind the threat only of attempted sabotage?

General SHORT. Because I felt that if the Navy which had enough resources in the way of intelligence agencies and so forth, and if the Navy with enough ships out on task forces with forces out week after week covering several hundred miles, and I felt that if they did not succeed in intercepting a carrier they would at least know if they were within hundreds of miles of Hawaii. We all recognized the facilities which they had in the way of ships and planes.

General McCoy. It is an old habit of responsible soldiers to consider the worst that might happen. Not what you think is going to happen but the worst that might happen from the enemy.

General SHORT. Yes.

General McCoy. Did you think of that?

General SHORT. Yes; frankly I had thought of that. I took into consideration all my wires from the War Department where they were interested in not alarming the public and not causing publicity and actions about sabotage and subversive movements, and I had sent my order to them and they knew exactly what I was doing, and they did not raise any objection and they did not say I was not doing the right thing, and I thought they knew more about what was going on in a diplomatic way than I did.

General McCoy. I am conscious as an old soldier of the [154] great irritation in reading in the papers at home suspicions of the reasons for the Army and the Navy not being on guard; not being ready to have any suspicions, but having in mind the fact that for 25 years this particular command has just been training and preparing for this very thing.

General SHORT. Yes.

General McCoy. There have been various things said to the effect, in one of them, that on Saturday night everybody was out on parties and that there was unusually heavy drinking in Hawaii. Now, without making any direct charges, just those general statements, and I am satisfied that no such things did occur because you would not know what every officer in your command or your soldiers were doing, but are you satisfied that whatever they did had nothing to do with what happened the next morning?

General Short. I am absolutely positive. My men are not the men who would get involved in getting drunk. My two air men never take a drink. General Martin and General Davidson have not had a drink in years. I do not know whether they ever have, but I know in years they have not had.

I am sure nothing anybody did the night before had anything to do with what took place the next morning.

General McCoy. Have you looked into the fact that this surprise attack occurred on Sunday morning and what happened in the past on Sunday morning as to the subordinate officers and men being on duty?

General Short. Well, I know the division, the 24th Division, was already turning out within 15 minutes, in time to reply to anti-aircraft guns or machine-gun fire from the air. The whole division had moved out by 8:30, and the same thing with the 25th Division. These troops were going out when the Alert No. 3 was ordered.

General McCoy. Do your records indicate how many men were present?

General Short. No, sir.

[155] General McCoy. May we have that looked into, Mr. Recorder? I would like to know how many men were present for duty and how many were absent.

Is it possible to get that from your records?

General Short. The records would not show whether they were present right at the formation, but I think that they would know when the men fell in how many men there were. If a company had only three or four men missing apparently they would not have taken the time for a full roll call at all.

[155A] General McCoy. I doubt very much if they had roll calls in most cases.

General Short. I don't imagine. That is, they would know generally whether they had 95% or whether they had a much smaller number.

General McCoy. Were you conscious that these Axis movements almost without exception took place on Sunday?

General Short. I don't remember that I had noted that particular thing.

General McCoy. At any time, as far as you remember, had you thought of the fact that Sunday was the most dangerous day?

General Short. I had not given that particular thought. Here that would probably affect us less than almost any place because, I say, the men get to their posts in thirty minutes to an hour, and practically nobody ever stays in town.

General McCoy. Did you issue any instructions in view of the alert as to the number of men or proportion of men that should be permitted to leave their commands?

General SHORT. Ordinarily a minimum of 50% is kept in the post at all times on alerts.

General McCoy. But did you issue any special order as the result of the alert?

General SHORT. No. It has been my practice that on any kind of alert 50% of the command must be immediately available to turn out, and in certain organizations there must be a hundred percent, complete.

General McCoy. Did you issue any special instruction on that score?

General SHORT. No, sir.

General McCoy. As a result of the imminence of hostilities?

General SHORT. Not on that particular point, because we had—the reserves were maintained at certain definite places, [156] full battalions.

General McCoy. Did I understand you to say that it was not customary for the Admiral to notify you when his fleet was leaving or entering the harbor?

General SHORT. No, sir, I did not get notice.

General McCoy. You never did?

General SHORT. No, sir, not personally. Now, of course, my harbor control post knew every time a ship went in or out, but whether—any kind of a ship.

The CHAIRMAN. And where would that information be deposited as a matter of record?

General SHORT. The harbor control post down at Fort Kamehameha; it was a combination post that the Army and the Navy operate there, and no—

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, that didn't come to your headquarters?

General SHORT. No, it didn't come to my headquarters. I could have had it come to my headquarters.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. But I did not have it come to my headquarters. No boat can come in or go out without signalling that post and getting authority, and that was operated in combination, Army and Navy. The chief thing was that, so that our harbor defense guns would know any minute whether—we could tell them whether to fire on a ship or not.

General McCoy. Do you know or have you been informed since of when the battle ship divisions came into Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. I am of the opinion that they came in the Saturday afternoon, but I am just relying on memory without ever having any official report, so it would be better not to say.

General McCoy. Did the Admiral at that time ask you for any special protection or to be on guard to protect his ships?

[157] General SHORT. No, sir.

General McCoy. Nor Admiral Bloch?

General SHORT. No, sir.

General McCoy. So that there were no special precautions taken?

General SHORT. None.

General McCoy. When the fleet was in or out of the harbor? No change?

General SHORT. No. Just regularly they were always sending out a couple of task forces and would be bringing another one back in, and they handled that themselves except for this harbor control post.

General McCoy. I have no further questions for the present.

The CHAIRMAN. I have another question or two, General. Would it be true to say that this attack was a complete surprise to both Army and Navy?

General SHORT. I think so, definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. And would it be true to say that its initial success was due to a lack of a state of readiness against an air attack of this kind by both branches of the service?

General SHORT. Partly. I will say this: that if we had been absolutely on the alert for this kind of an attack, I believe that those low flying planes that came in at 200 feet would probably have gotten in regardless. It's pretty hard—your gunfire is very ineffective against planes as low as 200 feet, and the chances are they would have gotten in. We would have probably gotten a lot of the others.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is your chief intelligence officer?

General SHORT. Colonel Fielder.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell?

General SHORT. He is what we call the contact officer. He stays—he has charge of our counterespionage group and works [158] intimately with F. B. I. He has his office downtown right adjoining F. B. I. and works intimately with them, and he has a group of counterintelligence police working under him.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get any report through your Intelligence on December 3rd with respect to a radio message to Japan giving a pretty definite outline of the form and nature of this attack?

General SHORT. I don't remember anything of that kind at all. Are you sure that it was not deciphered after the attack?

The CHAIRMAN. No, I am not.

General SHORT. No, I know I didn't—I haven't seen all of those, but in this file of the consul, the Japanese consul, that the F. B. I. got when they went there to—when they went to arrest them there they got this file, and they sent the file down to Naval Intelligence to be broken, and I understand that they did get very definite information as to the nature of the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you informed on December 3rd, 1941, that the Japanese consulate was burning its papers and records?

General SHORT. No, sir, I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you personally were never informed of the occurrence of that?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of that occurrence, whenever it took place, until after the attack?

General SHORT. That is correct. Are you sure of the date, Mr. Justice?

Admiral STANDLEY. I have the 6th.

General SHORT. I think it was December 6th that they show rather than the 3rd, and I didn't know—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure of the date.

General SHORT. I didn't know until the next day; I did not [159] until the next day when I checked with Mr. Shivers, the head of the F. B. I., that there had been any burning of papers before.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know when your staff was informed of that fact?

General SHORT. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir. That is all I have.

Admiral REEVES. General, you said that had you been fully alert, and had this attack not been a surprise, that you think the low flying planes might have been successful?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Because your guns wouldn't be effective against them?

General SHORT. They are not as effective.

Admiral REEVES. Do you mean that you relied entirely on anti-aircraft gunfire for security, or do you rely also on pursuit and fighter planes?

General SHORT. If you knew exactly the minute that that attack was going to take place, you would have your pursuit in the air to meet it, and you would try to meet it many miles out; but if you had a squadron on the ground ready to go into the air there would be quite a possibility that those first low planes would have gotten in before you could have gotten to them. Without you had been tipped off that an attack was going to take place at a certain hour and certain minute you would never have—you couldn't possibly keep all your pursuit in the air constantly for that kind of a proposition.

Admiral REEVES. If you had been fully alert your radio detector service would have given warning of the approach?

General SHORT. Radio detector service covers—

Admiral REEVES. And your fighter planes might have been in the air?

General SHORT. They gave us 35 minutes warning. If a [160] state of war had existed and we had had a squadron always ready to take off, we undoubtedly would have gotten that squadron in the air. We could not keep all of our planes in such a state of readiness that we could get them all in the air in 35 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. That was on account of the size of your field relative to your planes?

General SHORT. Well, no. I mean you couldn't do that day in and day out; you would wear out your troops and your planes, and you wouldn't have anybody when the crucial time came.

General McCoy. You spoke, however, of the air being full of planes every morning starting at four o'clock in the morning. Apparently there were none up on this morning, of all others?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Sunday morning. Have you looked into the reason for that?

General SHORT. I have not looked into the reason for that because the details of the—I mean the exact time that the field sent up a certain group of pilots for training was a detail that they ran, and I have not looked into it.

General McCoy. General Davidson would know about that?

General SHORT. General Davidson and General Rudolph would both know the reasons why.

General McCoy. What is General Rudolph's command?

General SHORT. Rudolph commands the bombers, the bomber wing.

General McCoy. General Davidson commands the pursuit planes?

General SHORT. General Davidson commands the pursuit planes.

General McCoy. Are there any of the air attack planes here, air attack squadrons?

[161] General SHORT. Air what?

General MCCOY. Or do they have any of those nowadays?

General McNARNEY. The A-20's have taken their place nowadays.

General SHORT. The attack.

General McNARNEY. The two-engined light bombers, A-20 attack.

General SHORT. Yes.

General MCCOY. They don't have that low flying formation that you used to have?

General McNARNEY. No; that has been somewhat passe since they have built the two-engined light bomber which they call the attack, but they do do some low flying.

General MCCOY. Would such planes be able to handle such an attack as these low flying torpedo planes made?

General McNARNEY. They could, yes, but would probably use the A-20A fighter.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any A-20's?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. We had ten. I think there were nine in commission and one out on that morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that the bulk of the morning flying was practice flying?

General SHORT. Yes, just ordinarily, just regular and regular training flying.

The CHAIRMAN. Training flying?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, the bulk of all the flying. The only time that we did straight reconnaissance flying was when we were carrying out a problem with the Navy or sent out for long distance reconnaissance for the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any warning system on Hickam Field? And, if so, how was the alarm to be set off?

General SHORT. The details of that, I believe it would be safer if you ask—

[162] The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General SHORT. Because I might be wrong in the thing.

General MCCOY. Were the pursuit planes armed and supplied with ammunition at all?

General SHORT. They were not.

General MCCOY. If they went up at all they had—

General SHORT. They had to arm their—yes, they did; they had to arm their planes.

General MCCOY. In other words, up to that moment the planes were not on a war footing?

General SHORT. They were not, no sir.

General McNARNEY. Have you reached any conclusion as to why the Japs picked approximately eight o'clock to make their attack?

General SHORT. No. The only way you could arrive at it would be the fact that they made up their minds—that they knew we would figure that it had to be made sometime around the vicinity of daylight to get the benefit of the darkness hour running their carriers in, that we might be expecting them more about dawn, and that they would delay it an hour as a bigger surprise. That is the only conclusion I could draw, that they figured they would get more surprise out of it at eight o'clock than they would at dawn, and maybe—that's just guesswork.

General McNARNEY. That would be my conclusion; more surprise.

General SHORT. Yes. They expected us to be more careful at the most dangerous hour, which we were.

Admiral REEVES. Could it have been possible that they were aware of your standing order to secure at seven o'clock each morning?

General SHORT. It could be possible.

Admiral REEVES. That was true, was it, that that was a standing order?

[163] General SHORT. Oh, yes, that was it, because that was just a routine training proposition. It would have been probably fairly easy for them to obtain that order; we have fully 1500 Japanese serving here as enlisted men.

Admiral REEVES. You say this was a routine training operation. You didn't man those radio detector stations, then, as a matter of security?

General SHORT. Both, but the basic thing was that I knew that they needed this training worse than any other part of the command. They were new, so I took—I thought I would make them take it more seriously: I put them in this alert specifically to give them—not so much that I thought that they were going to be used to the real thing but to get the battle training at the hours when it was most needed and most difficult.

General McCox. In other words, there were no troops in your command ready for war at that moment?

General SHORT. No, sir. They were ready for uprisings. They were—we were definitely organized to meet any uprising or any act of sabotage or anything of that kind. A battalion of troops was the biggest unit that was ready to fight right then.

General McCox. Were the bombers in the same state of unpreparedness as the fighting planes?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Without—

General McCox. And as I remember you said all these planes that were ferried back and forth in recent months enroute to the Philippines arrived here without arms or ammunition?

General SHORT. Well, what I was talking about, the ones that came in then, I said that in the planes that we sent on I saw that they were in an instant state of readiness before they were let out. Now, that did not apply to bombs; that [164] applied only to machine gun ammunition to defend themselves. They could not have made part of the flight with bombs. They could make it with machine gun ammunition, and if they had a full weight of bombs they couldn't make the flight from Wake to Port Moresby, and what we were doing was not arming for offensive action; we were arming for the personal protection of the personnel. I think most of the previous planes coming in had had their machine guns, but that we had equipped them with ammunition here, and I had no orders from the War Department; I took that responsibility myself.

General McCox. What became of those two photograph planes that were on the mission to the—

General SHORT. Only one of them ever got here. I don't know what held it up on the mainland. And the one that got here was parked in a hangar and was destroyed. We didn't send it on because it was not equipped so it could protect itself, and we didn't have the adapter, so we could not put in the guns.

General McNARNEY. Did you discuss with the Navy the category of alert required to meet the situation as it was known to you on November 27?

General SHORT. They knew. They knew, I am sure, that we were not in—not alerted to resist an air attack, that we were alerted thoroughly for sabotage.

General McNARNEY. You didn't actually coordinate with the Navy as to whether they considered Alert No. 1 sufficient?

General SHORT. I didn't go down and ask the Navy, no, sir, whether they considered it sufficient. I am sure from all of our talk that everybody understood just what was being done.

The CHAIRMAN. This Alert No. 1 or Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3 is referred to in this joint defense plan. Was it intended that the same alert would be ordered by the Navy as by the Army in each case?

General SHORT. I hadn't—yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very much in difficulty because of my [165] lack of knowledge of military procedure.

General SHORT. Well, I would say that the same situation that would cause me to go on the alert against an air attack should cause the Navy to get all their ships out of the harbor because they could not defend themselves when they are huddled in the harbor. If they were going on an alert against air attack I think they would move out all their major ships. If they were going on alert against submarine they would probably prefer to have them inside.

Admiral Standley can answer that much better than I can. Would that be correct?

Admiral REEVES. During war, General,—

General SHORT. Beg pardon?

Admiral REEVES. During war, actual war, are you not on the alert always against an air attack?

General SHORT. You would during war, yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. Well, now, at the present time we are at war.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. By your testimony just now, do you expect the Navy to remain at sea throughout the duration of the war, because of that threat?

General SHORT. I would expect them to come into the harbor only a part of the time. I wouldn't expect them, if they had a dozen battleships here, ever to put them all in the harbor at the same time; and, when they put them in, that they would have their task forces of airplane carriers, cruisers, and destroyers where they could be reasonably sure of detecting any enemy carriers far enough out to protect their battleships. I don't believe that the Navy would start a battleship from here to San Francisco tomorrow by itself, because it couldn't protect itself.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney, have you another question?

[166] General McNARNEY. No, sir, I have no more.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. No, I have nothing more.

The CHAIRMAN. General? Admiral?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, I would like to pursue this just a little bit further.

Your answer to that last question, General Short, brings up the whole question of what is the purpose of a naval base.

General SHORT. The purpose of a naval base, as I see it, is to provide facilities to which the Navy can go for servicing the ships and for repairing them and for supplying them.

Admiral STANDLEY. What of recreation for your crew and rest for your crew?

General SHORT. Of course that does enter in. That would be secondary in case of a real fight.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, then would you expect the Navy to provide their own security in that case, or whose responsibility is that?

General SHORT. It would be everybody's responsibility.

Admiral STANDLEY. The what? Whose?

General SHORT. If they are in a state of war—if there had been a state of war and I knew that the Navy was bringing in all those battleships, I would have doubled my alertness with regard to my air protection, definitely, but I would have expected them to have every anti-aircraft gun on their ships absolutely alert and to have all possible marine anti-aircraft under my command for the same purpose.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, but what I am trying to get at is, Is it your concept—suppose this war lasts a year—is it your concept of this base that the Navy is to go out and stay out?

General SHORT. I think—

Admiral STANDLEY. Or could it—is the base to be used as a place of rest, a haven where the Navy can go in and be [167] protected? What is your belief?

General SHORT. I don't believe, under modern conditions of aviation, that there is any restricted area where it will ever be safe for the Navy to go in and huddle.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, but that is afterthought. Now, what has been the concept of this base from the beginning of time?

General SHORT. The concept of the base, before the air accounted for as much in the fighting game, was that they could come in here, they could put out their submarine nets, and they would be relatively safe. I think the Navy has been perfectly conscious in the last two or three years that this was too restricted an area for the fleet; that a bay like Manila Bay, extending from Cavite to Manila Bay probably 60 miles long would be an immensely safer place to put a fleet in view of an air attack, because you could disperse them and you wouldn't have such an enormous target. All you had to do was to drive by down here when the fleet was all in; you can see that they just couldn't be missed if they had a serious air attack. There were too many—there was too little water for the number of ships.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand your testimony, General, at all, to imply that it wasn't your obligation to protect that harbor in every way you could.

General SHORT. No, not in the least. I am implying that it would be practically impossible to protect the ships in such a restricted area against a serious attack, no matter how much you tried; that they would be so close together that they would be bound to suffer losses, and I don't believe the Navy at war would ever take a chance on putting the entire fleet in Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you say that no matter how apparently impregnable the defense against air attack was made,

[168] if you had been on the complete alert and had had every machine and every fighting airship and every anti-aircraft gun that you could specify, you could not guarantee the Navy that you could keep one or more planes from getting in there and making a hit on a battleship?

General SHORT. Definitely not; the area was too restricted.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have your ideas materially changed since the 7th of December?

General SHORT. Not on that point. That has been apparent and I believe that you will find that Admiral Kimmel would have had the same idea, that the area was too restricted in case of war to have the fleet in there.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, your basic plans state specifically that that is the responsibility of the forces here, to protect that base.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. All right. Now, if you had those ideas have you discussed them with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch along those lines? Have you ever discussed with them the situation, or rather, whether or not they should bring their fleet in, or how many? Has that ever been discussed?

General SHORT. I don't think that I have discussed that particular point as to how many ships they would bring in.

Admiral STANDLEY. I haven't anything further.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything more, gentlemen?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General, we may have a postscript.

General SHORT. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We may think of something else we may want to ask you about.

General SHORT. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So I have no doubt you will be available if we need you.

[169] General SHORT. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will excuse you for the time being, sir.

General McCoy. And I think we might say that if as a result of this testimony and our questions he wishes to present anything he may.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, further; if anything supplementary occurs to you that you think we ought to have, please feel free to furnish it.

General SHORT. Thank you very much. And if I may I would like to say to Admiral Standley that I am not trying to set up any idea of naval tactics; that I am just talking from the point of view of the defense that I could afford Pearl Harbor or that anybody else could have afforded it if the area were too restricted for the number of ships; that far be it from me to try to present a tactical doctrine for the Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. I am not looking at it, General, otherwise; I am just trying to get a basic understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will appreciate, General, in view of the situation and nature of this inquiry, that nothing that has gone on in this room should be disclosed by you or discussed by you with anyone.

General SHORT. Yes. I was not offering it as a criticism of the present situation. It is simply that the condition had changed over a period of years. When Pearl Harbor was first built it was adequate.

The CHAIRMAN. You got my caution about not discussing?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Let us call General Davidson.

[170] **TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HOWARD C.
DAVIDSON, UNITED STATES ARMY AIR CORPS**

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is your full name, General?

General DAVIDSON. Howard C. Davidson.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your rank?

General DAVIDSON. Brigadier General, Air Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was your official function on December 7th and theretofore in the Department of Hawaii?

General DAVIDSON. Commanding General, Fourteenth Pursuit Wing.

The CHAIRMAN. As part of your duties you had the interceptor service, the airplane interceptor command. Tell me what your tasks were as such.

General DAVIDSON. I had the pursuit wing, sir, but the interceptor hasn't really been formed—the interceptor command hadn't really been formed up to that time. I don't think it has been formed still.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, the pursuit wing—

General DAVIDSON. The pursuit wing, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. — was your particular care.

General DAVIDSON. My particular care.

The CHAIRMAN. And in that connection what materiel did you have under your command?

General DAVIDSON. I had two groups, one of four tactical squadrons and one of three tactical squadrons that were able to operate. Two other squadrons we had just been ordered to activate, but they had no airplanes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a trained force to man all the squadrons you have mentioned?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. Not the two that have been activated.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General DAVIDSON. They had—

[171] The CHAIRMAN. But the others?

General DAVIDSON. The other seven, yes, sir. Now, they were not very well trained, sir. They had a force, though. We were in process of training them at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your routine, so far as the squadrons under your command went, on and before December 7?

General DAVIDSON. We were occupied principally in attempting to train the new pilots that had been assigned to us. We received the pilots with 200 hours flying, none of which had been in pursuit aircraft and none of which had ever fired a machine gun, and we were occupied principally in attempting to train those pilots.

The CHAIRMAN. At what hours in the day were training flights being made?

General DAVIDSON. We trained until about four p. m., sir, each day, and then on alternate weeks the field was assigned to one of the groups for night flying. We didn't try to fly both groups at night. We were

operating both groups off Wheeler Field, and it was a little congested there for night flying.

The CHAIRMAN. None of your operations were off Hickam Field?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. They are now, but they were not at that time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when would the training flights begin in the morning?

General DAVIDSON. They would begin at about seven-thirty, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What, if any, planes, to your knowledge, were flying in the coastal patrol from four a. m. to seven a. m. or eight a. m.? Any?

General DAVIDSON. Why, the plot shows there were planes flying, but I couldn't say, sir, whether they were coastal patrol planes or not.

[172] The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have had information that in the early morning planes were flying all around the coastal area. Were those the planes under your command?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not?

General DAVIDSON. Not under my command, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there anyone else who had command of flying equipment besides yourself on the Island?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. General Rudolph and——

The CHAIRMAN. His were bombers, were they not?

General DAVIDSON. His were bombers, and Admiral Bellinger had patrol planes, and there were some marine planes at Ewa. but——

The CHAIRMAN. At what?

General DAVIDSON. E-w-a. "Ever" they call it. But whether they were flying or not I could not say, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, on a week day morning none of your command would be flying between four and eight in the morning?

General DAVIDSON. Well, about seven-thirty on a week day. This 7th was Sunday.

The CHAIRMAN. I know it was.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to draw the distinction between Sunday and week days.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There were none flying at any time Sunday morning, were there?

General DAVIDSON. None on Sundays of ours, as far as I know, at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. That was because the men were resting on Sundays?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

[173] The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney, have you any questions?

General DAVIDSON. May I amend that sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General DAVIDSON. One plane had gone to Molokai, a bomber, and it came back just in the midst of this raid. It might have been flying at that time.

General McNARNEY. Have you a standing operating procedure?

General DAVIDSON. We have. I just sent for some copies. The nearest approach to it is a paper here [indicating]. We were trying to explain the duties of the interceptor command. We called it "Tentative

Manual of Interceptor Command Organization Procedure, and Operation for Air Defense." But it is a rather elementary effort to explain to the pursuit units exactly what the duties of the interceptor command were.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am only a layman and don't know your military procedure, and therefore I am a little at large on this question. Let me clear it if I can. Am I to understand that the force under you and the small bomber force of General Rudolph were the only forces available to repel the airplane raid on Pearl Harbor? If not, will you tell me what the total available force for that purpose was on December 7?

General DAVIDSON. As I say, there were 34 marine planes, I think mostly dive bombers, over there, and I imagine they could have been considered a part of the force that was available.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, under the coordination plan, in the case of an air raid would those marine planes be available to you or to General Martin? Who would take command of them?

General DAVIDSON. If they were fighters they were available to me, but if—

The CHAIRMAN. If they were dive bombers?

General DAVIDSON. Dive bombers, they probably would be—come to me also. That is, in our joint maneuvers they have [174] often assigned me some dive bombers, which we didn't use as dive bombers: we used them to attempt to track the enemy back to the carrier in which he came, but the joint agreement says that bombers will be assigned to Patrol Wing 2 and the fighters to the Fourteenth Pursuit Wing for operation.

The CHAIRMAN. Who had command of the Fourteenth Pursuit Wing?

General DAVIDSON. I had the command of the Fourteenth Pursuit Wing.

The CHAIRMAN. You did. Now, I have your two groups of pursuit planes in mind; I have General Rudolph's small force of bombers.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And perhaps six—in mind. I have the 34 planes of whatever character the Marines had who would come under your command to repel an attack. Now, what else had you?

General DAVIDSON. Nothing else, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing more?

General DAVIDSON. Nothing more, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if a state of war had been declared, would plans have been made to coordinate a repulsive action against a possible raid?

General DAVIDSON. The plans were already in operation, sir. We had—

The CHAIRMAN. What alert would that be?

General DAVIDSON. That would be Alert No. 3, probably, sir. We were on Alert No. 1.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MCCOY. What were your duties under that alert?

General DAVIDSON. Simply guarding against sabotage, and we had direct orders, in a telegram from Hawaiian Air Force, not to dis-

perse the airplanes; that the airplanes would be kept [175] concentrated so they would be easier to guard against sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Who issued that order?

General DAVIDSON. General Martin, sir. One was signed "H. A. F.," which means Hawaiian Air Force, and the other was signed "Martin." There were two telegrams.

The CHAIRMAN. General Martin was your superior?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. He is the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. What other units did he have under his command? He had Rudolph's command under him?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And yours?

General DAVIDSON. And mine,—

The CHAIRMAN. And anything else?

General DAVIDSON. —except, in hostilities the operational control of his bombers would go to Pat. Wing 2.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. You are familiar with the Standing Operating Procedure of the Department, aren't you?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. And the covering letter on the distribution of the Standing Operating Procedure, as dated the 5th of November, requires each subordinate headquarters to furnish their standing operating procedure. Have you ever drawn one up?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. We got a notification from the Hawaiian Air Force that they would—when they put this alert on on November 27 they gave us a notice that they would draw up their standing operating procedure, but until that time they simply defined to us the various types of alert.

General McNARNEY. Under Alert No. 2 what dispositions would you have made?

General DAVIDSON. We would put the airplanes in the [176] bunkers, and we keep half the people there generally ready to fly.

General McNARNEY. What state of readiness would you have? What percentage of—what state of readiness?

General DAVIDSON. Could I look at the paper, or do you want me to—

General McNARNEY. Surely; look at the paper if you wish.

General DAVIDSON. I have it right here (indicating). The state of readiness is prescribed in the order, and it is called operational degree of readiness: 1 is four minutes; 2, thirty minutes; 3 is one hour; 4 is two hours; 5 is four hours; and then, the Alert No. 2: Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters.

General McNARNEY. Have you ever directed or have you ever actually issued any order as to what your state of readiness would be? You say, "as directed by this headquarters."

General DAVIDSON. This is from the Hawaiian Air Force.

General McNARNEY. Yes. Oh, that is directed by the Hawaiian Air Force?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. The state of readiness of your command?

General DAVIDSON. They designate the state of readiness.

General McNARNEY. In other words, you received orders from higher authority as to the proportion of your command which should be in state No. 1; is that correct?

General DAVIDSON. May I just show you the telegram?

General McNARNEY. You might read it.

General DAVIDSON. The telegram says—this was sent on November 27:

Air force 27 OB Priority

HAF Four two C period place Alert number one in effect immediately stop anti-sabotage only stop this [177] is an actual repeat actual alert not a drill.

Signed AGHAF 34OP.

Then that was followed by the next telegram. It says:

Under alert number one aircraft will not be dispersed stop all units continue training under condition easy five.

That means E-5.

General McNARNEY. Four hours?

General DAVIDSON. Easy five is just normal training condition, go right back to normal training on the easy five.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any information of the reasons why Alert No. 1 was put into effect?

General DAVIDSON. As a matter of fact I wasn't here when No. 1 was put into effect. I went to the United States on October 15 to study the interceptor command setup and didn't return until November the third, so I never gave it a thought as to why it was.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean December 3rd.

General DAVIDSON. December 3rd, yes, sir. I came back about December 3rd, and when I came back we were in Alert No. 1 easy five condition, which was an anti-sabotage alert, and the only effect that had had on us was to double our guard, practically.

General McCoy. And to concentrate your planes?

General DAVIDSON. We concentrated—we kept them parked in that same place, General, all the time, anyway; we just did not disperse them. It was a concrete mat on which we had rings to tie them down at night.

[178] General McNARNEY. You then had no actual knowledge of the existing condition known to the higher command here, as to the actual existing situation against Japan?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. I had just come back on the 3d. I spent—I got back on the 3d; I spent the 4th and the 5th either writing up—finishing the reports or talking to the staff of the Hawaiian Air Force, telling them of the setup in the United States on both the interceptor command and the maintenance command, which was very difficult to understand. It was contemplated putting in both those commands here.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you refer to by the interceptor command, which you say had not been established?

General DAVIDSON. The interceptor command is a combination of the pursuit units plus the air warning, aircraft warning regiment of signal corps troops principally and operational control of the anti-aircraft artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, a portion of the equipment for the aircraft warning system had been received?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was under your command, was it not?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Under whose?

General DAVIDSON. That was under the signal corps. They were installing these units.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, who was responsible for the training of the men in the use of these units?

General DAVIDSON. We had built, through the help of the signal corps, a small information center with material that we could find on hand here. You probably will visit it; it's on the top of a little concrete warehouse of the signal corps. But up until that time the signal corps had handled the construction of it. The troops that were being trained in it are all signal corps troops and were still under the signal [179] corps, but—

The CHAIRMAN. Under whose command was Lieutenant Tyler?

General DAVIDSON. He was under my command and had been sent there as duty officer for that day for that training.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what were his duties?

General DAVIDSON. We were trying principally to train the operating crews of the Radar stations—we call them Derax stations; the Navy calls them Radar—and the plotters around the board at that time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I still don't quite understand what Lieutenant Tyler's duties were on that morning of December 7.

General DAVIDSON. He was the duty officer in the place there, to see that that training went on, and he was being trained himself, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he is not a signal corps officer, is he?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. He is an air corps officer. Around this board you have a controller, and on his right is a pursuit officer, and he was really acting as a pursuit officer for that day but was actually just being trained himself.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7 when the attack occurred?

General DAVIDSON. I was in my quarters at Wheeler Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it your order that the stations should be shut down at 7 o'clock on the morning of December 7?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. That was the department had issued such orders as that. They operate the station from 4 to 7.

General McCoy. Are you in command of that station now?

General DAVIDSON. Now I am, sir. The order was just published a few days ago that the 14th Pursuit Wing Headquarters of my headquarters company would be constituted the headquarters in headquarters company of the interceptor command, [180] and the 14th Pursuit Wing would be designated.

General McCoy. So that now you have command of the whole layout of the detector system?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And the anti-aircraft service, as you call it?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And your own groups?

General DAVIDSON. Our own wing, yes, sir.

General McCoy. But that was not the case on December 7?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. The Aircraft Warning Service is still in process of being activated. We have recommended that the signal company that's operating now be used as a cadre to form this aircraft warning regiment which will operate the Aircraft Warning Service.

General McCoy. Does that include also the present setup for aerial alarm?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir, and the operating of the stations on the outlying islands, too, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The permanent station?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time of the first attack on the morning of December 7 how many men of your command were present for duty?

General DAVIDSON. I couldn't tell you that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any data available on the subject?

General DAVIDSON. I suppose we could get that, sir. We could get—I don't know just what it would be. It would be the morning report.

General McNARNEY. The morning report.

The CHAIRMAN. When would the data for the morning report be gathered?

[181] General DAVIDSON. It comes in in the morning, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No. I mean when would the data be gathered for the report? Before 7 o'clock?

General DAVIDSON. I think so, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you see if those data can be obtained, and give the Commission a memorandum of the number of men present and the number of absentees on that morning from your command?

Can you state, General, whether there were less planes in the air early Sunday morning, December 7, than usual?

General DAVIDSON. Well, we generally don't have any planes in the air on Sundays.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there would be less in the air than on a week-day?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any warning signal at Hickam Field that can be sounded as an alarm to the men?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. We have what we call the alert signal.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it? A siren?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. It's a gong that's beaten on. We tried the siren, and it's not very effective, and every time they have a fire you didn't know whether you were being alerted or whether it was a fire signal.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there the same system at Wheeler Field?

General DAVIDSON. I thought you asked Wheeler Field, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked Hickam. I asked first for Hickam Field.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir, I think Hickam uses the siren.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether those were sounded on the morning of the attack, and if so, when?

General DAVIDSON. I had an officer call up and order the alert sounded, but—— [182]

The CHAIRMAN. When?

General DAVIDSON. About 8:05, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was after you had by the use of your own senses observed the attack?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. I heard the first bombs dropping, and about 8:05 we sounded the alert.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is your home on the Island? Near either of the fields?

General Davidson. It's on Wheeler Field, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On Wheeler Field?

General Davidson. On Wheeler Field.

The CHAIRMAN. The bombs were being dropped at Hickam Field at that time, were they not?

General DAVIDSON. They were dropped at Wheeler Field, too, about that same time.

The CHAIRMAN. Both at the same time?

General DAVIDSON. They seemed to have attacked both fields almost simultaneously.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had any report that one of your officers or soldiers saw the approach of this fleet some time before it reached any of the fields and gave an alarm?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard of no such thing?

General DAVIDSON. I do not believe it, either.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not believe such a thing occurred?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. The fleet looked very similar to Navy airplanes. They were painted a gray like the Navy, and their silhouettes are quite similar, and I do not believe that it would have caused anyone to give an alarm.

General McCoy. Lieutenant Tyler didn't report to you that there were planes approaching?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. Lieutenant Tyler had a [183] chance to become a hero, but it would have been an accident if he had, because the board simply shows a little series of arrows pointing down as they come across the sea space, and there were many other arrows there, and if he had divined that that was a Japanese attack in peacetime it would have been almost a fifth sense.

I have that sheet if you want to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is attached to General Short's report to the Secretary of War.

General DAVIDSON. Oh.

The CHAIRMAN. And that we have seen it.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. We are having that same difficulty right now, sir, trying to determine friendly airplanes from foes. The system in England, where this was evolved, is what they call an I. F. F.—“Identification Friend or Foe”—setup on friendly airplanes; and by directing a radio beam on that the plane will tell you if it's a friend; and if it does not tell you it's a friend, it's a foe. But we have no such system, and we are in great difficulty now, still, trying to identify friend from foe, because they send out these patrols six and eight hundred miles to sea, and then they turn around and come back, and you have to divine each one or attempt to divine which are the friends and which might be foes. We are doing that through making their report when they are 100 miles offshore their exact position. Then if

that coincides with the arrows we assume that it's a friend. But if by chance they have shot down—maybe they have shot down a friend right there at that spot when he reports, and they would come in and we would plot them in as friends.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose you can coordinate the thing to some slight extent also by keeping very accurate track from the Navy of where their task forces are?

General DAVIDSON. They are doing that now, but they [184] are very chary, as these two admirals can vouch for, of reporting the position at sea, afraid it will give away the ship from which they have taken off.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General DAVIDSON. But we have gotten them to have the airplane report its position, thinking that that will not divulge the position of a warship out there.

General McNARNEY. Does not the radio detector give the indication as to the number of airplanes in a flight?

General DAVIDSON. It gives a big echo for a big plane, and it gives a big echo for a big flight, but the best we have gotten so far is to tell whether it's more than three. Now, with our present equipment, if it's more than three and there is any doubt about it we send a pursuit patrol out there to meet it head-on, but a big ship like the B-17 gives a big echo, and often we get that reported as two or three and go out and it's a—

General McNARNEY. Well, a flight of nine or twenty-seven, as contrasted to one of three, shows up on the detector, does it not?

General DAVIDSON. Well, it did on this Opana detector, which is the best one we had, but ordinarily the operators have not been able to tell us anything beyond the fact that they believed it's more than three airplanes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, this system was not nearly in as perfect order on December 7 as it is now?

General DAVIDSON. No; no, sir. And we were doing operational training, you might say, on that system at that time.

General McNARNEY. In order to get the record straight 15 i. of the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department states that the Department Signal Officer will (1) insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the interceptor command; (2) insure that joint army-navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment. This is under alert No. 2. I [185] understand, then, that under alert No. 1 the Aircraft Warning Service had not been turned over to you?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You had no control over it?

General DAVIDSON. Except we were attempting to teach these people how to operate it. We had our own Signal Corps Officers there and Signal Corps men; and the G-3 of the 14th Pursuit Wing, in conjunction with a Commander Taylor who had been loaned to us by the Navy, were attempting to teach these soldiers how to operate this board.

General McNARNEY. Well, in effect they had operational control, but you were exercising your control only for the purposes of training?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. That is about the situation.

General McNARNEY. You were not exercising operational control for the purpose of security?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, because the board was not manned 24 hours a day, which it would have to be for the purpose of security.

General McNARNEY. As you knew the situation at that time did you feel that there was any necessity for operating the RDF for the purpose of security?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, I never thought there was any necessity for it.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, it operated week-days and Sundays as a training proposition?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir, as training, and Sundays it shut down at 7.

The CHAIRMAN. And other days at what time?

General DAVIDSON. The schedule, I think at other days it shut down on Department orders at 7, but our people had them come back and operate, I think, until 11, and then in the afternoon they used that for maintenance to get the equipment in shape to operate the next day.

[186] The CHAIRMAN. The reason, I presume, that the orders were to shut down at 7 on Sunday was, again, that Sunday was partially a day of rest here?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Now, the Navy man that you stated was assisting you was there for training purposes, to assist you in training or for training of himself?

General DAVIDSON. He was assisting to get the board in operation. He had been stationed in England and was quite familiar with the board, had been sent out here by the Navy for some purpose, and we had without any orders simply borrowed his services.

General McNARNEY. He was not there, then, for the purpose of affording information of anti-aircraft to the Navy?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, he was not there operating as the Navy liaison particularly.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, I understand that under your routine procedure there was a Navy liaison officer at the board?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir, there is. There is now, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, was there anterior to December 7?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, I don't think so.

The CHAIRMAN. You think not?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, it would not be extraordinary if there was no Navy officer there on Sunday morning, December 7?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. We were running the board more to train the operators. I think that's what the order called for, to train the Radar station operators.

The CHAIRMAN. So that do I understand that Lieutenant Tyler did call the Navy?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

[187] The CHAIRMAN. He didn't call them at all?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He made the best approximation he could of the situation and decided that there was no necessity?

General DAVIDSON. Decided that we had a flight coming over from the mainland that could have been wandering up there, and the

Navy—well, even after December 7 they put off airplanes from carriers that came in exactly that same way, without notifying us.

General McNARNEY. Well, I take it, inasmuch as you personally had not been warned that there was a serious situation confronting the United States with respect to Japan, that similarly your subordinate officers had no idea that the situation was at all serious, and this lieutenant could not be expected to be on the lookout for enemy aircraft?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. I would say that if he had been on the lookout it would have been prescience beyond the ordinary person's capacity, knowing as little as he did about the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

General McNARNEY. Well,—

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

General McNARNEY. What did you think the situation was with respect to sabotage when you received the order for alert No. 1?

General DAVIDSON. We were very much afraid of sabotage. Every time we dispersed our airplanes—and we dispersed them on several other alerts before—we spent a lot of our time guarding them out there on those dispersed positions, expended a lot of energy in the guards; and around the airplanes here, even without an alert, we had very heavy guards. And then when the alert for anti-sabotage came we doubled the guards there and also guarded many vital places on the post, like [188] water system and transformer station.

General McNARNEY. What were the facilities on the field for protection, such as barbwire fences or manproof fences, searchlights, and so forth?

General DAVIDSON. We had been promised manproof fences, but they never had materialized. We had no barbed wire.

General McNARNEY. How much of the field was open to ingress from the outside?

General DAVIDSON. There is a public road going through the center of the field.

The CHAIRMAN. What field?

General DAVIDSON. Wheeler Field. And all the rest of the field was open to ingress. There was a public road running along the edge of the field on two sides. On the third side is a gully that leads into the pineapple fields.

General McNARNEY. Do you know the size of the guard that you maintained under condition of alert No. 1?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. We had about a hundred and fifty men in addition to the men that the groups—the tactical groups—had down there.

General McNARNEY. If your airplanes had been dispersed under an anti-sabotage alert, how many additional men would be required?

General DAVIDSON. It would have taken about two and a half times that many.

General McNARNEY. What was your total strength available for guard without seriously interfering with the operation of your aircraft?

General DAVIDSON. We had trained with rifles 500 men just for that purpose, for anti-sabotage work, and I think we have been maintaining 511 there at Wheeler for the big part of the time since that raid, to guard this—

General McNARNEY. Well, what effect would it have on [189] your operations if you had used these 500 men?

General DAVIDSON. Well, it is seriously affecting our operations now, and we still are using many of those 500 men.

General McNARNEY. In what way is it affecting it? Planes out of commission?

General DAVIDSON. Well, the planes are not out of commission now, because we have been reduced in—but it's affecting us in that the men that are in the squadrons are having to stay on duty longer than they would if they had their full quota.

The CHAIRMAN. You have taken men from the flying squadrons for guard work?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. As many as 34 men in—a squadron just reported this morning they had 34 men of their squadron up at Wheeler Field doing guard duty.

General McCoy. In other words, you are still more afraid of sabotage than you are of the enemy?

General DAVIDSON. We are still afraid of sabotage, yes, sir, and the field is difficult to guard, and it seems very difficult to get other troops to guard it.

General McCoy. Well, what difference has war made to you in your handling your command? Are you still handling it on the same line that you did before December 7?

General DAVIDSON. I don't understand that, sir. We have got all the airplanes alerted in the morning from 5:30 until 8. Then one squadron stays on alert which is ready to take off in four minutes, and the others are in a state of readiness. Then at I think its 4 o'clock they all come back on alert. So it's quite different. They are all operating on dispersed positions.

General McCoy. Are they all armed and equipped with ammunition, and so forth?

General DAVIDSON. All armed and equipped, yes, sir.

General McCoy. That was not the case before December 7?

[190] General DAVIDSON. We did not have the guns loaded. That was our biggest difficulty the day of the attack, was to try to get the guns loaded, especially since one of the hangars where we had a lot of our ammunition stored was afire, and the ammunition was afire too.

General McNARNEY. Did you have loaded belts available?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir, the belts were available, but the boxes were burnt up.

General McNARNEY. I notice in General Short's testimony that he said that on December 7 the pursuit planes in commission were 80, pursuit planes out of commission 69. Will you please explain this rather large percentage of planes out of commission?

General DAVIDSON. The percentage I do not believe is large compared to other places. I inquired about that when I was back on the mainland, and about 60% of these new planes is about the average for in commission. Our great difficulty was in getting spare parts for these new planes, the P-40's especially.

General McCoy. Have you received any additions to your force in the way of trained fighting pilots since the outbreak of war?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

General McCoy. They are still these amateur pilots?

General DAVIDSON. We are training these pilots—we were training these pilots on December 8, sir; still training them. We have men that haven't fired yet, and we are trying to get them trained. We have stopped that now because we just haven't got the facilities, but will start it again just as soon as we get new planes, which are coming in now. They are in the depot now.

General McCoy. Do I understand that there are no trained fighters over here at all?

General DAVIDSON. Oh, no, sir. We have trained fighters, [191] but we have got a number that have not been trained. They come over here, General, with 200 hours. We get them in a batch like 50. We got 58 with 200 hours.

[192] General McCoy. Right from school?

General DAVIDSON. Right from school, and they have never even been in a pursuit plane.

General McCoy. How many trained fighting pilots do you have?

General DAVIDSON. We have 150 now, but of these I would say at least 50 are this new batch which have just finished.

General McCoy. Are these men who did so well some of the newcomers?

General DAVIDSON. One of them was one of the newcomers. He did very well. He got four.

The CHAIRMAN. What was his training before?

General DAVIDSON. He had just finished the ground gunnery course. He got in the plane and got four, but he had just finished the ground gunnery course.

General McCoy. How many planes did you get in the air in these attacks on the Sunday?

General DAVIDSON. We got about 17 actually in the air, and I think three more were shot down as they took off from Bellows Field.

General McCoy. Where were the others of the 150 trained pilots? Why didn't they get in the air? Was it because of the construction of the planes?

General DAVIDSON. Our first job was to get the good ones out from the burned ones. The planes were all parked like on this table here (indicating). Some were set afire and some were not, and we had tried to get them apart, to get the planes that would roll out of the burned mass and the burned hangars. We had great difficulty rolling them because they shot the tires off many of them. Even of the ships which were not afire, they might be next to a ship that was afire, but it would not roll from the fire because the tire of one of the wheels had been shot off.

General McCoy. That was the first attack?

[193] General DAVIDSON. We did not have very much of a second attack, sir. Our second attack was more or less shooting off the additional ammunition that they had left from some other attack as they came by Wheeler Field on their way out.

General McCoy. There were just two attacks on Wheeler Field?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any planes flown from Hickam Field at all?

General DAVIDSON. There were bombers, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing but bombers?

General DAVIDSON. Yes. I do not think any of them got off at all.

The CHAIRMAN. There were no other planes but bombers there?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, nothing but bombers.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Just one question. Lieutenant Tyler, who was in the Aircraft Warning Station that morning, first observed from the Radar—

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, the Radar is miles away from here.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is at the Opana Station?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

Admiral STANLEY. He received that.

General DAVIDSON. He just received the telephone call.

Admiral STANDLEY. He saw nothing himself?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, he didn't see anything.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your board at the center was not working?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, there were not any plotters there. The plotters had all gone home, and they telephoned it from Opana Station, and the man with the telephone on his [194] head, he plots the position they give him, but they had all gone home.

General McNARNEY. It might be interesting for the Commission if you would explain the operations of the detector system from the observation station right on through.

General DAVIDSON. The Radar station is a high-frequency radio. It sends out a beam similar to a beam of light. It cannot go over a hill or over the horizon. It strikes a solid object and reflects back let us say a little figure on the screen. The screen is a glass screen and there is a tube there, and the man has a mask on his face and he looks into it at this light or flash like a flash from a spark plug, and you see it on a ground glass. When it hits that object, that echoes it a little. If it is a big echo, it echoes it quite a lot, and if it is a land echo it echoes a little different reading, and if it is an echo of a ship at sea, it echoes a slightly different reading.

It is sometimes difficult to tell a ship at sea from an airplane, but they generally tell them because the ship at sea does not move, and the airplane does, and they can see the movement in this screen.

He then brings this echo into the movement of his screen and gets the range reading, and he reads through the azimuth and sends that to his plotter, who plots that on the chart, and sends it in to our plotter upon this map of Oahu and the vicinity, and it is sent in by X and Y coordinated.

He calls off the square in that position, say squares 3 and 4, and plots them, and that is how anybody in the information center knows about it, and that is all anybody in the information center sees or knows about that plot.

The plotting is done there with the board, and the controller stays in front watching this map, and he has on his right a pursuit officer and on his left his general radio officer and switches the radio from one place to another so [195] he can get the radio to control the ships and the airplanes in the air.

There are other personnel around the board, anti-aircraft and Navy, air raid precautions officer and Federal Communications officer, and several others.

They all simply look at the board and they generally take the necessary action without having any orders issued. It is simply a fast method of command, trying to do away with orders as much as possible.

When the action is to be taken by the pursuits, the controller tells the pursuit officer next to him how many airplanes he wants in the air, and he picks off the exact squadron and he orders them off right from that board. Then they have a radio transmitter there, and he communicates with the squadrons in the air, and they draw a point at a certain altitude and they have that circle so that we will know where they are. In the system they generally turn that flight or squadron over to the interceptor, who handles the intercepting itself and handles the intercept from the control center because our station is so narrowed down.

General McCoy. Would you be at headquarters?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, although on the mainland, take for instance the one at Mitchel Field, the headquarters of the interceptor command is Mitchel Field. The control centers are at Boston, New York, and at Philadelphia. Isn't that right?

And each one of these is in control of a group commander who takes all necessary steps to intercept the hostile planes coming into his area, his group area. He defends that area against hostile attack without any further orders from the interceptor commander. The interceptor commander has a general board showing the situation in all areas of his command, and if one needs reinforcing or help, he orders it, but the actual defense of the area is entrusted to the group [196] commander who has charge there.

I think that covers it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

General McNARNEY. What date was the interceptor command activated?

General DAVIDSON. I would have to look at the order, but I would say about the 17th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves.

Admiral REEVES. Your evidence has been extremely clear and specific, and it is of great value to the Commission. I have only one or two questions that I would like to ask you merely in order to clarify this information. I call your pursuit planes fighters.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, we call them fighters.

Admiral REEVES. Are these fighters more effective if you have them all concentrated on one field, or are they more effective if they are dispersed to various fields?

General DAVIDSON. They are more effective if dispersed to the fields, and we are making every effort we can to get them dispersed.

Admiral REEVES. It adds to the risk of sabotage but adds more to the effectiveness of your operations?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. I understand that the torpedo planes came in from the East flying at a low altitude?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. If you had warning of their approach and had gotten your fighting planes in the air in an attack on these torpedo

planes flying at low altitude, would you have expected your attack against those planes to have been effective?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, they were quite slow.

[197] Admiral REEVES. That is, if you had warning of their approach and had your planes been in position you would have them in the air and your attack on those torpedo planes would have been effective and might have been perfected, among other things?

General DAVIDSON. Yes. I am sure it would have been perfected. I think they could have shot down most of them because they were quite slow.

Admiral REEVES. Before they reached their objectives?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. Your interceptor system would not likely pick up such low-flying planes?

General DAVIDSON. If the plane is low it is difficult because it gets down below the horizon and only the very high stations will pick them up.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, the interceptor did not get them at all when they got behind that big eastern ridge of the Island?

General DAVIDSON. I do not know, sir. As soon as they get behind anything which will give a reflection, they go off our screen. With this type of radio, it cannot hit anything without bouncing back.

The CHAIRMAN. If somebody put his hand up, that would indicate it?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, even a bird will do it.

General McCoy. You spoke of the British having a much better system. Why haven't we got that?

General DAVIDSON. I don't know, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. This is off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further, gentlemen?

You understand, General, that anything that has been said in this room is not to be disclosed or discussed with anyone else?

[198] General DAVIDSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We will now have General Rudolph.

(Thereupon the witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL JACOB H. RUDOLPH

The CHAIRMAN. What is your full name, General?

General RUDOLPH. Jacob H. Rudolph.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

General RUDOLPH. Brigadier general.

The CHAIRMAN. And your assignment in the Hawaiian Department?

General RUDOLPH. Commanding the 18th Bombardment Wing.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you held that position here, sir?

General RUDOLPH. Since November, 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you, sir, on the morning of December 7 last?

General RUDOLPH. At Hickam Field during the entire attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Are your quarters as officer near the field?

General RUDOLPH. I don't know what you mean by "near the field".

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, where is your home?

General RUDOLPH. Right on Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Right there?

General RUDOLPH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So you were in your quarters, in your living quarters, when this attack took place?

General RUDOLPH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no warning of it?

General RUDOLPH. Not the slightest.

[199] The CHAIRMAN. What did your command consist of that day?

General RUDOLPH. I had two groups of five and eleven bombers; 12 B-17 airplanes; 30 B-18's; 12 A-20's.

The CHAIRMAN. Under what order was the field being maintained that morning with respect to alert 1, 2, and 3?

General RUDOLPH. It was under alert No. 1.

The CHAIRMAN. And had been since November 27?

General RUDOLPH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What guard were you maintaining at your planes that day?

General RUDOLPH. I had the planes guarded well at night, and then I changed the heavy guard that was on at night and lessened the guard during the daytime because we were carrying on actual flight operations and were getting ready to actually do training in squadrons.

The CHAIRMAN. You were?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been training from Hickam Field, taking off from Hickam Field daily?

General RUDOLPH. Every day.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you training pilots and crews for heavy bombers?

General RUDOLPH. We were training ferry crews to get them prepared to go to the mainland and bring the heavy bombardment planes this way.

The CHAIRMAN. There were planes from your command in this training work in the air practically every morning?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, and every night.

The CHAIRMAN. You were out at night, too?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, at least four to five nights a week.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these planes armed for action, those being used in the training?

[200] General RUDOLPH. We were having a limited amount of gunnery in both the B-18 type and the B-17 type.

The CHAIRMAN. That meant arms and ammunition?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any of your planes in the air at 7:55 on that Sunday morning?

General RUDOLPH. I would not be positive. I know they got ready to go in the air.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any of your planes get in the air and get into action in any of the attacks that morning?

General RUDOLPH. Not until after the attacks.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no orders with respect to preparedness for airplane raids except the one order for alert 1?

General RUDOLPH. It depends. It did not include airplane raids; it included sabotage. Therefore, we bunched the planes because we

could have much better protection against sabotage. If with a raid we would have them dispersed.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McNARNEY. If alert No. 2 had been in effect, would that seriously have interfered with your training?

General RUDOLPH. Well, in alert 2 one cannot do a great deal of training. That is, I would have to stand by and start dispersing them and not go ahead with my normal training. In No. 1 I would go ahead with normal training.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any information of the international situation with respect to United States and Japanese relations? I mean official information?

General RUDOLPH. Not the slightest.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no general order or anything of that kind issued that there might be suspected an attack in the immediate future?

General RUDOLPH. None whatever; none whatever. If we had the slightest inkling we would have gone into a dispersed position, but we were doing that in accordance with alert 1, [201] which to us means getting them into a close area and guarding them very carefully against internal sabotage, not raids.

General McCoy. Has there been any sabotage in your planes at any time?

General RUDOLPH. We found several positive indications of sabotage within our own group. We found the gaps in the spark plugs hammered together. That is, in the back of the spark plugs were little points that connect it to the electrode and have a 10,000th clearance, and they had hammered them against the electrode. That was somebody from our own organization.

General McCoy. Have you discovered him?

General RUDOLPH. Not yet, no, sir.

We found the oil block in the oil tank cut to a point where it almost dropped off. We had several other unmistakable evidences of internal sabotage.

General McCoy. Was that recently?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, within the last two or three months.

General McCoy. Do you employ any Japanese in your shops or maintenance?

General RUDOLPH. None whatsoever. Mine are all enlisted men.

General McCoy. During these whole negotiations, you were not conscious of imminent hostilities?

General RUDOLPH. We certainly were not.

The CHAIRMAN. As an instructing officer in the strategy of war, would you have expected one form of attack by Japan to be an attempt at a raid on Pearl Harbor?

General RUDOLPH. I have conceived the possibility of that.

The CHAIRMAN. You would want to guard against it in the event of a state of war between the two countries?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, sir, rightly so.

[202] The CHAIRMAN. If you were given a warning in the words, "This is a war warning," would you be ready?

General RUDOLPH. Yes. We certainly would never have had them on the apron that Sunday morning. We would have scattered them as well as we could over Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. They would have been ready to get in the air?

General RUDOLPH. We would have been ready even though it was a Sunday morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think that a Sunday morning at dawn is about the most likely time for such a raid?

General RUDOLPH. Truly so.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Admiral REEVES. No questions.

General McNARNEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Standley?

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy?

General MCCOY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General Rudolph, of course you understand that the nature of the Commission's procedure is such that it is highly important that you do not discuss anything that has been answered here or said here nor discuss it with others. I will ask you to observe that.

General RUDOLPH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Now let us have Major Allen.

(Thereupon Major Brooke E. Allen was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

[203] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR BROOKE E. ALLEN

The CHAIRMAN. State your name, Major.

Major ALLEN. Brooke E. Allen.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank is what?

Major ALLEN. Major, Air Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are your quarters, as such, Major, on the Island?

Major ALLEN. At Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in those quarters on the morning of December 7?

Major ALLEN. I was, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you start from the beginning without questioning and tell us what you saw and what was done?

Major ALLEN. At the time of the attack I was asleep, and I heard planes diving and an explosion. As I looked out my bedroom window I could see a number of planes in a column in a dive, and as I looked they released bombs apparently in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor.

I rushed out and put on a robe and rushed outside to get a better look at them, and realized we were being attacked by Japanese planes.

I went in and immediately put on my uniform and rushed down to my hangar, and at the time I was in command of a squadron. My first idea was to save as many planes as possible. I managed to get into one of the B-17's that were assigned to my squadron.

At that time the attack was being conducted on Hickam Field on the hangar line. I got inside one of the planes. The guns were in the plane. We put the guns in readiness to fire. My first idea was to take off. I was unable to start one engine. I started with only three of the engines.

I got the crew, the best I could gather. I taxied across the field, about which time the attack apparently subsided. I observed ammunition bomb trucks being pulled out of the [204] ammuni-

tion storage area loaded with bombs. The thought occurred to me to try to load the bombs so I could attack any enemy ships in the vicinity. We were in the process of loading bombs when the second attack occurred, during which time they bombed the hangar line. Then the bombers, apparently having bombed Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field, were strafing the vicinity in which we were loading the bombs. In the meantime the crews from my squadron were trying to disperse the Army planes in the squadron.

During this strafing attack we were getting some distance away from the airplane, and as a result of the attack that airplane was so badly damaged that I was unable to fly it. One engine was completely shot up and one wheel was shot from under it.

So we turned our attention then to another B-17 airplane in the squadron and started in loading it with bombs to put it in readiness for a mission.

By that time the attack had apparently ceased, and I reported immediately to the wing commander for instruction. We were told to get a pursuit escort and arrange for protection of our take-off, and got off the ground sometime after 11 o'clock—about 11:30—with instructions to attack two enemy carriers reported about 35 miles south of Barbers Point.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is Barbers Point?

Major ALLEN. Right in here (indicating on map).

Major Saunders took a B-17 and I took one. We had some pursuit escort at the time.

We proceeded south of Barbers Point and saw no enemy activity there at all. We began a search to the southwest and northwest, there being no information available.

After some two or three hours Major Saunders had to turn back on account of engine trouble. I remained in the air until approximately 7 o'clock that evening and I saw no enemy activity at all.

[205] . I stayed in the quadrant to the northwest and southwest (indicating on map).

The CHAIRMAN. No pursuit was attempted to the north by anyone, so far as you know?

Major ALLEN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You two were probably the only ones that were fit or could be escorted?

Major ALLEN. So far as I know we were the only two fit to fly at the time. There was another plane fit to fly which had some trouble on the take-off and could not get off. He jammed his propeller on the take-off and was unable to get off.

The CHAIRMAN. You were innocent of any thought of an airplane raid when you went to bed on Saturday night, I suppose?

Major ALLEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard no discussion even informally of a possible attack by Japanese planes?

Major ALLEN. No, sir, there was no indication of such.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as you know, the general sentiment among the Army men was that there was no thought of a possible attack at all?

Major ALLEN. I would say particularly so in the Air Corps because the fact that most of our striking force was taken from here, and we were more or less in the status of ferry training, ferrying

B-17's to the Philippines. We had been conducting training in the squadron toward that end for some time.

General McCox. If this attack had not occurred in a few days, this would have gone off?

Major ALLEN. I would have gone, ferrying planes to the Philippines.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say your training was not at all on a war footing?

[206] Major ALLEN. No, sir. Our training had been conducted almost entirely toward ferrying planes to the Philippines. Our combat training had been more or less halted, and the other training had been given priority. At the time of the attack there were some of our combat crews back on the mainland waiting to ferry the planes back.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, General?

General McNARNEY. Did you see any planes come in from the mainland approaching north?

Major ALLEN. I did, sir.

General McNARY. What did you observe?

Major ALLEN. Well, when I arrived on the hangar line one of the first things I saw was a B-17E flying over the hangar line very low. I had never seen a B-17E before and I was a little confused about it. As a matter of fact, I had no knowledge of the flight from the mainland. It was a secret flight, of course. When I first saw these four-engine bombers flying over I was confused because I knew they did not belong to the Hawaiian Air Force. My first thought was, "Where did the Japs get four-engine bombers?" In a few minutes I realized that was one of ours and that this was undoubtedly some flight from the mainland, and then I knew the ships were coming over from the mainland.

I observed a number of others flying around, and one in the process of landing, with a Japanese right on his tail firing at him. When he was ready to land a pursuit plane pulled away, and the truck pulled this way, and he had to cut around, and there was a burst from the anti-aircraft which went off right opposite him, but he managed to circle around and land successfully.

General McNARNEY. Was that the only case you observed of our own anti-aircraft firing at our own planes?

Major ALLEN. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. There was no reason to believe that [207] our own anti-aircraft would not be able to identify that as an American plane?

Major ALLEN. No, sir. I can see why they would be confused, because they had no knowledge of that type of plane coming in, and they were not familiar with that type of plane in the Hawaiian Air Force because we had no planes of that type. Our planes were smaller and these planes were the B-17E type, which is different from the D.

General McNARNEY. How many men in your squadron were detailed to guard your airplanes? Or were the guards furnished by other units?

Major ALLEN. We furnished the guard for our own airplanes, and that was handled by a guard group. The regular troop organized a group for each guard and ran its own guard, a sergeant for the guard and a corporal for each relief. I don't remember the exact number,

but it was from five to six men who were detailed daily as members of the guard group to guard the airplanes from that group.

General McNARNEY. How many men would have been required if the airplanes would have been dispersed?

Major ALLEN. No more than that number except possibly one additional man. At the time of the attack there were two B-17D's and four B-18's. When we disperse the airplanes we always, instead of the normal guard, we keep one member of the ground crew armed and at the airplanes during all hours.

General McNARNEY. Well, would the furnishing of these additional six men have interfered in any manner with your training?

Major ALLEN. It is bound to. Any men you lose is bound to affect your training.

General McNARNEY. Would it have seriously affected your training?

Major ALLEN. Not seriously, no, sir, but it would be a matter which would depend on the number of men you are required to furnish.

[208] General McCoy. In wartime you are called on for a great number of men, including the guard. With respect to the case now, have they been replaced as guards by ground troops?

Major ALLEN. I cannot answer that. I have not been on tactical duty for the last week or so. I understand that the ground crew has been increased by some troops.

General McCoy. Where did you get your escort planes that day?

Major ALLEN. From Hickam Field. They were P-40's. I remember seeing four of them. They were merely to protect our take-off and stayed with us only a short time after the take-off.

General McCoy. I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Standley?

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke about one of the planes being interfered with by a truck?

Major ALLEN. I don't think I did, Admiral.

Admiral STANDLEY. You mentioned something like that.

Major ALLEN. Yes, one of the planes from the mainland when it was landing. The bombs are delivered to the planes by what is called a bomb trailer, a four-wheel trailer with a truck pulling it. The very first I remember seeing getting the bombs loaded at the airplane, they were scurrying all over the field, and the bomb storage area is at about in the vicinity where the planes are dispersed, and they were getting on the runway, trying to get the bombs to the airplanes to fly, those which were in commission.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Major. I need hardly say to you that you should not discuss anything that has been said here.

[209] Major ALLEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This is off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn at this time until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 5:25 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until tomorrow, Wednesday, December 24, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m.)

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[211] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1941

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

The Commission met at 9 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court,
Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal
Adviser to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Well, are we ready to proceed, gentlemen?

Admiral REEVES. We are ready to start.

The CHAIRMAN. Shall we call Colonel Phillips? He is General Short's chief of staff.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Phillips.

[212] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
GENERAL STAFF

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name, please?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Walter C. Phillips.

The CHAIRMAN. Your rank?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Colonel, general staff.

The CHAIRMAN. And your position in the Department of Hawaii has been what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have been the chief of staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Since General Short came here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. I became chief of staff on the 6th of November.

The CHAIRMAN. What position did you hold before that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was G-3, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. G-3. G-3 is Information, is it not? Intelligence?

Colonel PHILLIPS. G-3 is Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Operations?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. G-2 is Intelligence?

Colonel PHILLIPS. G-2 is Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Phillips, I show you a telegram received by the Navy on 28th November and sent by Naval Operations on 27th November. Did the Navy furnish you a copy of that telegram?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe so, although I do not remember exactly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice that in the telegram the instruction is, "Inform District and Army Authorities."

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe so, although I do not remember exactly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice that in the telegram the instruction is, "Inform District and Army authorities."

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. "District" evidently referring to Naval District?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Referring to Naval District. Fourteenth [213] Naval District.

The CHAIRMAN. This telegram, I suppose, was dispatched to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, under your routine, if information had been furnished pursuant to that direction, where would that information have been lodged in your organization?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That information, secret nature, comes directly from the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet ordinarily by an officer directly to the Department Commander.

The CHAIRMAN. And would it go to General Short in person or to you as his chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. If the general is present I usually direct that directly to him; otherwise it would come to me and go directly to him when he—

The CHAIRMAN. Is available?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Is available, yes, sir. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In such a case, Colonel Phillips, would any record whatever be made in your department of the receipt of such information?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have made a call, or the Commission has made a call, for your records anent this telegram, and that call has not yet been answered. Have you had anything to do with searching for the information?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I knew nothing at all about the call having been made, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was made through Major Allen, who is the officer assigned to us.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I heard from him that there was some difficulty about identifying the message and determining in what file it was.

[214] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard nothing about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you take it upon yourself, please, to determine what if any records?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That was what date, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. The date of receipt here by the Navy is November 28, 1941.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Subsequent—

The CHAIRMAN. The date of the message is October 27.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. November.

Colonel PHILLIPS. November 27.

The CHAIRMAN. 27. That was the date it was dispatched.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Go ahead.

General McCoy. Colonel Phillips, I remember the two also. That is, General Short received a like message in different language on the 27th or 28th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. From the War Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. From the War Department.

General McCoy. What was the routine in connection with that message? In other words, did it come personally to General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Or did it come to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It came directly to me through our General. The adjutant general brings that directly to me by an officer messenger, and General Short was here in the office at the time. I delivered it personally to him.

General McCoy. Yes?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As it happened, there was an officer [215] present. The adjutant general was present talking with General Short at the time.

General McCoy. Did you furnish a copy at that time to the Commander of the Fleet?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I will have to look in my records about that, sir. I am not sure that we directed. We ordinarily do.

General McCoy. Would you make a note to see whether you furnished them with a copy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I will look for that, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you want to ask anything about the text, there it is (indicating).

In reply to the message that General McCoy has just asked you about, that of November 27 from the War Department, the reply, copy of which was furnished us by General Short yesterday, is to the effect that he had alerted the Department to prevent sabotage.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir. I ordered that at once, at the direction of the Department Commander.

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge was there any discussion of that part of the message which indicated that hostilities might break out at any moment?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As I recall, sir, we—that was read and reread a number of times, and the gist of the thing seemed to be that sabotage—sabotage, subversive uprisings; and as a result we acted accordingly. No, hostilities and attack from without, any such thing, wasn't visualized by us at that time. We had our alert No. 1, as we call it, for sabotage and suppression of subversive uprisings within. We didn't visualize anything from without at that time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose the Army command here was cognizant of the fact that a Japanese air raid might be one element of any hostile outbreak, any hostile action?

[216] Colonel PHILLIPS. Possibility, yes, sir, but not particularly connected with sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course not.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I gather that the thing that impressed the responsible officers here, and was discussed on the receipt of that telegram, was sabotage, and that only?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That is it exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you the night of December 6, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The night of December 6 I was in my quarters by about 11:30. Mrs. Phillips and I were invited to a dance, and we left rather early and were back in the quarters here at Shafter. I live at Shafter here.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was the first knowledge you had of an attack on the morning of Sunday, December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was dressing, partially dressed, and the explosion, firing, is the first that I heard, evidently from bombs. I immediately went through my own mind: This is Sunday. What can this be? We planned nothing. Oftentimes the Navy was out on a problem, or we were doing a little firing with our coastal defense, or something of that kind, from time to time, but I was thoroughly familiar with everything of that kind that went on, and could see no justification for anything of the kind. And a member of my staff, G-1, called me and says, "This is attack. Attack."

I says, "It must be, because we have nothing planned today." With that, I shouted to my family and ran over to the Department commander's quarters just next door and told him what I believed to be the facts, that we were being attacked, and recommended that the troops move out under alert No. 3 at once. He approved it. I came to headquarters here and initiated that move without delay. I ran all the way to Headquarters, and in the meantime collected my G-4 [217] and my G-1 on the way up, and we issued those orders by phone.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they promptly carried out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, so far as I have been able to ascertain.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have attempted. I did at the time, because I put my G-3 right out immediately. That's his function, to go out and see how the troops are operating, and they moved out. I think the

25th Division moved out in better form than ever before in their history.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the G-3 alert was carried out—
Colonel PHILLIPS. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. —as it was intended it should be?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Absolutely. That is, the alert 3; not the G-3 alert, sir. The alert No. 3.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, it is the practice for the men in service to have a great many parties on Saturday nights here on the Island, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not think more than ordinary.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there a lot of large parties at which drinking was going on on the island and at which officers were present on the night of December 6?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not that I know of, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not that you know of?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the affair that you attended a reasonably sober affair?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Quite, yes, sir.

[218] The CHAIRMAN. Have you any knowledge of any officer who was disabled to have gone on duty if there had come a call at midnight Saturday night?

Colonel PHILLIPS. None whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. You have none?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was the dance that you attended?

Colonel PHILLIPS. At Schofield Barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. Given by some officers there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; at the Officers' Club on the post.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been the practice, I presume, to grant week-end leaves or Saturday evening leaves to a great many of the men in the service here, both officers and enlisted men?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not during the period of alert, sir. We were under alert No. 1, and we were granting passes to but very few. We considered ourselves on duty all the time.

The CHAIRMAN. You think, then, and I presume you can't have specifically accurate knowledge, that there were comparatively few officers and men on leave that Saturday night and over the Sunday?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I should say comparatively few, yes, sir. Yes, sir. To give you my actions before I left here—I did this nightly in order that I—this is particularly since November 27th. I would inform message center. We had an officer of the day, a staff officer of the day, on duty here all the time, and I would tell him whenever I left the post. He knew exactly where I could be found 24 hours out of the 24. I checked in at our message center, our signal office, to see what messages had come in and what the situation was as far as could be determined from messages we had received. When I came back from the party that night I did the same thing, went to the staff officer of the day, which was located in [219] the adjutant gen-

eral's building, checked through his messages and found nothing except routine nature.

The CHAIRMAN. Alert No. 1 being in effect, is it your belief that all officers in responsible command were in touch with the message center in the same way that you were?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Department commander was, and myself. We didn't believe it was necessary for others. If there had been anything of importance they would have been informed at once.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you any questions?

General McNARNEY. Colonel, did I understand you to say that Alert No. 1 was ordered immediately after the receipt of the message of November 27?

Colonel PHILLIPS. 27th, yes, sir. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. That was ordered prior to the receipt of the message on November 28 relative to sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, I am speaking of the receipt of the message here. I am not—I thought it was on the 27th. Now, the sabotage message was the one that we ordered the Alert No. 1 on, sir.

General McNARNEY. You did nothing, then, on the message of November 27? You did nothing on the receipt of that message?

The CHAIRMAN. Here they are, Colonel (indicating documents).

Colonel PHILLIPS. Could I refresh my memory?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Here is the November 27th one. Admiral, you have a reply to this message in your folder.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Here it is here.

The CHAIRMAN. My folder must have it.

Admiral STANDLEY. It refers to the 27th.

Colonel PHILLIPS. This is the message that we alerted.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. And when was that received?

[220] Colonel PHILLIPS. This was 11—6 the 27th here.

The CHAIRMAN. This goes out under what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. 11—6 p. m. the 27th. This is—

The CHAIRMAN. The 27th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The 27th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. This was 1:16 p. m. the 27th, and this went out at 5:40 p. m. the 27th (indicating). That was all on the 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. That means that the long message from the War Department was received at 1 o'clock, at 1:16 on the 27th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. 1:16, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And at 5:40 p. m. on the 27th you sent your reply?

Colonel PHILLIPS. 27th; that's right.

The CHAIRMAN. That you had alerted against sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right. Yes, that's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, have you got that clear?

General McNARNEY. Yes. In other words, Alert No. 1—

General McCoy. Mine, I notice, is dated at Washington the 28th. That must be a different message.

Admiral REEVES. It must be a different message.

The CHAIRMAN. It must be a different dispatch. It is in Exhibit b.

General McCoy. Here it is.

Admiral STANDLEY. 5:40, 27 November.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Here it is. Now go ahead.

General McNARNEY. In other words, Alert No. 1 was ordered prior to the receipt of the War Department message of November 28, which was concerned primarily with sabotage?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you find the 28th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I haven't that, sir.

[221] The CHAIRMAN. Where do you find the one of the 28th? Under Exhibit 1?

Admiral STANDLEY. Signed "Adams," right next.

General McNARNEY. "G."

The CHAIRMAN. "G." There is the new one (indicating).

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, that's right.

General McNARNEY. Going back to the message of November 27,—

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, that is under b.: 27th.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. (Continuing.) —I fail to find in that message anything relating to sabotage specifically, but I do find certain terms:

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action probable at any moment.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. I also find:

Policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. I also find a direction to "undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary."

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Do you feel that the Alert No. 1 carried out the directive contained in the message of the 27th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We felt so at the time, sir. We felt that we were alerting the entire command and our immediate threat was right here.

General McNARNEY. Do you know whether the gist of the directive of the 27th was communicated to any senior staff officers or senior commanders of the Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't tell you that. There was a [222] question of the minimum essential officers being informed in regard to this. At the last sentence it says, "Limit discussion of this highly secret information to the minimum essential officers," and that was done.

General McNARNEY. Will you tell the Commission who were the officers that was communicated to?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I informed the G-3. I don't know whom the Department commander informed. I believe I also informed the G-2.

General McNARNEY. Are you the senior member of the Local Joint Planning Committee, senior Army member?

Colonel PHILLIPS. By order, yes, sir; I have never functioned as such.

General McNARNEY. Since when have you held this position?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Since I became chief of staff.

General McNARNEY. There have been no meetings of the Local Joint Planning Committee since that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. What is your idea of the function of the Local Joint Planning Committee?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My idea is, of course, controlled more or less to conform to what we have as a joint plan, and I should say that whenever changes are necessary, why, that joint committee should meet and modify the joint plain that we have.

General McNARNEY. You did not consider that the situation as known to you on November 27 and 28 required any revision of the existing plans or any examination into the propriety of making a new plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We were all familiar with the plan thoroughly, sir, and a change was not deemed necessary at that time.

[223] General McNARNEY. What is the normal routine method by which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, and the Commander of the 14th Naval District maintained close liaison and contact with reference to the existing situation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. By personal conferences at one or the other headquarters.

General McNARNEY. Did you, as Chief of Staff of the Department, confer with any Navy officers during the period November 27 to December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not. I was occupied with the duties of my office here at headquarters practically the entire period.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. I have nothing, Mr. Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Standley?

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask you a few questions, Colonel.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. This party at the club at the barracks that you attended, this dance—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was General Short there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say, sir. It was a large party.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was this a club party, or were there other—Was this a private party, and were there other parties at the club? Was this a private party?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was the ordinary evening club dance, and this was a private party, not a club entertainment.

Admiral STANDLEY. And there probably were many other parties?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Many other parties, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Many other parties?

[224] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And those parties consisted of—what were the personnel at those parties?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Officers and their wives, generally speaking; some civilians.

Admiral STANDLEY. Both.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Invited guests.

Admiral STANDLEY. Largely officers of the post?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is liquor sold in the club?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. At the Schofield Barracks?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. There is liquor there at Schofield?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, just like ordinary clubs throughout the Army.

Admiral STANDLEY. Suppose there was obviously a drunkenness among the officers there: what would be your responsibility in the matter, as Chief of Staff if any?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, sir, I of course did not have the situation to face. I would have, of course, taken disciplinary action, perhaps put the officer concerned under arrest, send him to his quarters, or report him to his commanding officer. There was no indication of such thing.

Admiral STANDLEY. You feel, and felt then, that you had a responsibility in case there was a drunken orgy at the club that morning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Most assuredly. Most assuredly.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is, your responsibility as to the conduct and the morale of this post would involve a responsibility which required you to take action of some kind if that occurred?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that true?

[225] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was any such action taken?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no occasion for such action, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just one other question: You would be cognizant of the disciplinary measures taken at this post since you have been here; is that true?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Absolutely, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What has been the record of punishment for drunkenness at this post among the officers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There has been very little drunkenness among the officers here, sir. We have had—I can't say offhand, but perhaps two or three trials since the first of March when I arrived, but those are—I am not positive about that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The records will indicate it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, yes, the records will.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you make a memorandum for us of all such instances of charges of drunkenness?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just a moment. When I used the expression "post" I meant this Department.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I understood that, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Command.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy?

General MCCOY. Have you ever had occasion, Colonel Phillips, to report to your commander any such individual derelictions or cases of drunkenness?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at this Department, sir; never.

General MCCOY. Did you see any evidence of drunkenness that night at the dance at Schofield Barracks?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not.

General MCCOY. Never even occurred to you?

[226] Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Was it a dinner dance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. The usual post dinner dance at the club?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The usual, the ordinary post dinner dance, and Major and Mrs. Dupree—he is adjutant of Schofield Barracks—had quite a large party of, I should say, 40 people, officers and their wives chiefly.

General McCoy. Had it ever occurred, in consideration of what might follow on an alert, that it would be proper to lay down that there should be no social activities during an alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That has never been considered, no, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, after you were warned on the 27th that war was imminent and hostile action might occur, unpredictable, from any direction, you still carried on the usual social amenities and activities?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There were not so many present, of course, because many officers were involved in duty. We are very closely packed here; we can get to our stations in a very few minutes. Ordinarily there is no distance involved, any place in the Island, and there had been no restrictions in social functions.

The CHAIRMAN. If an Alert 3 had been ordered, there would have been?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Quite different. Quite different.

The CHAIRMAN. Everybody in effect would have been on post?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Absolutely, just as it has been since Alert 3 has been in effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Alert 3 has remained in effect since December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. May I ask another question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

[227] General McCoy. In your consideration with your commander on receipt of this warning of November 27 did you discuss these first phrases that General McNarney called to your attention: "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

General McCoy. "This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Now, that is the body and the gist of the whole dispatch.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. But on that you simply ordered Alert No. 1, with regard to sabotage, which is local—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

General MCCOY. —and hasn't anything to do with hostile action as stated there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We——

General MCCOY. Did you discuss those statements and those warnings with the commanding general?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. What was the——

Colonel PHILLIPS (interposing). The thing that might jeopardize our defense the most was an organized internal uprising right in our midst here, with the large Japanese [228] population led by aliens. With the Pacific Fleets here responsible for distant reconnaissance under our plan we felt, while a possibility of attack from the outside—while it was possible, it was rather remote, and the thing that would jeopardize our defense plan the most would be an organized uprising right in our midst, to sabotage our seacoast defense, sabotage our planes, and generally disrupt our plan of defense on the Island.

General MCCOY. Excepting what actually did happen?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. And you didn't envisage that happening at all?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not with distant reconnaissance provided by the Navy.

General MCCOY. Were you informed that such distant reconnaissance was being carried out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know that we were in so many words. We assumed that we were carrying our part of the plan, and I don't know that there was even any thought of anything else.

General McNARNEY. Was there any discussion of it?

General MCCOY. But I can't quite get yet why you thought that, with these statements that I have just read, which are the burden of the whole dispatch.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I was controlled in my action, sir, by the directive of the Department Commander.

General MCCOY. Were you informed by the Naval District of the arrival of the battleships in the harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was not, sir. I can't say whether the Department Commander was or not. I was not, sir. I never knew whether the ships were in or out.

General MCCOY. Wouldn't that affect any plan for defense that you might have, whatever?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, it should have affected that, [229] sir, but as Chief of Staff I never knew.

General MCCOY. Did it ever occur to you that that was one of your main functions here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. To help protect the fleet?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. But you automatically thought that that followed from your——

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. That was a matter the Department Commander was attending to personally, sir.

General MCCOY. Were not you usually with him at these conferences with the Commander of the Fleet?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I was not.

General McCoy. Were you with him when he had any conferences with the Navy during that period of November 27 to December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Who was with him on those conferences? Are you informed as to that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe his aide, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is his aide?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Captain Truman.

General McCoy. Captain who?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Truman.

General McCoy. At any time during the period of the alert from the 27th of November to December 7 did you have any conference with your vis-a-vis in the Navy or with any officer in the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I did not.

General McCoy. Did anybody of your staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. None of my staff, no, sir.

General McCoy. And neither the Operations nor the G-2, as far as you know?

[230] Colonel PHILLIPS. As far as I know, no, sir. The Department Commander was handling all that himself.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. If your Department, Colonel, was informed of the nature and tasks of the scouting forces of the Navy, that information came to the Department Commander himself, in your belief?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. I have some questions.

On receipt of this cable of November 27 you discussed the matter with the commanding general, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Was there any discussion as to the type of alert which should be put in? That is, did you consider No. 2 and No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Or just No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We considered exactly what we should put in, whether 1, 2, or 3.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the objection to putting in 2 or 3, if any?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no particular objection, sir. It was considered that 1 was what we desired and required.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. I have one; I am not quite ready yet.

General McCoy. I have one: Colonel Phillips, under Alert No. 1, the very first line, the very first sentence, 14, page 3, it states, "This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands, with no threat from without."

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Now, here was a warning telegram that did mention hostile action and unpredictable action from without, from the War Department.

[231] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. So that that line is absolutely inconsistent, then, with the instructions from the War Department, is it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It says, "with no threat from without," sir.

General McCoy. So that Alert No. 1 is not consistent, I take it, with these instructions from the War Department. Had that inconsistency in the very first paragraph of Alert No. 1 occurred to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It had not, sir. At the time I saw no inconsistency, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, in this Standing Operating Procedure under the duties for the interceptor command—that is paragraph 15 j. (2).

Colonel PHILLIPS. Page 7.

Admiral STANDLEY. On page 7. The first paragraph of j. says that the interceptor command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, including available naval and Maritime Corps anti-aircraft artillery.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, that would involve, would it not, the artillery or the anti-aircraft artillery on board ships in the harbor; and then to follow up I will help you, will follow up 2: it says—

coordination of anti-aircraft fire with naval ships in Pearl and Honolulu harbors.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. So that automatically, then, your plan takes care of the ships that are in the harbor; wouldn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had planned that. That feature of this had never been settled in any joint agreement at all at that time, sir.

[232] Admiral STANDLEY. But it was on operating procedure?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This was at the time, yes, sir.

General McCoy. I understand, however, the interceptor command was not constituted until the 17th; is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why was it that that had not been activated prior to December 7, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We did not have the Radars. They are still not installed. Making every effort that we can to get them in, sir, and that was the basis of the interceptor command, we felt: Aircraft Warning Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, when was this operating procedure adopted?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This was signed on the 5th of November, 1941, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was therefore—what was written about the interceptor command? Was it prospective?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly the same as the Home Guard; there is a reference here to the Home Guard, which had not been in existence, was not at that time. It has just been organized.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there any other parts of this procedure that were not operative at that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe not, sir.

General McCoy. Was there a provision made in this Alert No. 1 for aerial warnings, for warning against hostile aircraft? Any system, in other words, in effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not understand that question, General.

General McCoy. Well, I notice since the attack you have issued an instruction establishing an aerial warning service with sirens in the tower downtown, and so forth.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. That was not in effect on December——

[233] Colonel PHILLIPS. That was not in effect at this time, sir.

General McCoy. Nor any other system——

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of air raid warning, no, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Coloney, you just stated that the Radars were not installed. Do you refer to the permanent stations?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The permanent installations, yes, sir. We had temporary mobile stations. We had six mobile and six permanent provided.

Admiral REEVES. Were the mobile stations installed?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The mobile stations were in position, yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Yes?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. On page 1 of Alert No. 1——

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Or no. On page 1 of the Standard Operating Procedure I notice under the term "security," under (6): "Security."

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. "Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces."

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. What measures for security did you envisage as being normally taken under that provision?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is set forth in that Field Manual 100-5, sir, which gives the—makes the unit commander responsible for his security. General statement as to that.

General McCoy. Did it provide for having ammunition at the guns and the guns in readiness and a skeleton crew at the guns?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In case the guns were out, yes, sir, I should say so; that would provide—that is a normal battery function. I should say.

[234] General McCoy. When they were in the field, you say?

Colonel PHILLIPS. When they were in the field, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Do you know whether on December 7 anti-aircraft guns were ready for action with ammunition present at the guns?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They were moving in under Alert—these were mobile units, sir. They were moving in under Alert 3 just as soon as they got their orders.

General McCoy. But they were not prepared under Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, they were not in position under Alert No. 1. That is not required, sir.

General McCoy. Is there any provision under the standing orders as to where ammunition and bombs for the air fleet should be kept? I will make that a little explanatory by telling you that a statement has been made that at Hickam Field the ammunition was in the hangar.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

General McCoy. Which were immediately set on fire.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. That's what leads me to ask this question.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, was there any inspection and report to you as to the security of ammunition and its availability against immediate surprise attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No report made, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Phillips, when the message of November 27 was received I understand you had three mobile Radar units?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any discussion, in view of the possible outbreak of hostilities, of the necessity for working those Radar units 24 hours a day?

[235] Colonel PHILLIPS. No discussion of that so far as I know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, in spite of the availability of those units your Department depended simply upon the scouting forces of the Navy and such intelligence information as the Navy might otherwise obtain to warn you of any hostile attacks?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would say so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the system of training on the Radar units went on as before?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had no trained operators. We were exerting every effort we could to train these men. They were all rank amateurs; nobody was a professional on the Radar. We were devoting——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, was it because of that deficiency that you didn't give orders for the Radar equipment to be worked full-time, or was it because that expedient didn't occur to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; there was no discussion of that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that any inquiry I might make now as to why the senior officers of the Department did not give instructions for the use of the Radar equipment continuously would be simply speculation on your part as to why somebody didn't think of it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Radar and its operation was under the interceptor commander and also the Department signal officer at that time. He was training these people, and that was his function.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. •

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But inquiry could be made of one or both those men?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As to whether it was not possible to keep [236] the equipment working continuously?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That's true, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But, as I understand your answer, that expedient occurred to nobody and was discussed by nobody in the superior command?

Colonel PHILLIPS. So far as I know, sir, that was not discussed. It's possible that the Department Commander took consideration of that. I didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, isn't it a fact that those things were not discussed because no one in the superior command had the slightest notion that there would be any raid within any reasonable number of days? You all felt secure against a raid?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We felt secure against a raid, particularly with the Fleet here, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, Colonel, had you, in fact, a right to rely on the Navy's scouting unless you knew what the extent and the nature of that scouting was? For example, if you had been told that the Navy had available but a single task force for that purpose would it not be obvious to you that but a single task force couldn't cover the four points of the compass of this Island?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Certainly it would, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you didn't know how many forces they had out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As I said a while ago, sir, I never knew what the Navy had.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions.

General McCoy. I noticed in General Short's report to the War Department and also in his statement to us that he mentions and gives full particulars of the operation of the [237] Radar on the morning of the 7th.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Including the volunteer action of one of the operators that did find a large force of planes approaching the Island. It is carried forward in these statements up to the point where Lieutenant Tyler—is it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Lieutenant Tyler evaluated the information.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. When did you discover that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As to the evaluation of the——

General McCoy. As to the whole story that is stated here.

Colonel PHILLIPS. The whole story? Perhaps on the 8th or 9th.

General McCoy. There was no report made to you at the time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no report at the time. I reported it to the Department Commander as soon as I——

General McCoy. How did you discover it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was reported by the signal officer, Department signal officer, Colonel Powell.

General McCoy. What was the nature of his report to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Informal report, sir.

General McCoy. What did he say?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He told me of the circumstances and that they were retained—they were running from 4 to 7 normally, and that after 7 these planes had appeared on the graph of the Radar, and that Tyler had considered they were either planes being ferried from the mainland as we had been getting them in from time to time—of course that was very secret. Sometimes they knew, and he had known of them arriving; or they were planes from the Navy carriers.

General McCoy. Did you inform anybody in your command—[238] that is, the ground command—of the arrival of those planes that morning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of the arrival of the B-17's?

General McCoy. Yes, from the mainland.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Whom?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Hawaiian Air Force.

General McCoy. Were they mistaken on their arrival for hostile planes by any member or any detachment or any anti-aircraft organization, as far as you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As far as I know, no, they were not.

General McCoy. You do not know whether they were fired on by our own guns?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know about that, sir.

General McCoy. Has any report—

Colonel PHILLIPS. There have been no reports to that effect.

General McCoy. Have you made inquiry since December 7 as to what went on in these various posts and fields on that day?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, through my staff, through my G-3, G-2.

General McCoy. Have there any reports been called for from the commanding officers of the different fields and posts as to what happened on that morning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe so, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, General Short's report to the War Department, a copy of which has been furnished us, was made up without finding out what happened in his subordinate—

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. He visited personally every post; he was out on reconnaissance the entire period personally making that report.

General McCoy. You think he knows, then, what happened [239] on each field and post at that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was inspecting continuously.

General McCoy. Since that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, during that—during the 7th and following, subsequent thereto.

General McCoy. I understand that he established immediately what you call your advanced—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Command post.

General McCoy. Command post, in the crater?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Do you remember about what time that was established?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Very shortly; I should say around 9, perhaps 9 o'clock, 9:30, it was being opened.

General McCoy. It was functioning, then, during most of the succeeding raids?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. That is, I take it there were three raids, were there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There were three to my knowledge. I remained here, sir.

General McCoy. That is, you remained in this building?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I remained in this building, my office just in there (indicating). We had our scrambled phone to Washington in this little booth right here, and I was directed to remain here and did not go to the forward command post until Tuesday following the attack.

General McCoy. Who was in charge of it during the Sunday morning after it was established?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Short was there himself, G-3 was there, and the bulk of G-2; the headquarters commandant, Major Henderson, was there establishing the post, and he of course is—

[240] General McCoy. That was the normal arrangement for it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was the normal arrangement, yes, sir. Normally the Chief of Staff, of course, would have been there; but due to our telephone arrangement with Washington and the necessity that the Department Commander felt for getting information to Washington and from Washington I remained near this phone and did all the talking with the War Department.

General McCoy. How many times did you talk with them that day? Do you remember?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Two or three, sir.

General McCoy. Did you take a transcript of your conversation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, sir. Most of them were in the—first call I put in at the direction of the Department Commander, General Marshall.

General McCoy. The Chief of Staff, you mean?

Colonel PHILLIPS. To the Chief of Staff, yes, sir.

General McCoy. You talked to him personally?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. How many times that morning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We only called once, as I recall.

General McCoy. Did he call you back at any time that day?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe he did, sir. There is a record of that. There is a record of the number of calls.

General McCoy. Yes. Could you sit down and think it over and dictate the nature of your conversation to General Marshall?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. I think it would be well.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you make a memorandum to do it and come back later when we have got through these other matters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Was there any other time between November [241] 27 and December 7 that the Department Commander or you talked with the Chief of Staff or anybody else in the War Department about the measures taken for security here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, sir, and I do not believe that the Department Commander did.

General McCoy. Was it customary in time of crises to use the telephone with the office of the Chief of Staff in Washington?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was used very very seldom, sir.

General McCoy. Why was that the case? That is, I mean it is the quickest means of communication.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Now, why was it not used in time of emergency more frequently, say?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I could not say as to that, sir.

General McCoy. Did you possibly feel that it was not as safe as a code message by radio?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. With this phone it's a highly secret arrangement. It's a scrambled phone, and we feel its use is ex-

tremely—that is limited; we shouldn't use it but on a highly important—or for highly important calls. That is the impression that the Department Commander gave me. It is the most secret, we think. I don't know.

General McCoy. And it is certainly the quickest?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No question about that, sir.

General McCoy. You talk in the open, and it scrambles itself?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right. You raise a little plug on the phone itself. There are definite instructions as to how to place the call. The operator says, "Go ahead," and you pull out this little plug, and that scrambles your conversation.

General McCoy. Both ways?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Both ways. He pulls out the plug on [242] his phone.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is understood beforehand?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, yes, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Have you any such arrangement with the Navy here on the Island?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Do you have a direct line between commanders-in-chief and the commander here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We have in the forward C. P.

General McCoy. But not here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not here, no, sir?

General McCoy. It would go here through the city central, would it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Well, no. We have cables here direct to Pearl Harbor but no direct connection. The forward C. P., we have a phone directly—onto the Department Commander's desk directly from the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

General McCoy. How would you get the Commander in Chief normally here at headquarters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Call Pearl Harbor, sir.

General McCoy. That would go into a military central, would it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, right here, sir.

General McCoy. It would not go downtown to the civilian central?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I do not believe so. I believe that is correct, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, there is a military central here and a naval central down at the—

Colonel PHILLIPS. A naval central down there.

General McCoy. At Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[243] General McCoy. How long does it take physically to get from here to Pearl Harbor in case of emergency?

Colonel PHILLIPS. From 15 to 20 minutes, sir.

General MARSHALL. Were there any liaison officers exchanged as a result of Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Prior to Alert No. 1, we had a naval officer on duty at this headquarters in G-3 office, and we had also an Army officer on duty in the operations section of Admiral Bloch's staff.

General McCoy. That was prior to Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. What happened after Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no change in that made.

General MCCOY. So that there was a naval officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was a naval officer here, and we had an Army officer there.

General MCCOY. Was that the case on Sunday?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Who was that naval officer? Do you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Lieutenant Burr.

General MCCOY. Is he here now at this headquarters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. That is normal for him to be here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Well, he is in the forward command post.

General MCCOY. But he is here now—oh, he is in the forward command post now?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. And who is the Army officer on duty over there at the District?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Lieutenant Colonel Dingman.

General MCCOY. What are their respective duties?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe they have ever been [244] given prescribed duties. They are liaison officers.

General MCCOY. Embraced under the term "liaison officer"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, liaison officers.

General MCCOY. I have no further questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, you took over the duties of Chief of Staff on the 6th of November?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. This Standing Operating Procedure is dated 5 November.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. '41.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And it says that—

This replaces, supersedes Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, 14 July, 1941.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know what brought about the issuing of this draft of the standing order, of the Standing Operating Procedure?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of this one (indicating), sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. The one dated November 5.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. It was a result of—this tentative procedure was published, and all major echelon commanders were directed to submit suggested changes, and these changes were considered by the Department Commander, G-3 Section, gone over very thoroughly, and various conferences were held with the major unit commanders. Those changes were all embodied in this volume which was issued the 5th of November (indicating).

Admiral STANDLEY. Were those conferences attended or taken part in by the Commandant of the 14th District?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They were not, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. They involved a number of commitments or requirements for naval action or cooperation?

[245] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were those various phases approved by the Commandant of the District?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They had not been taken up with the Navy so far as I know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, that ties in with your statement to General McNarney that there had not been a meeting of the Joint Planning Committee since you had become Chief of Staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir.

General McCoy. Did you furnish the Navy with a copy of this Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say about that, sir. I did not myself.

General McCoy. Will you make a note and make sure of that, please?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did the Navy have a corresponding plan, so far as you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you say whether anything of that nature was furnished to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And if it was, where would it be located in this Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It would be—if anything of this nature was furnished, it would come through me, and I do not believe that such a thing exists.

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge were the naval commanders advised that you had put Alert No. 1 into operation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They were, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And how were they to know what Alert No. 1 comprised? Would it mean anything to them for you to tell [246] them that Alert No. 1 had been put into effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not as such, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words,—

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not positive of that, sir. I am not positive about it.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that what was communicated to the Navy by General Short would be known by General Short and his aide, rather than by you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing came to your knowledge with respect to the state of preparedness that the Navy was in in view of these warnings?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Did you have any conference or conversation with the Naval officer in the G-3 about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The G-3 had in the course of normal operations the naval—naval liaison officer is in with all G-3 conferences.

General McCoy. It would be one of his functions as liaison officer—

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right.

General McCoy. —to have a copy of Alert No. 1, would it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And he would probably furnish it to his own headquarters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, if the Navy had put in operation an operation order which involved cooperative measures or joint action, would you expect the Army liaison officer to inform the commanding general of it? Would that be part of his responsibility?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That would be the normal thing, yes, sir, I would think.

Admiral STANDLEY. But wouldn't the normal thing be to [247] have this commanding general and the Commandant of the District discuss such a procedure as that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right.

Admiral STANDLEY. Prior to putting it into effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Prior to its adoption, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether General Short had such a discussion or not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything further?

General McNARNEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You will get the matters that we asked you for, Colonel, will you, as expeditiously as you can reasonably?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And, Colonel, on account of the nature of this inquiry it is enjoined upon witnesses that they shall not discuss anything that has gone on in this room or discuss it with anyone else.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I will ask you to observe that caution.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, gentlemen, I am not sure whom we have here. (There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Call in General Wilson.

TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL DURWARD S. WILSON, COMMANDING 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name, General?

General WILSON. Durward S. Wilson.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

General WILSON. Brigadier General, commanding the 24th Division.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy, will you examine him?

[248] General McCoy. Is your division constituted on a war footing now?

General WILSON. Do you mean as to strength, sir, or activities?

General McCoy. Yes, as to organization of the division on a war footing.

General WILSON. I don't believe I follow you, General. As far as its activity is concerned, it is. It's considerably under strength, if you have reference to that.

General McCoy. Well, I had reference both as to organization and strength.

General WILSON. As to organization, it is organized along the lines of a triangular division, with a considerable number of shortages. In other words, the personnel is not more than two-thirds strength, officers for duty approximately 50. Certain installation—units such as the Quartermaster Battalion, Medical Battalion are both way under strength. For instance, the infantry regiments have a strength of enlisted personnel of around 2,000, whereas they are supposed to have around 3,200, and about 40-odd officers for duty. The artillery also is way under strength; we understand replacements are on the way.

General McCoy. When was this division formed?

General WILSON. October 1 this year, sir.

General McCoy. Were all the personnel brought here from the States since then?

General WILSON. Oh, no, sir. The Hawaiian Division that existed here was split into two triangular divisions. I might also state that one of the three regiments belonging to the 24th Division is not under my command; it is the 299 Infantry, which is scattered throughout the outlying islands, defending them.

[249] General McCoy. Under district commanders?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. You have no responsibility for them at present?

General WILSON. No, sir, none whatever. In fact, they were detached some time ago before the organization of the two triangular divisions.

General McNARNEY. General, were you ever informed of a War Department cable dated November 27 which outlined the situation between the United States and Japan and gave certain directives?

General WILSON. On I think it was the 27th I was informed by an officer who had come from Department Headquarters; I was given a message something to this effect—it wasn't even written: that negotiations with Japan seemed to be off, that the United States would sit tight, await action by Japan. That was the intent of the message which I received.

General McNARNEY. Who delivered this message?

General WILSON. It was delivered by Colonel Haynes, who is G-2 of the 25th Division. He got it from Department. The Department directed that he deliver it to me. He delivered it to me after dark.

General McNARNEY. When did you receive the orders to go on Alert No. 1?

General WILSON. Alert No. 1, I think it was that same day, the 27th. I am quite positive of that, because after I got this message from Colonel Haynes we of course put it into effect. We have a Standing Operating Procedure, so that we can tell them to carry it out. But as soon as I got that message, which was after dark, I assembled the regimental commanders from my chief of staff, only very few, because I was told to keep it secret, had a little discussion with them and directed [250] that every installation which we were guarding, vital installations, be inspected that night.

General McNARNEY. What did Alert No. 1 involve to your command?

General WILSON. Alert No. 1 involved proper measures against sabotage, under the supposition that there was no threat from the outside, and the measures that we put into effect were as follows: A number of vital installations were protected by standing guards. These

had been carefully selected in advance. Standing guards were put upon them, and in addition we had patrols cover the principal roads throughout the north sector. In addition we had a battalion of infantry alerted and ready to move on very short notice.

General McNARNEY. Were there any observational units on the beach?

General WILSON. No, not—no. This Alert No. 1, as I stated, was based upon no outside threat. It was against sabotage.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any information on the 27th that the War Department had sent a message which stated in effect: Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment?

General WILSON. Not in that manner. I have stated to you the import of the message which I received on the 27th.

General McNARNEY. There was no indication in that message that hostile action might be expected?

General WILSON. No. No, because the following day the newspaper, as I remember it—because it impressed me that we were bound to great secrecy, and the newspapers stated practically the same thing, and that is that negotiations looked like they were practically finished and that our country would wait and allow Japan to take the initiative.

General McNARNEY. Did the fact that negotiations were [251] practically finished lead you to believe that there was a possibility of action against the Island of Oahu?

General WILSON. No. I had no feeling whatsoever that there would be any action that we wouldn't get wind of. Now, as to what action would be taken—no, I didn't expect—personally didn't expect any attack on the Philippines, because I figured—

The CHAIRMAN. On Hawaii.

General WILSON. I mean on Hawaii, because I figured that with the patrol system and the strength that we have here Japan would make her effort in another direction.

General McNARNEY. You mention a patrol system. What do you know about the patrol system in effect?

General WILSON. I know nothing about it. That I could testify to only by hearsay, about a Navy patrol, inshore and offshore patrol. I know nothing. All that is kept very secret, and I know nothing about it, except just what you hear.

General McNARNEY. Can you give the Commission a brief narrative of your actions after the attack started?

General WILSON. As soon as the—I was at my quarters at the time the attack started.

General McNARNEY. Where are your quarters?

General WILSON. They are in the 21st Infantry Area at Schofield Barracks, about five minutes from my command post by car. Sunday is my day for taking it easy, and I was in bed when the first bomb sounded, landed. I arose and dressed, went out in front, and while I could hardly believe it I saw that they were Jap planes. I immediately jumped into my personal car and drove as quickly as I could to my command post. There I found my chief of staff had preceded me; he lived nearer. He had gotten there, and he had already issued orders to supplement Alert No. 1: in other words, to direct the troops

to get their machine guns into anti-aircraft [252] position just as quickly as possible, some of our units having already anticipated us and got them there; in addition, to send patrols throughout our whole sector for observation of the beach, and to increase the standing guards. That action was all taken by the time I got there. About—I can't give you the exact time, but I would say it was approximately 8:50—as far as we could determine this attack came about 8:05, and within a few minutes after that my chief of staff had issued these instructions to the troops. About 8:50 we got word from Department that Alert No. 3 would go into effect at once. That was an all-out defense where our troops moved and get into their defense position, and that was immediately initiated.

General McCoy. Did it work satisfactorily to you?

General WILSON. Yes, sir, it worked very satisfactorily.

General McCoy. Could you say, just off the bat, what proportion of your command, first as to officers and next as to men, took part in that initial movement? That is, was there any particular proportion of your command, both officers and men, absent on pass?

General WILSON. General, I am not aware of the—I haven't the details on the proportion, but I would say that the bulk of our command was in the quadrangles preparing to move very shortly after the alert sounded.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by the bulk of your command?

General WILSON. Well, I would say at least 80%.

General McCoy. Did you make any check on that at any time?

General WILSON. The regimental commanders of course checked. I haven't the figures myself, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are they lodged?

General WILSON. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. Where are they lodged, if anywhere, the [253] figures?

General WILSON. Within the regiment, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they furnished to the adjutant general?

General WILSON. I am not certain, sir. The figures may have been collected by my own adjutant general. That is a point that has escaped me, because—I might state in that connection that we are not able to immediately jump into our transportation and move out into our position, and by the time the troops were ready to move the troops were all there. There are many preparations that have to be made. We have a great many sector weapons. For instance, we have organizations that have as many as—rifle companies that have as many as 24 machine guns, and ammunition had to be loaded. Up until that time we were allowed to have 1,000 rounds of machine-gun ammunition loaded in belts. That's four belts, but of course we had to load a lot more. So I don't think the exact number that initially turned out when this alert sounded has any particular bearing, because they were there by the time we did move out.

The CHAIRMAN. Your apprehension is that there were not many passes and not many men on leave on Sunday morning?

General WILSON. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think less than 10% of your command?

General WILSON. I said I would estimate 80% were present, so it would run about 20%.

The CHAIRMAN. Twenty percent?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And under Alert No. 1 that was not an abnormal number of leaves?

General WILSON. Well, no, sir, I wouldn't think so, because, as I stated, we had a battalion alerted and kept ready for a quick movement; and, as I stated, this alert is all based on sabotage, no threat from the outside. Therefore, [254] we put no particular restraint on the men, granting of passes for the men, so long as we had the troops that we needed to meet the sabotage threat.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you Saturday night, sir?

General WILSON. I was at Schofield.

The CHAIRMAN. At a party?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What sort of party?

General WILSON. This was a dinner dance and a cabaret—so-called cabaret one of the very talented young ladies had worked up, some singing and dancing and song, and it was a combination dinner dance with some dancing by these people.

General McCoy. By post ladies?

General WILSON. Yes, sir. Oh, yes. It was called Ann Etzler's cabaret. It is a feature that they put on annually.

The CHAIRMAN. What time did it break up?

General WILSON. I think I left about 11 o'clock, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see drinking there?

General WILSON. No more than normal.

The CHAIRMAN. What is normal?

General WILSON. Well, over here cocktails are served before dinner. I saw no drinking in the evening.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see anybody who was apparently under the influence of liquor there?

General WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If anybody in your command who was there was under the influence of liquor, what would have been your duty in the premises?

General WILSON. To take the proper action, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What would that be?

General WILSON. Investigate the case, sir, and, if necessary, put the officer under arrest and, if circumstances justified, try him by general court martial.

The CHAIRMAN. There was nothing approaching that sort of [255] thing, was there?

General WILSON. No, sir. In fact, I might state that I think the liquor angle at the point with which I have been stationed, Schofield, is excellent. People take a drink when they want it, and maybe before dinners people will have a drink or two, but you don't see people who are intoxicated, in other words.

[256] General McCoy. Have you had occasion to court-martial any of your officers or men for drunkenness?

General WILSON. No, General.

The CHAIRMAN. On this night you saw nobody the worse for liquor?

General WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And there was no reason why if they went home they would not be fit for active duty the following morning?

General WILSON. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. In regard to the passes of men on liberty, do you have a check to your company commander or anybody else by a check of the men going out and coming in?

General WILSON. The men who go on a pass check out except in certain particular cases. We have what we call good conduct passes where the men are allowed out for a certain length of time without checking in.

Admiral STANDLEY. How is he to get past the entrance?

General WILSON. Each man has his pass.

Admiral STANDLEY. He has his pass?

General WILSON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. If he does not go out on a good conduct pass, he is checked out on the pass?

General WILSON. That is right.

Admiral STANDLEY. And he is checked when he comes in?

General WILSON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then you could give an absolute record of the state of your command at practically any time of the night?

General WILSON. You could give an approximate number. That is, of the men having good conduct passes, there is no check made at the gate. The check is made within the organization, within each company. I could not possibly check each [257] company, but we could probably approximate this.

Admiral STANDLEY. What percentage of the men have good conduct passes in the regiment? How many men?

General WILSON. I could not tell you the proportion of them because that is worked out within the lower units based on certain regulations that were set down as to what constitutes good conduct, and they will vary with the various organizations.

Admiral STANDLEY. Could you recall whether or not at some period it may have involved your whole company?

General WILSON. Oh, no, no, sir. It never would be that.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is limited?

General WILSON. Yes. At this particular time it would be a limited liberty because of the fact that we are on alert No. 1 and were using a great many of our men for patrol duty and standing guard duty at the vital installations and so on, so that the number on pass would be less than in normal peace time.

General McCoy. Was there any anti-aircraft action against the enemy on the part of your command?

General WILSON. On that morning?

General McCoy. Yes.

General WILSON. Yes, sir. Before I left my quarters. In fact, by the time I got out of my house there were machine guns mounted and in operation, 19 and 21. The men themselves had gotten these machine guns out and had gotten to work. As soon as my chief of staff got out of headquarters he directed them.

General McCox. Did they have any effect, so far as you know?

General WILSON. Well, I don't know, General, whether we succeeded in getting any of them or not.

General McCox. But they were in action?

[258] General WILSON. Yes, in action.

General McCox. Who is your chief of staff? I would like to know his name.

General WILSON. That is Colonel Spraggins.

General McCox. I would like to see a man like that who takes the initiative instead of waiting.

General WILSON. Well, he is a very fine officer, gentlemen, and you will probably run across him at some time. He is a nephew of Colonel Eckles.

General McNARNEY. Do you have the written standing order of procedure?

General WILSON. Yes, the standing operating procedure.

General McNARNEY. Did you bring a copy of it?

General WILSON. Yes, I have six copies here that were called for.

General McNARNEY. Would you leave those with the Commission?

General WILSON. Yes.

There is one statement that I would like to make if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General WILSON. I have been very much impressed myself since General Short arrived in this department at the initiative and the activity that he has exerted over this command.

I came over here a year ago. I came here in September last year. Before that time nothing had been done in the way of fortifications. There was much discussion about it. I know I remarked that it seems there was a lot of talk but no work.

General Short initiated fortifications work and initiated some very live maneuvers and got them alerted. As division commander I am very sure that he succeeded in getting many machine gun emplacements constructed prior to December 7 [259] without the money for them, and the department commander tried to get them and had very little money to do it with. It was done mainly by salvaged material here.

I simply wanted to make that voluntary statement that I feel that in the short time that General Short has been here that we have been more on the alert, that there has been more initiative, more aggressiveness, and all the fortifications that were never initiated prior to his coming here were started in May and continued up until December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General, with respect to our function here we think it is necessary that the witnesses called here shall not disclose what goes on in the room nor discuss their testimony with anyone else, and I will ask you to observe that.

General WILSON. Yes, sir, I realize that. It stays with me.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Call General Murray.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL MAXWELL MURRAY,
UNITED STATES ARMY, 25TH DIVISION

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

General MURRAY. I have six copies of the Standing Operating Procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your name, General?

General MURRAY. Maxwell Murray.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

General MURRAY. Major General, United States Army.

The CHAIRMAN. In command of the 25th Division?

General MURRAY. In command of the 25th Division.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy, will you examine?

General McCoy. Give us some idea of the present condition of your organization with regard to the type of division and the [260] strength.

General MURRAY. The division is now organized as a modified triangular infantry division. The strength is approximately 8,000 men. I do not have the exact figures this morning. It was 7,940 as of the last check I made yesterday or the day before.

General McCoy. What should it be under the tables of organization?

General MURRAY. It should be under the tables of organization, General—I am not certain. I think it is probably 12,000 men. We are short in headquarters communications, the signal corps units, military police units, and are quite low in the infantry strength. Our authorized strength is 7,000 as against 3,000. I have one National Guard regiment of two battalions, which is a strength of approximately 900 men as opposed to a full war strength.

General McCoy. Is the division equipped and armed for war service?

General MURRAY. Yes, but not with standard equipment. We have just reorganized as of October 1st from a half division with artillery units and we had a great number of artillery units, of the British 75 model 1917, left over from the 1917 emergency, and the howitzer equipment is 1917, 155 millimeter, and 75 millimeter tank guns, and we had improvised sets for those 75's and I have that organized so that I am using them for adapting the anti-tank guns, so they would be effective.

General McCoy. Will you state what happened on the morning of December 7?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir. I got up early, which is unusual for me on Sunday morning. I planned to take a horseback ride and I went to the window to see whether it was possible to ride.

I heard a dive bomber coming over my quarters, so I looked [261] out so that I could report him for coming so low into an occupied area. The plane went over my place about 75 yards, and I could not identify him. I thought he was going to land at Wheeler Field. I ran to the front door and turned to take my watch so that I could report the time he landed. As I was watching him, I saw him drop his first bomb very clearly. My first thought was that there was some crazy

aviator dropping a practice bomb on the dump there. Just then a bomb exploded. So I went into my quarters and told my wife and told her to get under cover and then I called next door to my aide and then took my wife and daughter to cover. This was about eight o'clock. I am not certain as to the exact time. I took them to cover about eight o'clock, and this was about 7:53 when the attack began.

I took them to the barracks and then began to get the information from department headquarters and then decided to order all artillery of the 25th Division moving out, and at 8:20 starting to draw ammunition. The artillery did not draw any ammunition under Alert 1, but the artillery was all set to move and they were drawing ammunition and they were loaded before the roads were clear for them to move fast.

General McCox. Were you at the command post at this time?

General MURRAY. I went direct to my division office, which is a frame building, and the machine gun strafing was heavy. So I moved my staff there and stayed in there directly across the street. That was the only protection we had from overhead fire. As a matter of fact, one bomb landed in my front yard and struck the house of my chief of staff, but it did not actually strike my house.

General McCox. Did you take any action as division commander for the purpose of getting the artillery set in place?

General MURRAY. I sent word up to the infantry post by telephone to get the machine guns on the roofs, but the machine [262] guns were on the roofs and they were firing within ten minutes. They had gotten started before we could get the telephone through.

General McCox. Did they have any effect?

General MURRAY. No, sir, I don't think so. We had no anti-aircraft weapons then in the division, no seacoast anti-aircraft. We had 30 caliber machine guns, and that is supposed to provide for an emergency, anti-aircraft fire, but it is not a very effective seacoast mount there until it is sandbagged up.

General McCox. When did Alert No. 3 start?

General MURRAY. It was approximately nine o'clock, General. I have it in the records. Would you like to have the exact time?

General McCox. No. I just want to follow through what your actions were.

General MURRAY. It was approximately nine o'clock. The machine guns were in action on the roofs, and the artillery was at the other end of the post.

They were getting some strafing, and they were probably firing with the B. A. R.'s, shooting operations for close defense, anti-aircraft fire.

General McCox. Was the artillery all motorized?

General MURRAY. Yes, all truck-drawn.

General McCox. What did you do after you got Alert No. 3?

General MURRAY. I transmitted it to the organizations which were loading. I had already given them the verbal order that No. 2 was in effect. That meant they should start loading, getting ammunition.

Several days before the alert I violated the usual regulations regarding ammunition by moving all infantry ammunition except high explosives into the company barracks, the barrack rooms, and that meant that most of them had as much as 30 rounds [263] of ammunition in the belts; so they were ready for immediate action.

Ordinarily we do not keep loaded ammunition in the barracks, but I had a full unit of fire for each rifle, and most of them going into operation except for the high explosives.

General McCoy. Why did you do that?

General MURRAY. Because of the situation at Schofield. I think you know the situation at Schofield. We have a very congested magazine area there that was built for peacetime, but when a whole post starts to draw ammunition at once, it would be just like a slaughter with the Japanese bombs dropping into that area while they were all drawing ammunition. It would be just hopeless.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not expect Japanese bombs when you gave that order?

General MURRAY. No, sir, I did not. I was just looking after the alert. I thought there might be a surprise raid.

The CHAIRMAN. By plane?

General MURRAY. By boat. I never dreamed that there was a possibility of carriers. The answer was just to draw and try to move forward and to be able to move without delay, without two or three hours delay that would be occasioned by drawing for 20,000 men going through two gates, one gate going in and one gate coming out and there would be that congestion there and the exposed position of the troops. It took approximately six hours to draw the ammunition from the magazines due to the congestion in the area.

The CHAIRMAN. Alert No. 1 did not call for that?

General MURRAY. No, except for what we call emergency ammunition of 20 rounds per rifle, but we had the ammunition at hand except the artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. When would you be ready under that alert?

General MURRAY. I was ready inside of an hour. As a [264] matter of fact, Alert No. 1 required us to get one battalion ready, ready to suppress sabotage, ready to move in an hour.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you get Alert No. 1?

General MURRAY. November 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. What communication did you get with respect to the Japanese situation at or about the time you got Alert No. 1?

General MURRAY. I am sorry. I haven't got my teletype message here. I just took it when it came off. There was some telephone call, and we advised them we were under attack, and we got some other stuttering messages.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I do not mean that. When was Alert No. 1 issued?

General MURRAY. November 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any communication with respect to the Japanese situation?

General MURRAY. There was no expression of imminent action then. The negotiations were apparently progressing, and everybody was following it carefully, and the only concern we had was a possible attempt at sabotage of our communications systems or possibly some of the Hawaiian projects or the vital installations such as water. We had a very heavy guard on our electrical plants, substations, and communications.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any communication on the 27th from headquarters here as to what the probabilities then were?

General MURRAY. Not that I recall, sir. If I may refresh my recollection (referring to a paper). Unless I am very much mistaken the only thing on November 27th was a telephone communication that Alert No. 1 had been ordered. Alert No. 1 immediately put in the standing operating procedure and simply required: "This is not a drill," and I took the first message over the phone at my office. However, there was nothing to indicate a change from the steps described in the standing operating [265] procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no message by any staff officer to you stating that any communication had been received from the War Department indicating an imminent state of hostilities?

General MURRAY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not know about that at all?

General MURRAY. I don't recall it. There was a liaison officer at department headquarters and we knew we were—I might say I talked with General Short several times personally between November 27 and December 7. As a matter of fact, our last conference was in this office on December 6, in which I brought out a number of shortages that were reported particularly in the personnel, officers, and the fact that the staff of one battalion consisted of the major commanding the battalion and no other officer.

General McCoy. In this conference with General Short, did he speak to you about any messages he had received from the War Department?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir, a number of them.

General McCoy. What was the nature of them?

General MURRAY. The nature was in general that he had not been able to get funds that he had requested to build the defenses, installations, and field fortifications, and we needed the material very much.

General McCoy. Did he give any indication as to the international situation as outlined by the War Department?

General MURRAY. No, sir, except in general. No, in our discussion he brought out the fact that he had been able to take the necessary action on our plans to prevent sabotage, but I recall no other threat that was mentioned at any time.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6, sir?

[266] General MURRAY. I was in my quarters the whole evening—no, sir, I was at a dinner at the club on Saturday evening until about ten-thirty and then went home.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a party?

General MURRAY. A small dinner.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a party at the post?

General MURRAY. Yes, but I was at a small dinner. They had a small cabaret show that started about seven o'clock in the evening with some dancing, two or three dancers, and then there was general dancing.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you observe any drinking there that night, General?

General MURRAY. Nothing unusual. As a matter of fact, there was some drinking. I had a cocktail or two before dinner. I had nothing at dinner. I saw no signs of it. In fact, I haven't seen for months any evidence of excessive drinking in the club.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not?

General MURRAY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a large percentage of your command on leave Saturday night and Sunday morning?

General MURRAY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There was not?

General MURRAY. No, sir. I do not, as division commander, keep a record of the men who are actually authorized to be absent at amusements, but the amusements of the post of Schofield are on the post at Schofield. Of course lately Honolulu has been very crowded and it is very expensive, and the junior officers get their amusement on the post with amateur theatricals and card games, and such, and three dances a week. They have a dance on Wednesday in which the music stops at ten o'clock.

[267] General Short had curtailed all late parties shortly after taking command of the department. The last hop was allowed to go until twelve o'clock, and the bar closed at the same hour.

Admiral STANDLEY. How about the moving pictures?

General MURRAY. The last moving picture gets out about ten-thirty. The movies have been running three shows and they start about five o'clock or five-fifteen and the last show was from eight-fifteen to ten-fifteen, which the officers attend.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many movie houses do you have?

General MURRAY. Three permanent and three temporary ones, of which one was a cantonment type building, and one was open-air surrounded by canvas, like the ones you see at the roadside in the States, open, with no covering at all; and one in a tent, rather small, at the replacement center for the new draftees who had been coming in about a week before the attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you permit civilians from outside in the vicinity of Schofield to come into the movies?

General MURRAY. Yes, there are quite a number of them, many of the civilian employees of the post, and many in the adjacent town, and there are also a few Americans who live over in Wahiawa, and they come over to the post movies when there is a movie there that they think worth while driving two or three miles for.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is it the practice of your men generally to attend your movies in the post or to go into Honolulu?

General MURRAY. Generally in the post, sir. I would say 95 out of 100.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General, because of the nature of our investigation it is desired that the questions asked here and the testimony given is such that anything that happens in the [268] room shall not be discussed in any manner, nor disclosed nor discussed by you with anyone else.

General MURRAY. I understand that thoroughly.

The CHAIRMAN. And you will observe that admonition?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Call General Burgin.

**TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL HENRY T. BURGIN,
COAST ARTILLERY, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your name, sir?

General BURGIN. Henry T. Burgin.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

General BURGIN. Major General.

The CHAIRMAN. And your command here?

General BURGIN. I command the Coast Artillery commands which consist of two parts, the seacoast artillery on the one hand and the anti-aircraft artillery on the other hand.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy, will you examine?

General McCoy. Is your command on a war footing?

General BURGIN. It is on a war footing, yes, sir.

General McCoy. As to strength?

General BURGIN. It is below strength considerably, in the nature of about 900 men at the present time, short in the whole command. That condition has gotten rapidly worse since the policy of sending men back after one year's service and the men who are 28 years old.

When I came over in August we were above strength by a couple of hundred men, but now we are below strength by approximately 900.

General McCoy. Have you sent any replacements to the Philippines?

General BURGIN. No, sir, I have not; not from here.

General McCoy. You are not short in the noncommissioned [269] officers?

General BURGIN. No, sir.

General McCoy. You have not been depleted?

General BURGIN. Not in that line, no, sir. We have recently sent some detachments to the outlying islands in the Hawaiian group.

General McCoy. Do you have a close liaison with the Navy?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, with the Naval District Commander, Admiral Block. I have no communication with the fleet as the fleet, but my dealings are with the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Block. We have a close cooperation there.

General McCoy. When Alert No. 1 was ordered on the 27th of November, what happened so far as your command was concerned?

General BURGIN. My harbor defense troops were right at their guns, their operations, and slept, bedded down and ate there.

My anti-aircraft troops stayed in their home positions and went on guarding that property and guarding against sabotage, acts of sabotage, internal disorders, but not with the idea of an outside attack.

General McCoy. At that time were you informed either by the Department Commander or by any member of his staff as to the nature of the orders or directives on that subject from the War Department which caused the alert?

General BURGIN. I put Alert No. 1 in effect immediately, and after assuring myself that it was going smoothly, I came up here. I talked to the Department Commander on other subjects and that, and I saw the Chief of Staff. He handed me out of the safe this, and said, "Do you want to see this put into effect?" and I said I did.

[270] He showed me a radio to the effect that diplomatic relations had broken down completely. It was more or less of that nature. I talked very little.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the telegram (handing telegram to General Burgin)?

General BURGIN. It probably is, sir. Yes, sir, that is it. I saw that telegram. That was shown to me as an explanation why Alert No. 1 was put into effect.

General McCoy. Did it occur to you that Alert No. 1 was the consistent order to follow that telegram?

General BURGIN. It seemed to me. It seemed to be perfectly proper at the time, although I talked with Colonel Phillips, and he said, "We are going on Alert No. 1 now."

I expected it to follow immediately with Alert No. 2, which is where we take ammunition. We waited for Alert No. 2 or 3 to go into effect and it did not take place.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any further talk with Colonel Phillips or with the Department Commander between November 27 and December 6?

General BURGIN. I did not, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not here at headquarters during that period, were you?

General BURGIN. No, sir. To my best recollection, no, sir, not on that subject; certainly not on the subject of the alert or the war.

General McCoy. Were you surprised completely by the attack?

General BURGIN. I was, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Why?

General BURGIN. In the discussion with the Navy people and with General Short himself the question came up several times, the question of a carrier getting close enough to this shore to land or to attack, and the assurance was always that it could not be done. We had the Navy scattered, scouting out [271] with the naval patrols and it was felt they would certainly detect any such movements before they could get near enough to land a plane.

General McCoy. Do you remember any particular naval officer making that statement?

General BURGIN. Yes, talking to Admiral Bloch, I am quite sure he did. General Short is the man who expressed himself forcibly along that line also, my Department Commander.

General McCoy. Did he tell you what he based it on?

General BURGIN. No, sir.

General McCoy. He did not state it was as a result of any conference with the Admiral?

General BURGIN. No, sir, not in particular, sir, but it is my impression he got it from talks with the Navy people.

General McCoy. Did you accompany General Short on any conferences with Admiral Kimmel?

General BURGIN. No, sir.

General McCoy. Your liaison was entirely with Admiral Bloch?

General BURGIN. Yes.

General McCoy. Was that frequent?

General BURGIN. Rather infrequent, sir. I had a representative in his office there and have had for two or three months, called the Harbor Control Post. There are three officers there on continuous duty.

General McCoy. Do they have any additional officers in your headquarters?

General BURGIN. No, sir, I didn't have until after December 7th to now.

The CHAIRMAN. There were three officers in the command post?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. An officer of your command?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

[272] The CHAIRMAN. An officer of the Navy?

General BURGIN. No. It is a Navy control post, sir, called the Harbor Control Post, operating at Pearl Harbor. It is purely a Navy post.

My representative goes over there as liaison officer, and for example there might be a ship, an enemy ship coming in, and the Navy control tells me whether I should open fire on the ship or delay firing and tell the Navy take care of it.

General McCoy. That comes to you from your representative?

General BURGIN. Yes.

General McCoy. Do you have a wire?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Where is that?

General BURGIN. Fort De Russy.

General McCoy. In a bombproof place?

General BURGIN. Semi-bombproof. It is a 14-inch battery magazine.

General McCoy. You control from your command post all coast artillery functions?

General BURGIN. That is correct. I control absolutely the sea-coast defense against surface ships. As soon as the anti-aircraft goes into operation, actual fire, that goes over to the interceptor command. I train it and put it into position, but in order not to shoot our own planes, it goes to the interceptor command.

General McCoy. Did it go over to the interceptor command on the 7th?

General BURGIN. Yes. It has been going over within the last two or three months. They have been working on it quite extensively.

General McCoy. Was it functioning on the 7th?

General BURGIN. It was functioning, sir, for two or three months.

[273] General McCoy. That is with regard to anti-aircraft?

General BURGIN. It has been functioning, sir. I have turned my aircraft over to the intercept command.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that interceptor commander?

General BURGIN. General Davidson, of the Air Corps.

General McCoy. Have you had any conferences with the District Naval Commander since November 27, since this alert went into effect?

General BURGIN. No, sir. I had no direct conference, only through my harbor control post.

General McCoy. Were you informed as Coast Artillery Commander of the arrival of the fleet in Pearl Harbor?

General BURGIN. In the days immediately preceding the 7th of December, no, sir.

General McCoy. Wasn't it one of your functions to protect the fleet when it is in Pearl Harbor?

General BURGIN. I don't think so, sir. That is a broad question. The mission is to protect Pearl Harbor from this Island. Of course we do what we can to protect the fleet against both surface ships and

from the air, but so far as protecting the fleet in Pearl Harbor from the air by anti-aircraft fire alone, I do not think it is possible to do it. We could derange and break up and perhaps make the attack less severe than it would ordinarily be.

General McCoy. But wouldn't it be useful for you to know when the fleet comes into the harbor?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, it certainly would. My positions with the anti-aircraft are the same whether the fleet is in the harbor or the fleet is not in the harbor, but there was the condition of readiness for Alert No. 1 and there were the fixed anti-aircraft guns along the coast. They were in position ready to shoot.

General McCoy. Did they shoot?

[274] General BURGIN. Yes.

General McCoy. Did they have any effect?

General BURGIN. We claimed eight planes, all told, with the small arms fire and the anti-aircraft fire.

General McCoy. These anti-aircraft guns were operating under the interceptor command?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, they were, although they were shooting at everything in the air that morning. With respect to the interceptor command, I don't think they had much control because of the conditions of the attack, but they just shot at them.

General McCoy. Where were you at the time this happened, this attack?

General BURGIN. At 8:05 when the first shock came, I was asleep in my quarters about a hundred yards from the command post.

General McCoy. What did you observe on the morning of the attack?

General BURGIN. I felt the shock of the torpedoes first. I got up and I could see the anti-aircraft fire from the fleet guns. I knew what it was. I came back into my office, which is only a short distance from my house. I got a message from the Department saying that Alert No. 3 was in. I immediately sent that out to my post units. They were out in their positions within ten minutes. They got into position, some of them in a very short time—fifteen or twenty minutes—and others had to go to the other side of the Island and did not get into position until the afternoon.

A great many of the anti-aircraft batteries did get into position and did considerable firing, both the 3-inch guns and the machine guns.

General McCoy. Do you know whether any low flying torpedo [275] planes were brought down?

General BURGIN. Not to my knowledge, sir, I don't. It was reported that two were, but I have no official information on that, sir.

General McCoy. So far as you know, none of your guns brought them down?

General BURGIN. My guns?

General McCoy. None of your guns?

General BURGIN. I am quite sure none of my guns brought them down. If they were brought down, they were Navy guns.

General McCoy. Were they too low-flying for your guns?

General BURGIN. Not with my machine guns or automatic weapons, but too low-flying for the 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, yes.

General McCoy. Were your coast defense guns there, the anti-aircraft guns firing at those torpedo planes?

General BURGIN. Not at the torpedo planes, no, sir.

General McCoy. They came in too low and too fast?

General BURGIN. Too fast and too low and before anybody knew they were there.

The CHAIRMAN. Under Alert No. 1, as I understand it, most of your guns were ready to go into position but they were not in position?

General BURGIN. That is absolutely correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that mean with ammunition?

General BURGIN. Ammunition? It is different for different batteries. We have been working for months getting the ammunition near the positions where the guns would be firing. That was worked up in nearly every instance. There were some half dozen batteries whose ammunition was still out in the main magazine in the crater, and of course, they had to go there to get the ammunition.

[276] Even with the guns with the ammunition nearby, the ammunition was boxed, and it takes some time to get the actual ammunition there and shooting, but that had been done in some cases inside of fifteen minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6?

General BURGIN. I was at Fort Ruger, down in my command.

The CHAIRMAN. Not out at the party?

General BURGIN. Yes, we had a little dance out at Fort Ruger. It broke up at ten o'clock and I went home.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see any drinking there?

General BURGIN. A little, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see anyone under the influence of liquor?

General BURGIN. Absolutely no one, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are clear about that?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, absolutely, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The men you saw there could have left and gone to their stations and been adequate at that moment?

General BURGIN. Everyone of them, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Have you had any disciplinary trouble or such in recent months?

General BURGIN. No, sir, I have not. I have been in command since August 7th only.

I have been very careful about that particular thing. I have not seen a single drunken officer in the whole time, either in my command or anyone else's command.

General McCoy. Have you had much trouble from drinking among the enlisted men?

General BURGIN. Not anything unusual, no sir. There were a few old-time drunks that you can't get away from, but as a general rule the men are far better than the men we had years ago. They drank their beer and seem to enjoy it, and let it go at that.

[277] General McCoy. Have you had occasion to try any officer since you have been here for drunkenness?

General BURGIN. No, sir, not even any suspicion of charges.

General McCoy. You have been satisfied with the morale and discipline of your command?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir; no question about that, sir.

General McCoy. There would be more trouble with your command, I take it, than with any other command in the Army on the Island on that line, if there was trouble? That is so from the nature of their stations; you are closer to Honolulu, in other words.

General BURGIN. Well, sir, that depends. I don't think so, sir. The men from Schofield and other places get down to Honolulu almost as often as my men do.

General McCoy. Well, as a matter of fact, Fort De Russy is right in town?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In Honolulu?

General BURGIN. Yes.

General McCoy. Have you seen signs of any disorder or drunkenness among the soldiers around you?

General BURGIN. A little bit. There are a few honky tonks just over the fence where we had some brawls within the last two or three months where two enlisted men were severely injured. One was stabbed in the neck, and the other in the arm, but there is so little of it.

General McCoy. Is there any of it?

General BURGIN. Yes.

General McCoy. Did any of these brawls occur on the night of December 6 or the morning of December 7?

General BURGIN. No, sir. They were at least six weeks or two months prior to that.

General McCoy. What proportion of your command would you estimate was ready for immediate duty on the morning of [273] December 7th?

General BURGIN. I have not found anyone who was not ready.

General McCoy. Your estimate is that your whole command was ready?

General BURGIN. Yes, my whole command was ready.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the men on leave, officers or men?

General BURGIN. They were on leave, but they were back the next morning and probably were home asleep.

The CHAIRMAN. You think everybody bunked there that night who was supposed to be there?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir. There may be some instances of officers visiting, but they hurried in there and came to their post.

General McCoy. Were there any officers reported absent at the time of the surprise attack?

General BURGIN. No, sir, except one who was killed trying to get back to his place; a bomb hit him.

The CHAIRMAN. You said something before that after you got Alert No. 1 you were staying around waiting for Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3 to come through, and apparently surprised that you did not get it. Am I right in that understanding?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, that is the thing in back of my mind all the time. I kept expecting to hear this next alert, to get my action ready and to get in position. I had nothing to base that on but just my feeling in the matter.

General McCoy. Was that caused by the dispatch shown to you from the War Department?

General BURGIN. No, that is the only dispatch I saw (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. That says, "Hostile action possible at any moment."

General BURGIN. Yes.

[279] The CHAIRMAN. That did not influence your judgment?

General BURGIN. It certainly did, yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. I think he stated Colonel Phillips mentioned something.

General BURGIN. Yes, if hostile action started, but I don't think it occurred to our men that hostile action would occur here in Hawaii. We expected—at least in my mind—that at some distant place some distant ship would be sunk, and that would be the overt act which the President wished to be done. It never occurred to anybody's mind that the attack would be right here in Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that before war was declared there might be a hostile raid?

General BURGIN. Yes, but we were ready with Alert No. 1 and in a few minutes we could get to our battle positions with everything ready. We thought we had plenty of time to do that and we didn't.

General McNARNEY. Would you know the naval patrols that were out? Would you know the routine naval patrols out scouting? Would you know that?

General BURGIN. No, not completely. We don't know that now. We know there are twelve destroyers out there, but we don't know where they are. We cannot know that. We know they are friendly ships, but it is pretty hard to tell whether you are a friend or an enemy out there, the ships look so very much alike.

General McNARNEY. The Navy does not indicate to you what patrols are out?

General BURGIN. No, except what type of destroyer they are. When they come in to Pearl Harbor they let us know.

General McNARNEY. Do you furnish that information to anyone else?

General BURGIN. Only to G-3.

[280] The CHAIRMAN. You do furnish it to G-3?

General BURGIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you communicate or furnish the information? As soon as you got it?

General BURGIN. As soon as we got it, yes, sir. We did not communicate the information about the offshore patrol, which is a running matter. For example, if the fleet is sending a carrier back here for supplies, or something of that kind, we hear nothing but that they will enter Pearl Harbor at a certain hour or that it expects to clear Pearl Harbor at a certain hour.

General McNARNEY. Was that true on December 6?

General BURGIN. No.

General McNARNEY. What proportion of your guns were not in position then, or I might say, what proportion of your guns are mobile guns?

General BURGIN. The great majority of them are mobile; I would say 80% of them. I can get the figure.

General McCoy. That is anti-aircraft?

General BURGIN. Yes, anti-aircraft only. Is that what you mean, General?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

General BURGIN. There are 60 mobile and 26 fixed. Since the 7th we added 12 guns of the Marine Corps that are mobile; so at the moment there are 72 mobile 3-inch and 26 fixed 3-inch.

General McNARNEY. What proportion of the 37 millimeters have been furnished?

General BURGIN. 20 guns out of 140.

General McNARNEY. How about the .50 calibers?

General BURGIN. I have not got the figures exactly on the .50 calibers, but we have got about 40% of what we are supposed to have.

General McNARNEY. You are using the .30 calibers for substitute weapons?

[287] General BURGIN. Yes, wherever we can with improvised tripods, wherever we can use them.

Admiral REEVES. Do you have ammunition for your machine guns?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, ammunition for the machine guns, yes, but we had no ammunition for the 37's until about two days before December 7, and then 9,600 rounds arrived, so each gun has about 500 rounds only.

Admiral REEVES. Do you expect to get any Bofors or Oerlikon guns.

General BURGIN. I have no information on that, sir, except a personal letter from my Chief of Staff in Washington, in which he said that the Bofors was a very fine gun and that they were trying to get some for everybody. That is all I have on that.

Admiral REEVES. None have been assigned to you?

General BURGIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. General, you stated you had three officers in the harbor patrol station. That was under the control of the Navy?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. How long prior to December 7th was this man detailed there? I mean your detail.

General BURGIN. There was one man, one officer, Major Dingham, and one enlisted man, prior to December 7th. On December 7th it was increased so that we keep one man there all the time.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was his detail changed after December 7th or were his duties exactly the same after December 7th as before?

General BURGIN. They were added to considerably after December 7th and we were beginning to function continuously and getting the information from the Navy, but up to that time it [282] was still the practice, and then it was a continuous operation. For example, we did not get notice of the ships coming in and out of the harbor of Honolulu. Now we do. Now we know what is coming in.

Admiral STANDLEY. Into the harbor of Honolulu?

General BURGIN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You did not get Honolulu before?

General BURGIN. No, we did not get Honolulu at all.

Admiral STANDLEY. What about Pearl Harbor?

General BURGIN. We did not get Pearl Harbor ordinarily; I only got it when we were practicing.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was that man supposed to do? He was there all the time?

General BURGIN. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not all the time?

General BURGIN. Not all the time, no, sir. The functions were in the daytime.

Admiral STANDLEY. They were there every day?

General BURGIN. Yes, every day.

Admiral STANDLEY. Their purpose was to keep you informed as to what was happening every day?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. So it was the duty of that officer to keep you informed about the ships going in and out? Is that a fact?

General BURGIN. That is what he was there for, yes, sir, when we functioned on a war basis, but up to the time Alert No. 3 went into effect, we were not functioning on a war basis.

Admiral STANDLEY. But he was kept there daily all the time?

General BURGIN. The harbor patrol post was working all the time, but the Army representative was not functioning all the time, continuously. He was just setting up the skeleton and [283] framework when it came to a stage where it got working.

Admiral STANDLEY. But he got the information just the same every day when the ships came in and out?

General BURGIN. He should have, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. He should have had that information?

General BURGIN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. It was his business to get that information?

General BURGIN. Yes.

General McCoy. Do you remember whether you were informed of the entry of battleships to Pearl Harbor?

General BURGIN. No, sir, I was not. We did not expect to.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

General BURGIN. We were not functioning on that basis. The Navy never gave us any information before December 7th except when we were practicing.

General McCoy. In other words, it was purely a training matter?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, purely a training matter up to the morning of the 7th of December.

The Navy was quite secret and they gave us practically nothing in that way except when we were practicing, training.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General, the nature of our inquiry is such that we must ask you not to disclose or discuss anything that has taken place in this room or discuss your testimony with anyone.

General BURGIN. I shall not.

General McNARNEY. Will you leave copies of your Standing Operating Procedure?

General BURGIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Call Colonel Phillips.

[284] FURTHER TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS, GENERAL STAFF

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have the information that we desired, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes. One question was, was the Navy furnished a copy of the Standing Operating Procedure?

According to our records, on or about November 5th, the Navy received ten copies of the Standing Operating Procedure.

In a telephone conversation with Commander Momsen—and I believe he is operations officer for Admiral Block now—he states that he has nine copies in his safe now.

General McNARNEY. Does that include Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Our Standing Operating Procedure, yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, complete copies of them.

In regard to the record of Army officers tried for drunkenness in the Hawaiian Department, I am only going to March 1st, the date of my arrival here. There have been no trials of officers for drunkenness in the Department since March 1, 1941. Charges were preferred against Second Lieutenant Seacat, 8th Field Artillery Battalion, on October 3rd. Upon investigation, the investigating officer recommended a reprimand, which was given.

Memo. relative to the telephone conversation with the Chief of Staff, Washington, about 9 a. m. on December 7, to the best of my recollection:

General Marshall, this is Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department stating that General Short, who is now on reconnaissance, has directed me to call you and give you the situation. We are now being attacked by Japanese planes. Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, and Pearl Harbor are being attacked.

[285] General Marshall asked, "Did you get my message?"

Reply: "What message?"

General Marshall: "A radio I sent you last night."

Reply: "It has not been received."

General Marshall: "Continue with the description."

They were not his exact words, but he used words to that effect.

Some hangars and planes have been destroyed. Our casualties have not been heavy. All troops in the Department are now moving to their field positions.

General Marshall: "Keep me informed."

There is no record in the Chief of Staff office files. We keep a record of incoming messages and outgoing, and their disposition. There is no record of a message on the 27th or the 28th being delivered to the Navy. G-3 believes that the message—both messages were taken by the Department Commander to the Navy. I have a faint recollection—

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have a faint recollection that this was the case, although there was no record and there would not be a record made of that in our files.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any record of a communication to the commander of the fleet of November 27th which includes the words "inform Army" or words to that effect, which was received by you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no record on that subject at all?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that cover everything we asked you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That covers everything you asked me, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Just a moment. I want to ask you one question.

[286] The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Another question occurred to me.

Admiral STANDLEY. You say there is no record of a message having been sent to the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, not in my office, so far as we can find.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your reply to that message states, "liaison with Navy."

Colonel PHILLIPS. That meant that the Department Commander had gone to the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Phillips, did you show this message of the 27th from General Marshall to any of the Department Commanders, to your recollection?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. It is possible the Department Commander did, but I don't know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he see it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Commander saw it, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you show this message of General Marshall's to anyone, this message which states that negotiations with Japan were about to be terminated, and so forth?

Colonel PHILLIPS. To the Department Commander?

The CHAIRMAN. I mean the Division Commander. Did you show it to any Division Commander?

General McCoy. To the Division Commander of the Coast Artillery?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I did not, personally; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. One of them has a recollection that he saw it here at headquarters.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Through the Department Commander then, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No, he stated you showed him a message. [278] I believe that is in General Burgin's statement.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have no recollection of that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was something to the effect of, "Would you like to see a message about putting Alert No. 1 in effect?" and he said, "Yes," and you showed it to him, got it from the safe and showed it to him. Do you remember that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is possible, but I do not recall it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

It has been suggested that we have a recess now.

(There was a brief recess. The following then occurred:)

The CHAIRMAN. Shall we have Colonel Fielder now?

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL J. FIELDER, GENERAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name, Colonel?

Colonel FIELDER. Kendall J. Fielder.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

Colonel FIELDER. Lieutenant Colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. And your command here?

Colonel FIELDER. G-2, General Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. You are chief?

Colonel FIELDER. Chief, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Since when?

Colonel FIELDER. July 22nd.

The CHAIRMAN. What, if any, information, Colonel, did your department or your G-2 have with respect to hostile action by the Japanese fleet or by carriers?

Colonel FIELDER. None.

The CHAIRMAN. You did have cognizance of certain intercepted messages, did you not, on the days of December 5th, 6th, and thereabouts?

Colonel FIELDER. Military messages?

[288] The CHAIRMAN. No, from a Japanese on the Island here.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I had knowledge of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you advised between what parties that telephone conversation took place?

Colonel FIELDER. The party in Tokyo was unknown; it was Dr. Mori here in Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is Dr. Mori?

Colonel FIELDER. He is a civilian, but I know, sir, that I did not know him. I had never heard of him prior to this, although I understand the F. B. I. did have him on their suspect list.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you furnished a transcript or a translation of that message?

Colonel FIELDER. About 7 p. m. Saturday, December 6.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you take it up with anyone?

Colonel FIELDER. I took it up with General Short at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us the conversation, will you please?

Colonel FIELDER. My contact officer brought it to my division. We then went to General Short's headquarters and read it over and discussed it. We tried to figure the significance of it but we were unable to attach any military significance to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you obtain any radio intercepts in the day prior to December 7th?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any in which you were unable to break the code and forwarded them to Washington for decoding?

Colonel FIELDER. Not to my knowledge. That could have happened without my knowledge.

[289] The CHAIRMAN. How?

Colonel FIELDER. Because our signal officer or possibly one of the other investigative agencies, such as the F. B. I. or the O. N. I. or my own contact officer might have done so, but not to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. It would not necessarily come to you?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, it would not.

General McCoy. Why wouldn't it have come to you?

Colonel FIELDER. If it was one of the other agencies it would not have necessarily come to me. It would do me no good unless it was a decoded translation. If it was decoded shortly after, it would come to me thereafter.

General McCoy. But wouldn't it have to go to some agency to be decoded and forwarded?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. That agency would be either the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Office of Naval Intelligence or my own office. We all have translators.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you since the attack become cognizant of the fact that a code was intercepted which would be used to signal the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you become cognizant of that?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't remember the date, sir. It was right after the attack, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you become cognizant of the fact that there had been such a code?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That code, as your information now is, contained signal code words for directing the attack on Pearl Harbor, did it not?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And who got hold of that code?

Colonel FIELDER. That code was gotten by the Federal [290] Bureau of Investigation after the attack by a search of the Japanese Consulate.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any attempt by the military authorities to get a translation of the intercepted code done at Washington? Let me ask you this: Is it a fact that the War Department in Washington intercepted three code words and advised you of the three code words they intercepted, and this before December 6th?

Colonel FIELDER. Not to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't there be any knowledge of that?

Colonel FIELDER. There might be knowledge at this headquarters here through the signal officer. It should come to me.

The CHAIRMAN. It should come to you?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I should know about it before it happened, but I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been reported to me that about ten days before the attack a code was intercepted which could not be broken, but it was forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken, and the War Department found out it could be broken and did break it, and found it contained three important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.

Colonel FIELDER. I have no knowledge of that whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. You know nothing about it?

Colonel FIELDER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no communication from the War Department as of December 5th forwarding to you the meaning of the three code words which would be the signal for the attack?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, it never came to my attention.

[291] The CHAIRMAN. After the Japanese Consul had burned his papers, the code message here was discovered?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, the code book was.

The CHAIRMAN. Which contained all sorts of information as to signal lights, blinker lights, and so on, which would be used to advise the Japanese fleet?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew nothing of that before the attack?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What, if any, interceptor device were you using on the Island then?

Colonel FIELDER. We had none.

The CHAIRMAN. You had none?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir. This is hearsay, but I have been told that such a service was requested by the signal officer over a year ago, but it was turned down.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Federal Bureau of Investigation pass on to you anything they discovered about subversive activities or anything of that kind?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. We worked in close relationship.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been entire harmony there?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not able to furnish you anything of significance of a possible attack prior to December 7th?

Colonel FIELDER. That is correct. I had talks with Inspector Shivers since that time, and he told me that he knew that the entire espionage ring centered around the Japanese Consulate, but diplomatic immunity prevented his investigation, and that anything he did might start the overt act which would create war.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, he could not search the Consulate any more than you could?

Colonel FIELDER. That is correct.

[292] The CHAIRMAN. I understand that this message in Japanese was tapped over the telephone? Is that your understanding?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. That was a trans-Pacific telephone, which he had authority to do. He could intercept a cable message, but nothing at the Consulate.

The CHAIRMAN. This was a commercial message?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, a commercial message.

The CHAIRMAN. Since the outbreak of hostilities have you had any access to the records of the commercial radio here?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, that is supervised by the Navy. The Navy has censorship over the commercial radio.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose there is no reason why we cannot subpoena any of the messages that were put on or that came in. I mean the local office of the radio company.

Colonel FIELDER. That is right. I see no reason why.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose that short of a declaration of war, you could not demand copies of those messages?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, I could not.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no advice from the Navy at any time of ships moving in the Pacific that would indicate anything with respect to Honolulu?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir. All I could say was that they had bases in the Mandate Islands.

The CHAIRMAN. That the Japanese did?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to subversive activities, as I understand it, there was very little evidence that any of the bureaus or services could work on?

Colonel FIELDER. I had my own Intelligence, and most of our agents were engaged primarily in that. We had reason to believe that subversive acts would be committed, and most of our efforts were directed along those lines.

The CHAIRMAN. There has not been any word on the Island [293] of secret meetings or Bund meetings, Japanese Bund meetings, if I may call them that, or anything of that sort?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, there has not. The few meetings that were held are attended by one of our agents.

The CHAIRMAN. What sabotage have you known of prior to the attack?

Colonel FIELDER. None, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General Rudolph said there had been some sabotage in the airplanes.

Colonel FIELDER. I had them investigating as to whether they were actions of sabotage, and none have been proven.

The CHAIRMAN. He thought some spark plugs showed that the points had been hammered back down to the contacts possibly by someone in the plane, in the airplane service.

Colonel FIELDER. That is entirely possible, but our investigation revealed that the irregularities probably were spite on the part of local soldiers. That is the only thing that came to my attention.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean spite against a superior?

Colonel FIELDER. Perhaps. The personnel concerned have been disposed of. They are no longer here, but there were two or three instances in one particular organization which indicated that perhaps—

The CHAIRMAN. That they were disgruntled?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, when did it come to your knowledge that the Japanese Consul was beginning to burn his papers?

Colonel FIELDER. I think on the 6th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Colonel FIELDER. No, it must have been before that time. It came to my attention on the 6th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. I am informed that it was on the 3rd or the 5th.

[294] Colonel FIELDER. That is entirely possible. The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported it to my agent, and I in turn reported it at a staff meeting on the morning of Saturday, December 6.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you attach any significance to the fact that the Consul was burning his papers at the time?

Colonel FIELDER. It was suspicious, but we burn secret papers every day in the world, and we have a can out there that does nothing but burn secret papers. I discussed that on that day with the F. B. I.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with the fact that when a consul or diplomatic representative is about to make his getaway that the first sign is the burning of the consulate papers?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, we were quite suspicious of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Wasn't the Department Commander convinced by that fact that war was imminent?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, apparently not. We know war was imminent, sir.

[295] The CHAIRMAN. Imminent?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't think it was going to reach Hawaii, did you?

Colonel FIELDER. Not in that form, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in the form of an airplane raid?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. We suspected organized——

The CHAIRMAN. Sabotage?

Colonel FIELDER. Sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. And you thought there was such organized sabotage, perhaps, in spite of the fact that you had never been able to uncover a sign of it?

Colonel FIELDER. We did. Just the mere fact of approximately 160,000 people of Japanese extraction would lead us to believe that a certain number of them would be loyal to the Japanese Empire.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe no further questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many Japanese are there in the whole Islands?

Colonel FIELDER. 160,000, approximately.

Admiral STANDLEY. In the whole Island?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. That's all of them. Those are people of Japanese extraction. There are approximately 35,000 aliens. The rest are dual citizens.

Admiral REEVES. How many are there on the Island of Oahu?

Colonel FIELDER. I beg pardon, sir?

Admiral REEVES. How many are there on the Island of Oahu?

Colonel FIELDER. Of Japanese extraction? I don't have those figures in my head, sir. I can get them very easily. I think it is in the neighborhood, though, of 80,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Did your command make any investigation along the coast in the two months before the attack for [296] blinker signals, light signals, offshore signaling?

Colonel FIELDER. We did not.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Colonel FIELDER. For the reason that that is very prevalent over here between the fishermen and the shores. They use a lighting system to direct the fishing fleet into the various channels, and they home on these signals. They have been doing that commercially for years.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there a lot of small entrances around the Island, other than the big entrance?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There are?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where the fishermen come in?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, there are many of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to the attack had you any record of the number and location of small radio sets on fishing boats here?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They were very common, too?

Colonel FIELDER. They were very common, and literally hundreds—I won't say hundreds but dozens of residents were authorized amateur—so-called "ham"—operators.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel FIELDER. Many of these, of course, were Oriental.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Are there any further questions?

General McNARNEY. How often did the commanding general hold staff meetings?

Colonel FIELDER. Once a week.

General McNARNEY. Was that normally on Saturday morning?

Colonel FIELDER. Saturday morning only.

General McNARNEY. Was the War Department message of November 27 discussed at any staff meeting?

[297] Colonel FIELDER. Yes, it was. It was either discussed—I believe that message was passed around to the staff officers. They were called in, a few at a time, and permitted to read the message. That's what took place in my own case. I was called in and read the message, and I received a similar one from G-2 section of the War Department the same day.

General McNARNEY. Now, you state you received a similar one. What do you mean, "a similar one"? The same message?

Colonel FIELDER. Mine was much shorter than that, but the gist of it was that war was imminent and to be—that we might expect sabotage.

General McNARNEY. That was dated November 28, was it not?

Colonel FIELDER. 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. It is dated the 27th in this from the War Department. Receipt is dated here the 28th, I don't know why.

General McNARNEY. You received that on the 27th?

Colonel FIELDER. 27th was the date of the War Department message. Now, we would normally receive most of our messages in the morning of the day following the date of their transmission, because the transmission is usually done at night.

General McNARNEY. This message was not discussed in the full staff meeting, then?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't remember whether it was or not. It was brought to my attention, and I can't remember whether it was—I know right away they ordered an alert, No. 1 alert, but whether or not it was discussed in detail at a meeting I don't know.

General McNARNEY. Did the Department Commander call for any suggestions, advise, or opinions from his staff?

Colonel FIELDER. He did from me. He called me in and asked me what we should do, and I told him that I recommended the No. 1 alert remain in effect indefinitely and that I utilize all of my agencies for additional investigations, snooping around the various communities, intensify their [298] activities, in other words.

General McNARNEY. What were your relations with O. N. I. previous to November 27?

Colonel FIELDER. We have a meeting—the relations are very close; we meet once each week, the O. N. I., the F. B. I., and my office, but we have the closest of relations. I have a teletype machine, for instance, in my private office. It is connected only with F. B. I. and O. N. I. and the Navy Yard and the Provost Marshal. The relations have been quite cordial and close.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean messages can come both ways on that or go both ways on it?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Between your agencies?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. It's a complete loop.

General McNARNEY. Had there been any significant messages between November 27 and the date of the attack?

Colonel FIELDER. From whom?

General McNARNEY. On the teletype.

Colonel FIELDER. No; nothing relating to a possible attack. Most of the messages are in the nature of suspected individuals who are possibly Nazi-inclined or Communistic in their tendencies or disloyal or something like that.

General McNARNEY. In your meetings with O. N. I. did you ever discuss the location, disposition, possibility of attack by Japanese forces?

Colonel FIELDER. No, never discussed it. We probably discussed attacks in general—the probability of attack, perhaps, and the possibility of it—in a more or less informal discussion, but we never discussed it with viewpoint of apprehension, you might say.

General McNARNEY. With any thought that it would actually happen to you?

[299] Colonel FIELDER. That's right. Any discussion that we had was more or less informal discussion.

General McNARNEY. Academic.

Colonel FIELDER. Academic, exactly.

General McNARNEY. Did the Navy furnish you any information as to what they picked up over their radio intercepts?

Colonel FIELDER. No, not in relation to this. I get a lot of news broadcasts from them and propaganda and things like that, but they have given me nothing directly related to this attack.

General McNARNEY. Did they give you nothing relative to the movement of Japanese vessels?

Colonel FIELDER. Oh, you mean now?

General McNARNEY. Now and prior to the time—

Colonel FIELDER. They didn't prior, no.

General McNARNEY. They do now?

Colonel FIELDER. They do now.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Fielder, the nature of our investigation is such that we feel it necessary to warn those who come here that they should not disclose the testimony or anything that occurs while they are in the room or discuss it with any other officer or person.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. I shall observe that.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you to do that?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, said.

General McCoy. May I ask one thing more? The question occurred to me to check upon where General Wilson, commanding the Division—

Colonel FIELDER. I beg your pardon?

General McCoy. General Wilson—commanding the 24th Division, is that?

[300] Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

General McCoy. —stated that either you or some officer from Headquarters gave him the gist of this War Department message.

Colonel FIELDER. You speak of the one of the 27th?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MCCOY. Yes.

Colonel FIELDER. It probably was the Chief of Staff. I did not. I hadn't talked to him at all about that.

General MCCOY. My remembrance was that he said an officer at G-2 or "G-2" came out and gave him the gist of that message upon which the alert No. 1 was based. General Burgin also said he saw it.

Colonel FIELDER. That could very easily—I have over 50 officers in my section, and the Chief of Staff might have grabbed someone as a messenger. That is quite possible, but it wasn't to my knowledge, sir. I didn't do it personally.

General MCCOY. And you didn't do it through any of the commanders?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir. That's a command function rather than intelligence.

General McNARNEY. Just a minute. I have one more question. Is this the message you referred to as having been received by you from G-2 (indicating)?

Colonel FIELDER. No, that is not it. Shall I get a copy of it? Would you like it?

General MCCOY. There is a copy here.

Colonel FIELDER. I believe it is. I turned it over—no, sir, that still isn't it. This one had about five lines, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get it?

Colonel FIELDER. I think it is on the way here now. I know it has been assembled. It has been taken from my section. I can—if you will give me about five minutes, sir, [301] I will look it up.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be in this dossier?

Colonel FIELDER. No, I don't think it would.

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't it?

Colonel FIELDER. That looks like it right there. That looks like it might be a copy of it. No, sir, that isn't it.

General MCCOY. It came to you from Miles, did it?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, it came from General Miles, only about four lines. It said war was imminent and to be—that we could expect sabotage. That was the gist of it, four lines.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, when you get it let Major Allen know that you have it, and you can bring it right in, if you will.

Colonel FIELDER. Very well. I know it's on the way to this Commission, sir, because they got it out of my office early this morning to be presented to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we haven't seen it yet. At least I think not. Will you trace it up?

Colonel FIELDER. I will trace it up, sir.

Major ALLEN. Colonel Craig, the Provost Marshal.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MELVIN L. CRAIG, PROVOST MARSHAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name?

Colonel CRAIG. Melvin L. Craig.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

Colonel CRAIG. Lieutenant Colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. And your commission here in this Department, or your office, the office you hold?

General MCCOY. Assignment.

Colonel CRAIG. Provost Marshal.

The CHAIRMAN. Assignment?

Colonel CRAIG. Department Provost Marshal.

[302] The CHAIRMAN. Since when?

Colonel CRAIG. Since July—it was a year last July, almost two years now.

The CHAIRMAN. In your official capacity you are supposed to know the conditions within this District with respect to law and order by troops and officers?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What have you to say as to the condition on the night of December 6, 1941?

Colonel CRAIG. The condition as to law and order on the island of December 6, 1941, was very good.

The CHAIRMAN. Any reports of misconduct or drunkenness by enlisted personnel?

Colonel CRAIG. Nothing unusual.

The CHAIRMAN. What is unusual?

Colonel CRAIG. Well,—

The CHAIRMAN. Or, rather, what is usual on a Saturday night?

Colonel CRAIG. Saturday night we usually have 70, 80 arrests, drunkenness.

The CHAIRMAN. For drunkenness?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you perhaps had 70 or 80 that night?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is of enlisted personnel?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. What was done with those 70 or 80 on Saturday night?

Colonel CRAIG. The most of them were returned to their stations. That is, those from Schofield were returned to Schofield; those from Fort Kamehameha were returned to Kam. The other ones were detained, those that were beyond—seemed what we might call passed out—detain those at Fort Shafter [303] guardhouse overnight.

General MCCOY. How many of those? Do you remember?

Colonel CRAIG. Well, I should say offhand approximately 25, roughly.

General McNARNEY. I think we might have the exact figure.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the exact figures.

Colonel CRAIG. I can get the exact figures for you.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like you to furnish them to us.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Arrests and detentions and returns for that night.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything with respect to officers that night?

Colonel CRAIG. Nothing to my recollection, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any records that would show?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, I have the records.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you consult them?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And certify the fact to us?

Colonel CRAIG. That is the night of the 6th?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right, sir.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. It might be well to have the comparison of the night of the 6th with two or three other Saturday nights.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you do that for us?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir. Very well, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Pick them out over the the two or three previous months at random, some Saturday nights, and see what the record shows.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Would you say that that was a small proportion of a command of this size?

[304] Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, it is. I think it is remarkably small for the number of men we have here.

General McCoy. How would it compare, possibly, with civilians of like number?

Colonel CRAIG. Well, I would say it would be comparatively—well, I couldn't answer that question; I would have to check the records of the civil police.

General McCoy. Yes. Would you be able, for instance, to check the civilian records?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, if they were available.

General McCoy. On a Saturday night?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Would you make it your business to get in touch with the Chief of Police and get comparable records for the City of Honolulu?

Colonel CRAIG. We are in very close contact with the Chief of Police all the time, and our relations have been very—hundred percent.

The CHAIRMAN. In connection with that get us, as nearly as you can, the male population of the City of Honolulu and the number of arrests for drunkenness by the police of Honolulu on three or four Saturday nights.

Colonel CRAIG. Very well, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That would not be a difficult thing to get?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir. They have that information right available.

General McCoy. I think we might state to the Provost Marshal the reason we are asking these questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

General McCoy. So that he could possibly even give us a better picture than what we asked for. For instance, there have been telegrams received by all the members of this [305] Commission, before it left the United States, from certain organizations asking us to investigate what they stated were reports of great revelry and drunkenness on the night of December 6 amongst the officers and soldiers of this command.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir. Well, I can get that record in figures for you.

General McCoy. So that we would like to get a sort of picture, comparative picture,—

Colonel CRAIG. I see.

General McCoy. —that would show just what did occur on that night.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir. Very well, sir.

General McCoy. And comparable notes over a period of, say, some month or two.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Does that cover it from your point of view, Mr. Justice?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel, where were you on the night of December 6?

Colonel CRAIG. I think I was home, from my recollection; I just hadn't thought about it, but I think that I was home that night. I don't think I went out anyplace.

Admiral STANDLEY. Where is it?

Colonel CRAIG. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Where is your home?

Colonel CRAIG. Right here on Fort Shafter.

General McCoy. In other words, you weren't called out during the night?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir.

General McCoy. Due to any unusual happenings?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir.

General McCoy. Mobs or brawls or anything like that?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir, nothing unusual.

General McCoy. Where were you on the morning of the [306] attack?

Colonel CRAIG. Right at my quarters, No. 8 on the Department Headquarters, Fort Shafter here.

General McCoy. What did you do?

Colonel CRAIG. I got up about 7 o'clock, had breakfast, dressed. I usually ride Sunday morning, a little exercise, and I dressed for riding and had gone up to my bedroom again—it was about 8:15 I guess—went out to look for the morning paper before this, and we hadn't received it yet, and I didn't think anything unusual about that.

I was up in my room, and I saw Colonel Phillips, the Chief of Staff, who lives two doors below me, walking up the street in front of the house. He was dressed in uniform. At that time I had heard shell-fire over here, landing over here in the Damon estate, and could hear airplanes in the air, and at that time Colonel Phillips took up the double-time. He came up towards Headquarters here.

So I immediately went downstairs and came up to Headquarters here, and Colonel Phillips informed me that Alert No. 3 was in effect. When I first heard this firing the thought occurred to me that it was artillery firing falling short. I didn't know whether the Coast Artillery were having target practice or not, but that's what I thought it was at first. I really didn't know it was an attack until I came up to Headquarters, and that was about 8:25, I would say. I immediately went down to my office and alerted my commands.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you apprised of the contents of the War Department's telegram of November 27 as a result of which Alert No. 1 had been put into effect?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And how were you apprised of the contents of that message? Was it shown to you?

Colonel CRAIG. It was read to us right here at the staff [307] conference.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the staff conference at which it was read? On the day it was received?

Colonel CRAIG. On the day it was received, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The staff was assembled to hear it, were they?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any discussion as to what was the appropriate measure to take in the light of that message? What I mean is—

Colonel CRAIG. Nothing more than Alert No. 1 was in effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, was that put in effect as a result of the staff conference or before the staff conference, if you know?

Colonel CRAIG. Well, that was put into effect as the result of the staff conference, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I ask you, Was there any discussion as to what would be the appropriate orders in the light of that telegram, in the light of that message? Did you talk it over?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir. We didn't. I didn't stay; I just got the telegram and went back and put my Alert Order No. 1 in effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel CRAIG. That was the only—it didn't last very long.

General MCCOY. Who held the staff conference?

Colonel CRAIG. I think it was Colonel Phillips, the Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. And if I get your testimony correctly, Colonel, what he did was to acquaint the staff with the message and say that Alert No. 1 was to be consequently ordered [308] into effect?

Colonel CRAIG. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, I would like to ask: In the number of arrests during the day here or the evening are some of them sent back to barracks?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Without any record?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir. We keep a record of them, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. If you pick them up, take charge of them, there is always a record?

Colonel CRAIG. That's right, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. There is a naval patrol—

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, shore patrol.

Admiral STANDLEY. —in connection with it?

Colonel CRAIG. They were right next door to my office downtown.

Admiral STANDLEY. And any records they have would be the same as you have? If you pick up a sailor man and turn him over to the patrol you would make a record of it?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir, we don't pick up the sailor men. That is done by the shore patrol.

Admiral STANDLEY. Done by the patrol?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir. They handle all theirs, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So they will have in all probability a similar record as to their forces—

Colonel CRAIG. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. That you have with respect to your forces?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. When you get up your records will you let us have one on pay night, records as to the arrests on payday night?

[309] Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Colonel CRAIG. Well, you know, we have a dispersed payday over here now, just the last couple of months. That is: Hickam, the Air Corps paid in one night, and the Coast Defense another time. It's spread out over a period of time. That is, it just happens the last two months an order—the arrests were getting pretty large, and of course we had more troops, too, but they dispersed the paydays over a period of time, but I can give you the reports on the number—on who was paid and what troops confined that night. You see, we don't have just one payday any more like we used to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, sir, what you could do would be to go back to a period three or four months ago when you did have a pay night, and get that.

Colonel CRAIG. Oh, yes, sir, I can get that very easily; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Approximate number.

General McCoy. Were you conscious on Saturday night of any unusually large number of sailors being in town?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, I did; I noticed that there were quite a few sailors in town.

General McCoy. In other words, you knew the fleet was in the harbor, did you?

Colonel CRAIG. Well, I noticed that there were an awful lot of sailors in the streets. I didn't know, of course—that's all that I observed. I didn't know that the fleet was in, but it seemed to me there were a lot of sailors in town on the evening of the 6th. I was down there about 6, between 6 and 7 o'clock, I think it was, and I remember seeing a lot of sailors in the street.

General McCoy. But even so, there was nothing that caused you to stay downtown that night due to anything unusual?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir, not to the best of my recollection. I think that I was at home that evening; I could check [310] it up with my wife.

General McCoy. In other words, it wasn't so outstanding that you remembered anything about it particularly?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir.

General McCoy. Have you heard any comment in town here among civilians, any charges that the Army or the Navy ran riot that night, a lot of them.

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir. This is the first I have heard of it. I haven't heard anything like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, in view of the nature of our investigation we feel it is necessary to caution witnesses not to reveal questions and answers or anything that took place in the room.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And not to discuss it with anyone.

Colonel CRAIG. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall ask you to follow that injunction.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And when you are ready with your information if you will let Major Allen know we will try to call your office.

Colonel CRAIG. Very well.

Mr. HOWE. Colonel Fielder has that message, G-2 of the Army. There are no other witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the adjutant? Has he got his figures?

Mr. HOWE. I imagine. The adjutant general is called to stand by for 2 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, he is?

Mr. HOWE. In case General Martin does not come.

[311] **FURTHER TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL J. FIELDER, GENERAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY**

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Fielder, what is the message that was given you?

Colonel FIELDER. This is from General Miles, War Department Message 473, secret, dated 27 November:

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop. Hostilities may ensue stop. Subversive activities may be expected stop. Inform commanding general and chief of staff only.

General McNARNEY. What was the time of receipt?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't have that recorded on here. It got to me on that same day. I showed it to the Chief of Staff and the general on that same day.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the 27th?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did you show that to them before Alert No. 1 was ordered?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't remember in relation to that whether it had. I don't remember which message was received first, this one or the one to the Commanding General.

General McCoy. Well, I think it is important for us to have that, and certainly your signal office would have some record of that as to the exact time of receipt. Would you look into that, please?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, I will, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just certify it to us if you can get it.

Colonel FIELDER. I might clarify one point, sir, that General McCoy asked about my having been reported as talking to General Wilson. I was sent out by General Short to inspect the—to see that the provisions under Alert No. 1 had been put into operation, but that was some time—that was several days after the 27th.

[312] General McCoy. Yes.

Colonel FIELDER. That is the only time that I could have possibly talked to him.

The CHAIRMAN. I think he mentioned an officer of another name; I don't think he mentioned you.

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, I did not talk to him.

The CHAIRMAN. He made some allusion, but I think it was not your name, sir.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Do you remember a staff conference on the morning of November 27 or 28 where this message may have been read and

the other message that came through to the Department Commander on the same date was read to the assembled staff?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't remember in detail, no, sir. I know that it was shown to me, because I'm right in the next room (indicating).

General McCox. But you don't remember any staff conference where the whole staff was there?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, I don't remember that.

General McCox. And where these messages were read?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

General McCox. I believe that is all.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Colonel FIELDER. I now have the hour of the decoding of General Miles' message to me of November 27, and the decoding hour is 4 p. m.

General McCox. Were those messages together discussed or taken to the Department Commander, as far as you know?

Colonel FIELDER. I discussed mine with the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff only, as directed; it was not discussed at staff meeting. When the message came in—the first message came in—I was immediately called in, because I am in the next room, and—

[313] General McCox. That is the message from the War Department, Marshall?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. I read that before the 4 p. m. conference. There was a staff conference of the four heads at 4 p. m. on the 27th, but I in the meantime had already been given the information, and I had started action so far as my agencies were concerned. The training section, G-3, was told at this conference at 4 that the Department Commander had decided to put Alert No. 1 into effect, and to get busy and see that it was carried out.

General McCox. And both these telegrams were available at that time?

Colonel FIELDER. They were available at that time, yes, sir, but the conference did not see this one; they don't know yet that this one was received, except the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

(Thereupon, at 12:50 o'clock p. m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[314]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., at the expiration of the recess.

**TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL,
ASSISTANT TO DEPARTMENTAL G-2, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name?

Colonel BICKNELL. George W. Bicknell.

The CHAIRMAN. Rank?

Colonel BICKNELL. Lieutenant Colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. Your assignment here, sir?

Colonel BICKNELL. I am the assistant to the Departmental G-2.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we have had news of one intercepted telephone communication shortly before December 7 which I believe was turned over to you by the F. B. I.

Colonel BICKNELL. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you take it?

Colonel BICKNELL. I brought it directly to the Department Commander.

The CHAIRMAN. And what discussion was had about it, if any?

Colonel BICKNELL. I stated that the message looks somewhat suspicious to me in part. At present, up until that time, having just received it only an hour—less than an hour before that, I had not been able to make any evaluation of it, but there were certain portions of that that did appear to be suspicious.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you and the Department Commander able to make anything out of it that would put you on any alert as to any hostile action?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

[315] The CHAIRMAN. Had you gotten from the Navy Intelligence or F. B. I.—and I understand you all worked in conjunction—

Colonel BICKNELL. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. —any message that would arouse suspicion of any hostile action?

Colonel BICKNELL. Nothing of the kind, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing of the kind?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were unable to know what was being sent from the Consulate?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir, that's true.

The CHAIRMAN. And were you able to get anything from the commercial radio?

Colonel BICKNELL. We were not authorized to do that.

General McCoy. Did you make an attempt, that is?

Colonel BICKNELL. I did not make the attempt, no, sir. I believe there were some attempts made by the other services, but we did not.

The CHAIRMAN. You felt that you were forbidden in peace time to do it?

Colonel BICKNELL. That's right. It is illegal to do that in peace time.

The CHAIRMAN. Sir?

Colonel BICKNELL. It was considered illegal to do that in peace time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You knew nothing of any code or blinker signals, or what have you, of the same character until after the 7th; is that right?

Colonel BICKNELL. That is correct, after the 7th.

The CHAIRMAN. You then obtained some information about that?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From the consulate?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[316] The CHAIRMAN. When did you get information that the Consulate was burning its papers?

Colonel BICKNELL. I received that information at 5 o'clock Friday afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be the 4th?

Colonel BICKNELL. The 4th, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise your Department—

Admiral REEVES. 5th.

General McCoy. 5th.

Colonel BICKNELL. 5th, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise your Department Commander of the matter?

Colonel BICKNELL. I advised them. That is, I gave all that information to the congregated staff heads at the staff conference at 9 o'clock Saturday morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Nine o'clock Saturday?

Colonel BICKNELL. Saturday morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Saturday morning. Did you impart to the conference the significance of that?

Colonel BICKNELL. I did. I said that was a most interesting fact.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the significance?

Colonel BICKNELL. That they were burning the papers.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the significance, in your judgment?

Colonel BICKNELL. The inference of it, in my judgment, is that that is one of the signs that something is going to happen somewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you are at the very brink of war—

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. —when a consul—

Colonel BICKNELL. —starts burning the papers.

The CHAIRMAN. —gets ready to flee, aren't you?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[317] The CHAIRMAN. So that you explained that that meant that some hostilities were probably going to break out immediately?

Colonel BICKNELL. I didn't make that explanation at the staff conference.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Colonel BICKNELL. But I said that it was very significant, in view of the present situation, that the consul was burning the papers.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no doubt that there were communications back and forward to Japan from the consular office here, have you?

Colonel BICKNELL. I feel certain that the entire espionage system headed up at the consular office.

The CHAIRMAN. There seemed to be no way that you could break through that?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral REEVES. I would like to know what the reaction at the staff conference was to your statement that this burning of papers you thought was significant.

Colonel BICKNELL. There was no comment that I know of.

Admiral REEVES. No comment on it whatever?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir. Of course, I might explain that under the delineation agreement that was published a year ago in June the F. B. I. and the Navy jointly were in charge of Japanese espionage.

The CHAIRMAN. They were?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir, amongst the civil community, and the Army was only charged with espionage within the military establishment.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't know that.

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir. That is the joint agreement of—
(The witness examined papers.)

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you need not refer to them; your word [318] is quite sufficient.

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir. I think it was in July of 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, legal or illegal, if there were attempts to break the communication system between here and Japan it was an F. B. I. or a Navy job?

Colonel BICKNELL. Or a Navy job, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel BICKNELL. We work in very close connection with them, but it was their responsibility only.

The CHAIRMAN. But they gave you nothing?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir, that's true; they gave us nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. Except that the F. B. I. gave you some things after the fact that were too late to use?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, what do you know about an interception of a message having certain code signal words that were to be used to signify—to signal the attack on these islands?

Colonel BICKNELL. That message was turned over to the F. B. I. encoded in a file of papers which were removed from the consulate after the police established a guard at the consulate. The story as related by them is that they smelled papers burning when they went in the consulate on the morning of the 7th.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Colonel BICKNELL. They saw smoke coming from behind a door. They asked the consul if there was a fire, and he said, "No; there is just something in there." They opened the door, which was a double door, and found a wash tub on the floor in which they were burning these documents. The room was full of smoke, and there was just one brown—this bellows type envelope that was full of papers that had not been destroyed. They [319] removed that—I don't think the consul knew that they got it—and brought it down to the F. B. I., and we turned it over immediately to the Navy Intelligence, inasmuch as Commander Rochefort has the key to some of their codes. Within I think it was less than 24 hours Commander Rochefort had broken one of the messages in this file in the consulate, which gave the system by which various lights, star boats, and other systems—

The CHAIRMAN. That is the so-called Kita, K-i-t-a, code?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I refer to something else which you may or may not know anything about; I refer to the fact that some ten days before December 7 it is supposed that a Japanese code message was intercepted and was broken down by the Department in Washington, one of the military departments, which gave certain key words which would be flashed over the radio directing the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that, having broken that down, one of the military establishments in Washington caught over the radio the three key words and relayed them here to you. When I say "you," to the Islands.

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any such story?

Colonel BICKNELL. I never heard of such a thing, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Never heard of it?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no other questions. Are there any other questions?

Admiral REEVES. I would like to ask if in close cooperation with the Navy and F. B. I.—if from Commander Rochefort or the Navy you learned anything about the collection of Japanese ships in the mandated islands.

[320] Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir. I knew nothing. We had no information from Navy, at all.

Admiral REEVES. No information about that movement of any ships?

Colonel BICKNELL. We knew nothing of any of the fleet or where they were.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel—go ahead.

Admiral REEVES. I have nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. Complete.

Admiral REEVES. No; I was going to say that I had nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, in view of the nature of our investigation we shall enjoin upon you that you shall not disclose what has been asked you or what you have testified here or discuss this testimony—

Colonel BICKNELL. Certainly. Very good, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. —with any other person.

Colonel BICKNELL. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

General Martin.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL FREDERICK L. MARTIN, AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES ARMY

(Thereupon the witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name?

General MARTIN. Frederick L. Martin.

The CHAIRMAN. Your rank?

General MARTIN. Major General, Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. And your assignment here?

General MARTIN. My assignment has been as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force from November 2 until December 17 when I was relieved.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you care to make any statement about the occurrences off your own bat, General, or would you prefer [321] that you be questioned about the situation?

General MARTIN. Well, I might state what little I know about what happened and what we tried to do to fight back. I was coming down to my breakfast on Sunday morning, December 7, just before 8 o'clock, when I heard a very violent explosion in the vicinity of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. I ran to the door just in time to see the second airplane making the dive release its bomb and pull up. I saw the red circle—

The CHAIRMAN. Where were your quarters, sir?

General MARTIN. They are on the channel that leads into Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you had a view of the harbor?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. This was about—this bombing was occurring probably less than a mile from my position. I saw the red circle on the wing tip of this airplane as it pulled out, and I knew it was Japanese. I rushed back to the telephone, called General Davidson, who was in charge of the intercept command, to tell him to get his pursuit ships in the air just as fast as he could, and he said they were being attacked at the same time and that they were struggling to get their ships in position so they could get them off.

I then tried to call General Rudolph, who was in command of the bomber command, and I could not get him at his telephone. So I got in my private car and drove to my headquarters as quickly as possible, so as to get communications with everyone. I found my staff assembling very rapidly, and we communicated with those that we could. We tried to get such information as we could from the intercept command to give us an indication of the location of these carriers, because our ambition at the time was to try to get the carriers if we possibly could. I called Admiral Bellinger on the field phone which I have in my office, which connects the two of us. As you know, the Navy is responsible for the search, and they also have turned over to them our bombardment in case of [322] attack. I talked to him, and the bombardment was so heavy at the time we could hardly hear each other, and he said he had no information whatever to give me any light as to which direction to go to find the carriers. I called him back later; he still had no information. The information we got at the time from the intercept command led us to believe that there was a carrier not far distant from the southernmost point of Barbers Point, which is out in this direction [indicating], and they indicated it might be 25 or 40 miles from there; that there was considerable air activity in that direction.

Of the airplanes we had, which were not very many, of bombardment airplanes we had in commission, loaded as quickly as possible, four A-20's, which are a light type of light bombardment airplane. As soon as they were loaded we gave them a mission. After finding that they had no mission from the Navy and they had no instructions from the Navy, I myself gave them a mission of trying to find the carrier that was south of Barbers Point. They took off at 11:27, four of them. They did not succeed in finding anything in that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. When did the bombardment by the Japanese cease, as nearly as you know?

General MARTIN. I have no information from anyone as to just when it ceased. Everyone seems to know when it began, but no one seems to know exactly when it ceased. There were three distinct attacks.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, three waves.

General MARTIN. Three waves. One started at about 8 o'clock and lasted for about 30 minutes, and there was another one at 9 o'clock or just after, and the third one was probably in the neighborhood of 9:45 to 10 o'clock. No one seems to know the exact time of the third.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, when you got this pursuit squadron off at 11:20 or thereabouts, the bombardment had ceased by [323] the Japanese?

General MARTIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is what I want to know.

General MARTIN. Some of the pursuit got off before the bombardment had ceased, and I saw their first attack was made on some ships—that is, within my view.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARTIN. —was made on some ships that were attacking the Ewa Marine Station; that is south here a short distance.

The CHAIRMAN. Then they went off to the south southwest in pursuit?

General MARTIN. Our information was to the effect that they left south or west of south.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Had any of the Japanese attacking planes in your observation gone off in that same direction?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir; that's what I was saying.

The CHAIRMAN. That is why you suspected a carrier?

General MARTIN. Yes, that's what I was saying.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARTIN. And one of our pursuit pilots had shot down two of the Japanese planes leaving in that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

General MARTIN. We had that information. After we dispatched this, the first four A-20's, we were given a map that had been recovered from a pilot that had been shot down on the edge of Fort Kamehameha, which is right on the edge of the military reservation of Hickam Field. This map had approximately ten courses laid out on it to a point northwest of the Island of Oahu, which indicated that they either had left carriers there or expected to return to carriers in that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[324] General MARTIN. And as we got other ships in commission we dispatched them a little after 12 o'clock, as I remember, in the northerly direction, but they didn't succeed in finding anything. As to what position they launched the ships from the carriers, we do not know, but from the time of the attack we suspect they were in the neighborhood of 200 miles from here, and it is pretty likely that they steamed back from that position before they recovered their airplanes.

The CHAIRMAN. Away from the Island?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. So it was possible for them to be approximately 300 miles from here at that time. Now, there is nothing positive about that.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

General MARTIN. The control officer in the intercept command did not give us any information that there were carriers in that direction, although, as you probably have received testimony, we were receiving all sorts of spurious messages with reference to the positions of the carriers. They were in every position around here, but they never mentioned the northerly position, which now would lead us to believe that they probably were in that position rather than south or east.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you acquainted with the condition of the radio air after these attacks, or have you since learned of the condition of the radio air? I understand it was full of—

General MARTIN. Well, to this extent: that we have had considerable interference, and they have tried to monitor the position to

locate the position of the instruments that are causing the interference.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We have heard that the sea was full of Japanese ships that all started talking on small radio sets and jammed the air.

[325] General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With contradictory talk and signals.

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the fact, is it?

General MARTIN. We have learned that since, and we were getting this information that we knew in all probability was spurious, but we couldn't differentiate one from the other.

The CHAIRMAN. That would indicate a perfectly complete espionage system operating before the attack, here in the Islands, wouldn't it?

General MARTIN. Justice Roberts, they had complete information of everything. It is impossible for one to believe that such a well-coordinated attack could have been made. They knew the exact position of everything. In their attack upon our installations they picked out those things of greatest importance to our future effort. They started in on our engineering establishments and our depots and our ships that were in the line, the armed forces——

The CHAIRMAN. Ships that were in the line, you say?

General MARTIN. Ships that were on the line.

The CHAIRMAN. On the line.

General MARTIN. Unfortunately, as you probably know, we were in Alert No. 1, which means prevention against sabotage, and that means pulling in your equipment so you can protect it from things that are moving on the ground, and that was the most unfortunate thing of all. After we got our ships dispersed, which was between the first and second attacks, we only lost one bombardment airplane, and that was of an obsolete type.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the third wave didn't get home at all, so to speak?

General MARTIN. Well, the success of the third wave was small as compared to that of the others, and the third wave [326] was largely horizontal bombing; there was very little bombing, but there was a good deal of strafing that preceded each bombardment attack, and this strafing was very effective. They had mounted in the wings of their ships 7.7 millimeter weapons and something that corresponds to our 20 millimeter weapons, and some of the ammunition in these belts was armor piercing.

The CHAIRMAN. Was what? Armor piercing?

General MARTIN. Armor piercing. Others were incendiary, and most of them were tracer, so the destruction of the ships was largely from this strafing.

The CHAIRMAN. You gathered that they even knew the location of ships in the harbor and picked their ship?

General MARTIN. There is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Picked individual ships as their individual targets?

General MARTIN. In my mind there is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you apprised of the contents of the Chief of Staff's message of November 27, the day that Alert No. 1 was put into operation?

General MARTIN. Well, I am apprised of one message. I did not receive the last message until after all this was over.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I understand that.

General MARTIN. I am apprised of one message in which he said to take such measures as necessary to prevent subversive effort—words to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there was more in it than that, wasn't there, General?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir, there was more in it than that. They said that—

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see the whole message?

General MARTIN. I read it, and then it was put in the secret files of the Department.

[327] The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Can you say if that is the message, General (indicating)?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir, that is the message. He mentions that—you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary. These measures should be carried out so as not to repeat not to alarm civilian population or disclose intent.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that shown you, General Martin? Here?

General MARTIN. As I remember, I was called to General Short's office right here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Were the staff present?

General MARTIN. My staff?

The CHAIRMAN. No. no. General Short's staff.

General MARTIN. Not that I remember.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you were called in alone?

General MARTIN. I believe my chief of staff was with me.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

General MARTIN. And probably General Short's chief of staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

General MARTIN. I do not remember exactly as to who was present when I went in, but there were not many.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not remember at what hour of the day that was? This message, to refresh your memory, was received at 1:16 p. m.

General MARTIN. Well, it was one afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. It was in the afternoon?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And was it the afternoon on which the Alert No. 1 was ordered?

General MARTIN. It was ordered immediately after that, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Immediately after?

[328] General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you discuss the significance of that message with the Department Commander?

General MARTIN. Nothing more than he said that we were going into Alert No. 1 right away and that we would prevent—take all necessary precautions against sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARTIN. It was felt at the time that sabotage was the thing to guard against an attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

General MARTIN. I cannot say. Probably geographical location and the fact that we had no information to the contrary.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, between the time that Alert No. 1 was put into effect, which happens to have been November 27, and December 7, did you hear—were you apprised of any other information or any other fears or any other intention to put the command into a more alert position?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. I have a message from my own chief, General Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force, which I have brought along with me here I might read.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would.

General MARTIN. This was dated November 28 and addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force:

That instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units under your control and command is desired against those subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department (see paragraph 3 MID SR 30-45). The present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at once stop. It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you immediately to provide the following: protection of your [329] personnel against subversive propaganda, protection of all activities against espionage, and protection against sabotage of your equipment, property and establishments stop. This does not repeat this does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures stop. Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be confined to those essential to security stop.

It is also desired that on or before December 5 this year reports be submitted to the Chief Army Air Forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions stop.

Signed

ARNOLD,
ADAM, *Adjutant General.*

The CHAIRMAN. What is your reply, sir?

General MARTIN. The answer to that was given as follows:

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,

Washington, D. C.:

Following report in compliance with instructions contained in AGWAR 4A4-28: instructions contained in subsequent radiogram issued to all establishments and units under control of Hawaiian Air Force on 29 November stop. Entire subject of protection recently received, and continues to receive, detailed and comprehensive attention as result of these reports prepared by special investigator during June and July 41 stop.

Additional steps initiated specifically to comply with subject radiograms substantially as follows: assembly of intelligence officers of the major subdivisions of Hawaiian Air Force 29 November stop. Personal inspection of stations and activities by Air Force Commander one and two December. Increase in size of guard where desirable stop. Instructions issued to expedite overhauling of pass system, civilian and military, now in progress stop. This entire department is now operating and will continue to operate under an alert for prevention [330] of sabotage activities stop.

Secrecy discipline being given all emphasis practicable through official and quasi-official agencies stop. Work has actually been begun on essential protective fencing and floodlighting projects stop.

With reference to counter propaganda, the problem is educational rather than regulatory and at present is being dealt with through the medium of squadron talks stop. Need is felt for a War Department publication (possibly in form of

development and extension of forewords suggested, FM21-100) suitably arranged and worded for use of relatively inexperienced personnel, dealing with status of soldier as citizen, ideals and doctrines influencing founders of American government, structure of government, place of military establishment in the structure, national objectives, both domestic and international, together with discussion of those forms of government inimical to democratic form stop.

Signed

MARTIN N.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further communication from your chief after that and before the attack?

General MARTIN. Not that I remember of.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be in your file if you had one?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had been in Alert No. 3 would your situation have been bettered to meet this attack?

General MARTIN. Very materially, because our intercept command would have been in operation, and as we were so hard pressed for training our problem here has been impressed on us as one of training. We have a lot of new men and a lot of new equipment, and the intercept command is one that requires specially trained men for the manning table, and we endeavored to train these men as quickly as we could, because the equipment [331] had been set up but recently. And we were working all day long through the week, but on Sunday they were only working from 4 to 7 o'clock. Now, had that been in operation by more skilled operators we would have had sufficient warning so that we could have intercepted before they reached the bomb release line. We did not have enough equipment here, airplanes, to have prevented attack of that intensity, but we could have reduced the effects of the attack very materially.

The CHAIRMAN. Your considered judgment is that even if you had had warning of the attack sufficient to get your ships into action still you had not enough equipment to have entirely prevented damage in Pearl Harbor?

General MARTIN. No, sir, we could not. I make that statement for this reason: that we had but a hundred and one of the P-40 type, which is the later type of pursuit airplane, and, as I remember, 39 of the P-36 type, which is an obsolescent type of pursuit airplane that does not have the requisite fire power. That is not sufficient. In our estimation we should have two fully-equipped groups of pursuit aviation or approximately 200 pursuit airplanes to ward off such attack.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean 200 fit to take the air?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On notice.

General MARTIN. And I have so recommended. In addition to that, we have had a great deal of trouble with reference to getting the requisite amount of spare parts.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARTIN. Of course our program at first, as you know, was one of all-out production.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General MARTIN. And then we had to pick up the spare parts later.

[332] The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARTIN. And while we are getting some spare parts under control now, it hasn't been, and about half of this number of airplanes

we had were out of commission for one reason or another. So we had on the morning of this attack approximately, as I remember, 64 of the P-40 type and—let me refer to my notes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly.

General MARTIN. I think it was 24 of the other type. (The witness referred to notes.) Twenty of the P-36 type. That would make it about 84, which was less than half of that which would be necessary. Now, of that number we lost about—a large part of our equipment in this attack by being on the ground. But had we been alerted and ready we would have had approximately 80 airplanes ready to meet them.

The CHAIRMAN. General, do you use intoxicating liquor?

General MARTIN. No, sir, not for many years.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on December 6, the evening or night of December 6?

General MARTIN. That was a Friday evening?

The CHAIRMAN. No; it was a Saturday evening.

General MARTIN. Saturday? Oh, yes, Saturday evening. I think I attended a dinner party at the club, at Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Schofield Barracks?

General MARTIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

General MARTIN. No, I was not at Schofield Barracks. I was at Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Hickam Field. You saw other officers there?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was their condition?

General MARTIN. As to sobriety it was nothing to criticize. They were having a drink now and then.

[333] The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

General MARTIN. But no one showed the effects of it.

The CHAIRMAN. When you left could the rest of them have left and taken battle stations with full efficiency? Was there anyone there who wasn't fit to go out and take his command?

General MARTIN. So far as I know there was none, Judge. You will have to qualify that because it's a question that even medical officers would discuss as to the effects of one drink on a man.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, exactly; I understand.

General MARTIN. And a great deal depends on the individual.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARTIN. But I would consider any of them could have taken their positions and put up a good fight, without any question in my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That is what I wanted to know. I think I have no other questions. General McNarney, have you any?

General McNARNEY. Have you the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Air Force?

General MARTIN. That Standing Operating Procedure came out for the Department on the 5th of November, and there were certain changes that had to be made on it. Our staff were working on it, and it had not been published at this time. For the Alert No. 1 we published—(The witness examined documents.) I don't know whether I brought it with me or not. Yes: for Alert No. 1 we published this paper right here (indicating).

General McNARNEY. The Commission has copies of those.

The CHAIRMAN. We have copies of that.

General McNARNEY. We have a copy of that.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a copy all right.

[334] General MARTIN. The purpose of withholding the finished preparation of that report was that we had General Davidson and Major Meehan back on the mainland at a maneuver, and we wanted the value of their experience there to guide us in the preparation of this report.

General McNARNEY. When you were informed by the Commanding General of the Department that Alert No. 1 would go into effect, did you have any reaction or apprehensions that this type of alert was not sufficient to meet the situation as then known to you?

General MARTIN. I must say that I did not.

General McNARNEY. If Alert No. 2 or No. 3 had been put into effect, would it have seriously disrupted your training program?

General MARTIN. Yes, it would, very materially.

General McNARNEY. If under Alert No. 1 it had been the practice to distribute your airplanes in their bunkers and disperse them, would that have seriously disrupted training?

General MARTIN. Not seriously disrupted training; it would have increased the guard very materially, and the Air Force is furnishing the guard, so you would have to take them out of the tactical units in order to increase the guard.

General McNARNEY. Would it have affected maintenance?

General MARTIN. It would, yes.

General McNARNEY. To any considerable extent?

General MARTIN. Our estimate—because we have done that—our estimate is that it is about 25%. We have practiced all these alerts from time to time, had drills on them, and everyone knows how to perform the duties in connection with a specific alert. The men—the airplanes have been dispersed a number of times on Alert No. 2, in simulated Alert No. 2.

General McNARNEY. Under Alert No. 2 what is the state of readiness of your interceptor command?

[335] General MARTIN. The interceptor command is in operation continuously while the alert is on.

General McNARNEY. What is the state of readiness of the actual forces? That is, you probably have one squadron ready to go in four or five minutes?

General MARTIN. Oh, you mean the pursuit forces?

General McNARNEY. Yes, the pursuit forces.

General MARTIN. We have a state of readiness in addition to the alert, you know.

General McNARNEY. Yes.

General MARTIN. The state of readiness indicates whether they are all ready, one-fourth ready, one-eighth ready, or whether they are—of course, with a No. 2 you couldn't have the last, which is that training goes on as usual and you have four hours to get to your post.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what the standard procedure is under Alert No. 2? For instance, at dawn how many squadrons would you have ready to go?

General MARTIN. Well, under Alert No. 2 you have to specify the state of readiness, and the state of readiness indicates the number of airplanes that are ready to go.

General McNARNEY. Well, in your practices under Alert No. 2 would your state of readiness be prescribed?

General MARTIN. Well, we have different ones. Sometimes we have all of them ready, and sometimes we have only a fourth of them ready, and sometimes we would just have one squadron in each group ready.

General McNARNEY. In other words, it depends on the situation existing at the moment?

General MARTIN. It depends upon what we prescribed at the time; there was no set rule for it.

General McNARNEY. You prescribed in accordance with your idea as to the existing situation?

General MARTIN. That is right.

[336] General McNARNEY. You previously mentioned the fact that a large number of airplanes were out of commission. That was true not only in the pursuit but also in the bombers and reconnaissance. Was that primarily due to a lack of spare parts?

General MARTIN. Well, we had a particularly vicious condition in reference to the B-17 bombers that had just come to our attention, and that is in the assembling of these leakproof tanks. The grommets fastening the tanks in position had not been properly placed, and the gasoline had gotten into the ingredient between the two layers of this composition which was supposed to swell up when the gasoline came in contact with it, and it had expanded down into the tank until the capacity of the tank had been very much reduced, and we did not find this until we began to get a red color to the gasoline, and we upon investigation found that about half of the tanks that we removed were so damaged, and reported to the Chief of the Air Corps this condition. We found it at the time when we received instructions to send all of our remaining B-17's to the Philippines, and we asked that we be permitted to delay their departure till the last of the ships in transit, which was granted, and this was for the purpose of getting them in commission, as well as for extending the training, because the few that had a part of the tankage could be used for training missions here. And then we were also changing the engines on those ships so as to insure that the engines on the airplanes, these 12, would have the proper interval between overhaul and inspection to permit their making that transit. So had the transfer been completed we would have had no B-17's at all.

General McNARNEY. Was the Aircraft Warning Service under your control on November 27?

General MARTIN. The what?

General McNARNEY. The Aircraft Warning Service.

General MARTIN. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Radar?

[337] General MARTIN. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. When was it placed under your control?

General MARTIN. It has never been placed under our control. It operates—cooperates with the intercept command, which is wrong of course.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean it is a component part of the interceptor command?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. I intended to speak to General Short about having it transferred, now that it was in operation, to the control of the Air Force and the intercept command. That is where it belongs.

General McNARNEY. Has it been placed under your command or was it placed under your command after the attack?

General MARTIN. No, sir, not to my knowledge. I knew nothing about that, if it has.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps it was after your relief. I think we were told that it was done on December 17.

General MARTIN. I have been in the hospital since last Sunday a week ago, and if it has been done it has been done since probably General Emmons came.

General McNARNEY. Who prescribed the hours of operation for the—

General MARTIN. That was arranged by the intercept command and the chief signal officer or the signal officer having charge of the air warning service company.

The CHAIRMAN. General Davidson is subordinate to you, is he not?

General MARTIN. He is the intercept command. He is the pursuit commander and the intercept commander.

The CHAIRMAN. And in both capacities he is under you?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, if the interceptor command had been organized and integrated it would have been under you; it [338] didn't need to be transferred to you, did it?

General MARTIN. That is perfectly correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, we have had some information, General, that it wasn't activated until December 17, ten days after the attack.

General MARTIN. Oh, it has—as soon as the first stations were in a position so they could operate and we could get personnel trained for that operation, they have been conducting drill in order that they could train additional personnel as rapidly as possible so as to man all the stations, and we finally had six mobile stations but none of the fixed stations. There are supported to be six fixed stations, which have not been in position and are not in position yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Had there been any emergency requiring continuous operation of one or more of the mobile stations, had you a force at your command then that could have kept those stations operating and reporting to the control room?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. They were not well trained men, but they were men sufficiently skilled that they could get information to us that would be of value, that we could investigate to find out the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, with your knowledge of the setup, General, if you had been given Alert No. 3 would those mobile stations have been running 24 hours a day?

General MARTIN. They probably would not have run 24 hours a day, but enough of them would have been in operation at any time out of the 24 hours that we could have gotten information. The reason I say that is that if you ran them 24 hours, as we had in the first—

The CHAIRMAN. You play them out?

General MARTIN. We found out that the machinery wears out. [339] So to prolong the life of the machinery we kept enough in operation at all times so that we could get a semblance of information. If we saw something of importance, then we would put the others in.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me for interrupting you.

General McNARNEY. Would you have had authority on December 6 to order 24-hour operation?

General MARTIN. Would I have had the authority?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

General MARTIN. I am sure if I had requested it I could have obtained it.

General McNARNEY. You yourself did not have authority to order operations?

General MARTIN. It was in complete operation, but it hadn't been turned over to the Air Force as yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, who had it?

General MARTIN. He is talking about the Air Warning Service; aren't you?

General McNARNEY. About the Air Warning Service.

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, who had it if you didn't?

General MARTIN. It was under the signal officer who was in charge of the installation of the equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see.

General McCoy. He is not an operating man.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any information on December 6 of the naval patrols that were actually operating?

General MARTIN. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did the Navy as a matter of course furnish you this information, or if you desired it would you have to go after it?

General MARTIN. They never have furnished us any information as to what they learned from their reconnaissance and [340] search. Had they found something of interest to us, they probably would have done so.

General McNARNEY. After the attack what was the situation?

General MARTIN. After the attack they had very little with which they could work. I, as I told you, had talked to Admiral Bellinger, which is my contact with the Navy, twice during the morning while we were being attacked; and, learning that some of the bombardment planes that were in a state of readiness, could go on a mission, and loaded, had not been assigned a mission, I assigned them myself. There was a mission assigned in the afternoon of that day by Admiral Bellinger, late in the afternoon. I was in the bombardment command post when this message came in: they wanted to search for a carrier which was reported to be about 65 miles north of here, and this was late, so late that it was hardly possible for them to get this information or to see anything before it became too dark, but they went out.

The CHAIRMAN. Who went out?

General MARTIN. The six B-17's, in answer to this request.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

General MARTIN. They did not find anything in that position. I will get the exact time of this in just a minute (examining papers).

Three B-17's went out at fifteen-twenty to eighteen-twenty-five, three hours and five minutes. The bearing was between 165 and 195 degrees. That's from three-twenty to six-twenty-five.

Admiral REEVES. Well, that is not north.

General McCox. What is the bearing?

Admiral REEVES. What is the bearing? That bearing is not north, is it?

General MARTIN. 165 to 195. You see the spread in the search [indicating].

[341] Admiral REEVES. Are you referring to compass bearings?

General MARTIN. Sir?

Admiral REEVES. That would be to the southward if you are referring to compass bearings.

General MARTIN. This is an azimuth.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General MARTIN. Wait a minute. You are right. It is not north.

Admiral REEVES. No.

General MARTIN. This is in a southerly direction, south and southeasterly.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General MARTIN. That is the information I had here on this chart that I held. I was sitting there in the office, and they said that they had information that there was a ship 65 miles north of here.

Let me see if I can find anything more on that subject.

[342] General MARTIN. It says 165 to 195. They flew in sight contact with each other on a course between 165 to 170 and about a distance of 70 miles. No enemy contact was made.

This mission was ordered by the Navy.

Admiral REEVES. No flight was sent to the north?

General MARTIN. No, sir. Evidently this is wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. After the 7th, General, were you advised by the Navy what task force they had out scouting and where it was?

General MARTIN. No, sir. We had to seek for that information as we had to know where their ships were, and it was quite difficult to know the position of friendly ships. That has since been arranged, but it was not true at the time or immediately afterward, to identify a signal that would mean whether you could identify the friendly ships, which has since been arranged. You had to go down close to see whether they were friendly or enemy, which is fatal to us.

The CHAIRMAN. It takes too long?

General MARTIN. No, if you get too close you lose your ship from anti-aircraft fire.

Admiral REEVES. The records on the morning of December 7 show that the enemy force proceeded in a northerly direction at 10:27 and 10:29.

General MARTIN. I have spoken to the control officer since then and they said that was the position in which the entry was made that morning which they overlooked and that there was such an entry on the board, but there was no indication of that course being an important one at that time.

Admiral REEVES. That information was not brought to your attention in the morning?

General MARTIN. No, sir, not until they analyzed the history of the control chart.

Admiral REEVES. You said, General, had Alert 2 been in effect it would have seriously interfered with your training. [343] Did you refer to the training that was in progress for ferry service or combat?

General MARTIN. No, sir. I have reference to both, because we had both problems of training here. We were required to train crews to ferry these ships to the Philippines, and we had our problem to get the combat crews trained also, and we had not reached our quota. I am speaking of the bombardiers primarily.

Alert No. 2 requires a certain proportion of the men to always be available for carrying out the mission. As to whether you are in a state of readiness, the proportion of your command which is placed in a state of readiness will affect the training. If it is a serious threat you will have all your men in that state. If no threat is imminent, you may take, say, one squadron of each group.

Admiral REEVES. In Alert No. 2 you would have been obliged to do a certain amount of flying?

General MARTIN. Alert No. 2 means searching as well as flying.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General MARTIN. We would have tried to continue with that particular phase of the matter.

Admiral REEVES. You would have fighter planes in the air?

General MARTIN. No, sir. You do not have the fighter planes in the air because they have such a limited amount of fuel. You can't afford to try it in getting them off in the air on a mission like that because you take the chance of having them out of the fight when the fight comes on.

Admiral REEVES. I do not follow you. I would think that you would have your fighters in the air ready to fight. I do not mean if their gas is exhausted, but you would certainly send fighters up in certain periods of the day.

General MARTIN. It would depend on when the fight came in. [344] If they went on and exhausted their fuel and the fight came on, they would be of no value to you.

Admiral REEVES. But in a state of Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, would you keep your fighting planes on the field with the gas tanks full?

General MARTIN. It depends on the situation. Generally speaking you would keep them on the field and make ready to get them off on information issued from the interceptor commander as to the direction of the attack in order that you could intercept that attack before it got to bombing the field.

Admiral REEVES. If you had fighters in the air, they could intercept them quicker than if they were on the ground?

General MARTIN. Yes, that is true.

Admiral REEVES. Therefore, it would seem that the fighters would be in the air on Alert No. 3 or Alert No. 2 at the critical periods protecting against a surprise attack?

General MARTIN. We think it is tactically unsound to do that; our teaching is contrary to that.

Admiral REEVES. You could intercept the attack sooner, don't you think so?

General MARTIN. Yes, if you expedite by contact with the enemy and have enough fuel to carry through to the end, it is very desirable.

Admiral REEVES. So you think in Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3 your training would have been interfered with in aviation?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. If they were engaging in war maneuvers, reconnaissance, fighter tactics, wouldn't all that be useful training?

General MARTIN. I do not get that question.

Admiral REEVES. In Alert No. 2, that does not prevent your carrying out reconnaissance, does it?

[345] General MARTIN. No, sir. In fact, Alert No. 2 means to carry out reconnaissance.

Admiral REEVES. That would be useful training, wouldn't it?

General MARTIN. Yes. The point is, you can't get training for the bombardier. You get training for the pilot and the copilot, but you are getting no training for the bombardier, and the gunners get very little training, and your mission fails if they do not destroy their target.

Admiral REEVES. It is not quite clear to me to what extent a war condition interferes with war training, because war training is a part of war operation. In a condition of Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, your planes would have guns and ammunition?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Don't you think, General, that on this Sunday morning, December 7th, if you had been in a condition of Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, that you would have been better off?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. You would have been?

General MARTIN. Yes, we would have been much better off.

Admiral REEVES. Even at the sacrifice, in your opinion, of a certain amount of training?

General MARTIN. Yes. If the attack was so imminent as that, you would have to sacrifice everything in order to meet the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Alert No. 3 implies that an attack is imminent?

General MARTIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have to sacrifice some training and stay ready?

[346] General MARTIN. Had we gone into Alert No. 2, our information was sufficiently adequate to indicate that we could expect the danger of attack for a certain period and we could carry on a certain amount of training in order to bring additional crews up to combat efficiency.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. This is off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

General MCCOY. Did you consider this an order from Washington to yourself as chief of the air service, for you to take local disposition here when you were under another commander yourself that you give instructions under Alert No. 1?

General MARTIN. No, it was not in accordance with the Department, but it was in full accord with the instructions already issued, practically all instructions here which were already put in force, and there was no discord.

General McCoy. Had you received your orders from the head of the air service in Washington direct?

General MARTIN. I don't remember receiving other orders.

General McCoy. Didn't this surprise you to get an order from the War Department?

General MARTIN. My reaction was I thought they were very much concerned with respect to subversive activities and they wanted to be sure we had the information here and would take steps to counteract it. That was my information.

General McCoy. Did you report that order to General Short?

General MARTIN. Yes, he knows about it.

General McNARNEY. That is the same one General Short received on November 28th which states, "This message is to be sent direct to all air fields."

General MARTIN. I might explain that this message was [347] addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, decoded, and he saw the message before I did.

General McNARNEY. The message was sent to the Department Commander?

General McCoy. It was.

I would like to go back to this other dispatch on the 27th. Do you have it there? Is that 472?

The CHAIRMAN. 472.

General MARTIN. 472 on the 27th?

The CHAIRMAN. That is under B?

General McCoy. Yes. Do you have it?

General MARTIN. Yes, I have 472 in front of me.

General McCoy. Tell me again when this was communicated to you in person by General Short.

General MARTIN. He called me to his office in the afternoon before Alert No. 1 went into effect.

General McCoy. In reading that telegram you will notice down about two-thirds of it that it indicated the imminence of hostilities with Japan?

General MARTIN. Yes. It says that if hostilities cannot be avoided that the United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act. Is that what you have reference to?

General McCoy. Yes. It says:

This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense prior to hostile Japanese action.

Don't you think that Alert No. 1 did that, did that plainly after what happened, and didn't you think so at the time?

General MARTIN. I have to admit that I did not.

General McCoy. You mentioned an inspector last July. Who was that?

General MARTIN. That was Colonel Burwell, who made an [348] inspection of all our air force activities to determine the possibility of sabotage, and we had taken steps after receiving his report to prevent those things that he thought might happen.

General McCoy. What did he think might happen?

General MARTIN. He was very much concerned about the protection of the B-17's, as he thought they could be sabotaged by men getting near enough to them to interfere with the airplanes or the wires or the

instruments or the controls, and he was concerned about the possibility of incendiary activity and so forth.

General McCoy. Did he make any recommendation about the disposition of the planes themselves?

General MARTIN. Yes.

General McCoy. What were they?

General MARTIN. In order to protect them against sabotage he recommended that they be brought into close formation or in a small, as small an area as possible, so that they could be more easily guarded. He said this thing of having them in an exposed position was not the best possible protection for them as a man can come up in the night and throw an incendiary bomb into a plane.

General McCoy. That is, having them dispersed in the bunkers?

General MARTIN. Yes.

General McCoy. He did not call attention to the danger of having them together, as has been shown throughout this war in attacks on airplanes?

General MARTIN. No. That is absolutely the wrong position for airplanes to be in if they are going to be attacked from the air.

General McCoy. I take it, then, that at the time you received this imminent hostilities report, it did not occur to [349] you at that time that it was possible that such an attack as was made could be made?

General MARTIN. No, sir. I will say that we discussed this thing not only among ourselves but with the Navy, and it was the accepted consensus of opinion in the Department and various other departments about the danger of losing any task force of that nature, but on account of the Pacific fleet being in this position, that the opportunity of such an attack was practically nil.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you and the Navy really agreed on that proposition before this war telegram came?

General MARTIN. Yes, not afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General MARTIN. We discussed the possibility of such a surprise attack, and that was the consensus of opinion among everyone that we talked to, which would be anybody who would be taken into our confidence.

General McCoy. After these instructions about Alert No. 1, you were only concerned with sabotage and the protection of your planes on the ground against subversive activities?

General MARTIN. Yes. That was our opinion, to be correct, the thing to do under this condition. We thought the explosion would come from within rather than without as soon as hostilities were declared between the two countries; so on account of living here with these people and knowing the condition with respect to sabotage, we were very alive to that particular situation but not sufficiently sensitive to the other.

General McCoy. Do you know anyone who took the other position?

General MARTIN. No, sir, I do not. Some of the Navy claim that they have now, but they never expressed it in my presence.

[350] The CHAIRMAN. This is off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

General McCoy. With respect to the Burwell report you mentioned did it envisage at all an attack such as happened here?

General MARTIN. His report was based entirely, General, on sabotage, the possibility of sabotage and the method of preventing it. It increased the guard and watchfulness of communications and passes for individuals and things of that nature. It was all based on that.

General McCoy. Did he make any recommendations about the possibility of an attack that might catch you in this exposed position?

General MARTIN. No, sir, he did not.

General McNARNEY. I have seen that Burwell report. I read it at the hotel before I left Washington. It was particularly concerned with sabotage, and I looked at it and saw what guard measures he had recommended, and I could find no place where he recommended anything except anti-sabotage, and I knew that was in effect, so I was not particularly interested in it.

General McCoy. The reason I brought that up was because I heard of this report and it seems to have a pertinent bearing on the state of mind of General Martin.

General MARTIN. I hate to say it, but we have been thinking of sabotage and not of an attack from the surface.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

General McCoy. I have no other question except one, and this may have been brought out, but in drawing up the air side of Alert No. 1, you were consulted on that?

General MARTIN. Yes.

General McCoy. And you made no objection to it as a passive defense?

[351] General MARTIN. That is right.

If I say at the end here, it might be interesting to the Board to know that we have submitted here from my headquarters on the 20th of August a plan for the employment of long range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu which requires only 180 long range bombers, and as the allocation of airplanes which I received indicated, they were sending us 180, I think it would accomplish this object, and in my opinion—and my opinion is getting of less value—but this report or this plan, if carried into execution, can give security to this place for approximately half the cost of one battleship so that nothing can get in on the surface; maybe some submarines, but nothing on the surface. If I can, I would like to leave it with you.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we would be very glad to have it.

That will be marked as Martin Exhibit No. 1.

General McCoy. I would like to have the Burwell report.

General MARTIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And when it is received it will be marked as Martin Exhibit No. 2.

General MARTIN. You gentlemen are aware of a joint agreement between the Army and the Navy with respect to the air forces?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we are.

I neglected to ask you, considering the state of alert in which you were under orders, what was the performance of your troops when the attack came?

General MARTIN. Justice Roberts, I have never been so proud of men in my life.

The CHAIRMAN. From all I have heard I think that you may well feel that way, General Martin. Your force was practically complete and ready to go on station?

[352] General MARTIN. They were at their stations by the time I got there, so far as I could ascertain. I do not know how they got there so quick. Upon arriving at my office we were then being attacked, and so far as I know, practically every man was on duty.

The CHAIRMAN. That is fine. This will be off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. Of course I need hardly say that our inquiry is confidential and we will ask you not to disclose anything that has happened in this room or to discuss it with the men outside.

General MARTIN. I understand that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Call Colonel Powell.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARROLL A. POWELL, SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name, Colonel?

Colonel POWELL. Carroll A. Powell.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

Colonel POWELL. Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been here?

Colonel POWELL. I have been on the Island since July 3, 1939.

The CHAIRMAN. In the same capacity?

Colonel POWELL. I was Department Signal Officer for about a month, and then I was relieved by Colonel Van Duzen. He came in August, and the following year, 1940, he left in October, and I was again appointed Department Signal Officer.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have been such since 1940?

[353] Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Had the interceptor command been organized in accordance with the Standing Operating Procedure on December 7, 1941?

Colonel POWELL. It had not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Under whose responsible direction were the detector instruments on that day?

Colonel POWELL. They were under my direction, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was planned when you had your system operating satisfactorily that it should be turned over to the interceptor command?

Colonel POWELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in a period of training at the time?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your period of training was not affected, I take it, by the installation of Alert No. 1?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the training had been between the hours of four and seven at the various mobile stations prior to December 7?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. It was just during the daytime or morning, and my previous answer was incorrect. I did not quite understand your question.

At the beginning of Alert No. 1 I was on the mainland at that time. The CHAIRMAN. You were?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. I was with General Davidson. We were going around the country visiting the various interceptor commands there, getting information on how we were going to improve our operations here, and when this Alert No. 1 was put into effect, Colonel Murphy—he was the acting department [354] signal officer in my place—and he told me G-3 gave the order to operate the stations two hours before daylight and one hour after daylight.

When I got back—I got back the 3rd of December—and I saw Colonel Murphy on the 4th, and he reviewed the whole situation for me.

I asked him about that particular point, these orders, and he told me he had received them from G-3, and I said they appeared to me to be satisfactory for the situation on hand.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had had Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, was the training sufficiently advanced so that you could get the stations running smoothly, or some of them, every day?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had sufficient personnel trained then to do it?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir, we had. We were using some of the men 18 hours a day, which is not conducive to good work, but the stations were in position on training and location, and in most stations we are dependent on the men plotting.

The CHAIRMAN. They are the permanent stations?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You had one at Opana?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was your other mobile station for training?

Colonel POWELL. I can tell you on the map. We had one here at the peak (indicating on map). Then we had one over here at Waianae.

The CHAIRMAN. That is about the center, along the western shore?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. That was covering the sector firm here (indicating) up through here and down to here, because these mountains will obstruct it.

[355] Then we had one at Fort Shafter, in the back here, and that would only cover the sector down through here.

Then we had one at Koko Head. That was covering this sector here. We felt that should give us the most protection here through this area (indicating).

Then we had one over here about Kaaawa.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was approximately in the center of the east coast?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, that covers down to here, right here. Then we had this Opana station, and then we had one at Kawailea. That was over here and down through here (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. You were training at all these stations?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. While it may have been difficult in view of your training to get every one of these stations running 24 hours a day, you could have had such stations going 24 hours a day?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, but there are not enough here to give you clear protection all the way down, because you have to shut down your machines for mechanical difficulties and repair them, and the generating plants which have been running quite successfully, but

they don't stand a 24-hours operation very long. They are only emergency sets, and we did not put the permanent power in from the Hawaiian Electrical Company for the reason we believed they were just temporary training stations, but thereafter we made progress with them, and we are putting them in now.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the temporary stations?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, we are putting power in these temporary stations.

The CHAIRMAN. You are?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, until we get the permanent stations in. Opana will be a permanent station also.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a member of the staff of this department?

[356] Colonel POWELL. Yes, I am department signal officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you appraised of the contents of a War Department message of November 27, 1941, that came in the same time Alert No. 1 was ordered?

Colonel POWELL. I was not here, sir, at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. I forgot. You were on the mainland?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If anyone would be apprised from your branch of the service, it would be Colonel Murphy?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing was said to you about the reason for the alert?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. All I know was what I read in the papers on the mainland on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the evening of December 6?

Colonel POWELL. I think I was at my home.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were at your home on the morning of December 7?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. They called me up.

The CHAIRMAN. The first information you had was when they called you?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are your living quarters?

Colonel POWELL. Down in Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. In the city?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General McCoy. With respect to that message from the War Department—

General McNARNEY. Before we leave that, did you have any system of ground observers in the aircraft warning system?

Colonel POWELL. No, we do not think there is any need for ground observers here. That was borne out in the air [357] observations on the mainland at the interceptor command exercises in Seattle. The observers can't see any more or can't see as much as our detectors can. The distances are so short that before the observers can get anything, the planes are away.

General McNARNEY. If you had observers on the outlying islands, wouldn't that have afforded some protection?

Colonel POWELL. That would have meant a radio phone call here to give us that information because there are no cables between the various islands, and the only way is by radio phone.

General McNARNEY. It would have been comparatively simple to equip them with radio phones, would it not?

Colonel POWELL. Well, your answer would be the answer to that, but as I say, we were in a state of training, not worrying about detectors on the other islands.

General McNARNEY. Maybe I can make it clear this way: What system of aircraft warning service did you have prior to the time you received your mobile detector sets?

Colonel POWELL. We had none. There was no system before for covering anything.

General McNARNEY. Was there any system planned?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is another subject that I would like to ask you about.

Admiral STANDLEY. If I may?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead.

Admiral STANDLEY. In regard to your schedule, you say the schedule of four to seven went into effect on Alert No. 1?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that correct?

Colonel POWELL. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was ordered as a part of Alert No. 1?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

[358] Admiral STANDLEY. You would have a schedule from four to seven?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Prior to that, did you have any regular schedule for the period of training?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, it is quite difficult to get the people trained and we would have to take the individual sets and put the men out and train them, and that report came to our information station, but we probably started in the morning, probably about nine o'clock, and worked until eleven one day, and probably in the afternoon, or we would have arrangements with the air corps to send out a fleet, and if they came in we could go out and practice. It was just a practice condition. It was practice.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were here on the morning of the 7th?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. On that morning, that Sunday morning, had there been any special orders changing the routine as a skeleton organization after seven o'clock, or was there any change in that?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, no change.

The CHAIRMAN. The standing order of four to seven was in effect?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir, four to seven was in effect.

General McCoy. This pick-up which occurred was just a routine training thing?

Colonel POWELL. It was just a routine training thing.

General McCoy. As I remember, the station had closed down and one of them stayed down there operating on his own?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. All the men are all keen about this thing. It is to me an interesting thing, and the men are all keen and anxious to learn all about these sets, especially the operators of them. It is almost fantastic the way these things [359] operate, and the

men are all anxious to learn about them. This particular one wanted to work longer to get more training, because we were to put control sets on the other islands, and he wanted, I suppose, to become one of the operators on the other islands. That he did not say but that is what they were working for, to be able to operate those sets on the other islands.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you about your radio communications with the War Department. Was it the practice of the War Department to go on the air at any particular time?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, we have general schedules with them and we are on the air all the time and they are on the air all the time. They can shift to us any time and call us.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any inquiry to discover whether there was an attempt to call you on the morning of December 7th?

Colonel POWELL. There was no record in our department.

The CHAIRMAN. In the office?

Colonel POWELL. There is no record.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no record of an attempt to get you?

Colonel POWELL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any peculiar weather or atmospheric conditions on that morning that you know of which would have prevented the War Department getting through to you?

Colonel POWELL. I can't answer that question, but I will find out.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would find out whether there was any difficulty in getting to you or anything preventing you from receiving on that morning, and if so, what the difficulty was.

[360] Colonel POWELL. This is on December 7th?

The CHAIRMAN. This was the morning of December 7th from, let us say, five to eight.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As chief signal officer, do you know whether the War Department in Washington has used the RCA commercial circuit?

Colonel POWELL. Occasionally they use it to cable.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the occasion for their using the commercial cable? If they could not get through to you?

Colonel POWELL. As a general rule. We relay from 'Frisco. The RCA may have had access through a certain frequency which we did not have, and they gave it to them and sent through 'Frisco.

The CHAIRMAN. You do this only in case your own Army radio is not working properly?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir, that is my understanding.

General McCoy. Or it might be loaded?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, it might be loaded in Washington sending to other places and our not being loaded.

General McCoy. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a limit to the load?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. I might have all the load I can handle because I relay all traffic from Manila, and I have my own men to take care of that situation, to report and read the message and then retransmit to Manila. I handle that traffic and refile that traffic to Manila.

The CHAIRMAN. That gives me a thought. Would there be a record here of your having handled a message for Manila that morning?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the same sense and in the same verbiage as the message they got here through RCA?

[361] Colonel POWELL. Yes. However, that would be in code.

The CHAIRMAN. Never mind whether it is in code. You would forward it in the same code?

Colonel POWELL. We can decode it.

The CHAIRMAN. You would forward it in the same code?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have a record here showing you re-forwarded a message that morning?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Please get it for me.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a telephone communication direct with the chief of staff in this building?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, and it is in the Aliamanu Crater.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the War Department was familiar with the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had a direct radio line from Honolulu to the F. B. I. headquarters in Washington? Did you know of that fact?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, I did not.

You say a direct telephone line?

The CHAIRMAN. No, a radio.

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, I did not know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps neither did the War Department know it.

Colonel POWELL. I would probably have known about it. I should have known about it, because they could probably have relieved some of our load.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact is, there is a communication line to the central F. B. I. office from Mr. Shivers' office here, and you did not use it?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. I did not know it existed, because I am in charge of the messages and the only other people I ever used are the Navy.

[362] The CHAIRMAN. The Navy had a radio communication to Washington?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. They communicated direct to Washington.

General MCCOY. I would like to follow that dispatch that arrived here but was not delivered until the afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. The dispatch of the 7th which was delivered to the Department Commander on the afternoon of the 7th.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that go through your office?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. For what purpose?

Colonel POWELL. For delivery and decoding.

The CHAIRMAN. When it was brought over, it was sent from Washington at what time?

Colonel POWELL. I would have to get the message on that. It would be after midnight.

General MCCOY. I thought he could describe the message.

Colonel POWELL. No, I have not got that here. The messages are in our secret files.

General MCCOY. Do you know what message we are talking about?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. I am in charge of messages and I investigated that because the chief of staff asked me to see what it was. Do you want our copy of the message?

The CHAIRMAN. That will be contained in the code room in Washington as to the date of delivery?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, that only gives us the date and hour that it was delivered to the RCA in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have it.

Colonel POWELL. It would merely show the time it was received by the RCA in Honolulu.

General MCCOY. Can you tell us what happened after it got to the RCA office in Honolulu?

[363] Colonel POWELL. I investigated that and the message shows it was received here at 7:33 a. m. in Honolulu. It was delivered by a messenger. He brought it out here along with a lot of personal messages. We handle all messages from RCA, and we put them out on our own delivery system for delivery to the various outlying posts. That is a service we give to the officers because otherwise these personal messages would not be delivered until the next day.

He brought this message out and left it here, and on that particular message he did not get a receipt for it; so therefore there is no record of the actual time of delivery that we can show except what the young man says.

He says he found it there about 11:55 laying with a bunch of messages that had been delivered to the office by this messenger who had left RCA some time that morning.

He got by the boy because he was rushing a message for the Commanding General which he delivered, and as he came back the messenger was there, and he was kidding him for having this red circle on his arm, and he said he had better take that off or somebody might take him for a Japanese. That is how he knows that boy did deliver that message.

General MCCOY. Do you know what time it was received downtown?

Colonel POWELL. Seven thirty-three in the morning.

General MCCOY. Do you know approximately from this reliance on your man's memory of this incident about what time it was delivered here?

Colonel POWELL. About eleven-thirty.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the messenger been interrogated about it?

Colonel POWELL. I only investigated the men here.

The CHAIRMAN. Your own men?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. There was considerable excitement around at the time, so I didn't get down to the code room [364] until two o'clock. It was decoded and delivered at three o'clock to the Adjutant General.

The CHAIRMAN. We had better see it.

Colonel POWELL. Do you want a photostatic copy?

General MCCOY. I do not know whether it is necessary to see it, because they will have a full account in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very important message.

General McCoy. Yes, I think it is a very important message. I think we had better have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you bring a copy of it?

Colonel POWELL. This message had taken us an hour to go through the code machine and had to be played back to make sure it is accurate, so it was about a half hour that we spent in decoding it.

The CHAIRMAN. In your judgment, would it take longer to encode it than to decode it?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It should be about the same time?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General McCoy. If you lost an hour in coding it, you would say that the scrambled phone would have been much better?

Colonel POWELL. Absolutely, yes. I think that is what caused them to inquire. I don't know what time the message came in, but they inquired of me where the message was, and that is how I found out where it had gotten lost.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

General McNARNEY. No.

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The nature of our inquiry is such, Colonel, that we feel it necessary that you should not refer to your testimony here.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Or anything that occurred in this room, and do not discuss your testimony here with any person.

[365] Colonel POWELL. Very well, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ROBERT H. DUNLOP, ADJUTANT GENERAL DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your name, Colonel?

Colonel DUNLOP. Robert H. Dunlop.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

Colonel DUNLOP. Colonel, Adjutant General Department. I am Adjutant General.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have been for how long?

Colonel DUNLOP. Since the first of last June.

The CHAIRMAN. As such, sir, do you have any records for us which indicate the absences or the complement of forces which were on hand on the morning of December 7, 1941? Let me make myself clear. We thought perhaps you could give us some approximation of whether there were a vast number of leaves in the force when the attack occurred on Pearl Harbor, or whether the forces were practically intact when the attack took place.

Colonel DUNLOP. They were practically intact. The only men who were absent were, I would say, very few, due to the proximity of the center of population in the Island of Oahu. For instance, most officers, or especially the men, might go to Honolulu, but in a little after twelve o'clock there is no place for them to stay with the exception of possibly—well, I would say 50 out of my department spending the night on the island of Oahu, and they go to a place like Pawaa, a cabaret, but they don't stay there.

In order that I might get the information I have prepared a radio this morning and sent it out to the echelons, the stations, and so on, to get a reply at ten o'clock tomorrow morning, sir. It states:

[366] Estimated percentage of strength your command who were present for duty at zero eight hundred comma seven December forty one will be radioed or otherwise submitted this headquarters not later than ten hundred comma twenty five December nineteen forty one period for the purpose of this report personnel absent on pass will not repeat not be considered present for duty.

The CHAIRMAN. You think the records at the various commands will be adequate to supply that information?

Colonel DUNLOP. I am not sure about that, sir, because there are so many, and a great many of the well behaved soldiers have their good conduct cards, and they go out, and there could be a number that might not be there the next morning. Now, whether the first sergeant is going to know about it the next morning at eight o'clock or not is problematical, but I do not expect to get actual figures. I did not ask for any figures, but just a percentage.

The CHAIRMAN. You think those percentages can be given and that they will be approximately correct?

Colonel DUNLOP. Yes. There won't be any great absenteeism because they would be home the night before.

The CHAIRMAN. Do most civilian amusements in Honolulu close down at midnight?

Colonel DUNLOP. Yes. The sale of liquor stops at twelve o'clock and there may be a few places, the Swanky Franks, and such, that run after, but the soldiers begin to go home, and the sailors too. They go home in great numbers after that.

Of course there was a payday in there. We have staggered pay-days, but they had some paid, but I could hold up my hand and really say that I do not believe there were any great absentees at eight o'clock the next morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6, sir?

[367] Colonel DUNLOP. I was here in the post. Yes, I went to the movies at Fort Armstrong. I came back and got a message for the chief of staff and gave it to him before I went to bed.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see any disorder in town that night, Saturday?

Colonel DUNLOP. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any signs of drunkenness or carousing?

Colonel DUNLOP. No, sir, I didn't notice anybody out here at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there some soldiers on the street?

Colonel DUNLOP. As usual, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This was Saturday night?

Colonel DUNLOP. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your observation with respect to sobriety or the contrary among the officers and men in this Department?

Colonel DUNLOP. I have not noticed any excessive drinking among the soldiers, any more than any place in the service, or during my service. I very seldom see a drunken officer. As I stated before, the only time that I ever saw a drunken officer was the occasion of the annual alumni dinner at West Point, and this was about three o'clock in the morning, and maybe I didn't have any business being at the club at that time. Officers do not get drunk any more, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad to hear that.

Colonel DUNLOP. I mean, as a general thing.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Any further questions?

General McNARNEY. No.

Admiral REEVES. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Colonel, we desire that no communication of what goes on in this room shall be made, and your testimony shall not be discussed with anyone.

[368] **Colonel DUNLOP.** It shall not be mentioned, sir.

The **CHAIRMAN.** If you care to, you can send the summary that you get in answer to your radio to Mr. Howe, our Recorder, who will incorporate it in the record. He will give you his address at the hotel.

Colonel DUNLOP. Yes, sir.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Call Lieutenant Tyler.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT KERMIT A. TYLER, AIR CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The **CHAIRMAN.** Will you state your full name, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant TYLER. Kermit A. Tyler.

The **CHAIRMAN.** And your rank?

Lieutenant TYLER. First Lieutenant, sir.

The **CHAIRMAN.** What was your assignment prior to December 7, 1941?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was assigned to the Eighteenth Pursuit Squadron.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Were you at any special duty on or about December 7, 1941?

Lieutenant TYLER. My special detail was pursuit officer at the interception control board, Fort Shafter.

The **CHAIRMAN.** That is right here on this reservation?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Tell us all that happened that Sunday morning.

Lieutenant TYLER. On Sunday morning I reported, in compliance with my instructions, to the interception control board, at four o'clock in the morning. There was no activity observed on the board, as near as I remember, until, I suppose, 6:10 or thereabouts. At that time a number of plots or indications, some arrows, appeared on the board to show that there was aircraft flying around the islands. I noted that there [369] was one in the vicinity south of Kauai and there was also one south of Molokai shortly after seven o'clock in the morning at a distance of—I think it was—130 miles north of Oahu. A couple of plots appeared on the board.

This activity gradually increased in the general direction of the Island. I think it was just about seven o'clock.

All the plotters that put these arrows on the board folded up their equipment—they have headsets to receive their information—and folded up their equipment and went out to breakfast. All the rest did as they were doing.

At that time, just prior to this folding up, I noted that there was a man on the drafting board and was completing this thing. I did

not know what he was doing. I asked him what his job was, as to what he was doing, and he told me he makes a historical record of the plots that appear on the board. In other words, if they were practicing something, generally to find out what it was so that we can trace it back.

I don't remember that these two plots north of the Island were on the main board. They were some distance out, but I know they were on the drafting board, because I saw they were side by each.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this the plot (handing a document to Lieutenant Tyler)?

Lieutenant TYLER. This does not look to me like the one, but it may have been.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, at any rate, it was a plot something like that?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the idea of the plot?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When you looked at it you saw what?

Lieutenant TYLER. I saw those two little plots. It was right after that that the operator, or all the fellows and [370] this draftsman also left.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you do anything about the plots?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir. I had previously only once seen the board in operation, and it looked to me like the usual thing. I had seen just the same setup on the board, saw these plots all over the place, and I had no reason to suspect, so far as I am concerned, that there was anything irregular going on.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought these might be friendly planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, sir. That is my thought. I did not know they were anything else. I thought that is what they could be, or possibly some friendly craft.

About seven-twenty the operator from Opana contacted the station.

The CHAIRMAN. You were still in the control room?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, I was detailed from four to eight a. m.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would you stay there after the headset operators had left?

Lieutenant TYLER. Well, I was detailed to be there those hours, so I just stayed.

The CHAIRMAN. And you stayed?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes. About seven-twenty, I believe, the operator of the Opana radio direction finding station told me that he had followed these plots and that there was a large number of aircraft, he thought.

Well, perhaps I should have done something. I don't know, but it seemed to me that there was still nothing irregular, that they probably might be friendly craft. So I thought about it for a moment and said, "Well, don't worry about it," and went back awaiting the hour and time until the next relief.

At about between ten and five minutes of eight I heard some noise outside and went out to see what was going on, and saw what I thought to be Navy bombers in bombing practice over [371] at Pearl Harbor. Thereafter I heard a few bursts of antiaircraft fire.

About a little after eight Sergeant Starry from Wheeler Field called me and said, "There is an attack at Wheeler Field," and I told

the operator to remain on duty, so I immediately told him to recall the plotters and receivers of this information.

They came back and it was at about that time that Major Tindal, one of the controllers, came in and took charge of the situation.

From then on I just assisted him in communications and whatever I could do. I still did not know very much about the setup because of my first experience.

The CHAIRMAN. You attempted to trace back the Japanese planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. They were plotted, I believe, on this historical record. I did not oversee it, because there was quite a bit going on and it was lots doing.

The CHAIRMAN. You got the impression that they did trace the planes going to the north after the attack?

Lieutenant TYLER. The stations were all operating. The plotters were there; so I thought the operators certainly got them.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, was the information that these stations received, which was coordinated at the control room, to your knowledge transmitted by telephone to the air force so as to direct the air force to get the pursuit planes in the air after the air bombardment? The stations were kept running in tracing these Japanese planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, sir, as soon as the call was made.

The CHAIRMAN. No one from the control room would have sent to the particular officer of the air force whatever information you got?

[372] Lieutenant TYLER. I did not personally call anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they send any command there?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was the only officer there, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the men?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, until Major Tindal got there.

The CHAIRMAN. When did he get there?

Lieutenant TYLER. Eight-fifteen or eight-twenty.

The CHAIRMAN. Then when you started to trace the receding planes, didn't Major Tindal call up the air force base, to your knowledge, and direct them, tell them in which direction they had gone?

Lieutenant TYLER. I don't know that. Major Bergquist and Major Tindal were really in charge, as they had training on the mainland and were working with the installation.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were more or less an observer after that?

Lieutenant TYLER. That is correct, yes.

General McCoy. Was there any other officer there at that time?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir. I was the only officer there until the Major came or it may have been a signal corps officer before that, but I don't know. He didn't have anything to do.

General McCoy. Didn't you transmit this information of the plotted planes to anyone?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Why not?

Lieutenant TYLER. The historical record was there, and I felt if they had anything left to fight with, it would be there to use. As a matter of fact, it didn't occur to me to do anything about it at the time, sir. I was so confused with the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you perhaps misunderstood General McCoy's question. As I understand your testimony, it was that [373] before you knew of the actual attack you thought that this was a normal movement of friendly planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore you did not communicate with anyone?

Lieutenant TYLER. That is right. I communicated with no one.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you would have if you had thought these were enemy planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

General McCoy. Did you know of the coming in of the friendly planes from the mainland?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir, I did not. However, I suspected they were coming because as a matter of fact on coming to work from two-thirty to four I heard the station so I thought these were B-17's coming in, and that confused me still more.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought they were friendly planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. I thought they were off course and that they were maybe working out some problem, and it confused me.

The CHAIRMAN. And on this particular morning the Navy may have had a task force in that neighborhood?

Lieutenant TYLER. The movement of the Navy was usually secret, more so than we are, sir. I do not know what they are doing.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether there is a closer liaison between the Army and the Navy than there was before December 7th with respect to the direction and location of Navy scouting forces?

Lieutenant TYLER. I do not know that, sir. That is under bombardment. I am in pursuit, so I do not know that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not under your province?

[374] Lieutenant TYLER. No.

General McCoy. You are attached to the detector service?

Lieutenant TYLER. I worked for two days after the raid and then I went to the subordinate unit at Wheeler Field and worked there up until another week, and I was on flight patrol with my pursuit squadron for four days after that. I am now back down here. I have been here for three days working in the control unit.

The CHAIRMAN. You are in the control room?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McNARNEY. Was there a controller on duty that Sunday morning?

Lieutenant TYLER. Major Tindal was one of the controllers.

General McNARNEY. What time did he get there?

Lieutenant TYLER. He got there at eight-twenty.

General McNARNEY. I mean prior to that time, before 7 a. m.?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. There was no controller there then?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Were you acting both as controller and as pursuit officer?

Lieutenant TYLER. Well, sir, I did not know what my duties were. I just was told to be there and told to maintain that work.

General McNARNEY. That is your experience as controller or pursuit officer, or did you have any experience?

Lieutenant TYLER. I had once previously seen this being made around the Island. We walked through the installation and had the situation explained to us.

General McNARNEY. You had no experience as controller or pursuit officer?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was detailed once before as pursuit officer.

[375] General McNARNEY. You really had no conception of what your duties were?

Lieutenant TYLER. I had very little, sir.

General McNARNEY. This was purely a practice run, to your knowledge?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. There was actually no one stationed in readiness that morning, the 7th, Sunday?

Lieutenant TYLER. No.

General McNARNEY. There was nothing in readiness?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Did you report afterward any of these plots to anyone?

Lieutenant TYLER. I reported, sir, I believe, to Major Tindal. This may be all wrong, but I know someone asked, "Why didn't we plot this thing?" and I remember reporting in the confusion to, I think it was, Major Tindal or Major Bergquist, and I think General Short also saw me, but I can't think what it was, and I told someone, and I think he gave it to him.

Admiral REEVES. Who detailed you to this duty?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was detailed by order of the Fourteenth Pursuit Wing operations officer, who is Major Bergquist.

Admiral REEVES. He did not tell you what you were to do there or what your duties were?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was instructed to become acquainted with the situation, and the previous Wednesday I had reported there for duty, and there was an operator there, and I called and he said, "We are getting this in Saturday and we have to have someone there," and I was looking around finding out what I could do.

Admiral REEVES. How long have you been in the air service in the Army?

[376] Lieutenant TYLER. Four years and two months, sir.

Admiral REEVES. No other questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. You say you were detailed from four to eight that morning?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. If nothing had happened in the ordinary course of events, would you have stayed for relief at eight o'clock?

Lieutenant TYLER. I believe there was another relief detailed, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. But you don't know?

Lieutenant TYLER. The thing seemed to be that it was shifted because I was previously detailed Saturday afternoon, and then it was shifted to Sunday, and I don't know whether we had any detail scheduled or not, so far as there was relief.

Admiral STANDLEY. What about on Wednesday?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was detailed on Wednesday from twelve thirty to sixteen hundred—four o'clock.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you relieved then?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The station closed?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

General McCoy. In other words, this was just a drill?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

General McCoy. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, our inquiry is such that we will ask you not to discuss the testimony that has been given here by you or anything said while you have been in the room. Do not discuss it with anyone.

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We will take a recess for a few minutes.

(There was a brief recess. The following then occurred:)

[377] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR KENNETH P. BERGQUIST, AIR
CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name?

Major BERGQUIST. Kenneth P. Bergquist.

The CHAIRMAN. Your rank?

Major BERGQUIST. Major, Air Corps, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your assignment here?

Major BERGQUIST. The Hawaiian Interceptor Command, sir.

General McNARNEY. What particular position in the Interceptor Command?

Major BERGQUIST. I am the operations officer of the Hawaiian Interceptor Command, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As such have you to do with the Warning Service?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that your particular assignment now?

Major BERGQUIST. My assignment includes the operations of the Hawaiian Interceptor Command, a part of which is the operational control of the Aircraft Warning Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. When was that interceptor service set up as outlined in the Operating Procedure? What date? We have been told December 17; is that about right?

Major BERGQUIST. That is the date that the Hawaiian Interceptor Command, as that name, was ordered, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, what was being done with the devices for warning on and before December 7, 1941?

Major BERGQUIST. We were operating them, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As a regular service to the Department?

Major BERGQUIST. We were setting up the information center, sir, and I was working at that most of the time to get that functioning.

The CHAIRMAN. And how much were you operating your [378] detecting devices each day?

Major BERGQUIST. We were operating them from 4 in the morning a week prior to this, sir. We were operating them from 4 in the morning until 11 in the morning. Four to seven was as ordered by, I believe, a verbal order from the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, and from 7 to 11 we were operating them for the purpose of calibrating the instruments and training our pursuit pilots in interception.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was what period?

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Admiral STANDLEY. What period was that?

The CHAIRMAN. That was from 7 to 11.

Admiral STANDLEY. Seven to eleven?

Major BERGQUIST. Seven——

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but what period? What period of days?

The CHAIRMAN. A week.

Major BERGQUIST. That schedule was approximately taking in a week before and previous to that.

The CHAIRMAN. A week before the 7th?

Major BERGQUIST. Sir, previous to that we were operating them during the period 7 to 12, I believe it was, sir, and also two or three hours in the afternoons.

Admiral STANDLEY. In addition from 4 to 7?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. In other words, were attempting to get the sets calibrated and get all our personnel trained.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you know why the order was during this week prior to December 7 that you should operate from 4 to 7 a. m. each day?

Major BERGQUIST. I do not, sir. The Hawaiian Interceptor Command was not set up. Therefore, the Aircraft Warning Service was operating directly under the Department signal officer, and we had no control whatsoever over it, but we were [379] as a matter of cooperation and coordination operating, and the period 4 to 7 was ordered for the detector stations but for nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. And you operated, therefore, on the morning of Sunday, December 7, from 4 to 7?

Major BERGQUIST. The detector stations were operating at that time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of training, or what?

Major BERGQUIST. On Sunday morning, sir, I would say as a matter of compliance with the order. On the weekday mornings, other mornings, they were, in addition to compliance with that, operating as a matter of training, and I also had assigned watch officers during those periods in order to train them, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, was Lieutenant Tyler one of the men you assigned as a watch officer?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. That was done just on the part of the wing on my own hook, so to speak. We were not required to do that, but——

The CHAIRMAN. You were not?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would have operated the service?

Major BERGQUIST. As far as I can see, sir, they would have just operated with the Aircraft Warning Service personnel. They would have had no Air Corps officers there, but I took it upon myself to have these watch officers assigned as long as those stations were required to operate, so that I could train my officers in the system.

The CHAIRMAN. And therefore Tyler was sent up and other officers were sent up to get familiar with the things?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that about the size of it?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. I had a roster of officers. I published a roster of officers.

[380] The CHAIRMAN. Who were to go up there in turn?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And various times. You would not expect Tyler to know very much about the whole thing, would you?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. I just hadn't had time to get around to all officers that were on this roster. I was trying to teach as many as I could, to acquaint them with the system.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, I take it that Tyler had no duty, so to speak, there, of communication or warning or anything of that kind, had he? Or what was his function?

Major BERGQUIST. My instructions, sir, were verbal to these officers: that they were to go down there during the times I specified, acquaint themselves with the whole setup as far as they possibly could, and if anything went wrong they were to notify me.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what do you mean by "anything went wrong"?

Major BERGQUIST. Well, in an emergency they should have notified me.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if Tyler had been conscious that what was being recorded in front of his eyes was a flight of enemy airplanes he should have called you?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, was it likely that Tyler would identify this flight as enemy planes?

Major BERGQUIST. I don't believe so, sir, due to the fact that we had not had the Navy liaison position manned so that we could know the movements of the naval air forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Major BERGQUIST. And so it was logical for him to assume that there probably was a friendly carrier up in that area operating their planes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, had there been a Navy liaison officer [381] there, on the earlier days prior to Sunday, December 7?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. We were trying to get that arranged, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That hadn't been set up?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So it was not unnatural that there was no Navy officer there that morning?

Major BERGQUIST. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Major BERGQUIST. That's right, sir. We had a meeting on the 24th of November of coast officers and representatives from the Navy in order to try to get an interceptor command—or interceptor information center, rather—operating.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Major BERGQUIST. And ironically we said—I have the notes on that meeting—and we said that we had hoped to get everything operating within a period of two weeks, and I think that was just about two weeks to the day that we had the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. And therefore you hadn't notified the Navy that things were running so now that there would be a regular routine whereby a Navy officer could be there as liaison officer? I say, you hadn't sent them that notice yet? . Or had you?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. Commander Taylor who was loaned to the Army by verbal arrangement to help with this setup, had contacted the Commander-in-Chief's staff, I would say, approximately on the 24th, thereabouts, sir, and had asked for liaison officers to be assigned.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Major BERGQUIST. But they had not been assigned, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, it was contemplated that when your staff had been properly trained and you had your liaison arranged and established with the Navy this communication center would be run under regular orders and that the information would be released to the Army and Navy as received?

[382] Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. On the 24th of November we wanted to expand every effort to get it operating on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

The CHAIRMAN. You couldn't run these little mobile stations that much a day, could you?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir, we can. They are operated by an auxiliary power unit.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Major BERGQUIST. And we had also made arrangements and asked the signal officer at that time to bend every effort to get us commercial power put in at these positions, which he said he was going to do, but in the meantime they could be operated by these engines.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. They would wear out pretty fast if you ran them?

Major BERGQUIST. Well, the main difficulty was the gasoline engines that ran the generators.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Major BERGQUIST. They were subject to failure on occasions, but they could be operated.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if there had been an emergency whereby it became critical to sweep the seas with these detectors around Oahu you think you could have arranged, subject to breakdowns, to run a 24-hour detector?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had enough personnel to work it out, did you?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you don't know why you were instructed to run a regular tour of three hours daylight or dawn, do you?

Major BERGQUIST. Well, you see, when you say why I was, I mean I wasn't in the organization that was ordered to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Which organization was ordered to do it?

[383] Signal corps?

Major BERGQUIST. It was the Aircraft Warning Service company which operated directly under the Department signal officer, and we were just cooperating with them on the basic principles.

The CHAIRMAN. Until the time would come for you to take it over as part of the Interceptor Command?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. If you had been operating on a wartime basis how many pursuit officers would be present in the information center?

Major BERGQUIST. There would be a controller and a pursuit officer, both of which would be flying officers of the Air Corps.

General McNARNEY. Had you a trained controller?

Major BERGQUIST. I considered myself trained as a controller, sir, and also Commander Tyler or Major Tindal; any one of the three of us could have taken over controller, as we did after the attack.

General McNARNEY. None of the three were present that Sunday morning prior to the attack?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir, not prior to the attack.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any trained pursuit officers?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You were training Tyler as a pursuit officer?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. May I retract that? One officer who I know could have been considered a trained pursuit officer was at Wheeler Field.

General McNARNEY. If you had been in condition Alert No. 2, how many squadrons would you have had in the first [384] degree of readiness at the hour of the attack?

Major BERGQUIST. That being the dawn period, sir, we would have had all available squadrons on the alert. When I say "on the alert," I mean that all the planes are in the dispersed position, the pilots are in a tent or dugout near their planes, with their flying equipment on ready at a moment's notice to jump in their planes and get off. In other words, it would take them from the time they were ordered off from one to three minutes before they would be in the air.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean your engines would be warmed up?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir, and there would be a man sitting in the cockpit. As soon as the signal came he would start the engine. In the meantime the pilot would slip his parachute on and jump in the plane.

General McNARNEY. During your maneuvers here what was the rendezvous of the pursuit that took off on the dawn period?

Major BERGQUIST. We have initial points around the Island which we have had for—I think I made them up about approximately two years ago now, initial points. In other words, this Island being rather roughly a square shape, each corner of the Island plus one point in the middle—I can enumerate them for you, sir, or show you them on a map.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a map right behind you.

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. Kahuku Point is Affirm or Point A. That is phonetic. Ulupau Head is Point Baker. Koko Head is Point Cast. Hickam Field is Point Dog. Barbers Point is Point Easy. Waianae parenthesis City—Waianae City—is Point Fox. Kaena Point is Point George. Haleiwa is Point Hypo. Wheeler Field is Point William.

In other words, the system that we have been operating on for the past two years is that if we get a warning of an enemy coming from any direction, if I knew the general direction it is coming from the system was to immediately dispatch pursuit to the initial point nearest

to the approach of the [385] enemy, and then while they were getting there and gaining their altitude, then from the information I had I would try to figure out their course for collision, interception. That was prior to the operation of the Radar. Our system now is, with the Radar plot we also will plot our own pursuit, and we can direct them right from the board by giving them course changes following their plot.

General McNARNEY. You still get them off to initial point, though?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. During your practices how was the radio communication between you and the patrol in the air?

Major BERGQUIST. Fair, sir. Not good.

General McNARNEY. Not good?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. That has been one of the worst things over here, is the radio communications.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the matter with it?

Major BERGQUIST. The transmitters in the airplanes are too weak, and the transmitters we have had on the ground are too weak, but we now have, I believe, a satisfactory system right now, because we have some stronger transmitters.

General McNARNEY. If the information center had been in operation the controller would give the order for take-off, or the pursuit officer?

Major BERGQUIST. The controller would tell the pursuit officer to order so many squadrons off and tell them where to send them.

General McNARNEY. And the controller determines the number of pursuit that takes off?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. The controller, being the more experienced officer,—

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. —determines that, and the pursuit [386] officer is really just a method of transmitting information?

Major BERGQUIST. More or less, yes, sir. He helps the controller.

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Major BERGQUIST. He is really the assistant controller, but normally he just operates to direct—to carry out the orders of the controller.

General McNARNEY. The controller has the mike in his hands; he can talk direct into the air then?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. You speak of arriving on the morning of the 7th at the center. At what time did you arrive there?

Major BERGQUIST. I did not arrive there, sir, until approximately 10 o'clock, 10:15. The first thing I did was to try to get an organization at Wheeler Field of what we had left, to get the squadrons organized into—I mean even if we had to disband one squadron and take the airplanes we had left and organize them into an air unit. Actually control is centered at Wheeler. That is, this is merely a relay point, because we had most of our squadrons at Wheeler. Get them—be sure that that was operating. I directed the signal officer to check all our lines, and as soon as I had finished that then I immediately started out for the information center at Shafter.

General McCoy. Did Lieutenant Tyler bring to your attention this peculiar plotting that would have indicated the approach of the enemy planes?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. I had no inkling that he even saw a plot.

General MCCOY. When did you discover that?

Major BERGQUIST. The next day, sir.

General MCCOY. Were you conscious of the fact that it was important to follow these planes out to their aircraft [387] carrier?

Major BERGQUIST. I should have been, sir. I was not that morning.

General MCCOY. So that nothing was done toward following them out?

Major BERGQUIST. Not that I know of, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing was done, no directions were given from the control room, the information center?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. I believe that Major——

The CHAIRMAN. The operator?

Major BERGQUIST. Major Tindal was there operating.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you mean you don't know what he did, or you do know?

Major BERGQUIST. I do not know what he did up to the time I got there.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. After you got there what was done?

Major BERGQUIST. It is not clear in my mind exactly. I cannot give the sequence of what I did. The only thing I can say is that I immediately went to work and tried to get everything functioning properly. I went from one position to the other in an attempt to make it function.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose your crews for your stations had all disbanded and gone?

Major BERGQUIST. They were called back, sir, at the time of the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. And went back to their stations at the mobile units?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. In fact, they have those base camps near there, their stations.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

General MCCOY. What were they called back for?

Major BERGQUIST. Well, as soon as we knew that we had been attacked, from then on we were on 24-hour-a-day operation. [388] Immediately ordered that.

The CHAIRMAN. And then they were starting tracing, were they, from their stations?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And were those tracings coming into the information center?

Major BERGQUIST. I believe they were, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think Tindal was acting as controller?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And somebody was relaying information as to where these planes were going, or were they able to find them, or what was it?

Major BERGQUIST. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't. You didn't stay there?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir, I did after I got there, but all the pilots of those planes were going out, as far as I know, had disappeared by

the time I got there. You see, that was two hours—a little over two hours after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Where had they disappeared to?

Major BERGQUIST. I mean, evidently the planes had gone so far out that we couldn't pick them up even.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Major BERGQUIST. But it is not clear in my mind, sir, exactly what I did when I got there or what I saw.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know whether the control room was all in service in advising air service as to where these planes were disappearing to? You can't say that?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Whatever happened in that respect happened before you got there?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Normally would the bombardment have an [389] officer in the control room to relay information to the bombardment?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. We had a bomber liaison officer there.

General McNARNEY. Was there one there on the morning of the 7th?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. At any time?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir, I don't believe we got one there until either that afternoon or the next day; probably that afternoon.

General McCoy. Is the center functioning now?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. How would it be if we stroll over with you, Major, and see it?

Major BERGQUIST. We would like very much to have you come, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess we just have about time to do it before we have to leave to beat the darkness. If there are no other questions from the major we will do that.

General McCoy. We might do that on the way home.

The CHAIRMAN. On the way, yes.

Let me just say to you, Major, that under our regimen here we desire that the witnesses say nothing about the questioning here.

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or discuss what goes on in this room with anyone.

Major BERGQUIST. Right, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Major Tindal is here.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we shall bring him in, and we will be with you in a minute.

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

[390] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR LORRY NORRIS TINDAL,
AIR CORPS UNITED STATES ARMY**

The CHAIRMAN. What is the full name?

Major TINDAL. Lorry Norris Tindal.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your rank?

Major TINDAL. Major in Air Corps, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And your assignment is now to the Interceptor Command?

Major TINDAL. No, sir. I am assigned to Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your duties on the morning of December 7?

Major TINDAL. My duties on the morning of December 7 were my normal duties as S-2 and assistant S-3 of the 18th Bomb Wing, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What had your duty to do with the information service?

Major TINDAL. I was sent to New York to go to their school early in the year, and later on I was transferred to Hickam Field, so that on December 7 I had no connection with the Interceptor Command.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you appear at the information center at any time that morning?

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Under what circumstances?

Major TINDAL. Well, I knew they would probably not be fully manned, and I thought that I was the nearest one and could get there sooner, so I went there.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you got there what condition of affairs did you find?

Major TINDAL. The condition of affairs was a little muddled up and everybody was in somewhat of an uproar because of the suddenness of attack, but the R. D. F. stations were working, and the boys were manning the board.

[391] The CHAIRMAN. Were you able to trace the course of the retreating Japanese planes?

Major TINDAL. No, sir. The retreat of the planes seemed to me from the directions of the board to go to the southwest, and the plots would have appeared to go about 30 to 50 miles—somewhere there about that distance—to the southwest, and mill in a circle, and we would lose them. There were two distinct circles in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. You traced nothing away to the northward?

Major TINDAL. No, sir. If there was anything going away to the northwest it was probably a thin plot that I didn't see.

The CHAIRMAN. You were acting for the time being as controller, were you?

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir, and practically everything else, too.

The CHAIRMAN. You had assisted in setting up this information center before you went back to Hickam Field, did you?

Major TINDAL. Partly, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Are there any questions?

General McNARNEY. Did you communicate the probability of what you might believe to be planes going out or landing on carriers to anyone?

Major TINDAL. I communicated this to the Air Force, sir.

General McNARNEY. The Air Force.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir; those I could get hold of immediately, I knew that, because I knew theirs was in operation. Their office was manned. I am not sure; I don't remember whether I communicated that to the Navy or not. I may have. I was running around from one station to another there, from one position to another, and I am not sure how many other places I sent it to, but I know I did send it to Air Force.

Admiral REEVES. Did your plot show any indication of a surface ship to the southwest?

Major TINDAL. No, sir. It just showed the plots. Are you familiar with those plotting boards, sir? [392]

Admiral REEVES. No, I am not.

Major TINDAL. Well, they put down a series of little arrows.

Admiral REEVES. Yes?

Major TINDAL. And the arrows proceeded to the southwest between 30 and 50 miles away and then formed a circle, indicating many airplanes, and there were two distinct circles about 10 miles apart.

Admiral REEVES. Well, I understand your instrument will indicate a small flight or a large flight.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Or that it will indicate perhaps a surface ship.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir. That's quite correct, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Provided the altitude is sufficient.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Well, was your instrument in such a position that it would have shown the presence of a separate ship 40 or 50 miles away to the southwest?

Major TINDAL. That's quite a long range to pick up a surface vessel from these ground—from these R. D. F. stations.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. Of course your instrument is at a high altitude?

Major TINDAL. Well, even so, even if the instrument is high, there is too much shadow from the water itself.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. Your waves. Your waves pass too close to the surface.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir. I did, though—in those circles I did have we could have picked up a surface vessel on account of many plots of airplanes in the immediate vicinity.

Admiral REEVES. Well, now, the testimony you have given would indicate these planes disappeared by landing on a carrier?

[393] Major TINDAL. That's what it indicated to me, through looking at the board, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Major. Please observe secrecy as to what has been said in here and what has been done in here.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't communicate it to anyone.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Will we have time to step in? We might ask the major if he would go down with us; we might like to take a look at that center.

Major TINDAL. Very well, sir.

General McNARNEY. We would like to go to the information center right now.

Major TINDAL. Very Well. Fine. Will you have enough transportation?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Major TINDAL. I have my car out there.

(Thereupon, at 4:55 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until Friday, December 26, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m.)

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[395] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1941

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

The Commission reconvened at 9 o'clock a. m., Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Adviser to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF COLONEL CARROLL A. POWELL,
SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The CHAIRMAN. Now, since you have been here before, Colonel, have you investigated the atmospheric and radio conditions on the Island of Oahu on the morning of December 7?

Colonel POWELL. I did not investigate the atmospheric conditions but just took our log that we worked with from Washington and the trouble we had that morning.

At 1:40 a. m. we were contacted with Washington. Our frequency here was 8160. Washington's was 8860. We had been [396] contacting them previously and we were clearing corrections. We had been clearing corrections, errors, and we had a readability of four, which is very poor.

At 2:40 a. m. we were still clearing our corrections of the previous errors and had a readability of four. The frequency was the same.

At 3:40 a. m. we were still clearing our corrections. The readability was the same. It was very difficult to get anything through that morning.

At 4:20 a. m. we were still clearing our corrections, but we decided we would go on another frequency. It was getting so bad that our signals were not clearing.

General McNARNEY. What time was this?

Colonel POWELL. Four-twenty a. m.

General MCCOY. Hawaiian time?

Colonel POWELL. Hawaiian time.

This has been a terrifically bad reading of signals due to atmospheric conditions all the way through. Our signal set was very poor. That was S-1 to S-2.

We shifted at 4:20 a. m. to 12240 frequency.

The CHAIRMAN. 12240?

Colonel POWELL. Twelve comma two-forty cycles. Washington was still on 8860.

At 5 a. m. we were unable to hear Washington on that frequency, and we shifted to 12090 and tried to listen to Washington. We were unable to get him at 6 a. m. or 7 a. m.

Then we shifted at 7:20 to the listening station 12075, hoping we might break through. There was a lot of interference developed about that time.

General MCCOY. What kind of interference?

Colonel POWELL. Static. I think it might have been—the operators, the men could not tell me whether it was other radios or not, but there is a possibility. This comes in on a siphon recorder, and it shows up on this little tape. Our [397] indications are both static and possibly something else.

We shifted to WAR at 7:30 to 1600, and we heard them then. We heard them on this. We had interference from our WVY, which is the San Francisco station. We were unable to keep them on or to get any signals or messages through. Then at 9:05 he told us to get him and he would relay through San Francisco. That is what we did at that time.

General MCCOY. That is very interesting.

The CHAIRMAN. That is very interesting, and it confirms what French said.

Colonel POWELL. The other question was—

The CHAIRMAN. Before you get to that, there was another thing. We want to know whether there was any message received between 5 and 8 a. m. on December 7 which you relayed to Manila?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, there was not, because we did not get anything.

The CHAIRMAN. You are to produce General Marshall's message that arrived on the morning of the 7th?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir (handing a document to the Chairman). That was dispatched at 12:18 p. m., which is 6:48 our time here.

The CHAIRMAN. That was dispatched from Washington at 6:48 your time?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The date there shows it was received at 7:33 your time?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, downtown.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no evidence here of when it went in and out of San Francisco?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. It was relayed at San Francisco by R. C. A. to this station. They do not work Washington direct. They read the tape, and as the operator read the tape, this is the time showing it was coming in. I think that is what it meant. There was some considerable delay in getting it out to [398] us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we understand that. I believe that covers everything that we asked Colonel Powell to bring us.

Colonel POWELL. You asked me to find out whether a message had been sent to Manila.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel POWELL. There was a message, and this is a message or a copy of the message which they sent to Manila asking whether they had ever received such a message, and this is the message that was sent to them.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you know that?

Colonel POWELL. This came back.

The CHAIRMAN. If the message to Manila did not go through your station, relayed through, how do you know that Manila got this?

Colonel POWELL. This is after the thing was all over. This was during that day or during that afternoon in which we had contact with Washington, and they asked if the message going to Manila—asked whether they had received this R. C. A. message. Then it went to the decryptographer and then it was delivered to me, and this answer came back. I think they figured out here the Honolulu time so you can get the comparison of it.

The CHAIRMAN. But you say this transmittal of the Washington message for Manila which, I understand, did not go through your station—

Colonel POWELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And it arrived in Manila, according to subsequent records, at what time?

Colonel POWELL. Eight-twelve a. m. Honolulu time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is to say, the R. C. A. message to you, sir, got here at 7:33 a. m.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And the R. C. A. message in the same tenor [399] got to Manila in the same comparative time at what time?

Colonel POWELL. Eight-twelve on the same day.

The CHAIRMAN. What would that indicate to you, Colonel, that the R. C. A. message was put through to you by R. C. A. before they picked up Manila?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Because Manila got it at what time? How much later?

Colonel POWELL. Forty-five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Later than you did?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. That may be due to atmospheric conditions again. They have a more powerful transmitter than I had. Their transmitter at Manila is 25 kilowatts; ours is only 10 kilowatts.

If I had a transmitter as high as theirs I could have maintained traffic to Washington very easily then because I could have busted through those atmospheric conditions, but I could not do it with only a 10-kilowatt station.

General McCoy. You would consider that weakness in your transmitter a military weakness in a fortress of this type?

Colonel POWELL. I do, sir, yes, sir, very definitely, sir. I do not recall what the Navy transmitter is, but it is much more powerful than mine.

General McCoy. You do not know whether the Navy had trouble that morning?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Their log will show it?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, their log will show it. That is the Lualualei Station. That is heavier than mine.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know of any reason why the Army strength should be less than the Navy strength?

The CHAIRMAN. You mean as to a transmitter?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

[400] Colonel POWELL. It is just a matter of lack of funds.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is your opinion?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you ever asked for a heavier or for more transmitters?

Colonel POWELL. I have asked for additional transmitters. I got it but I didn't get a chance to say what size it would be and I have installed that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are you familiar with the Navy uses for radio at this station?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You do not know whether the Navy uses their station for broadcasting air reports and time signals in this whole ocean?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You do not know that?

Colonel POWELL. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Army does not do that?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, we do not do that. That is all the function of the Navy.

General McCoy. Do you have a personal conference from time to time with your parallel communications officer in the Navy?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Do you keep in close personal touch?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. He is a very fine officer, Commander Graham.

The interference from other stations, the Japanese station would not show up on our recorder as an individual station, but it is very possible and it could happen.

[401] They have a 25-kilowatt transmitter beamed on this Island here, and they could shift over entirely into any frequency they want and get a beam and get to jamming up anything.

I was listening to it last night.

The CHAIRMAN. You were?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, and it comes in very powerful. It is beamed right here.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that located?

Colonel POWELL. Tokyo.

• The CHAIRMAN. In Tokyo?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. That is a 25-kilowatt transmitter. It sends its beam on us and puts in signals at 52 decibels, and the Navy station puts out from 10 to 15.

The CHAIRMAN. You could easily pick it up?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. I am trying to rent a station to counteract that same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. To jam it?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General MCCOY. When was this powerful Japanese station put in? Do you know?

Colonel POWELL. That I don't know, sir, but it has been picked up over here for some time, and I have been here two years and a half, and it has been coming over that time. We have been noticing them and they have been putting out this propaganda. Now the propaganda is in English. They have a Britisher or a Japanese youngster who has studied in England, because he has a very decided British accent.

There might have been interference at that time. They could swing into any frequency they wanted to to jam anything they wanted to.

General MCCOY. In other words, they can jam you but you cannot jam them?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, they have a more powerful station than I have.

[402] Admiral STANDLEY. Are you responsible for the communications that you have on the Island?

Colonel POWELL. The only communications?

Admiral STANDLEY. And outlying posts?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have a signal post at Kahuku Point?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, we do not as yet. That has just been made an Army post.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have any station on the north coast around Kahuku Point? You have a station at Opana?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, we have a direction finder station at Opana.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have any of the responsibility as to the guard?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have any watch on them?

Colonel POWELL. There are men guarding them.

Admiral STANDLEY. They would not be under you?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, they are not under me.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are your men under cover in this station? Do they have a regular post under cover in the buildings?

Colonel POWELL. They did not at that time.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were they out in the open?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, because we only considered this as a training station until the others were completed.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are you positive there were guards at that station on the morning of December 7?

Colonel POWELL. I don't know. The Army commander was responsible for the guards.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is Colonel Fielder?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, that is the commanding general in that division, in that area.

Admiral STANDLEY. Of the Infantry?

[403] Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be Murray or Wilson?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General McCoy. Did I understand you to say you had no communications with the other islands in this group?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, we have radio communication with the other islands. We have our own system and by Mutual Telephone Company radio system. That is by voice. They have it on the principal islands, but not on Lanai; but they have a radio phone service to Kauai, Maui, Molokai, and Hawaii, and it goes through the interisland system.

General McCoy. I thought you said there was none?

Colonel POWELL. I said there was no cable station. There is no submarine cable station. That is not practical because it is so very expensive to lay it and the waters are very deep, and the cable would have to be swinging around and it would be worn out.

General McCoy. From the viewpoint of security, you think the present setup of wireless telephone and radio is sufficient?

Colonel POWELL. I think it is, yes sir, because if they wanted to they could cut the cable just as quickly as they jam up the radio.

General McCoy. Do you know whether any of those communications systems were working on that Sunday?

Colonel POWELL. That I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. By that question do you mean the ones in operating order or whether they were actually sending and receiving?

General McCoy. Well, I had in mind whether they had been put out for some reason.

Colonel POWELL. I could find that out.

General McCoy. Atmospheric conditions or jamming or from some local Japanese effort.

[404] Colonel POWELL. I can say I don't believe they were.

The CHAIRMAN. Were what?

Colonel POWELL. Were operating. They were operating. I think they were operating because I would have heard of it because I am in close contact with the Mutual Telephone Company and I think they would have expressed to me statements as to the conditions taking place at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you find out and let us know within the next hour whether the telephone system on the Island was working and whether your radio system was working that morning?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. They go on a different frequency. Theirs is a very high frequency, and for that reason it is better. They are very high in the air, practically line of sight.

General McCoy. Did we ask you when you were on the stand before as to whether you were conscious of any concerted effort to jam you at any time during Sunday, any jamming from fishing boats or such?

Colonel POWELL. Nothing was reported to me. I got the logs on that situation and I have gone over the logs, and according to the report of the operators and the logs, there was no attempt to do that that morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Does your last answer mean that you do not think this 25-kilowatt station in Tokyo was attempting to jam the Army radio line from Washington that morning?

Colonel POWELL. I saw no evidence of it. As I say, it could be possible, but the tape does not show there was any effort. A concerted attempt at jamming would show up in a regular beat.

The CHAIRMAN. The tape does not indicate that?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, no regular beat.

General McCoy. In other words, you would assume that had the attack not occurred that normally that interference would [405] be atmospheric?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, that is what I thought about it, because we have been having that same experience right along. This is a bad time of the year to transmit with our transmitter to Washington. We might be a complete day without communication to Washington due to atmospheric conditions, the time of the moon and so on, that sometimes no one was able to transmit to Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. The same thing does not necessarily apply to their ability to transmit to you because their station is more powerful?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But as it was, your reception was very bad that morning?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. Didn't you have some questions you wanted to ask concerning this scrambled telephone?

The CHAIRMAN. When was your scrambled telephone instrument installed here?

Colonel POWELL. It was about a year ago. It is a very secret thing. Very few people know about it.

The CHAIRMAN. We are keeping everything secret, but we have got to know the facts.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Because it was so very secret, was there any understanding here that it should be used only in emergency cases, or was it generally used?

Colonel POWELL. It was only for the use of the commanding general and the chief of staff. Nobody else used it or had the key to it except the commanding general and the chief of staff.

The CHAIRMAN. That would indicate that it was an emergency service?

[406] Colonel POWELL. Yes, a confidential service.

The CHAIRMAN. A confidential service.

Colonel POWELL. Yes. It is fairly confidential, but it is not secret by any means.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Colonel POWELL. Just because of the mechanics of the thing. Our transmission to San Francisco is all scrambled by the Mutual Telephone Company.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Mutual Telephone Company here?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, and the R. C. A. at San Francisco. For scrambling done here, a radio or an ordinary receiver could not pick up that message.

The CHAIRMAN. If I had an ordinary receiver I would hear a series of queer words which did not mean anything?

Colonel POWELL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Mutual office here has to advise San Francisco which dial they are using in order to unscramble it?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then San Francisco has got to set its dial at a certain point?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that San Francisco will hear it clearly?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They have the same system from San Francisco into Washington?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if anybody was going to listen in on another set, he would have to know which dial they are going to use to get it?

Colonel POWELL. He would not know the type of instrument?

The CHAIRMAN. The type of instrument?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

[407] This scrambler here has an addition to the scrambler, put in by the Mutual Telephone Company so that the message is double scrambled. A very interesting thing happened. We installed the outfit about a year ago, and the telephone circuit from Tokyo uses the same scrambler as this Mutual does from here to San Francisco.

So when we put this on the circuit, Tokyo called up right quick and wanted to know what we had done to the circuit between Honolulu and San Francisco because they said they could not understand it and wanted to know what was being done to it; so we have been watching that telephone circuit and reading it all the time—everything that goes on.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that telephone circuit a radio circuit?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not run on a cable?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. The only cable is the cable company.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought this was a wire?

Colonel POWELL. It is simply a radio.

General McCoy. So they could listen in?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General McCoy. And you put in a second scrambler to cover that?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. That is what they called up for and wanted to know what we had done to the circuit.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know if they ever found out or not?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. We just told them something had happened, or Mutual told them something had happened to the circuit, and that is all.

I have been assured by the board in Washington that, so far as this particular circuit ever getting out of the United States, that does not mean it makes it private because they can [408] undoubtedly find out that, I suppose, or shift it or make it themselves; so it is not a secret means of transmission. It is what you might call a private means of communication.

The CHAIRMAN. But rather dangerous to use?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General McCox. What caused it to be put in? Was it put in on your recommendation?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, it was a system put in under orders of the Secretary of War, I understand, in that he wanted to talk to all commanding generals in the area in the United States, and then he had one put in over here in Puerto Rico—no, in Panama, so he could have a private means of communication so everybody would not be able to listen in on his conversation.

General McCox. Do you know whether there are any Japanese in the telephone central office here?

Colonel POWELL. There are no alien Japanese in the telephone central, and the Department Commander has placed me in kind of charge of the telephone company, and they have cooperated very well and have removed all aliens from the telephone circuits going to the mainland, and have eliminated them from all very important key jobs. They had no aliens, but only people of Japanese ancestry, which they have taken out.

General McCox. Has it occurred to you that it might be an additional safeguard for the telephone company to cut out all telephones to aliens or Japanese on this island at this time, during the war?

Colonel POWELL. We did discuss that, but we didn't think it was of any advantage because of the fact that the Navy censors all trans-Pacific calls, and I have a crew of 30 people censoring all interisland calls; so nothing can get on the air or the radio that we do not want on the air.

General McCox. But they could communicate using the Mutual system?

[409] Colonel POWELL. They could do that, because this is an automatic exchange.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no operator?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

General McNARNEY. On your trip to the mainland to inspect the Radar system, were there any permanent stations on your trip, or were they all mobile?

Colonel POWELL. The ones I saw were mobile. I just heard of one that was a permanently installed station. I think it was in Maine, but I did not get a chance to see it.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what particular priority you were on for the permanent station order?

Colonel POWELL. Well, we had authority to build these stations, and the plans were drawn up by the District Engineer, and he is to proceed to build them, but it was just a question at that time if there was any urgency. That is, we wanted to get them done as promptly as possible, but we did have difficulty getting the cable for Mount Kahala, and a few other things for the other stations here that were not ready; but as to priority we had sets here to install in this station, and they have been here for approximately three months, and the stations haven't been finished due to the lack of our ability to get the materials to finish them.

General McCoy. Do you have that material now?

Colonel Powell. The last of it is here, the power plants.

General McCoy. Do you know when they will be here?

Colonel Powell. No, sir. They were being bought by the District Engineer, so I did not check that part of it. We had a conference yesterday on that particular thing, but we are starting.

General McCoy. Did the conference bring out the probability [410] of the permanent installations being completed?

Colonel Powell. The station at Maui will be up in about two weeks. The equipment has been there and the building.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the power plant there?

Colonel Powell. No, sir. The signal corps power plant is there, but I am going to divert one of these to give our power to operate the radio sets and other things like that temporarily, but the buildings are just being completed, and that coming back from Maui has given me a few items that the District Engineer is clearing up with the engineer there and has directed them to be completed promptly. At Haleakala the shelter building was not completed and the water supply was not complete, and it is very cold up there, which you would not imagine. They had a barrel of ice there and they had no heat, and they were putting in commercial power to augment our power.

Kauai is in about the same condition. They expect to get them going in about two weeks.

General McCoy. What alternative action has been taken for security purposes pending the completion of these stations?

Colonel Powell. We have concentrated at this island all our portable Radar sets. By that means we hope we will have our security sufficient in this particular island. Now, that is about the best answer I can give you.

General McCoy. What could be done to supplement that for additional security during this dangerous period?

Colonel Powell. We would have to have more portable Radar sets. I was talking to General Emmons several times, and he wanted me to let him know in particular how many more we would have to have, and that is the reason for the conference yesterday, determining how many more we would have to have until these permanent stations are fixed because it would take us two weeks to get the portable stations here, if there are any available on the mainland.

I believe in the meantime we may be able to get these fixed [411] stations completed so that we would not need these mobile stations and operate them.

The CHAIRMAN. Has there been any system of observers on the outlying islands who could radio in any information of enemy planes observed by them?

Colonel Powell. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose it would be possible to put observers on the outlying islands and let them radio messages in of planes coming in?

Colonel Powell. Yes. The question there is with respect to transmission. I have taken over practically all amateur radio sets in the Island, and I have to change them from their frequency to meet our frequency, and that is being done now, and they will be installed on these islands.

The CHAIRMAN. So they can warn you?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Couldn't these observers talk over the inter-island telephone system?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, they could. My answer was that we did not think the situation here was so serious that we should try to get them from the other islands because we felt that these Radar sets would give us sufficient protection in an emergency, and we could put them in different positions.

General McNARNEY. Have you looked into the plans around 1935 to see what system there was of aircraft warning then completed prior to the development of the Radar systems?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, I did not. I have not looked into it.

The CHAIRMAN. When you came here, sir, was there any warning system established on the outlying islands?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Over the telephone or radio?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, because at that time they were [412] concentrating all their defense here on the Island of Oahu, and we had no military people, no organization of any kind on the other islands. There were no military organizations for defense on the other islands.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no thought of putting out scouts or outposts on these islands for your help and assistance?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. This is the system that has been developed since then. It has only been the responsibility of the signal corps since the development of the Radar.

General McCox. Do you have in effect local aerial warning sets?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir, by which we are now warning the people.

General McCox. Yes.

Colonel POWELL. By means of broadcasting stations downtown and by means of other things, whistles that we can get set up and get in word of an air raid, which is an air-raid warning system, and we thought of putting stations all over the Island and installing these sirens just as soon as we get them.

There was a telegram came here the day before yesterday advising that the signal corps was getting them at San Francisco, or anticipating getting them for delivery at the earliest possible time.

General McCox. There was no such thing provided for prior to the attack?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, only we had discussed that with the defense counsel. I went down there and we were developing a plan to do that, the Governor's committee, and had assumed control of it, and felt at that time the responsibility was to take care of the field; that is, the air fields and the Army posts; and the civilians, that they should take care of their own.

General McCox. Did you have on the air fields any warning service prior to the attack?

[413] Colonel POWELL. We had made tests at Wheeler Field of various sirens to determine what siren was the best to install, and we recommended to the War Department that we be given authority to buy certain sirens, and they came back and said they were developing sirens and that as soon as they were available they would send them to us.

General McCoy. But they were not on the air field at the time of the attack?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Was there any other warning service on these fields, that you know of, under your control?

Colonel POWELL. None on the fields under my control, no, sir.

General McCoy. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask a question off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

General McNARNEY. What was the approximate date on which it was decided to install this Radar system on the Island?

Colonel POWELL. I will have to get my records out. I would say about a year and a half ago.

The War Department sent out a directive to the Commanding General to direct him to state our requirements for these Radar systems, and this board was appointed and travelled all over the Islands to determine on the locations for the various sets.

That report went into Washington and it was approved, and then they got that appropriation from Congress and we started to build them.

Then recently, about four months ago, they said, "We think you should have four more stations." So we studied it and located these four more stations on the Islands, and they have been in the process of doing that.

[414] General McNARNEY. Are these positions based on the experience of the board?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. That is all the information there was. Nobody from this Department had gone to England to study the situation. We just had to take what was reported by the observers and base our positions on their report, which sometimes is quite difficult to understand.

General McNARNEY. Do you know how long the Army and Navy have been experimenting with this sort of thing?

Colonel POWELL. I can't answer that question except by guess-work.

General McNARNEY. What would you guess?

Colonel POWELL. I would say about four years.

General McNARNEY. In other words, the decision to put these in was based upon the successes of the instruments in this war?

Colonel POWELL. In England, yes, sir.

General McCoy. As I remember, they were carrying on experiments for at least four or five years back?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. At Monmouth?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. It was so secret that nobody got in there. I used to try to get in there because I am an electrical engineer and was interested, but it was so secret nobody could get in there. I just heard they were doing something like that.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Chief of Staff told me about it at least three years ago.

Colonel POWELL. As I understand the situation, the British have had a well-developed situation, but they did not let us know anything

about it, so we had to start in right from scratch and work it up by our own help and not with the help of the British.

General McCoy. This is an American system, not British?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. It is different, as I understand it, [415] from what the British system is.

General McCoy. Would it be possible to get the British to give us the results of their successes?

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get us that information, Colonel?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Army has produced the Burwell report, which the Recorder has marked Martin Exhibit 2, and which will be a part of our record.

Call Lieutenant Taylor.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT KENNETH M. TAYLOR, AIR CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us your full name, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Kenneth M. Taylor.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a lieutenant in the Army?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With what assignment?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Pilot, 47th Squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you examine, General?

General McCoy. Is that Hickam Field or Wheeler Field?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Wheeler Field, sir.

General McCoy. Pursuit squadron?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. We would like to have a narrative from you first. Give whatever information you know and simply tell us what happened to you during the morning of the attack until your own activities were over that day. Just give us a running narrative without any attempt to give us more than just what [416] happened, what you saw and what you did.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Well, sir, on the morning of the 7th I was at Wheeler Field at the Officers' Club when the bombing began. Lieutenant Welsh and I got in my car and drove to Haleiwa. We had been in the field there for the past week or thereabouts, as one squadron is at all times recently.

When we got out there mostly new men were there. I saw the new men, and so Lieutenant Welsh and I took two planes that they were servicing and got ready to go up. We had called them or somebody had called them; so they were practically ready when we arrived.

There were some other officers there getting ready to take off, but I think they followed us in about 30 minutes; I am not sure, but Lieutenant Welsh and myself started patrolling the Island. There wasn't any .50 caliber ammunition, so we landed at the field. That was be-

tween the first bombing and the second bombing. I got .50 caliber ammunition in my plane and Lieutenant Welsh got some in his.

From there on things got kind of jumbled, because we took off, and as we took off they were coming over the field.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the second attack?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes. We landed three times, it seems like. It is kind of jumbled in my mind which time we did go back, but I would say this time they were going very low over Pearl Harbor, and the men left, and I took my plane around and took off right into them so they could not run me down too easily. I made a nice turn out into them and got in the string of six or eight planes. I don't know how many there were. I was in them. I was on one's tail as we went over Waialua, firing at the one next to me, and there was one following firing at me, and I pulled out. I don't know what happened to the other plane. Lieutenant Welsh, I think, shot the other man down. Then we patrolled some more over Ewa. At that time there was a whole string of planes looking like a [417] traffic pattern. We went down and got in the traffic pattern and shot down several planes there. I know for certain I had shot down two planes or perhaps more; I don't know.

At that time Lieutenant Welsh and I got separated. He came back to Wheeler Field, but I believe I landed about three times. I just landed and got ammunition and went back. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you getting breakfast at the time of the attack?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir, I was still in bed when the first bomb hit. I thought a Navy man had probably gone off the main route, so I didn't get up until the second one and then went out just as they were machine-gunning the club at that time, and they were machine-gunning all around while we were driving for the post.

The CHAIRMAN. What sort of plane were you up in that morning?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. A P-40B, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the crew in that plane?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Just myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one man?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you examine, General?

General McNARNEY. You say your squadron was stationed at Haleiwa?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. How many planes were in that squadron, if you remember?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. I think we had four P-40's and two or three P-36's, and B-12's—six. I don't know whether I should mention them, because they are obsolete.

General McNARNEY. How many of those were in commission?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. That morning we used four altogether [418] at different times. They were landed out there and we had got together and sent more up.

General McNARNEY. Where were the enlisted personnel in your squadron?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Well, they were there at the field.

General McNARNEY. They were stationed at the field?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. And the officers were there?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. It being Saturday night, some of them were sleeping or in there.

General McNARNEY. Normally, when you are stationed at Haleiwa, you sleep there?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. I would say normally, yes.

General McNARNEY. Who is your squadron commander?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Major Austin.

General McNARNEY. Where was he?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. He was on Molokai.

The CHAIRMAN. He had been sent there on some special mission?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir, he was deer hunting over the week-end.

The CHAIRMAN. He was on leave?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Who was in charge of the squadron?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Lieutenant Rogers.

General McNARNEY. Where was he?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. He was there when I got there at the field. He was at the field at the time and later took up a plane.

General McNARNEY. You say you and Lieutenant Welsh went and took off.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Were you directed to go up by anybody [419] or did you just go on your own initiative?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You were not directed by anyone?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir, we were not directed by anybody. He was the assistant operations officer, so we just went off.

General McNARNEY. In other words, no squadron commander gave you any orders? You just took off on your own initiative?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir, there was nobody there who could give us orders with the exception of Lieutenant Rogers, so we went ahead and took off. I imagine the orders would be the same.

General McNARNEY. You say you had no .50 caliber ammunition?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Is .50 caliber ammunition usually carried at Haleiwa?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. It should have been. We did not have any gunnery there, but for normal gunnery that would be done with .30 caliber.

General McNARNEY. Was your plane already loaded with .30 caliber ammunition, or were they putting it in?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. They were loading it at the time. They were doing it when we got there.

General McNARNEY. The men were loading when you got there?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, the men were loading when we got at the field.

General McNARNEY. No one gave you any instructions as to what particular part of the Island you were to patrol?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. We called the patrol at the interceptor center and they gave us Easy to patrol. That is Barbers Point. We went to Easy, but there were not any planes there.

[420] We then came back and got .50 caliber ammunition. Our communications were very poor. You know how it is trying to get communications on a ship. One minute you can and the next minute you can't. So from then on we took it entirely on our own. From now we were on our own at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, had you had any training firing .50 caliber ammunition before?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. I had fired it once or twice before.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been in training here?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. I have been over here since about—I graduated April 25 from the flight squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. This was your 200 hours?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes. There was a month's difference. I arrived here in June and I started flying probably June 10 or 11.

General McNARNEY. How much time did you get while you were here?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. I got more time than the rest of them. I think I got 430 hours up to that time.

General McNARNEY. Do you know whether your squadron had any operating plan, standing operating procedure and method of take-off and initial point and so forth?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. The only plan I know of we got to take orders, but it has changed constantly since then. We have changed our tactics considerably as to the formation of flight and the method of take-off and the method of landing. Then I had these M I reports. From them we got a general idea of what we were to do in the beginning, but they never appeared that we used them as our plan. We never had any set plan, I would say; I don't know, I am not positive.

General McNARNEY. If you got the signal to take off, where would you go?

[421] Lieutenant TAYLOR. I would turn in my control and they would tell me where to go when I contacted them.

General McNARNEY. Isn't there a normal initiative point of rendezvous?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Do you know all the initial points on the Island?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Call them off.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. It starts with A. That is Kahuku. The next is Ulupau, Baker; then Koko Head, which is Cast; Dog is Pearl Harbor; Easy is Barbers Point; Fox is——

Admiral STANDLEY. Lualualei?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Lualualei. The next is Kaena Point. That is George. Next is Hypo. Haleiwa, where we are stationed. Then William, which is Wheeler Field. Robert is the interception center.

General McNARNEY. Do you think everybody in your squadron was thoroughly familiar with these points?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir. I would not say they were all familiar with them. Most of them carried maps with them. I know the order came out that we were to know them.

General McNARNEY. Could you travel out to any point in the Island which was given to you, say Easy? Are you familiar enough with the Island to be able to go to Easy?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. You mean if it was heavily overcast and I could not see where I was?

General McNARNEY. No. If you knew your location, could you actually take your course which would take you within two or three miles of Easy?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Do I understand that you have received a commendation from the Department since the attack?

[422] Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In what form?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. I understand I am to receive the D. S. C. All I know is just what I read in the newspapers.

General McCoy. I congratulate you.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions of the lieutenant?

General McCoy. That seems to be all.

The CHAIRMAN. Our inquiry is of such nature that we ask all witnesses who come here to not discuss their testimony with anyone on the outside or to refer to it in any conversation with anyone as to what went on in this room.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask you to observe that.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. We have been glad to have you, Lieutenant.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Call Lieutenant Welsh.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GEORGE S. WELSH, AIR CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you have a seat, Lieutenant, and give the reporter your full name?

Lieutenant WELSH. George S. Welsh.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank is lieutenant?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your assignment on the 7th of December?

Lieutenant WELSH. I was assistant operations officer, 47th Pursuit Squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy, will you examine Lieutenant Welsh?

[423] General McCoy. General McNarney.

General McNARNEY. Where were you stationed on the morning of December 7?

Lieutenant WELSH. At Haleiwa.

General McNARNEY. Where were you personally?

Lieutenant WELSH. At Wheeler Field, Officers' Club.

General McNARNEY. Normally, would the pilots and enlisted men of the squadron stationed at Haleiwa remain there overnight?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Were any of your personnel on the alert or in a state of readiness on December 7?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Will you tell the Commission what you did personally from the time you heard the first bomb drop?

Lieutenant WELSH. When I heard them I stayed in the club and then watched for about five or ten minutes, I imagine, and then we got in Lieutenant Taylor's car and drove to Haleiwa.

General McNARNEY. What was the condition of the field when you arrived there and what happened?

Lieutenant WELSH. They had been alerted, apparently, from Wheeler Field, because they were loading the airplanes, and we received orders from control to take off and proceed to Easy, which was Barbers Point, at 8,000 feet.

General McNARNEY. How did you get the order from the control? By telephone?

Lieutenant WELSH. When we got the order, yes. We got over to Easy and didn't see any planes. We didn't get a radio, so we went around by Wheeler and saw a B-17 and saw Japanese strung out strafing Ewa. I came back to Wheeler Field and the Japs were attacking and came back to Wheeler Field, so we came back to the field and then took off again.

[424] General McNARNEY. When you first landed at the field, what was happening at that time?

Lieutenant WELSH. They were dispersing the airplanes. I got ammunition and gasoline and we took off again.

General McNARNEY. Was there any difficulty in getting the ammunition or gasoline?

Lieutenant WELSH. We had to argue with some of the ground crew. They wanted us to disperse the airplanes and we wanted to fight.

Finally I got the ammunition, and just as they were loading some 50 caliber, the Japs came back again. We took off directly into them and shot down some. I shot down one right on Lieutenant Taylor's tail.

I went back to Ewa and found some more over Barbers Point and engaged them there. Then I came back to Wheeler. I landed there and then I went up and found none around five miles Barbers Point. I continued around for 45 minutes. I didn't have a regular patrol. Then there was no more action.

General McNARNEY. How many planes in your squadron did you get in the air?

Lieutenant WELSH. While the Japs were still over the Island?

General McNARNEY. I mean the morning of the attack or during the course of the attack.

Lieutenant WELSH. I would say four, or maybe six, airplanes. I am sure it was four.

General McNARNEY. Did they go off singly or in formation?

Lieutenant WELSH. Lieutenant Taylor and I took off in formation. Lieutenant Brown, Webster, and Rogers took off. We were in formation and broke away and just disorganized, getting any airplane we could.

General McNARNEY. Are you familiar with all the initial [425] points about the Island?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Would you say you were familiar enough with the Island and sufficiently familiar with the topography to be able to fly direct to an initial point?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Could you say that for the rest of the pilots of the squadron?

Lieutenant WELSH. I can now, sir, but I could not then. It has been very well impressed upon us now, but before that I don't think very many of them knew them.

General McNARNEY. How long have these initial points been established here?

Lieutenant WELSH. Well, I arrived in February last year, and they were established then.

The CHAIRMAN. February, 1941, you mean?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This year you mean?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Who is your squadron commander?

Lieutenant WELSH. Major Austin.

General McNARNEY. Where was he at the time?

Lieutenant WELSH. He was on the Island of Molokai.

General McNARNEY. Who was acting squadron commander?

Lieutenant WELSH. Lieutenant Rogers is acting squadron commander.

General McNARNEY. Where was he?

Lieutenant WELSH. At Wheeler Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Had he been in the Officers' Club there?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir, he was in his own quarters.

General McNARNEY. Do you know when he arrived at Haleiwa?

Lieutenant WELSH. He arrived there about the same time I did. I saw him getting out of his car.

[426] General McNARNEY. Did he take off?

Lieutenant WELSH. He took off, too, about a half hour later, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6, Saturday night?

Lieutenant WELSH. At Honolulu, Hickam Field, and Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a party?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were on leave?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How many planes do you think you got?

Lieutenant WELSH. I only saw four hit, sir.

General McCoy. You were given credit for bringing down four planes, were you not?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes, sir. I was given credit for five, but I did not see the other one.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

General McCoy. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were assigned to special detail at Haleiwa?

Lieutenant WELSH. I had a regular duty, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you have a tour of duty at Haleiwa with officers assigned to the tour of duty, daytime?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir, our whole squadron was moved to Haleiwa for 15 days approximately for training in the field.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your planes were parked there?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What sort of guard was over your planes at that time?

Lieutenant WELSH. I imagine a regular field guard. I am not positive about it, but at least one man for every plane, armed with pistol and rifle.

[427] Admiral STANDLEY. Were there any officers assigned to duty with that detail so that there was some officer there every day?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes, we had an officer there and four or five others, pilots, but they were new pilots and apparently they had never flown P-40's, and we didn't take them.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, did you at any time stand a tour of duty?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. During your tour of duty, what was your responsibility as to these planes?

Lieutenant WELSH. To guard the planes from sabotage. We were on alert for sabotage then. We did not have any instructions against aerial attack; it was all ground defense, and I was to inspect the guard twice during each relief.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many guards did you have stationed?

Lieutenant WELSH. At Haleiwa?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Lieutenant WELSH. Twenty-three, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were they armed?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes, with a pistol, and some with pistol and rifle.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there any machine guns?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did they have ammunition?

Lieutenant WELSH. They had .30 caliber ammunition but no .50 caliber.

General McCoy. Was there any installation of antiaircraft guns ready for action then?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir, there were none ready. There were pits dug, but no guns in them.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there any instructions issued to those guards as to what to do in case of an enemy airplane coming over?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir.

[428] Admiral STANDLEY. There was no indication that sabotage might take the nature of an attack from above?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. We will ask you not to discuss the testimony that you have given here or anything that has happened in this room?

General McCoy. I congratulate you on your D. S. C., Lieutenant.

Lieutenant WELSH. Thank you, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Colonel Powell is back with some information you wanted.

**FURTHER TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARROLL A.
POWELL, SIGNAL CORPS, U. S. ARMY**

Colonel POWELL. I have checked with the general manager of the telephone company and he told me that there was no unusual amount of traffic that they carried on Sunday morning, that it was just the same amount, and the technical staff report there were no unusual disturbances on their frequency.

The CHAIRMAN. That would indicate there was no jamming?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

Their frequency is 35 to 40 megacycles.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Colonel.

Major ALLEN. The next is Sergeant Hall, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

**TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT MOBLEY L. HALL,
UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Have a seat, Sergeant, and give your name to the reporter.

Sergeant HALL. Mobley L Hall.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you assigned on the morning of [429] December 7, sir?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, I was in my quarters in the new defense housing project. When the first bomb dropped I knew something was wrong, and I knew my duty was to report to my place of duty.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was your place of duty?

Sergeant HALL. At the hangar.

General McNARNEY. What squadron did you belong to, or what job did you hold in the squadron?

Sergeant HALL. Crew chief, headquarters squadron, 18th Pursuit.

General McNARNEY. Go ahead with your narrative, Sergeant.

Sergeant HALL. I got in my car and went down to the hangar to see what was happening, and it was as I arrived there the bombing was going on, and as soon as that was over I saw the planes. We had only three planes.

General McNARNEY. How many planes did you have in the squadron?

Sergeant HALL. Three.

General McNARNEY. What was your regular assignment there?

Sergeant HALL. Three planes was the only ones: two AT-6's and one OA-9.

General McNARNEY. None of those were combat planes?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir. Two of them was on the line, the OA-9 and the AT-6. Mine was in the hangar, which was burned.

I saw one still in a whole piece which was parked by the OA-9. As soon as the bombing was over I had instructions and all I did was pull it off the ramp, and the oil lines were shot off. I thought it was on fire and switched it off at the end of the ramp. As I got it over they came back, and then I left. There was nothing then I could do because I thought the airplane was burning, and then we all went to work [430] on the fire and tried to get the hose to put the fire out.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were your quarters?

Sergeant HALL. 724.

General McNARNEY. That was in the barracks?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir. That is in the new defense housing at Kemoo Farms.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you patrolling near the house?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir. I had just gotten up.

General McNARNEY. Where were you on the night of December 6?

Sergeant HALL. I was home.

General McNARNEY. Are you married?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How quickly, according to your observation, did the men respond when these bombs were heard?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, as best I could say, everybody was there. They seemed to be there and doing everything as rapidly as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there practically a full complement of the airplane force on the field promptly? Was it that practically everybody who was assigned there was working there that morning?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, that is hard to say; I would not say.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I realize you did not stay there to count them.

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there many leaves that Saturday night?

Sergeant HALL. As usual.

The CHAIRMAN. More than usual?

Sergeant HALL. Sir, I could not say; not that I know of. As soon as my work was over, I would always go home.

General McNARNEY. Who is your squadron commander?

[431] Sergeant HALL. Lieutenant Armstrong.

General McNARNEY. Did you see him on the morning of the 7th?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did he give you any instructions as to what to do?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, he didn't come down to the squadron till after the attack. He came down the line with his flying clothes on, but somehow he tackled some kind of job before he got to the squadron.

General McNARNEY. Do you know anything about a guard on the field the night before?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir, I do not.

General McNARNEY. You do not know anything about that?

Sergeant HALL. No.

General McNARNEY. Were there any machine guns or automatic weapons placed around the field for anti-aircraft protection?

Sergeant HALL. I don't know about that, sir. I understood we were on the alert. I thought we were.

General McNARNEY. What kind of alert did you think you were on?

Sergeant HALL. When the first alert just went on it was four minutes and then E5—four hours, and all I knew was to stick close by.

General McNARNEY. When were you informed of the alert? Do you know the date?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be more than a week before the attack?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I suspect that it was November 27?

Sergeant HALL. That is just about when it was.

General McNARNEY. How soon did it take to go on Easy?

[432] Sergeant HALL. I know I was on guard in the hangar with our whole crew, 24 of our members, and I was trying to bring some of them out.

General McNARNEY. Which ships were in commission on the morning of December 7?

Sergeant HALL. My own ship, which had just been put in commission. I had just put a new engine in, and that was why it was in the hangar.

General McCoy. Did it burn up?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. It did?

Sergeant HALL. Completely.

General McNARNEY. What type ship was this you taxied out?

Sergeant HALL. AT-6.

General McNARNEY. Did it burn up?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You saved that one?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't you say the oil lines were shot off?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. With machine-gun bullets, I suppose?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When you got there and the Japanese were strafing your field with machine guns, did they get some of your fellows?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were your quarters bombed or strafed?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the barracks that was hit by the bomb at Wheeler Field?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Were your barracks bombed and burned?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, it was bombed, but not burned. It was burned slightly, but all that fire we exterminated. I [433] believe my barracks was the only barracks that was severely bombed, and they had some strafing.

General McNARNEY. How long have you been in the service, Sergeant?

Sergeant HALL. Three years and seven months, sir.

General McNARNEY. How long have you been over here?

Sergeant HALL. I came over here in September, 1938. I have been here ever since.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Sergeant, you spoke of your own plane being in the hangar?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was there any effort or plan for defense against sabotage of that plane in the hangar?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. The other two planes were out on the line?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there any plans for protecting those planes against sabotage?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir, we had guards for patrolling that area.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you have anything to do with the guards?

Sergeant HALL. Well, our guard is run, it seems to me, changed ever so often and they work in shifts.

General McCoy. Was there any infantry guard in the post, so far as you know?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, not around the airplanes, because our Air Corps men patrolled the airplanes.

General McCoy. Did they come to you? You took your turn at guard duty, I suppose?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

[434] General McCoy. What were your instructions in the event of danger from aloft or by plane?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, my instructions were naturally—all we had was on sabotage, and that was to investigate, and if anybody was fooling around, give them a chance to halt three times, as usual, and then, why, shoot. Those instructions we always gave the sentries.

General McCoy. Was there any sabotage, so far as you know?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir, so far as I know.

General McCoy. No attempt at it?

Sergeant HALL. No.

General McCoy. Was there any firing against the Japanese on Wheeler Field, so far as you know?

Sergeant HALL. Well, my ammunition wasn't sufficient to fire at the airplanes.

General McCoy. Did they get any machine guns in action?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir, Sergeant Bayon got the first machine gun set up. It was a .50 caliber, and he is credited with shooting an airplane down that went into Wahiawa, went down.

The CHAIRMAN. Were machine guns actually placed around the field?

Sergeant HALL. They had to go to the supply room to get them out.

The CHAIRMAN. To get the guns and the supplies?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not expecting that type of attack on the field?

Sergeant HALL. No.

General McCoy. Were you very much surprised when it happened?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir, I certainly was, although I looked for it, but I did not believe it was real.

[435] The CHAIRMAN. Had there been any talk among the troops or your crowd, your fellows, of a possible Japanese air raid here?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No one was expecting an air raid attack?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Were you conscious almost immediately that they were Japanese planes, or did you think it maybe was some friendly plane that was carrying out a maneuver or something of that sort? What was your reaction to it? What was your impression?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, my impression was when I heard the first bomb drop, I knew something was wrong. I did not know what it was, but I knew I was supposed to report to my place of duty.

General McCoy. Were you able to see that they were Japanese planes?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir. I looked at them for a while and I recognized the rising sun on the airplane.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you got to your place of duty?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. On the first attack, were they flying low?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, very low.

The CHAIRMAN. And strafing?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, and bombing.

The CHAIRMAN. And bombing?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. From a very low altitude?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When you went toward Wheeler Field, how many planes did it seem to you were attacking the field? I know you did not count them.

Sergeant HALL. They had to be anywhere from 12 to 15.

[436] The CHAIRMAN. It must have been that many?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. How many were brought down at Wheeler Field, if you know?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir, I don't know.

General McNARNEY. Did you see any Japanese planes brought down?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir, this one. I didn't see it fall but I saw it later after I got a chance to go over there.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what attack that occurred in?

Sergeant HALL. The first attack, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They got the machine guns up and hit one in the first attack?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

General McCoy. How many attacks were there?

Sergeant HALL. There were actually two that I know of. After the first attack they didn't go very far but they came back and started strafing.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, did you get an impression as to what direction they came from into Wheeler Field?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You could not ascertain that?

Sergeant HALL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. The nature of our inquiry is such that we think it necessary to ask the witnesses not to discuss with anyone their testimony or what has been said while they have been in the room. I will ask you to observe that.

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Sergeant, have you been commended for your action?

[437] Sergeant HALL. Only by the squadron commander, sir.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN FRANK W. EBEEY, COAST ARTILLERY,
UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name, Captain?

Captain EBEEY. Frank W. Ebey, Captain, 55th Coast Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your assignment on the morning of December 7?

Captain EBEEY. I was commanding Battery B, 55th Coast Artillery, Fort Kamehameha.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is Fort Kamehameha?

Captain EBEEY. Right at Hickam Field.

General MCCOY. Would you show it on the map?

Captain EBEEY. Yes. It is right here (indicating on the map).

Admiral STANDLEY. Is the fort across the channel?

Captain EBEEY. Yes, Fort Weaver.

The CHAIRMAN. Are your officers' quarters right there at the battery?

Captain EBEEY. About two and a half blocks from my battery, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you when you first learned of the attack?

Captain EBEEY. I was sitting on my lanai reading a book, when I first heard this commotion. I thought it was a Navy plane, but we were on an anti-sabotage alert, so I got my gun and went up to the battery. I did not think we were being attacked. I just stayed there, and the first indication was a plane dove at me, letting go machine guns at me, and I saw dive bombers coming down on Pearl Harbor, and I knew what it was.

[438] The CHAIRMAN. It was a surprise to you?

Captain EBEEY. Yes, I was sort of stunned.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your equipment at your post?

Captain EBEEY. My equipment was four 155 millimeter guns, truck drawn, and we had some .30 caliber machine guns with anti-aircraft mounts.

The CHAIRMAN. Were your machine guns in place?

Captain EBEEY. No, sir. The machine guns are not anti-aircraft machine guns; they are used for ground defense, but my supply sergeant was there with a few rounds of machine-gun ammunition, and I got the battery and the men from Fort Kam, and the machine guns were coming at us, and I ordered the machine guns set up in the rear of my place. We set them up in the tennis court. I sent two thirds down to load the guns and one third down to get ammunition. We loaded up the guns with the ammunition and started firing.

We established these machine gun positions there and started firing at 8:13. I looked at my watch.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were the machine guns before you set them up in your tennis court?

Captain EBEEY. They were right in my supply room, sir, ready to go to work.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you use your big guns for anti-aircraft action?

Captain EBEEY. No, sir, they are designed for no purpose except coast defense or against land attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what was done?

Captain EBEEY. We went to battle position.

General McCoy. Did you have any target in the harbor or any harbor mount?

Captain EBEEY. No, sir, our battle position is this point (indicating on map), Barbers Point. We had to cross the harbor. We had this position here (indicating) by barge, and then by road, but we did manage to bring down two planes in [439] the second attack with machine guns, two fighter planes that came over our barracks, and we knocked them down.

General McCoy. Which must have been a great satisfaction to you?

Captain EBEEY. It was a great satisfaction, sir.

General McCoy. You saw no submarines or other hostile water craft?

Captain EBEEY. I saw no submarines or any water craft. We were too busy trying to get what was in the air.

We got the barge loaded between the second and last attack. As we went out of the channel two fighters dove on us and machine-gunned us. The machine guns were firing back, but they didn't hit any of our men. It seemed like they were unloading a truckload of high-explosive ammunition.

As they passed over us, some cruiser there let go with all the equipment, and these two planes seemed to dissolve in the air. They must have cut them to—

The CHAIRMAN. Cut them to pieces?

Captain EBEEY. Yes, and I have some scraps of the stuff left.

The CHAIRMAN. You had machine guns in your barge?

Captain EBEEY. Yes, and we fought back. I personally handled the machine gun on the barge and we fought back.

I might say that Quartermaster Mr. Jack Barros made six trips under fire across Pearl Harbor, and he certainly did his job well.

That is all we did, sir. We went out to Barbers Point to battle position, and we went out and got our guns into position and were ready to fire at 3 o'clock. We were completely ready to fire.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Coast Artillery?

Captain EBEEY. The Coast Artillery, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did you get any instructions from high authority?

[440] Captain EBEEY. Yes, my battalion commander.

General McCoy. Who is he?

Captain EBEEY. Colonel McCarthy. He was at the battery a minute before I was and he said, "Get your guns ready and rolling," and I said, "They are all made ready now."

The CHAIRMAN. Was your full complement of men practically on hand?

Captain EBEEY. They were all on hand, sir. Of course, it was the day before pay day, and we were on an anti-sabotage alert, and not many of them could leave anyhow.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there many off on leave Saturday night?

Captain EBEEY. No. The ones that could did, but it was the day before pay day, and many of them were financially unable to go.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on Saturday night?

Captain EBey. Well, I am a sort of bachelor. My wife and daughter are in the States, and I was reading a book called "John Brown's Body."

General McCoy. That is a very good book, sir.

Captain EBey. Yes. I was reading about the surprise at Shiloh Church when the attack occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Captain, had you received any instructions in any way which would lead you to believe that there had been any warning in regard to an attack?

Captain EBey. We were on the anti-sabotage alert, sir, and with the international situation it might occur some day, and we were holding the infantry reserve in case of any uprising.

We had gone so many times to our war position that it just seemed like drill even when they were firing at us. None of the men got excited.

[441] Admiral STANDLEY. There was nothing in the way of an expression that would indicate that there was apprehension among those in the War Department or in headquarters of an attack other than sabotage?

Captain EBey. No, sir, I had no idea by any expression of any attack being imminent.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

General McCoy. Did you have liaison with the Navy at all? Any information from the Navy previous to this attack?

Captain EBey. Well, sir, I may say that the Navy impressed me with the efficiency of their barrage and they really saved the lives of many of this group when this cruiser shot those planes up, but I believe the battery commander would know about the liaison with the Navy.

General McNARNEY. How did you get this barge across?

Captain EBey. It is pushed. They had this harbor boat, and we just pushed it across.

General McNARNEY. Who manned it?

Captain EBey. It is manned by a crew of two sailors and chief engineers and master and several employees of the Quartermaster Corps.

General McNARNEY. They were there available at the time.

Captain EBey. Yes, everybody was on the job.

General McNARNEY. Where do they live?

Captain EBey. They live right almost at Fort Kamehameha dock.

General McCoy. Who was in command of it then?

Captain EBey. Colonel E. B. Walker.

General McCoy. Have you been commended for your action on that day?

Captain EBey. No, sir, it was just—I did not do anything more than the rest of the battery did. They were all just [442] calm. We were being shot at and we could not do much else than fire back.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, we think it necessary in view of the nature of our inquiry to ask the witnesses not to discuss their testimony or

what occurs in this room with anyone, and we will ask you to observe that.

Captain EBEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

**TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WILLIAM J. McCARTHY, COAST
ARTILLERY, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Please sit down, Colonel, and give your name to the reporter.

Colonel McCARTHY. William J. McCarthy.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your assignment on the morning of December 7, Colonel?

Colonel McCARTHY. Commanding officer, First Battalion, 55th Coast Artillery, Fort Kamehameha, Territory of Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your first information that you had been attacked?

Colonel McCARTHY. About 7:45 Sunday morning I heard several planes. They don't bother me any.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard the planes before you heard the shooting?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, for this reason, that my quarters are such that the planes flying in and out of Hickam Field always fly over my quarters.

It wasn't until I heard the bombing and explosion and the tat-tat of machine guns that I knew what it was. That was at 7:45.

[443] My first reaction was that this is a funny time for the Air Corps to start trouble. I got out just in time to see a single-seater Japanese plane flying over my quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any trouble in identifying it?

Colonel McCARTHY. No. There was the insignia the red ball, and his two machine guns were both going. I knew I was safe because he had just passed me and headed for Hickam Field.

That immediately excited my curiosity, and I went to the telephone and called to see what it was all about. The telephone operator could not give me any information, so I immediately got in my car and alerted my other batteries and told them to get rolling, that is, Battery A and C.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the captain who was just in here under your command?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, he is under my command. He commanded Battery B.

I told him to get rolling and get to war position.

At that time there was a lot of machine-gun bullets all around the place, and I reached the battery which is at the lower end of Oahu Point, and a Japanese plane had just struck a tree and caromed off the first tree and struck into a wall at my right at the ordnance machine gun shed. That plane was on the ground. The pilot was dead, having left the pilot stuffed in the tree, but the plane was on the ground, and the engine went around the ordnance shop. [444] In caroming off he struck several men who were in the road. One man was completely decapitated. Another man apparently had been

hit by the prop, because his legs and arms and head were off, lying right on the grass. The pilot was dead, as I say, in the plane.

By that time headquarters battery, A battery and B battery, were firing with machine guns, auto rifles, and rifles at the planes going over.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were the machine guns before the action began?

Colonel McCARTHY. They were in the battery areas.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel McCARTHY. Pulled out of the storeroom, and everybody started firing.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your command intact that morning?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there many leaves over that—

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir. They were intact. There were no leaves other than the usual granted. There were at least 50% of all commands present, and probably more than that, because nobody had any money, and they all stayed in the post.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. Colonel, when did you receive the orders to go on Alert No. 1?

Colonel McCARTHY. Alert No. 1? About the 21st or 22nd of November. We were on Alert No. 1 and 2 up to the time of the attack.

General McNARNEY. When were you ordered on Alert No. 2?

Colonel McCARTHY. About the 30th, and that was taken off about the 3rd or 4th.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a period in there that you were on 2, was there?

[445] Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. What does Alert No. 1 entail in your command?

Colonel McCARTHY. Alert No. 1 entails anti-sabotage guard, guard of installations, consists primarily of merely guards armed with rifles to protect vital installations.

General McNARNEY. While you were on Alert No. 2, what additional measures did you take?

Colonel McCARTHY. The additional measures involved in Alert No. 2, sir, were to increase the guards. We had doubled guards on every place.

General McNARNEY. You set up no machine guns?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Or anti-aircraft work?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir; just guards, anti-sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you expecting any attack in the nature of a Japanese air raid, Colonel?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Heard no suggestion of any such thing?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Over this period?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Where are your battle positions?

Colonel McCARTHY. My battle positions, sir, are located on the south shore. My command post is at station B, commonly called the Ewa group.

General McCoy. Will you show us on the map, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir, gladly.

(The witness went to a map.) Barbers Point lighthouse (indicating). My command post is right behind on a hill called Puu Palailia. That is my command post. I have two [446] guns at Awanui Gulch. I have four guns immediately to the left of Barbers Point lighthouse on the beach. I have four guns, battery C, at Fort Weaver, mounted on Panama mounts, and I have four guns at Fort Kamehameha mounted on the beach just to the left of Battery Selfridge, all mounted on Panama mounts with the exception of the ones at Barbers Point, which are dug in, the ordinary field positions. All these guns are on the beach.

General McNARNEY. And how many automatic or infantry weapons do you have in your command for close-in defense?

Colonel McCARTHY. For close-in defense, for the defense of the materiel I am armed with .30 caliber rifle, machine guns .30 caliber, and automatic rifles, Browning automatics, B.A.R.

General McNARNEY. Are any of those set up for anti-aircraft defense?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. They are all around the guns.

General McNARNEY. When did any of your weapons get into action on that morning? Do you know?

Colonel McCARTHY. The first somewhere between eight o'clock and eight-ten, but that was right in the battery areas at Fort Kamehameha.

General McCoy. Did any of your guns go into action at all against the Japanese?

Colonel McCARTHY. The 155's, no, sir; none of my guns have been in action yet, sir.

General McCoy. Did you see any targets at all on the sea or at the entrance of the harbor?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

General McCoy. Submarines?

Colonel McCARTHY. Submarines were out there, but we were told not to fire on them. When I say "not to fire on them," we were told to hold our fire until we were directed to fire, [447] although we have an order that if we cannot positively identify a submarine we will fire on it, in our own judgment. All American submarines now are to be convoyed or escorted by a destroyer, so that if we see a submarine that is unescorted it is presumably an enemy and we will fire on it.

General McNARNEY. Those are the orders in effect at the moment?

Colonel McCARTHY. At the moment, yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Were they in effect on December 7?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. How did you get your firing—or would you have gotten your firing orders, on December 7?

Colonel McCARTHY. From the harbor. Harbor defense.

General McNARNEY. From the harbor defense?

Colonel McCARTHY. At Fort Kamehameha.

General McNARNEY. Good communications?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. They are perfect.

General McNARNEY. How soon did you get your command post manned?

Colonel McCARTHY. The command post, sir, was manned all the time.

General McNARNEY. That is your battle position command post?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. That was manned ever since the day of the original alert.

General McCoy. Did you get any orders from higher authority that day?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

General McCoy. Acted entirely on your own initiative?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. As soon as I saw what was happening I told the batteries to roll, to get out to their positions. I might interpose this: Battery A of course was in position right there at Kam. Battery C guns were in position at [448] Weaver, and the only battery that had to be emplaced was B battery at Barbers Point. C and B battery started across the channel on the barge going about eight-thirty. They couldn't get across at that time due to the fact that the Navy destroyers were just pouring out of there just as fast as they could go, with all guns blazing, all their anti-aircraft, and naturally we couldn't block the channel to them. As soon as we got clear on the second attack we cleared across, and B battery was strafed going across with their guns.

General McNARNEY. Did you receive an Alert No. 3 status from the higher command on that day?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir, although I was in Alert No. 3.

The CHAIRMAN. After you got started you were?

Colonel McCARTHY. I just went out there with ammunition.

General McNARNEY. Now, you stated that you were on alert No. 2 for a few days during this period. Would there be any records in your headquarters showing when you received the Alert No. 2 and when you went off of it, or was that entirely a verbal order?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir, there would not be, because those were verbal instructions from the post commander.

General McCoy. In the nature of drill?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir, they were not in the nature of drill. The commanding officers of the various battalions were called in and told that Alert No. 2 was on, to double the guards, and three or four days before the attack it was eased off.

General McCoy. Have you a mimeographed sheet showing what Alert No. 2 is?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. It is contained in S. O. P., Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department, which all organizations or battalions at least—

General McNARNEY. Who is the officer that called you in [449] and gave you the order for Alert No. 2?

Colonel McCARTHY. If I recollect correctly, it was Colonel Walker.

General McCoy. He is your regimental commander?

Colonel McCARTHY. He is the post commander, yes, sir.

General McCoy. He is also regimental commander?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did that apply to the whole coast defense system, do you know, or simply to your post?

Colonel McCARTHY. I wouldn't know, sir. I know it applies—it applied to our post, because anything that would affect the whole system would come from the Hawaiian coast artillery command.

General McCoy. And you are quite sure that you never got an order for Alert No. 3?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir, not on the 7th I didn't, except: the only order that we received that might be interpreted as an Alert No. 3 was the message of three o'clock in the afternoon, or in the afternoon—just what time I don't recall—that all officers would report to their battle stations and remain there. That was a message from harbor defenses at Pearl Harbor.

General McNARNEY. Do you keep any war dairy in your organization?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did you keep it prior to December 7?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Have you one for December 7?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions, gentlemen?

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask some.

Under Alert No. 2, Colonel, that you went into on about [450] the 30th, what is your liaison there with the Navy?

Colonel McCARTHY. Our liaison with the Navy, sir, operates through Pearl Harbor, through a naval liaison officer called the harbor control post, the navy yard. I personally have no direct connection with it. That is, if I want to find out anything I call harbor defenses, and they get the harbor control post of the navy yard and get rulings on any questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there any Army liaison at harbor control post?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. That's Captain Eby that was in here, is the liaison officer in the harbor control post now.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was he before?

Colonel McCARTHY. Not before the night of the 7th, but there was one, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who?

Colonel McCARTHY. Colonel Dingman.

General McCoy. Do you get a report as to the ships that come in and out?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir, we get that direct from harbor defenses. In other words, a friendly ship coming out, they notify us that one DD or one BB or aircraft carrier is leaving port or will ply—

General McCoy. Did you get any such notices on the day of the 7th?

Colonel McCARTHY. I would have to consult the record, sir. There were so many things came in there, I wouldn't remember. We undoubtedly did, though, late in the afternoon or in the afternoon or night.

General McCoy. Are you conscious of any particular responsibility on your part when the fleet is in the harbor?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir, very much so. It is my duty to protect and keep that channel clear against all landing [451] forces and to see that the Navy has safe conduct through there.

General McCoy. Were you conscious of any particularly added responsibility when the fleet was in the harbor?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. I must prevent any foreign vessel, warcraft, from entering that harbor.

General McCoy. Is the torpedo net there under your control or defense?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir. That is entirely under the control of the Navy, sir.

General McCoy. You have no guns that would help protect that?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir, I have: A battery at Fort Kamehameha could shoot right down that channel, and I could have the guns at Fort Weaver turn around and shoot at it.

General McCoy. Did you learn from the Navy at any time on the 7th of the presence of any submarine?

Colonel McCARTHY. I presume it came from the Navy. My own headquarters notified me that there were enemy submarines off Barbers Point, and I was alerted on Alert 3, condition of readiness 2, ready to go in action immediately, not later than five minutes.

General McCoy. Did you see any submarines that day?

Colonel McCARTHY. Our own, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did you see any enemy submarines?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, this liaison between, or on this post, harbor—

Colonel McCARTHY. Harbor control post.

Admiral STANDLEY. Harbor control post. That liaison. That has existed for how long? Do you know?

Colonel McCARTHY. Well, I have been here, sir, twenty-seven or -eight months, and to my knowledge that has been in existence all the time.

[452] Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

General McCoy. Have you direct communications with the navy yard?

Colonel McCARTHY. Sir?

General McCoy. Have you direct communications to the navy yard or direct wire, or what?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir, I have no direct communication with the navy yard. All our communications are addressed to the harbor defenses of Pearl Harbor, and there is an officer there who contacts the navy control post.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we will ask you not to discuss what has gone on in the room while you were here, with anyone.

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Major ALLEN. Private Shortt, Fort Kamehameha.

The CHAIRMAN. Private, will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE CREED SHORTT, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give the reporter your full name, will you?

Private SHORTT. Creed Shortt.

The CHAIRMAN. What command are you in, Shortt?

Private SHORTT. Fort Kam Coast Artillery. Rather, ambulance. Fort Kam ambulance driver.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was your immediate commander on the day of December 7?

Private SHORTT. Sir? Major Gill was in charge of the dispensary.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you when the attack came on?

Private SHORTT. Well, sir, I was at the motor pool down there washing the ambulance when the attack first began, and I [453] hit—went to the dispensary.

The CHAIRMAN. A little bit louder. I don't hear you.

Private SHORTT. Sir, I was down there at the motor pool washing the ambulance, sir. I had the left fender, just got it waxed, and when the attack began I pulled out and went to the dispensary. That was my first move.

The CHAIRMAN. What hour, as nearly as you know, was that?

Private SHORTT. Sir, by the clock down there it was eight o'clock, about eight o'clock when it happened.

General MCCOY. Where was this, Private?

Private SHORTT. Sir?

General MCCOY. Where was this?

Private SHORTT. Fort Kam dispensary.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you notice the size of the flight that went over there? Have you any notion of the number of planes that came in on the first attack?

Private SHORTT. No, sir, I didn't. I just looked up and saw that there red rising sun on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Were they flying high or low?

Private SHORTT. Sir, they was flying low.

The CHAIRMAN. What character of planes?

Private SHORTT. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Single seaters, any of them?

Private SHORTT. Sir, they was kind of single-seated, flying pretty low.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNARNEY?

General McNARNEY. You said you went to the dispensary?

Private SHORTT. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. What did you do there?

Private SHORTT. Sir, went there, went out—went down and picked up some men where the plane crashed.

General McNARNEY. How many officers or men were in the dispensary at the time?

[454] Private SHORTT. Sir, there was Major Gill and Captain Ketchman and Captain Smith and Captain Garry.

General McNARNEY. Did they organize a litter service or an ambulance service, or how did you get these men?

Private SHORTT. Sir?

General McNARNEY. I say, how did you get these, how did you pick these wounded men up? Did you have a litter service or ambulance service?

Private SHORTT. Litter. I just went out and it took—I went out and picked them up by myself, sir. I went out to get them.

General McNARNEY. Did nobody help you?

Private SHORTT. No, sir. We got down and there were some fellows, and I got them to give me a hand.

General McNARNEY. Who directed you to pick them up?

Private SHORTT. Sir?

General McNARNEY. Did anybody direct you to go out and pick them up?

Private SHORTT. No, sir. They just said there was a plane crashed, and I went on out to pick them up.

General McNARNEY. How many wounded were brought into the dispensary that day?

Private SHORTT. Sir, there was nine wounded.

General McNARNEY. They were all coast artillery men?

Private SHORTT. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Were there any Japanese wounded?

Private SHORTT. No, sir. The Japanese, he was killed.

General McNARNEY. What did you do with him?

Private SHORTT. Sir, I didn't pick the Japanese up. I just took care of the wounded.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

General McNARNEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't discuss your testimony here with anyone, Shortt, outside of the room. [455]

Private SHORTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We are much obliged to you.

Major ALLEN. Lieutenant Saltzman, Schofield Barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT STEPHEN G. SALTZMAN, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give the reporter your full name, will you, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Stephen G. Saltzman.

The CHAIRMAN. Of what unit are you a member?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. 98th Coast Artillery, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And where is the headquarters of that command?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. The upper post, Schofield Barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. And where are your quarters, your personal quarters?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. My personal quarters are at the upper post, the regimental area.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your assignment? What is your specific command?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, I am regimental communications officer.

General McCoy. Regimental?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell us in your own way when you first learned of the attack, and go on from there and tell us what you observed and what you did, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I will try to, sir, to the best of my knowledge. I was lying in bed about quarter of eight Sunday morning, the 7th of December, and I heard the fleet that attacked Wheeler Field come over my quarters, and I have been interested in the air corps for some time. I knew [456] immediately that they were not American planes; they didn't sound like American planes. And I threw a towel around myself and went outside and saw that they were Japanese planes, ran down to the switchboard to call the commanding officer, and his line was busy, so I told the operator to get in touch with him and tell him that we were under attack. Just about that time they opened up over Wheeler Field. I ran back, and there were officers standing around in the quadrangle, in the officers' quarters, and I shouted to them that it was an attack, and threw on a pair of coveralls and pistol and runs down and turned some of the men out in the regimental area where the barracks are, and saw that they were drawing ammunition. We already had small arms ammunition in our storerooms due to the alert which we had had for a week, and I drew some pistol ball and went up to the motor park, and there were drivers up there, and our regiment—the alert plan on which each man has a job, and I sent the drivers off to their appointed stations and—

Yes, sir? I thought you were going to ask a question (addressing General McCoy).

And at approximately eight-fifteen the guns had started to move out of the motor park. One point of interest I think you might be interested in is the fact that the whole flight that came down came over Kolekole Pass and directly over our gun park, and we had 24 guns and 6 directors and height finders sitting there in the gun park, and one group—one small bomb would have done a great deal of damage.

General McCoy. Did or would have done?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Would have done.

The CHAIRMAN. Would have done.

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I don't see how anybody going over as low as they were could have missed seeing them. I believe that they were interested in only their ultimate purpose, which was [457] to lay low the air force.

About that time I took off for my regimental communications shop. My men were there loading up the truck. I had been battalion communications officer, and that detail had already left for their field positions. The alert, as far as I could determine, was sounded at eight-twenty. I went through Wheeler Field, drove a ton and a half truck of the regimental communications detail out of the gun park at 8:25, and it was under attack at that time. I dropped guards at my terminal cans to guard the wires, and went over to command post which is approximately 300 yards due west—east of Wheeler Field.

While we established communications I heard what sounded like two planes pulling out of a dive over Kam Highway, and I grabbed a rifle from one of the men standing there and a couple of clips of

ammunition—it was a Browning automatic rifle—and ran outside, dropped to my knees, and Staff Sergeant Klatt was behind me, and we got on our knees to study the planes and make positive there were no friendly pursuits in the air. Nobody was firing at it. Just then he opened up with his four machine guns, and I think I was too mad to be scared. He wasn't more than a hundred feet off the ground. We opened up at him, and fortunately for us there were high tension lines behind us, and he had to pull out of his dive or I am afraid I wouldn't be sitting here. He crashed about—after we emptied our clips he crashed the other side of the building. Two pilots in it. We ran over there, and it was a Pratt-Whitney engine in the machine, and it worried me. I thought I had made a mistake, and after the Air Corps Intelligence got over there they determined that it was Japanese.

The rest of the morning was spent in preparing the command post, and the regiment itself seemed to move into the field with very little delay and confusion, and never in the whole time, the whole action we had, did I notice any chaotic con- [458] ditions. The men—it was—well, it was gratifying to see the way the men went to their jobs under attack the whole time.

The CHAIRMAN. What state of readiness or unreadiness would your command be in to meet an attack of this kind under the alert that was then in effect?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, we had been alerted, I believe, the Sunday before in a No. 1 Alert, which under the Standing Operating Procedure in the Department is an anti-sabotage alert, in which the guard was doubled—I believe our guard was tripled, and live ammunition was issued to it in place of the guard ammunition. All the batteries, all the organizations, drew a day's fire for each man and kept it in their storerooms. Then men were not issued the ammunition.

The CHAIRMAN. Personally?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. That is our state of readiness; our guns were all in the gun park, in the moving, traveling position.

General McNARNEY. What equipment did you have in your regiment?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I beg pardon, sir.

General McNARNEY. What equipment did you have in your regiment?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, we had two battalions of 3-inch guns. In a second battalion we used all M-4 equipment, which is 1940 or later, and the first battalion is armed with the 1923 gun and the T-83 directors, which is older equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. Is your regiment a mobile regiment of artillery?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, our regiment is a semi-mobile regiment. However, we have I believe almost enough motor transportation to make it completely mobile.

General McNARNEY. How about automatic weapons? What did you have?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, we had no automatic weapons [459] other than .30 caliber Brownings with infantry adapter mount for A. A. fire.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no machine guns?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, we had these .30 caliber machine——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but you had no anti-aircraft guns?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. No, sir. There were infantry machines with an anti-aircraft adapter for high elevation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McCoy. Were they in position?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. No, sir, they were not.

General McCoy. Where were they?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I believe they were in the battery storeroom, sir. I believe that some of the guns had been kept out on the entrances to the regimental area in nests, I think just maybe two or three with ammunition.

General McNARNEY. Where are your normal gun positions?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Our regiment is—our first battalion of our regiment is assigned to the defense of Wheeler Field. The second battalion is McOppen out at Bellows Field.

General McNARNEY. I presume that you have been in position many times?

* Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir, we have.

General McNARNEY. Your replacements all prepared, and everything?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, our emplacements were in very good shape, but they were not in what I consider a shape to stay in the field for a campaign. The field fortifications for the guns themselves and the ammunition pits were all dug and ready to go, and they stand today almost exactly as they were then. However, we had to dig into the ground for barracks for the men, you see.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean to keep them on position?

[460] Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. What happened to the battalion whose station was Bellows?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Well, sir, they got under way very fast. They, as far as I can ascertain, were in position down there about two hours after the first alarm.

General McCoy. They were in your same park, however, at the time of the attack?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir, that's correct.

General McCoy. Had to go how many miles?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Well, sir, if they had gone over the Pali Road it would be, I should judge, 40 miles, but if they had gone around Koko Head it would have been closer to 60.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, we have heard something here about an Alert No. 1 ordered on November 27. Does that correspond with your recollection?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir, it does.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, was that order changed at any time between November 27 and December 7, the date of the attack?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, I have heard rumors that it was, but we never had notification of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you heard rumors that for a few days an Alert No. 2 was in effect?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. No, sir, I am not familiar with that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what are the rumors of change that you have heard?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I was told that Saturday night before the attack, December 6, that the alert had been called off completely, no alert, and that the units hadn't been advised of that, because—

The CHAIRMAN. So that they still assumed that it was in effect?

[461] Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I think the rumors are probably wrong, but we want to get all the light we can on this situation.

General McNARNEY. Sitting around barracks or sitting around talking with your contemporaries did you ever discuss an air raid, the possibility of an air raid?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, knowing that the signal corps—the air warning service has outposts all over the Island and on other islands and that they are manned almost continually and that the Navy patrols these waters, I never felt that we would be completely surprised the way we did. I don't think anybody thought that we would be surprised.

The CHAIRMAN. You know the situation was tense, didn't you, as between Japan and the United States?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir, I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. Did it ever come into your mind that Japan might take off in these hostilities by air-raiding the Island of Oahu?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, in my wildest dreams I couldn't fathom it. I couldn't see how, completely surrounded as she was by what would turn into hostile forces, she could dare to do a thing like that.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think your state of mind was not unusual amongst the military commands on this Island?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, among the junior officers I believe it was the same as I felt.

General McNARNEY. How long have you been in the service?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. One year January 2nd, sir.

General McNARNEY. Are you a reserve officer?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Where did you come in from, what school?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. University of Delaware.

[462] The CHAIRMAN. Where is your home?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Wilmington.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any training before you came in as a coast artillery officer?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. No, sir, I hadn't.

General McNARNEY. What did you study at school?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Economics, sir.

General McCoy. What was your remark there?

General McNARNEY. No previous training.

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I had four years of R. O. T. C.

General McCoy. At the University of Delaware?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, where were you on the night of December 6?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. The night of December 6 I was in the 98th Officers' Club playing cards.

The CHAIRMAN. We have heard rumors that a lot of the forces on this Island was off at parties on Saturday night and that there was a

good deal of drunkenness. What do you know or what have you heard on that subject?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, I can only speak for the officers of the 98th. I remember that night most of the junior officers were gathered in the club there, and we were sitting around and we were drinking, and I don't remember—recall any instances of drunkenness. I didn't move out of the area at all that night; I can't say.

The CHAIRMAN. Up to the time you left the club, Lieutenant, was there any officer there who wouldn't have been fit on account of drinking to respond when an alert was given?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I don't believe so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There was drinking there?

[463] Lieutenant SALTZMAN. There was drinking, yes, sir. It was mostly beer.

The CHAIRMAN. Mostly beer?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. What you would call normal drinking?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I would, sir. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your command practically intact as respects presence at their quarters on the morning of this attack?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, a report was required three or four days ago concerning the number of men present for duty, and as I recall it it was 95% present for duty.

General McCoy. Both officers and men?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions, gentlemen?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, we have found it necessary to enjoin upon witnesses here in this inquiry that they do not discuss it, speak to others about it at all, about what went on this room.

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. I shall ask you to observe that.

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I will, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Next witness.

Major ALLEN. Sergeant Klatt, Schofield Barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT LOWELL VINCENT KLATT, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name, Sergeant?

[464] Sergeant KLATT. Lowell Vincent Klatt.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your command, Sergeant?

Sergeant KLATT. I am in charge of wire communications for the 98th first battalion.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the same outfit to which the lieutenant who was just here belongs?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir. He is regimental officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are your headquarters?

Sergeant KLATT. Our headquarters are at Schofield Barracks, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at Schofield Barracks Saturday night, December 6?

Sergeant KLATT. I was, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not on leave?

Sergeant KLATT. No, I wasn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of the 7th when this attack broke?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, when it first started, sir, I was in the mess hall having my breakfast.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you hear first? What first attracted your attention?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, the first that attracted my attention was the squadron of planes coming in over Kolekole Pass and right over our mess hall.

The CHAIRMAN. You could hear them?

Sergeant KLATT. You could hear them when they went over low, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they high or low?

Sergeant KLATT. I would say they were quite low.

The CHAIRMAN. Without my asking you, then what happened? What did you do?

Sergeant KLATT. When we first heard them go over, why, we paid very little attention to them, figuring it was some of [465] either Wheeler Field or Hickam Field planes that were out on maneuver or something like that. And shortly thereafter, why, we heard these concussions down around Wheeler Field, and also machine gun fire, and at that, why, we all ran out and stood out around the yard watching to see what happened. At first we didn't know just what to expect, and as we saw smoke and flame coming up from Wheeler Field and as these planes would tear over the barracks, why, we would see them cut loose with their machine guns, and numerous places there was splinters flying and things like that. And at that, why, I figured it was something important, so I told my detail to get their packs, get the trucks down, and be ready to take off. And while I was doing that Lieutenant Saltzman gave the word that we were on the alert, to go to our battalion command post and set up communications. Well, I had my truck down in short order and loaded it, got my men aboard, and we took off 20 minutes—20 minutes, 25 minutes after eight and started for our battalion command post.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that?

Sergeant KLATT. That is on the other side of Wahiawa, in a C. C. camp.

The CHAIRMAN. How far?

Sergeant KLATT. I would say offhand about three and a half miles. And as we started for there, why, we passed Hickam Field, and we could see that it was all in flames, and we could see these planes diving down and concussions of bombs, and so forth, and so it looked very real to us, of course, and we got over there, and we were setting up communications, and shortly thereafter Lieutenant Saltzman came in, and he told us it was the real thing, boys. That's just the way he said it. And as we were setting up our switchboards, telephones, and so forth, connecting our wires, why, we heard two planes pull out of a

[466] dive over Wheeler Field, and they came right over Kam Highway so that they headed directly into us to strafe us. Lieutenant Saltzman wasn't armed with a rifle or anything like that, and he grabbed a B.A.R. from one of the boys that were there, and using him as a cue, why, I also grabbed one, and we got down on our knees and started firing at these planes as they came towards us, and right directly behind us was a high tension line, and as they pulled out and peeled off to the right and the second one peeled off to the left, and just as he peeled off to swing away from us, why, we cut loose with the Browning automatics, and within a second or two seconds at the most we heard this crash and a blast. And as there were no planes in our immediate vicinity at the moment, why, we ran around the corner of the building. We hadn't seen it crash or anything like that: it had passed around the corner of the building from us. We ran around the corner, and we could see this plane in flames, and we ran over there, and the gasoline and everything had spread so far, and everything was—

The CHAIRMAN. Burning?

Sergeant KLATT. Burning, and the heat was terrific. We couldn't get very close to it. And after a while, after it had burned itself out practically, why, we got in there and we investigated as much as we could—just looking, naturally, curious, why, we had the wing sections and saw the motor was an American make motor and American prop, and Lieutenant Saltzman told me that the parachute itself was an American parachute. And, well, that's about all there was to it, and we went back and finished setting up our communications, getting the command post in order.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you stayed at the command post what? The balance of the day?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, I have been there ever since, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Been there ever since?

[467] Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did both planes crash or just one?

Sergeant KLATT. No, sir; only the second one, the one that swung to the left. We didn't get a chance to fire at the first one to amount to anything because he pulled away from us pretty fast, but the other one pulled—swung right around broadside to us.

General McCoy. Was there more than one pilot?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, there was a pilot and observer, or another one right in behind him anyway. It was a two-passenger plane.

General McCoy. Both burned, were they?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, both burned very badly.

General McCoy. Both killed in the crash?

Sergeant KLATT. I believe they were, sir. At least, when we got there they were making no effort to get out; they were just all crashed down in the cockpit, from what we could see of them.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. Sergeant, what were your duties under Alert No. 1?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, our duties under Alert No. 1, as we had always done before, was to go over and set up the battalion command post and remain in constant attendance, and in case of any wire com-

munication going out it was our job to go out and fix it, splice lines for any breaks or shortages or anything like that.

General McNARNEY. You were not in position under an Alert No. 1, were you?

Sergeant KLATT. No, sir, we weren't

The CHAIRMAN. Under 1 you were to keep wire communications in contact to the command post, were you?

Sergeant KLATT. That's right, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did you mount any guard any place?

[468] Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir, there was guards—as soon as Lieutenant Saltzman was there, why, he mounted a guard around the C. C. post there, the command post.

General McNARNEY. That was after the fact, though, wasn't it?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir, that was after it had started.

General McNARNEY. What were your normal routine duties before the attack, from November 27, on, during the period of alert?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, we had gone out and we had checked all our lines, our line for our battery into the command post. We weren't—we didn't have our switchboard in or telephones or anything like that. They were left back in the barracks supply room, and it was my job to see that they were all right. We had had no orders to move out in the field and maintain the post.

General McNARNEY. What percentage of your detail was required to remain on the post?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, I have seven men in my detail, a corporal and six privates, besides myself, and I always had at least four of the men there and myself, or a corporal and four men were always there.

General McNARNEY. How many men of your detail got to the command post that morning?

Sergeant KLATT. They were all present, sir.

General McCoy. Did you have any casualties?

Sergeant KLATT. No, sir, there was none.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall ask you, Sergeant, not to disclose any questions or any of the testimony you have given in the room or discuss the matter with any of your fellows.

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

[469] Major ALLEN. Colonel Howard, at Fort Armstrong.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL JACK W. HOWARD, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Colonel HOWARD. Jack W. Howard, Lieutenant Colonel, Q. M. S., Supply Officer, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is Fort Armstrong, Colonel?

Colonel HOWARD. Well, that's located down on the waterfront, on Ala Moana and Richards Street.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the city?

Colonel HOWARD. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the city, on the front?

Colonel HOWARD. Right in the city, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell us when you first knew of the attack, where you were, and what happened as you observed it?

Colonel HOWARD. I was getting ready to play golf at the Waialae Golf Club when I heard over the radio a call for everybody to report to their stations, which I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would you report then? At your quarters?

Colonel HOWARD. At Fort Armstrong, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At Fort Armstrong?

Colonel HOWARD. At the depot.

The CHAIRMAN. What time did you get there? Do you know?

Colonel HOWARD. I would judge it was about 8:45.

The CHAIRMAN. The first attack was in progress or nearly over at that time?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir.

[470] The CHAIRMAN. Did you observe where the attackers in the first attack went after they—

Colonel HOWARD. I did not, sir. As a matter of fact, I was on my desk, and I wasn't out looking.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6, sir, and Sunday morning?

Colonel HOWARD. I was at the depot.

The CHAIRMAN. On the night of December 6?

Colonel HOWARD. Oh, no, no. I was at home.

The CHAIRMAN. At home?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And were your quarters in the city?

Colonel HOWARD. No, sir. I live out at Kahala about four miles from the depot.

The CHAIRMAN. So you know nothing about conditions in the city the night before?

Colonel HOWARD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. What do you store in your depot?

Colonel HOWARD. All supplies for the Hawaiian Department.

General McNARNEY. All nature of supplies?

Colonel HOWARD. Quartermaster supplies.

General McNARNEY. The General Quartermaster?

Colonel HOWARD. Class 1, class 2, class 3, and 4 supplies.

General McNARNEY. Were any calls made on you on the morning of December 7 when you got there?

Colonel HOWARD. Plenty.

General McNARNEY. What types of supplies were most needed?

Colonel HOWARD. Principally equipment and arrangements for food, bedding also, all classes of clothing and equipage and all classes of subsistence.

General McNARNEY. How large a place do you have in the depot?

[471] Colonel HOWARD. I have about 100 to 125 people under me.

General McNARNEY. Enlisted or civilian.

Colonel HOWARD. Some enlisted and mostly civilian.

General McNARNEY. How about the civilians? Did they turn up?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir. Most of them came in right away. Some few women did not show up.

General McNARNEY. Did you have standard orders as to what personnel—

Colonel HOWARD. They were to all report in. My key personnel report in; that was the standing order: the key personnel report in immediately, and then they call their own branches to come in if necessary.

General McNARNEY. On or about November 27 Alert No. 1 was ordered in effect?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Under Alert No. 1 what precautions were taken to guard the depot?

Colonel HOWARD. Other than the usual guard, none.

General McNARNEY. What does the guard consist of?

Colonel HOWARD. It consists of a post that runs across—runs up and down the Ala Moana and a post that runs up and down the Halekauwila Street, and, oh, those posts are not over a block and a half long, one of our city blocks here. Then, there is a roving patrol that visits those two guards, I think about every hour.

General McNARNEY. Was the depot easily distinguishable as a target?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, it is, very.

General McNARNEY. Were there any arrangements made for anti-aircraft protection of the depot under any type of alert?

Colonel HOWARD. Outside of the use of our own troops, which was set up as the original program, we were to take over [472] the defense of our own depot and Fort Armstrong.

General McNARNEY. What arms did you have for this purpose?

Colonel HOWARD. We had automatic rifles and rifles.

General McNARNEY. And no machine guns?

Colonel HOWARD. Not at that time.

General McNARNEY. Have you now?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. How many?

Colonel HOWARD. That I would hesitate to say. Being in command, I am not handling the troops directly. I wouldn't say.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what type of machine guns they are?

Colonel HOWARD. Browning.

General McNARNEY. Browning .30 caliber?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Adapted for anti-aircraft fire?

Colonel HOWARD. I think they are now. I think they have got their adapters on. I am not certain as to that. If they haven't the adapters on I am sure that Colonel Sothern who has command of one of those detachments as to the actual guard, has rigged up some mechanical attachments which will act as an anti-aircraft mount.

General McNARNEY. Did your issuing of supplies proceed smoothly on the day of the attack?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir, very, outside of the usual confusion in a situation like that.

General McNARNEY. Was there any jamming up of motor transportation in the vicinity of the depot?

Colonel HOWARD. No more than usual.

General McNARNEY. Is there a traffic control there?

Colonel HOWARD. Oh, yes; we got our traffic control to working right away.

[473] General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we shall ask you not to discuss with anyone outside your testimony here or anything that has happened in the room. Thank you, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, will you point out where Kahala is and where you live?

Colonel HOWARD. Kahala is right out in this area right out here [indicating].

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that right near Waialae golf course?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir; just a very short ways.

Major ALLEN. Lieutenant Cooper, Hickham Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant Cooper, will you be sworn, sir?

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT HOWARD FREDERICK COOPER, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Lieutenant COOPER. Howard Frederick Cooper.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was your assignment on and before December 7, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant COOPER. I am commanding officer of the headquarters squadron, 17th air base group. My duties are on the ground; I have nothing to do with the air.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7 at about 7:45?

Lieutenant COOPER. At about 7:45 I was sleeping.

The CHAIRMAN. In barracks?

Lieutenant COOPER. At my quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. In your quarters. Your quarters are how near to Hickam Field?

Lieutenant COOPER. My quarters are right at Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Right on it. What was the first thing that [474] attracted your attention, sir?

Lieutenant COOPER. The first thing that attracted my attention was the loud explosions along Pearl Harbor, after which I woke up and looked out, and I saw smoke coming out of Pearl Harbor. I figured it was very strange to have the Army—the Navy practicing on Sunday morning right in the harbor. And about that time I heard loud bursts on Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and tell us what happened, what you did.

Lieutenant COOPER. Naturally, I got out, put some clothes on, and ran out to the rear of Hickam Field. Dive bombers were tearing the place to pieces, blasting everything, coming down so close that I figured it was dangerous to run out, so I went out the front, and by that

time some of the other officers were up. And I noticed the high-altitude bombers coming over about over the officers' club, which is about 300 or 400 yards away, and there were two formations of five planes in each, I would estimate at about 12,000, 15,000 feet, traveling very slowly, proceeding to Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceeding to Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant COOPER. To Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. From what direction were they coming?

Lieutenant COOPER. From the ocean.

The CHAIRMAN. From the ocean?

General MCCOY. From the south?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MCCOY. From the south?

Lieutenant COOPER. From the south, yes, sir. When they were over Pearl Harbor they dropped their bombs, and the formation was perfect, so perfect, and the timing on the dropping of the bombs was so perfect, that I could follow them down in V formation right to the ground, right to the impact.

General McNARNEY. What did they hit?

[475] Lieutenant COOPER. They hit Pearl Harbor, something in Pearl Harbor; I couldn't see because of the buildings in close front. These two waves I noticed turn around, one wave turn around one way and another wave turn around another way. Well, I forgot about those planes for a while, got my steel helmet and my gas mask and went down to the hangar line. First I went down in my car, and I turned around and left the car home because the place was bombed, and I got down there and got in contact with my first sergeant, and he said that all our men were out of the barracks. I told him to keep the men separated. Of course the damage seemed pretty considerable at the time. I walked up to the parade ground. There were some machine guns out there, but they were all out of commission, lacking any water cans, and men were busy trying to put them to working order.

The CHAIRMAN. That was on the parade ground?

Lieutenant COOPER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They had not been in position before the attack, these—

Lieutenant COOPER. No, sir, not in position; they were just being brought out.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did they go to get them?

Lieutenant COOPER. They got them anywhere they could find them, and all the men showed remarkable courage bringing all of these weapons out, trying to put them together. And about this time, while I was down at one of the guns, I could imagine that the high-altitude bombers were close overhead because of the anti-aircraft fire just blasting the skies, and it was all black, and before I knew it they had probably dropped their second bomb load from high altitude, and that's what sprayed the large barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. That struck the large barracks?

Lieutenant COOPER. That struck the large barracks and [476] splattered on the ball diamond and the parade ground.

The CHAIRMAN. How many attacks would you say there were, how many separate attacks that morning?

Lieutenant COOPER. I would say that the whole thing was one attack. The CHAIRMAN. You would?

Lieutenant COOPER. It was split up in dive bombers and high-altitude bombers. While the high-altitude bombers were attacking Pearl Harbor the dive bombers were damaging Hickam Field, and when the high-altitude bombers came over Hickam Field the dive bombers were attacking Pearl Harbor, and they worked in that system. It was very methodical.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, was there not a respite around nine o'clock? We have rather gotten the impression that there was a first fierce attack about eight o'clock and another fierce attack about nine and another about eleven. Was it your observation that there seemed to be planes over you during that whole period from eight to eleven?

Lieutenant COOPER. Well, when those high-altitude bombers were bombing Pearl Harbor the dive bombers were attacking Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. And vice versa?

Lieutenant COOPER. And vice versa.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Lieutenant COOPER. And while the high-altitude bombers were going out to the ocean again to get a bearing on Hickam Field I was—the men—in fact, a lot of the men were watching the dive bombers attacking Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Lieutenant COOPER. And of course the high-altitude bombers were on a mission to bomb Hickam Field this time, and they would come over and bomb Hickam Field, and of course they would have to go out again to come back on another mission, [477] and the dive bombers came right after them. It was a methodical system whereby they wouldn't bomb any of their own planes.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. Which squadron did you say you belong to?

Lieutenant COOPER. Headquarters squadron, 17 air base group.

General McNARNEY. What are the duties of the headquarters squadron?

Lieutenant COOPER. Purely administrative. All the men are dispersed, scattered throughout the field and working in offices, libraries, and base maintenance when we have extra men.

General McNARNEY. Do you furnish any guard?

Lieutenant COOPER. We furnished—at the time that the thing happened we had about four men on guard.

General McNARNEY. What type of alert were you on on the morning of December 7?

Lieutenant COOPER. We were on status A-3 and Alert No. 3, whereby only the ground defense was alerted.

General McNARNEY. Status A-3. Is that a local directive for Hickam Field?

Lieutenant COOPER. That is the directive for Hawaiian Department, Alert 3.

The CHAIRMAN. When was Alert 3 ordered?

Lieutenant COOPER. It was ordered two weeks before the attack or thereabouts.

General McNARNEY. Under that status of alert how many men of your squadron do you permit to be absent at any one time?

Lieutenant COOPER. Fifty percent of men and officers.

General McNARNEY. How many do you estimate were present [478] that morning, on the morning of December 7?

Lieutenant COOPER. I believe close to all of the men were there. Very few men have any place to stay in town anyway, so they all reported back to the field.

General McNARNEY. Where did your men go, the most of them? Did they go to their duty stations, to their typewriters, or did they stay out on the field?

Lieutenant COOPER. Most of the men in my squadron had drawn rifles and ammunition and were out along Hangar Avenue.

General McNARNEY. What is your record of service, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant COOPER. I was ordered to active duty on the 7th November, 1940. I am now serving my second tour.

General McNARNEY. Where did you come from?

Lieutenant COOPER. Honolulu, sir.

General McNARNEY. Honolulu. Are you a native?

Lieutenant COOPER. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. A native of there. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. We find it necessary, Lieutenant, to ask that you do not discuss your testimony here, or anything that happened in this room, with anyone else.

Lieutenant COOPER. Yes, sir. I will do that.

Major ALLEN. The Provost Marshal is here, sir. Would you like to hear him at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we shall be glad to see him.

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF MELVIN L. CRAIG, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, FIELD ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY

The CHAIRMAN. Have you the information we requested?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, I believe that I have.

On the night of December 6, between 6 p. m. and 6 a. m. the total number of soldiers arrested was 43, and 38 of these men were arrested for being drunk and 4 for being A. W. O. L. [479] Out of these 43, 42 were returned to their organizations and one man was confined.

The civil police record for that night: they had a total of 90 arrests: drunkenness 39, gambling 39, threatening 2, theft 1, auto theft 1, drunk-driving 1, other misdemeanors 3, assault and battery 3. A total of 90.

Comparing that with previous Saturday nights at payday, the night of July 31 from 6 p. m. to 6 a. m. we had 80 arrests. That is soldiers. Out of these, the number that were returned to their organizations was 48.

On the night of August 30 between 6 p. m. and 6 a. m. we had 87 arrests. That is the military. Number of men returned to their organizations was 30. 28 were turned in for safekeeping that night.

In the night of October 1, total number of arrests was 87. Number of men returned to their organizations was 40, and 47 confined.

On September 2 we had 21 arrests, 20 men confined and 1 returned to his organization.

September 30, 79 arrests, 35 returned to their organizations and 44 confined.

Then in November they started to distribute the paydays, and on November 3 Schofield Barracks was paid. Number of arrests was 67. Number of men returned to their organizations was 49. Number of men confined was 18.

And November 7: number of arrests 70, number of men returned to their organizations 10, number of men confined 60.

Then on December 3—that was the payday before—the total number of arrests that night was 114. 98 of these men were returned to their organizations; 16 were confined. But as far as the records show there was a relatively small number on the night of the 6th.

The civil police on November 15 arrested 74. That's [480] civilians.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel CRAIG. Not soldiers.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel CRAIG. November 22, 63; November 29, 68.

General McCoy. So in every case there were more civilians arrested than soldiers?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, it works out about that way. The population of the City of Honolulu and police district #1—that includes just the City of Honolulu and around this area here—that is, men over 21 years of age—is 61,800.

That is as far as I went back; I thought that that was the information the Commission desired.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is exactly what we want, sir.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, was there anything else that we asked the colonel to get us? I think not.

Mr. HOWE. I have nothing else, no, sir.

Colonel CRAIG. There were no officers on the night of the 6th.

The CHAIRMAN. No officers detained?

Colonel CRAIG. No officers. And, as I stated before, I checked on my activities that night, and I was home at eight o'clock, and I was home all evening until Sunday morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes.

Mr. HOWE. I have a report from Colonel Dunlop of the Adjutant General's Department on the consolidated report on the radio question you sent out as to men on hand, in percentages of men on hand.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HOWE. And also one from General Davidson referring to Wheeler Field.

[481] The CHAIRMAN. I think we shall just ask the stenographer to copy this report of Robert H. Dunlop into the record.

(The report referred to is as follows:)

26 DECEMBER 1941.

Memorandum to: Major Brooke E. Allen, Air Corps.

In response to a radiogram of this Headquarters sent to all major echelons, post and district commanders, the following tabulation shows the percentage of strength present at 8 a. m., 7 December 1941:

24th Inf. Div., Schofield Barracks, T. H.	90.0%
25th Int. Div., Schofield Barracks, T. H.	85.6
Hawaiian C. A. C.	
Hq & Hq Btry, HCAC	86.0
Hq Btry & Intelligence Btry, 53d CA	88.0
Harbor Def. of P. H. (includes the following 97th CA, Ft. Kam., T. H.)	97.0
Harbor Defenses of Honolulu	91.0
64th C. A., Ft. Shafter, T. H.	89.5
98th C. A. (includes 97th CA, at Scho Bks)	94.0
251st C. A. (Camp Malakole)	67.0
Hawaiian Air Force, T. H.	
Hq & Hq Squadron, HAF	100.0
19th Transport Squadron	90.0
428th Signal Maintenance Co	96.0
Tow Target Detachment	91.0
5th Chemical Co. Service	100.0
7th AC Sq Communications (based on total strength including men on DS)	53.0
7th AC Sq Weather	90.0
407th Signal Co. Avn	97.3
18th Bomb Wing, Hickam Field, T. H.	94.0
14th Pursuit Wing, Wheeler Field, T. H.	
Officers	95.0
Enlisted men	84.0
[482] Schofield Barracks, T. H. (Non-Divisional Units less reception center)	93.49
Trainees at Reception Center	27.0
Hickam Field, T. H.	84.0
Wheeler Field, T. H. (non-tactical units)	
Officers	97.0
Enlisted men	81.0
Fort Armstrong, T. H.	81.0
Percentage of Strength present at 8:00 a. m., 7 December 1941:	
Bellows Field, T. H.	
Officers	51.0
Enlisted men	85.0
Kilauea Military Camp, Hilo, Hawaii	
Permanent Det	80.0
Visiting Det	70.0
Hawaii Dist., Nat. Guard Armory, Hily, Hawaii	95.0
Maui Dist., Nat. Guard Armory, Wailuku, Maui	59.7
Tripler Gen. Hospital, Ft. Shafter, T. H.	
Officers	20.0
Nurses	99.0
Det. Med. Dept	97.0
Det. QMC	100.0
DHST, Ft. Shafter, T. H.	95.0
Hawaiian Ord. Depot, Ft. Shafter, T. H.	
Officers	42.0
Enlisted men	95.0
Kauai District, Lihue, Manai	Not received.

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

[483] The CHAIRMAN. The interceptor command report reads thus:

(The report referred to was read into the record by the Chairman, and is as follows:)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN INTERCEPTOR COMMAND

23 December 1941

Honorable OWEN J. ROBERTS,

Associate Justice of The United States,

Chairman Investigating Committee, Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: As requested by your Committee, the following figures on the strength of Wheeler Field as of midnight 6-7 December 1941, are submitted:

Present: 228 Officers. 2547 Enlisted Men.

Absent: 1 Officer. 406 Enlisted Men.

Of the 406 men absent:

373 were on Detached Service (Schools, etc.)

5 were sick

21 were on furlough

2 absent without official leave

5 absent in confinement

406 Total.

H. C. DAVIDSON,

Brigadier General, Air Corps,

Commanding.

The CHAIRMAN. That seems to be a reasonable report, doesn't it?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Copy that, Mr. Reporter, if you will.

Major ALLEN. Lieutenant James K. Thomas, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, Lieutenant?

[484] TESTIMONY OF FIRST LIEUTENANT JAMES K. THOMAS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give your full name to the stenographer.

Lieutenant THOMAS. James K. Thomas.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your assignment here on December 7, 1941, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant THOMAS. I was post signal and post signal property officer at Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Hickam Field?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7 when the attack broke?

Lieutenant THOMAS. I was at my quarters when the first attack broke.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell us what you observed and what you did and saw done after that?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Well, I believe it was one of the very first bombs awoke me, and I saw that there had been a hit of some sort in Pearl Harbor area; I couldn't tell just what, from my quarters. I proceeded out into the front of the house. I noted some planes which I believe were dive bomber type carrying the Japanese insignia, which

were coming low over my quarters at that time, coming from the direction of Pearl Harbor toward our H. A. D. area. That awoke me to what was going on, and I went back and dressed immediately and went to my quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. Which were?

Lieutenant THOMAS. The headquarters building at Hickam Field, automatic telephone exchange.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in charge of that communications post, were you?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I suppose your duties at the post did [485] not permit of your observing very much outside? You were pretty busy?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Well, I was in and out quite a bit, sir. We immediately went to work laying field wire to set up an advance command post.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Lieutenant THOMAS. In the officers' quarters area, at Colonel Farthing's quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. Were your men under fire when they were doing that?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you Saturday night, sir?

Lieutenant THOMAS. I was at my quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of your command reported promptly?

Lieutenant THOMAS. I would say that every man was there within 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Full complement?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Yes, sir. I had—no, sir, I will retract that. There were two men on post who rang in about an hour later, as rapidly as they could get there from Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You say you were setting up an advance command post. Was that in accordance with Standing Operating Procedure or was it an order given that morning?

Lieutenant THOMAS. We had established no definite location of an advance command post, but it was in our operating procedure that such would be set up immediately, and the location would depend on the situation.

[486] General McNARNEY. Who picked the location?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Colonel Farthing.

General MCCOY. Who was the colonel?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Colonel Farthing.

General MCCOY. Was he post commander?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, we shall ask you not to discuss or disclose anything that went on in the room while you were here. Thank you, sir.

Lieutenant THOMAS. Thank you.

Major ALLEN. Sergeant Ullrich, Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, will you be sworn, sir?

**TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT RALPH TRAUGER ULLRICH,
UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is your full name?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Ralph Trauger Ullrich.

The CHAIRMAN. What command are you in, Sergeant?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Base engineering, sir, at Hickam Field, 22d Matériel.

The CHAIRMAN. And where are your quarters?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Quartered in the barracks, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you on duty on the morning of December 7?

Sergeant ULLRICH. I was, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you when the attack broke?

Sergeant ULLRICH. At Hanger 15, sir, the base engineering shops.

The CHAIRMAN. You had already gone out to the shops before the attack broke, had you?

[487] Sergeant ULLRICH. Yes, sir; I had.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the first thing you heard or saw?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Well, as near as I can give it to you, sir, we had orders to report into the shop at 7:30 in the morning, between 7:30 and 8, so I got up there about 7:30, and practically everyone else was there. We heard some airplanes overhead and heard some explosions over near the Navy sector. We all walked outside, and I heard someone make the remark that "If that's fooling I'll believe anything."

General MCCOY. That what?

The CHAIRMAN. "If that's fooling I will believe anything."

Sergeant ULLRICH. And just about that time we seen a formation of airplanes coming from the south side of the field, from over Fort Kamehameha.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they high or low, Sergeant?

Sergeant ULLRICH. I would judge about 200 feet, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Probably a little higher. Just then there was an explosion occurred near us, and we all scattered. Some of us went through the hangar, and there was a number of explosions in there. When the dust and everything settled, what of us were on our feet yet, we run outside, and then they began machine-gunning us.

The CHAIRMAN. These were dive bombers and machine-gun strafers, were they?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Yes, sir. So after that was over I went back in the hangar, helped to pick up the wounded. We got them out, I went down to the barracks, and sometime later it started all over again.

The CHAIRMAN. There seemed to be a second attack?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Yes, sir, there was.

The CHAIRMAN. Was Hickman Field bombed from a high [488] altitude, as well as this low-flying stuff?

Sergeant ULLRICH. I couldn't say, sir, as to the high altitude.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know. Your contingent was all on hand that morning, were they?

Sergeant ULLRICH. The greater percentage, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. Was it normal routine to work on Sunday morning in the base engineering shop, Sergeant?

Sergeant ULLRICH. No, sir, it wasn't. We had a B-24, and they were doing some work on it, that we had worked on late Saturday evening, and then they expected some more airplanes in in the morning, and we had orders that the entire crew would come out and report for duty.

General McNARNEY. Did your outfit furnish any guard?

Sergeant ULLRICH. They had some on ground training that I know of, but I don't know how many, or so forth.

General McNARNEY. What guard was on the shops?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Well, there was no guard at all around the shop, sir, that I know of.

General McNARNEY. Do you keep the shops locked at night?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Yes, sir, they are locked, and then they have the necessary guard, but they were not from my organization.

General McNARNEY. Anybody sleeping in the hangar?

Sergeant ULLRICH. No, sir. And then they did have guards up there while the B-24 was parked. We were doing some work on it. What organization had them I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you observe any of these 4-engine bombers come in that morning on a flight from the continent?

Sergeant ULLRICH. No, sir, I didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. From the mainland?

Sergeant ULLRICH. No, sir, I didn't.

[489] The CHAIRMAN. You didn't see them.

General McNARNEY. How many ships did you have in the shop? Have you any idea?

Sergeant ULLRICH. There weren't any at all in our shop, sir. Ours is all machine shop, engine setup, sheet metal, and so forth.

General McNARNEY. How much damage was done to your equipment?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Well, not near as much as I thought at first, sir. I lost a few grinders, drill presses; that's about all. Practically all my welding equipment was ruined because it was down there in that far corner where the first large bomb hit.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any fire in your hangar?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Just a small one, sir, of no importance. About the only fire I seen was an arc welder burned up, and a few points.

General McNARNEY. How many men were disabled in your hangar when the hit came?

Sergeant ULLRICH. They figured about 60-odd, sir. That is the organization. In my department there was around 50-some-odd men. I had 20-some-odd casualties, and they weren't all there at the time.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall ask you not to disclose the questions or anything that happened in the room, Sergeant.

Sergeant ULLRICH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Sergeant ULLRICH. Yes, sir.

Major ALLEN. Private McBriarty, Bellows Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

[490] **TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE RAYMOND F. McBRIARTY,
UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give your name to the reporter, please.

Private McBRIARTY. Private first-class Raymond F. McBriarty.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your branch of the service, McBriarty?

Private McBRIARTY. Air Corps, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are you stationed?

Private McBRIARTY. I am stationed at Bellows Field, sir, in the 86th observation squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. What are your duties there?

Private McBRIARTY. I am aerial gunner and armorer, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in the air on December 7?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, after the attack we got in the air.

The CHAIRMAN. How long after the attack?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, I'd say about five minutes after the field was strafed.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Private McBRIARTY. About five minutes after the attack, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you inquire, General?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Was there any other outfit stationed at Bellows Field besides the observation squadron?

Private McBRIARTY. Yes, sir. The 44th pursuit was stationed there.

General McNARNEY. What airplanes are you equipped with, your squadron?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, our squadron is equipped with the O-47 B.

[491] General McNARNEY. How many?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, we had at the time, I believe there was, six in commission.

General McNARNEY. What time was the attack made on Bellows Field?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, at 8:30 one ship came over from the sea and fired on the shore. I don't believe it inflicted any casualties, and I don't know where the bursts landed. I heard them myself, and from there proceeded to go to church, and later I seen a B-17-B-17 D I believe—was landing down wind on the runway, and at about nine o'clock whistles blew around the camp, and everybody proceeded to their stations, the sections where they worked. I ran from church down to the section, and that was the time the large attack started, sir. There was no bombs dropped. It was just a strafing of the field.

General McNARNEY. You didn't realize then, when the first attack was made by this single plane, that there had been a heavy attack on the Island?

Private McBRIARTY. No, sir. I seen the plane, and the bullets sounded just like blanks, like—like blanks that the U. S. Army uses, and the ship looked like the AT-6 trainer the Army has.

General McNARNEY. And your commanding officer didn't realize that an attack was in progress?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, I couldn't say whether he did or not.

General McNARNEY. Well, you say you went to church. Was that voluntary?

Private McBRIARTY. That was on my own, sir.

General McNARNEY. That was voluntary? Nobody told you that—

Private McBRIARTY. No, sir. I had seen that one plane, and somebody in the barracks asked me what it was, and I told [492] him it was a plane with two red balls, so I just proceeded to go to church, and of course thinking about it, and then when I seen this B-17 landing down wind, that should have—more should have dawned upon me. It didn't.

General McNARNEY. Well, you received no instructions from any of your—

Private McBRIARTY (Interposing). —superior officers, no.

General McNARNEY. —noncommissioned officers or officers that anything unusual was happening?

Private McBRIARTY. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. And you say a signal was sounded?

Private McBRIARTY. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Where were you then?

Private McBRIARTY. I was in the church at the time, sir.

General McNARNEY. And where did you go then?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, then I ran down to the line and proceeded into the armament shack and grabbed my gun, and another fellow followed me out with ammunition, and I got into the Major's ship, Major Stewart's ship, and mounted my gun and put my ammunition in my own gun and loaded it and went around and was proceeding to put ammunition in the fixed guns when the attack started; and when the first wave of planes came over I hit the dust. After it passed over I crawled in the cockpit, and I expended 450 rounds on them. I believe it was 450; I couldn't exactly say up to the dot, but I know it was over 400, in 100-round ammunition cans.

General McNARNEY. It was on the ground?

Private McBriarty. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. And did you notice any results?

Private McBRIARTY. Well, sir, one plane—one plane was coming down, just came right down the runway, didn't seem to have any objective at all, just fired on the ramp. Well, I know I hit that, but I could see that it sort of—it was so darned close, I could see holes going in the fuselage behind [493] the pilot, but I doubt whether I got him.

Then there was another one that dived straight on me. I fired right into its motor, and after he came out of his dive he pulled awful hard on the stick, not as any regular pilot would do, and I might say he was an awful poor pilot, because the way he was following in on his gunnery line, why, he tried to fire—to follow me straight in, and to correct his fire, why, he gave it too much rudder from one side and then too much rudder on the other side, and he completely missed his target.

General McNARNEY. You think he was an inexperienced pilot?

Private MCBRIARTY. Yes, sir; I would say most of them were, from the way they banked their ships. They skid all around. They really were rugged with the controls, really pretty rugged with them.

General McNARNEY. Rough?

Private MCBRIARTY. Yes.

General McNARNEY. When did you take off?

Private MCBRIARTY. Sir, I said—I'd say we took off about five minutes after the attack, and when we got up in the air the Major's plane was acting sort of rough. We were going to—I believe we were going to proceed to go out to sea, to try to follow them, but I don't think the Major took the chance with the ship; it was pretty rocky. I don't know whether the ship was hit or not, but it had plenty of chance to be hit.

General McNARNEY. And you came back in and landed?

Private MCBRIARTY. Yes, sir, we came—proceeded back to land.

General McNARNEY. Did any other ships of your squadron take off?

Private MCBRIARTY. No, sir, no ships of our squadron took off, but one P-40 from the 44 Pursuit took off, and that went down, as I understand. I don't know whether any more took off or not, sir.

General McNARNEY. Was there any great amount of damage done [494] to the airplanes there?

Private MCBRIARTY. Sir, from the 86th squadron there was only—there was an O-49 completely ruined, shot through the dashboard and the controls; the wings were all ripped up, and there was one hole in an elevator in an O-47.

General McNARNEY. That is all.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask one question: Have you knowledge of anyone observing planes that morning flying over or by your post, by Bellows Field, approaching the Island?

Private MCBRIARTY. No, sir; I haven't heard of anybody at all that has seen anything of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your contingent all present and accounted for that morning when you were needed?

Private MCBRIARTY. Sir, most of our men were. We were pretty well johnny-on-the-spot.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Private MCBRIARTY. We were pretty well eye-on-the-spot that morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Commanding officers all there and taking charge?

Private MCBRIARTY. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. About what time was it when you came out of church when this attack occurred?

Private MCBRIARTY. Sir, I would say it was about nine o'clock, almost on the minute.

Admiral REEVES. You had heard nothing before that except this one plane that you told us about?

Private MCBRIARTY. Yes, sir, just this one plane. Sir, what drew our attention to it was the B-17, which is unusual, it is such a small field, and then, besides, coming down wind, why, we thought there was something fishy.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did it make a good landing?

Private MCBRIARTY. No, sir. It was with the wind, and it [495] landed about midrunway and went off the end of the ramp. There is a big knoll there, and the plane was a complete washout.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was the pilot killed?

Private McBRIARTY. No, sir. He had three men wounded. They had been attacked on the way over here, and there was no ammunition in the plane, and evidently they couldn't fire back. I imagine—I couldn't say exactly the true facts of the case, so I would rather it was taken away from me.

General McCoy. Was that the only plane of that type that landed there that morning?

Private McBRIARTY. Yes, sir, it was the only B-17.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the B-17 one of our planes?

Private McBRIARTY. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. That is the big 4-engine flying fortress.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Private McBRIARTY. B-17 D I believe, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if that wasn't one of those that was coming in from San Francisco. It wasn't armed?

Private McBRIARTY. No. It had guns and everything else, sir, but it lacked the ammunition.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Private McBRIARTY. I know we took the guns out of it and placed them up for ground defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do not discuss the testimony or what has been asked you here, with anyone else.

Private McBRIARTY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Major ALLEN. Captain West, Camp Malakole.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN MELBOURNE H. WEST, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter, please?

Captain WEST. Melbourne H. West.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your branch of the service, Captain?

Captain WEST. I am in the Coast Artillery Corps, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you stationed on the day of December 7, 1941?

Captain WEST. I was stationed at Camp Malakole, at Barbers Point.

The CHAIRMAN. At Barbers Point?

Captain WEST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, your headquarters were not at Barbers Point, were they?

Captain WEST. I described Camp Malakole as being at Barbers Point. I was at Camp Malakole.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Captain WEST. Our headquarters is there.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the first you knew of the attack on December 7?

Captain WEST. Only by my own observation.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want.

Captain WEST. At eight o'clock in the morning I was having breakfast at the officers' mess, and I was officer of the day, and heard what sounded like gunfire, which sometimes is not unusual, and it continued to get louder, and I went outside and observed in the sky all the smoke coming from Pearl Harbor, in that direction, and the shrapnel in the air, so I knew it wasn't gunfiring, and shortly after eight o'clock I heard machine gunfire from—it sounded like from the air, and it was from the air over Camp Malakole, strafing of enemy planes over that camp.

[497] The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any machine gun defense there?

Captain WEST. We had ground machine guns, sir. We were protecting our own equipment against sabotage at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. You were under Alert No. 1 at that time?

Captain WEST. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And did you get your machine guns into action, Captain?

Captain WEST. Yes, sir; not only those machine guns but other machine guns which were for anti-aircraft protection, that would be moved out later on, but they were put into action during—oh—the third or fourth strafing attack.

The CHAIRMAN. You got them out of storage as fast as you could and set them up, did you?

Captain WEST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your contingent up to full strength that morning?

Captain WEST. No, sir. There were some men on pass. Some men were on pass. The guard battery was there a hundred percent, and we had a standby battery there, and I can't—I don't know how many were on pass, but very few, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain WEST. Small percentage.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. What equipment have you in your batteries, Captain?

Captain WEST. Have I in my battery, or——

General McNARNEY. Yes. In your battery what equipment do you have?

Captain WEST. I was commanding officer of the searchlight batteries.

General McNARNEY. Oh, the searchlight batteries.

Captain WEST. Yes, sir. We have all of our equipment there, of course: the 3-inch guns of the other batteries and [498] the .30- and .50-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns.

General McNARNEY. Was any of the equipment in place ready to fire?

Captain WEST. No, sir. It was in the storage area.

General McNARNEY. How long did it take you to get into position?

Captain WEST. I was at camp, and I can't state the time that the machine guns were in position at Pearl Harbor, but they got down there ready to fire within one or two hours after that time. The

3-inch guns moved out of there—it takes considerable time to place those ready to fire; it was some time in the afternoon before the 3-inch guns were ready in their war positions.

General McNARNEY. What were their war positions; will you tell us?

Captain WEST. Their war positions were down on the Ewa plain. There were three gun batteries, two in a southerly direction from Ewa and one near West Loch.

General McNARNEY. Will you point those places out on the map?

Captain WEST. One gun battery was down here southeast of Ewa (indicating), another here (indicating), and another up near West Loch.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what time you received the orders for you to take up your battle position?

Captain WEST. I don't know, sir. As officer of the day I gave the call to arms at 8:10. I tried to get through to the 53 brigade and also the commanding officer, and I couldn't do that, so on my own I gave that call to arms.

On the time that we received the order to go into Alert No. 3, I cannot give that to you exactly. It was between 8 and 9, all I can say.

[499] General McNARNEY. Well, this call to arms, position—is that the order to move out, or just alert?

Captain WEST. That alerted everybody; that is, to get every man into their—to get their equipment together, personal equipment together, and stand by for further orders.

The CHAIRMAN. You got the Alert No. 3 around eight, between eight and nine, did you?

Captain WEST. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From headquarters?

Captain WEST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had been in Alert No. 1 for how long, Captain?

Captain WEST. Since the 27th of November.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Had there been any interval of Alert No. 1 or 3 in between there, between the 27th of November and December 7?

Captain WEST. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It had all been Alert No. 1?

Captain WEST. Alert No. 1. We were taking all precautions against sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Anything more?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. We shall ask you not to discuss the testimony that you have given or anything that has occurred in the room while you were here, Captain.

Captain WEST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Major ALLEN. Do you want to hear some others, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Major ALLEN. Lieutenant Lyman, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, sir?

[500] **TESTIMONY OF FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIS THEODORE
LYMAN, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter, please?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Willis Theodore Lyman.

The CHAIRMAN. And to what command are you attached?

Lieutenant LYMAN. First Lieutenant, 251st Coast Artillery, Anti-Aircraft Battery E.

The CHAIRMAN. And where in that capacity was your personal station on the morning of December 7?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Sir, at Camp Malakole.

The CHAIRMAN. The same station as the captain, the previous witness?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the first warning you had of an attack?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Sir, at eight o'clock my captain and myself were just getting up preparatory to going to church; they were going to dedicate our chapel. And the phone call came asking for Lieutenant Lytton of our command, asking for him. His wife was phoning and stating that there was a lot of noise, and she said a lot of big black things dropping around the place up there at Wahiawa, which is near Schofield Barracks. We could hear the sound of explosions at that hour—that was about two or three minutes to eight o'clock, sir—and I could hear it over the phone, and I assured her that I thought it was just a practice bombing on the north side of the Island by the air corps. And then she hung up, and I stepped out to the porch of the officers' barracks, looked toward Pearl Harbor, and saw the bursts of high explosive in the air, and I knew that was not right.

At the same time I could observe three planes circling low [501] and left, following the hills from Fort Berrette toward camp. I rushed back to my room, grabbed my glasses, took a look, and the captain was right with me. We saw the red insignia, and I told the captain and Captain Byars, the battalion executive, that those were Japanese planes, and Captain Byars said, "Alert the battalion," and Captain McIntire and I both hit the phone at the same time to alert the battery. That was approximately three minutes after eight, sir. We then completed dressing and ran over to the battery and went to work.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you any anti-aircraft guns in place?

Lieutenant LYMAN. We did not at that time, sir. We are a machine gun battalion. We are in the machine gun battalion and are the machine gun battery of the automatic weapons battalion, and we had our .30 calibers out. I got two of them out on the line, and we got a chance to fire.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you get them out from?

Lieutenant LYMAN. From our ordnance room, sir, which is—well, it is kind of hard to describe from here.

The CHAIRMAN. Never mind. It is some distance from where you set up your guns?

Lieutenant LYMAN. We set up about fifty yards immediately toward the sea from the barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Lieutenant LYMAN. And fired from there.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had been in Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, where would those guns have been?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Under Alert No. 2 we would probably have been in the field, sir, because we go into the field on Alert No. 3.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. When did you get Alert No. 3 from headquarters?

Lieutenant LYMAN. So far as I know, sir, we never received that, but we received orders to move at about ten o'clock, and [502] I called the first platoon out and went to Pearl Harbor after we had fired on these planes at Malakole.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your fire effective?

Lieutenant LYMAN. We got one plane definitely, sir—I believe they are going to give us credit for it—and the other plane is a question mark. I noted in the journal that I wasn't sure about the other one, but it seemed to have some trouble getting away.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. At what altitude were the planes that you fired at?

Lieutenant LYMAN. The first plane that we fired at, sir, was approximately a hundred yards. The second plane was 75 feet at the lowest point, and at that point we, as far as I know about it, on one fire only had two guns going, sir, two .30 caliber on the old umbrella mounting, model 1918 mount, and it was almost pointblank fire both ways. One of our boys, Fairbanks, was struck in front of me by one tracer stream, and the other tracer stream from the plane was about as far away from me as between this gentleman here and myself (indicating), and he's recovered and is back with us.

That plane dipped to about 75 feet, and at that point when it fired—we fired at it—we could see—I saw one tracer ricochet off of the plane near the junction of the wing and the fuselage there by the cockpit, and it ricocheted off the plane, and the plane made a climbing turn to the left and wheeled on out and kept dipping down like this and struck the water some distance out.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you think of the way they handled their planes?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Their flying, sir, was skillful. They took their time. They apparently knew exactly where they were going. I didn't think much of their bombing. They fired on [503] our little group of three trucks on the way in to Pearl Harbor, so we stopped and piled out and shot at them with our rifles, and rode in, and while we were emplacing the 50's on the roof of the shop supply building in Pearl Harbor—that's building 150 where I put one section, put the first section I took out with me—they attacked us twice there, and that was at about eleven o'clock. I think my journal shows that about 11:12 we received the first one, and then the second one was about three or four minutes later. Things happened pretty rapidly; you didn't have time to keep track all the time.

They knew where they were going. And their speeds, approximately, I judge from our target practice work, didn't exceed more

than about 200 miles; the last group—we shot at that last group at Malakole—was approximately 200.

General McNARNEY. What type were they? Single seaters, or what?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Two types. The first group that we saw come over, and the first warning we had that they were actually going to strafe the camp, they cleared their guns, and they were a type that is like a pursuit, except the trailing edge of the wing might have been, instead of being tapered, straight like our P-40's. Their planes were plainly a hybrid, no definite type such as ours; a rounded nose like a P-36, and the back end of those wings looked like those old Douglas O-19's we saw in the maneuvers in '40, although not quite so much cut in. And then the ones that we shot at were apparently a two-place ship. And could only fire straight forward. Their guns fire from the leading edge of the wing. We picked up some of the slugs. I have one slug with a steel jacket and—steel core, and the base of the shell said 7.7, would be about 25.

General McNARNEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

(There was no response.)

[504] The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, we shall ask you not to discuss what has gone on in this room with anyone.

Lieutenant LYMAN. Yes, sir. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Major ALLEN. There is one more witness, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT JUNE D. DICKENS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give you full name to the reporter, will you, please?

Sergeant DICKENS. June D. Dickens.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, what was your tour of duty on the morning of December 7, 1941?

Sergeant DICKENS. I was sergeant of the guard, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Sergeant DICKENS. I was sergeant of the guard at Camp Malakole.

The CHAIRMAN. At Malakole?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is coast defense?

Sergeant DICKENS. No, sir. That is anti-aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. Anti-aircraft. Same unit as the lieutenant who has just been here, Lieutenant Lyman?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir; we are all in the same regiment, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All in the same regiment. Where were you when the thing broke?

Sergeant DICKENS. I was on the guardhouse porch there, sir. I had just got up, and I went out there to make up my guard book, and just as the corporal went down to get breakfast, why, I turned around and says, "So long. Take it easy," and [505] I stepped out there, and about that quick, why, the crack of machine gunfire

cut loose. It was two Japanese dive bombers. I am quite sure as to what they were because I took a good look at them.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were they coming? Over Malakole?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir. They were going directly down California Street in Malakole.

The CHAIRMAN. They were?

Sergeant DICKENS. They were going directly over the center of Battery B's barracks, and I looked up, and that is when the machine gunfire cut loose. They seemed to have picked out the ammunition dump as their target.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course you were not in a position to fire at those?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir, but I wheeled out as many machine guns as I could.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were your machine guns?

Sergeant DICKENS. I had one sabotage truck on the beach, and I had one other sabotage truck at the guardhouse, and I am pretty sure there were six planes. As the first two went over they fired at them from the beach there. They saw what was happening and didn't hesitate.

The CHAIRMAN. That truck was manned at the time?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir. It always had been manned.

The CHAIRMAN. It had been manned?

Sergeant DICKENS. We man all our trucks 24 hours.

The CHAIRMAN. That was under Alert No. 1?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Anti-sabotage?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And there was enough of a crew there to go right to work, was there?

Sergeant DICKENS. There certainly was, sir.

[506] The CHAIRMAN. And they did get additional machine guns?

Sergeant DICKENS. I warned the second battalion—they are the machine gun outfit—that we were being attacked, and to wheel out as many guns as they could, and the marine outfit up at the beach, I think they may have been at Malakole; now they camp at Nanakuli. They came and manned their five .50-calibers on the beach up there—they were having target practice a week before—and returned as much fire as they could. We had two B. A. R. men on the fire tower there, which brought down one plane. It was quite remarkable.

The CHAIRMAN. Two of your men?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir, two men on guard up there. It was a guard order that we had two B. A. R. men there. And as the plane swooped down to do its best to wipe out the Marine Corps, the B. A. R. men let go with automatic, short bursts, and it banked right down and went into the ocean.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those all the planes, those six or so, that went directly over you?

Sergeant DICKENS. There were six.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all?

Sergeant DICKENS. There was one bomber that come in from the west. It was a heavy bomber. I couldn't quite make out what it was. The motors on it were pointed; it had four motors on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess it was one of our own.

The WITNESS. It might have been.

The CHAIRMAN. One that was coming in from San Francisco and didn't know.

General McNARNEY. Did you fire on that, Sergeant?

Sergeant DICKENS. No, sir, I didn't. If you don't know what the plane is you don't want to shoot at it; it might be your own.

The CHAIRMAN. It was.

[507] Where were you the night of December 6, Sergeant?

Sergeant DICKENS. December 6 I was at the guardhouse. It was a funny thing about that. That afternoon, Saturday, we observed a Japanese fishing boat off the coast of Malakole there. Well, they naturally called me down there to see what it was. I knew what a Japanese boat looked like if I saw it. The boat was within 50 yards of the shoreline, and there were two men trying to swim in to shore. So I unlimbered my 45 and walked down to the beach and told them if they come any closer I would shoot to kill. They started treading water and headed back to their boat and went back, and that's how I mounted a machine gun truck up there, my two B. A. R. men and machine gun loaded, and told them if they ever came back again I would start opening fire, because they are not supposed to come near. The boat came back three or four times, but it didn't come into machine gun range. It's in the guard order at Malakole that I wrote it in.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[508] General McNARNEY. You thought that boat was getting its feet warm trying to sabotage your equipment?

Sergeant DICKENS. We are suspicious of the Japanese or Chinese around here and if they start fooling around the camp we don't take any talk from them.

General McNARNEY. Did you report that incident to anyone?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, the officer of the day was with me, and he went back to investigate.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it was entered in your journal?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, before I left the guardhouse on that day, I made notes about the attack and how many planes there were and the description of the planes, and I left it there for the next sergeant to write it in.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you were on duty until what time Saturday night?

Sergeant DICKENS. I was on duty all night.

The CHAIRMAN. You were on duty all night?

Sergeant DICKENS. All night, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you started to get breakfast after your tour of duty?

Sergeant DICKENS. I didn't get breakfast until the next day then.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been in the service?

Sergeant DICKENS. I have been on active service more than a year.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you called in from?

Sergeant DICKENS. I was called in from the National Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. What group?

Sergeant DICKENS. The California group.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Just do not disclose nor discuss with anyone anything that was said in this room.

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir. I have a short memory.

[509] The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We will adjourn at this time until 2:15.

(Thereupon, at 1:30 o'clock p. m., the hearing was recessed until 2:15 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The hearing reconvened at 2:15 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.)

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES J. UTTERBACK

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us your full name, please?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Charles J. Utterback.

The CHAIRMAN. And what is your profession?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I am head foreman for the District Engineers.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7?

Mr. UTTERBACK. At Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. At what hour?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I went to work at 6:30 in the morning, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is your position here under the Army or is it a civilian position?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I am a civilian, sir, working for the District Engineers.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell us what your first warning or your first knowledge of the attack was and tell us what you observed?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I was walking toward Mat A, which is the main mat at Hickam Field, air side, and I heard a large explosion, and I first thought—the first thing that I thought was the dynamite blew up, because we were loading the dynamite.

[510] I glanced toward Pearl Harbor and I saw this large black smoke rising.

About the time I looked up I heard another explosion, and then I saw a lot of planes flying toward us, and about this time the man with me remarked that they were Japanese planes, and they were right over us.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those planes flying high or low?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Very low, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What firing did they do? Were they dropping bombs?

Mr. UTTERBACK. The first planes that came over dropped bombs, sir, and they flew right over the—the first one I saw dropped a bomb which was at the repair hangar. It hit that kitchen, just this side of it. It dropped the first bomb there.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they seem to be going fast or not?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, they were not very fast, just slow cruising speed, flying very low and not very fast at all—very slow-flying planes.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us what else you saw.

Mr. UTTERBACK. When this happened, why I saw the Japanese planes. We could see the markings on them because they had the red insignia on the bottom of the wings.

I being a War Veteran then suggested that the men with me should take cover; so we ran back to the side of the road and went in the ditch along the Fort Kamehameha highway, which was 75 feet from there.

We went in this ditch and waited for a while. They were flying around in circles. They seemed to fly out to sea, and then came back again.

I saw my men seemed to be dumbfounded, and I told them to get under cover. I told these men to take cover. Then I telephoned the exchange to see what message there was. I [511] wanted to get to the foreman, and the telephone operator was there, and he wasn't there. At that time some Army officers appeared on the scene. I went back to my men, and they were under the trees; so I asked the Army officer there in charge if he would get these men under cover.

He told me to take them over to the old mortar casemate, and we found it was locked, but we got them under shelter for a while; so I told them to take cover back to the mortar battery.

I stayed there. That was when the second attack come over, and they were starting to strafe the ground. We laid along the casement there. So then we went back to the mortar battery. We were in there and we stayed in there probably an hour or so. Some of our men helped to get the lights running, and I sent mechanics to the gun battery to get the engines running.

The colonel had asked for volunteers, and I sent a bunch of men to dig trenches. They had no toilet facilities there, and there were no water facilities. We sent men out for water.

At this time my direct superior got in touch with me and told me to go and clear the streets and shut the water off. This was about the third phase of it.

They were very high at this time and dropping heavy bombs at the last attack.

I was near the parade ground at Hickam Field trying to shut off the main when the last attack came over, and they seemed to be dropping a heavy load on the ball diamond. One hit the railroad track, and the rest of them didn't hit anything. I don't think any bombs hit any building in the last attack. The only one that did damage was the one that hit the railroad track.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you observe any of our own [512] airplanes getting into the air?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I could not say, sir. There were some planes trying to land. They were trying to land, and it was while I had the detail out trying to get some water—I imagine 9 o'clock—that I noticed a couple of our small fighting planes flying very low after the Japanese planes, chasing them across, because I had hollered at the gunner from Fort Kamehameha to quit firing because it was one of our own planes. That was during the second phase, but the anti-aircraft seemed to be in action. It didn't take them long.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably they drove the last planes very high and spoiled their aim?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes. The anti-aircraft in less than 10 minutes were putting up a barrage from the Pearl Harbor side, were putting up quite a barrage.

General McCoy. Was that on Hickam Field?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. This anti-aircraft fire?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir, it seemed to come from Pearl Harbor. There was no anti-aircraft fire on Hickam Field, to my knowledge. There was from behind Fort Kamehameha, but not at that time.

General McCoy. What was your general impression of the conduct of the officers and the soldiers of the service under this shock, surprise, and so forth?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I can say the younger officers—I even remarked to someone later there how cool they were. There was some excitement. There are always some excited men, but I think they were very cool and conducted themselves in a very sober manner.

General McCoy. And the soldiers also?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes, because it was only 45 minutes until they were storing ammunition in the casemate and bringing up [513] surplus ammunition.

General McCoy. Was there anything exceptional that you noticed? Was there anything that struck you at the time as being an exceptionally bad act or anything of that sort?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No. The only thing I noticed that I thought was exceptional was how quick some of the officers got to their posts on Fort Kam, and I know several of the officers, and it seemed they got to their posts very rapidly because the old battery was manned—it seemed like it wasn't more than 20 minutes until they were ready at that old mortar battery.

General McCoy. Were there any anti-aircraft guns there?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir, but the coast defense were being manned very rapidly. I also noticed men in the hangars that came out fast trying to get the planes out, but they were strafed away.

General McCoy. Did you see the bomb that hit the barracks?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir, because the large hangar hides the barracks from where I was at that time, but I did see Hangar 13 hit, and I also saw the kitchen go up in flames, but I saw the direct hit on the repair hangar. They were right over that, and it seemed like they were just almost on it. They hit it several times but the first bomber hitting the repair hangar was very low. He was just right over it.

General McCoy. Did you see any Japanese planes knocked down?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir. I only saw one. I don't know whether he was knocked down or shot down. That was the only one sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Where do you live?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I live at 1419 Konia Street.

Admiral STANDLEY. Where is that?

Mr. UTTERBACK. That is on the Heights, Kamehameha Heights.

[514] Admiral STANDLEY. Kamehameha Heights?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is back from Fort Kamehameha?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir, that is the heights over here (indicating), right behind here. That is my house where I live over there.

The CHAIRMAN. That is toward Diamond Head?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir. That is right behind here. There is the school over there.

Admiral STANDLEY. What are your contacts in daily life? Recreation and so forth aside from those at Hickam Field?

Mr. UTTERBACK. You mean those I contact with?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, your friends and so forth.

Mr. UTTERBACK. I have the men I work with, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. They are all civilians?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes, all civilians.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you ever associate with the military to any extent except in your work?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir, except in my work.

Admiral STANDLEY. What, if any, comments or general impressions among the civilians and among your associates have been expressed in regard to the whole action on the 7th?

Mr. UTTERBACK. You mean the remarks that were said, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, the general understanding, the general comment on the whole situation.

Mr. UTTERBACK. The only thing I heard that morning, sir, was, "They caught them asleep, by God." That is all you would hear: "They caught them asleep, by God." I think I heard that comment 50 times that day.

General McCoy. How long have you been working here?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I have been on Hickam Field ever since it started, since 1936.

General McCoy. What would you say about the normal habits of the officers and the men at Hickam Field?

[515] Mr. UTTERBACK. Well, I have nothing but the highest respect for them, sir. I have been around the Army and in it practically all my life and I have seen nothing disorderly about any officer there.

General McCoy. Have you noticed any unusual drinking or drunkenness among the Army personnel since you have been here?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir, no more than any other place.

General McCoy. In other words, what would your general comment be about the Service men there?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Well, this is a small island and from the viewpoint of the Service men it has been very outstanding, sir, the soldiers and sailors here, because with so little recreation here they have to let some steam loose, and it has been outstanding from what I have seen.

General McCoy. Who is the engineering officer with whom you contact?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I am with the civil service. I am working directly under Colonel Wyman.

General McCoy. That is Rivers and Harbors?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a great deal of gossip in the newspapers about the Army men here having a pretty good time, and a great deal of drinking and so forth, and about a great deal of slackness. What is the opinion around among the civilians in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor? You realize we have got to get at the facts.

Mr. UTTERBACK. As I said before, there is probably a good deal of drinking, but with the large amount of men here, and as I say, there is no recreation for them, and I know myself, and probably some of you gentlemen do too, that back in 1916, 1917, and 1918 we had no recrea-

tion, and that was about the only thing you had to do, to get tanked up. That is just natural. I do not think it exists any more than among the civilians.

[516] The CHAIRMAN. No more in the Army than among the civilians?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir.

General McCoy. Isn't there some place for them to go in town? For instance, isn't there an Army and Navy YMCA?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes, but it is small for the amount of men.

General McCoy. Does the USO have a house in Honolulu?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No. They were raising funds for it, but there hasn't been any money for it unless it was started since the 7th. I know up to that time I don't think there has been any money for it.

The Navy had a recreation place out here but that was the only thing outside of their beach.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was the Richardson Athletic Field?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes.

General McCoy. Have you been in any of the hospitals here?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes, I have been in Tripler.

General McCoy. Does that impress you as being a good hospital?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes. I was in there three years ago when I fell and broke my arm and my shoulder on federal duty, and I was treated very nicely, being a civilian. I was treated exceptionally well and had a good doctor.

General McCoy. Do they have a Red Cross unit in that hospital?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes, sir, there is a Red Cross unit there.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Please observe silence about what has gone on in this room and do not discuss what has been said by you or anyone else.

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[517] General McCoy. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF EDWIN ST. J. GRIFFITH, UNITED STATES ENGINEERS

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us your full name?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Edwin St. J. Griffith.

The CHAIRMAN. And what is your official position?

Mr. GRIFFITH. I am chief inspector and associate engineer, United States Engineers.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a military or civilian unit?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Civilian unit, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7?

Mr. GRIFFITH. I was at the base yard. We were taking inventory.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that base yard?

Mr. GRIFFITH. That is between Hickam and Fort Kamehameha.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the first thing you observed? Tell us your observations around the fort and what happened, as nearly as you can.

Mr. GRIFFITH. We had just gotten started taking the inventory, or just about to get started, and we heard some shots, machine-gun

shots. I went out of the building we were in and looked out and saw a plane coming in a westerly direction about 100 feet or possibly more above us, which swooped down and machine gunned the place while it was in flight, and then swung around.

At first we thought that was our own maneuvers, military maneuvers, and many others seemed to think the same thing.

Just after it occurred I looked toward Hickam Field and saw another plane drop a bomb in the vicinity of the AC repair hangar, the one that was badly damaged, and then I knew it was Japanese planes.

The official that was in charge of the inventory asked me [518] if I would call Mr. Sisson, who is our boss, and ask him what he wanted us to do, or whether he wanted us to continue in this inventory.

I could not get Mr. Sisson, so I called Major Robinson, and then finally I called Colonel Wyman. He said, "Use your own judgment."

Then we went from there over to the section that was wooded near Fort Kamehameha, I should say, about half past eight, and the raid started at 8 o'clock sharp.

We stayed there under the trees for some time, possibly another half hour. Then the second raid started, and they put us in the magazine shelter in Fort Kamehameha proper.

We stayed there until it seemed to be quiet, about noon, and we came out and went back and stayed around in the base yard where our supplies are, and stayed there that afternoon and that night.

About half past 10 or 11 o'clock there was evidently another raid. We saw the tracer bullets, and I heard some shooting, but we could not see anything, but we knew it was another raid.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in the evening?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Yes, in the evening. We waited all that night and the next day. There wasn't anything of any particular moment then.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you see when they put the United States planes in the air?

Mr. GRIFFITH. I didn't see any planes at the time that the first raid was on. I did see later on planes coming back, which we thought were some of our patrol planes coming in. I can't say just exactly what time that was.

The CHAIRMAN. That was after the raid was over?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Yes, after the raid was over.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you living in Honolulu?

Mr. GRIFFITH. I live at the housing, the Hickam housing. [519] That is right adjoining the field.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right adjoining the field?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What has been your observations of the conduct of the officers and the private personnel of the Army here? Has their conduct been outstanding or poor? Was there a lot of drinking?

Mr. GRIFFITH. That is a hard question to answer.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize that, but we have a hard matter to decide here and we have to have the facts.

Mr. GRIFFITH. I believe there is quite a little of that goes on.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you Saturday night, sir? Were you out?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Saturday night?

The CHAIRMAN. December 7.

MR. GRIFFITH. I was home. I was home—no, I was not; I was out. I went to a show in town with my boy.

THE CHAIRMAN. Was there any disorder of an unusual character in town that night?

MR. GRIFFITH. I didn't notice any.

THE CHAIRMAN. I suppose there were many soldiers and sailors in town that night?

MR. GRIFFITH. I saw many, but I didn't notice anything disorderly.

THE CHAIRMAN. You did not?

MR. GRIFFITH. No, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN. Has there been among your acquaintances and friends, as you talk over the situation, any comment on the drinking by the troops and officers here?

MR. GRIFFITH. Not to any great extent.

THE CHAIRMAN. It has not been a matter of comment?

MR. GRIFFITH. No, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

[520] General McCoy. Have you served with the Army in any other station?

MR. GRIFFITH. I have been at Hamilton Field.

General McCoy. Is there any comparison that you could think of as to the conduct of the soldiers and sailors here and those you noticed on the mainland?

MR. GRIFFITH. My only comment is I have noticed that the men we come in contact with on the mainland were not quite so interested in taking over the construction work as it was being done. They did not delve into it so minutely as they do here at Hickam Field. That is my only comment.

It was rather irksome here at Hickam Field. Some things we felt should have been left to us. That is my only comment.

THE CHAIRMAN. How about the conduct of the officers and men at Hamilton Field and here as to whether there was drinking and their conduct generally?

MR. GRIFFITH. I don't believe I have noticed any.

THE CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. No.

THE CHAIRMAN. We are asking you, Mr. Griffith, not to communicate anything to anyone that has happened in this room or to discuss your testimony with anyone.

MR. GRIFFITH. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for coming.

TESTIMONY OF ALBERT L. BRECKMAN, UNITED STATES ENGINEERS

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

THE CHAIRMAN. State your full name, please.

MR. BRECKMAN. Albert L. Brenckman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Are you a resident of Honolulu?

MR. BRECKMAN. No, sir. I live in Hickam Housing, right next to the field.

[521] THE CHAIRMAN. What is your position?

MR. BRECKMAN. I am assistant associate engineer, Area No. 2, United States Army Engineers.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a civilian employee?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes, I am a civilian employee and an ex-Army man.

The CHAIRMAN. In what branch of the Service were you?

Mr. BRECKMAN. I enlisted in the 9th Ambulance Corps in 1917, and enlisted here, and I was transferred subsequently to the Hawaiian Infantry for discharge in 1919.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at your living quarters at Hickam Field on the morning of December 7?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No, sir. Mr. Griffith, Mr. Utterback, and the hangar force were at what we call Fort Kamehameha Base Yard preparing to take inventory because we were to take over the Base Yard for our own operations, and I was at that point when the first attack occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you first see up there, sir?

Mr. BRECKMAN. I looked up, and I heard quite heavy aviation noises coming from overhead, and I looked up and saw these green planes with torpedoes under them, flying very low and circling out toward Pearl Harbor. I then followed them with my eye, and all of a sudden there was a large explosion, so I jumped in the nearest ditch and stayed there during the first strafing.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did the first attack last?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Well, it seemed like hours, but I think it was 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a second attack?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes. We were largely disorganized. We had no place to go, so we gathered by the old trench battery in Fort Kamehameha, and while we were there trying to find a safe place—which we did find for the women—the second attack occurred. The machine-gun bullets were shooting around, and [522] we went to one of the magazines, and so far as I could see they just about repeated the same tactics, and then they came the other side over toward the hangars, but it was too hard for us to see anything definite. We were back against the wall. I would say that was about 9:30 or thereabouts.

The CHAIRMAN. And then there was a third attack?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes. I stayed there approximately for three days and three nights. On that night about 10:30 or 11 another attack occurred, and all we could see were tracer bullets.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether that was a sortie or some maneuvering by our own planes?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether it was a Japanese raid?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No. Then about 4:20 the next morning there was another raid, cannonading over Pearl Harbor. I don't know what that was, but I saw nothing after the first two.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been here in Honolulu?

Mr. BRECKMAN. I came over in March as associate engineer and have been at Hickman Field since the 12th of November.

General McCoy. What has been your observation as to the habits of the officers and men in this department, particularly with respect to drinking?

Mr. BRECKMAN. I haven't associated with any of them, so I would not know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no observation of that?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been around on Saturday nights?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes, I have. I could not very well afford to go to any of the night spots, and I don't believe I have ever seen an officer under the influence of liquor at all.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No, sir. I have seen several enlisted [523] men, but having had a lot of experience in sabotage and arson investigating. I am not too sure whether some of them were under the influence of liquor. I think they were just waiting for somebody to approach them and ask them a question, so I am not too sure about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard no gossip or talk about that?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No.

General McCoy. You, as an old soldier, know that there is a certain amount of drinking always among younger men in the Army?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes, definitely.

General McCoy. From your experience and what you have seen since you have been here, has it occurred to you that it might be worse now than it used to be?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Well, yes, sir, in this respect: that prohibition occurred in July. That was in July, 1917. From then on there was very little drinking unless it was bay rum or something like that, but at that time I was only 16 and I did not go in for night life, and I never associated any downtown outside of a few reserves living in the boarding house, rooming house, until my wife got there, and we never felt much like staying out. So I never had a chance to associate with any of the personnel except some of the Navy men who lived in our boarding house. I am trying to say that the civilians seem to be more addicted to it than the Service people. We had more drinking parties and brawls around our neighborhood among the civilians than the Service people did.

That is my observation, although having been in the Service I know that a Service man does like a drink too.

General McCoy. Were you close enough to see how the officers and men reacted under this shock of surprise?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes. We were in pretty close contact [524] with them during the second attack and between the two attacks. We got in with my employees in the mortar magazine over at Fort Kamehameha, and the younger officers there seemed to be quite busy, and the colonel in charge—I don't know his name—but he was all right. He just had everything under control. He was getting everything set, and he seemed to be handling it very well, so far as I could see. The conduct there was reassuring to many of the employees who were a little bit jittery. As a matter of fact, inside 20 minutes they had already broken the men up into groups, laboring crew and so on, and got them ready. I don't know how long it was, but I am sure it started clicking right off the bat.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. When you saw these planes in the first instance, could you get any idea of the direction from which they came?

Mr. BRECKMAN. They seemed to be coming in from the ocean.

Admiral STANDLEY. From Barbers Point?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No, sir, over the other way.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is toward Koko Head?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes, toward Waikiki. They seemed to go in this way and then come back and swing in the back and drop the bombs. As I say, I didn't expose myself very much after the first one or two drops.

Admiral REEVES. You said the first planes you saw were torpedo planes?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes. I saw these enormous torpedoes. They seemed to be almost the length of the plane at the time.

Admiral REEVES. Do you have any idea how many of those planes there were?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No, sir, but there seemed to be no end of them. They seemed to be zipping in there no more than two or three hundred feet flying over us.

Admiral REEVES. How many would you say you saw?

[525] Mr. BRECKMAN. I saw at least six. They went down as soon as they got over the oil tanks in Pearl Harbor, and then they machine-gunned some on the way back. One soldier took some shots on the second attack, but they did not have any effect. The officer told him he was wasting ammunition.

General MCCOY. Did you see torpedo planes in the second attack?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No, sir, I don't remember seeing them. After that we were not allowed to go out and expose ourselves but went under this canopy.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything more, gentlemen?

Admiral STANDLEY. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. We will ask you, Mr. Breckman, not to refer to your testimony or to talk to anyone or to refer to anything that has occurred in this room.

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes, sir.

(Thereupon Mr. Breckman left the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. There is ordered to be placed in the record a communication from Major General Maxwell Murray to Major General Frank McCoy under date of December 25, 1941, correcting, in certain respects, General Murray's testimony given before the Commission.

(The communication above referred to is as follows:)

SECRET

DECEMBER 25, 1941.

Major General FRANK MCCOY,

c/o A. D. C. to Chairman,

Military Investigating Committee, Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR GENERAL MCCOY: After leaving the committee room yesterday morning and reconsidering the questions which were made to me concerning the message received immediately after Alert No. 1 was ordered on November 27, I remembered that I had directed that a copy of an important message received [526] be filed in my G-2 safe.

As I stated to the committee I sent a liaison officer to the Headquarters Hawaiian Department as soon as the Alert No. 1 was announced on November 27. About an hour later he reported to me giving information substantially as I gave it to the committee. However, when I remembered that I had directed this liaison officer to make a copy of the message and file it in the safe at my headquarters for future reference, I decided to send for it and furnish this copy to

you. At the time this liaison officer gave me the message he told me that he had been allowed to read the message received from the War Department but was not permitted to make a copy of it. He was instructed to read it and repeat it to me in person, and he carried out his orders to the letter. The copy of the message as filed in my safe follows:

(Quote) "Negotiations have come to a standstill at this time. No diplomatic breaking of relations. We will let them make the first overt act. You will take such precautions as you deem necessary to carry out Rainbow plan.

Do not excite the civilian population. This will be held to minimum people. Above message is signed MARSHALL." (End quote)

I repeat that the above message was written from memory (by my liaison officer) approximately three-quarters of an hour after my liaison officer had read it at the Department Headquarters. I received it in my headquarters at Schofield Barracks. I do not recall any other conversation or message from the Department which indicated an emergency more acute than that pictured in the message quoted above.

The above may be of interest to the committee as an indication of exactly what information was given the Division Commanders after the initial Alert No. 1 was ordered.

[527] I also recalled after leaving the committee room that I was in error in stating that I had received the announcement of the Alert by telephone directly from the Department Headquarters, and that I had been in my Division Headquarters at the time the Alert was called. Upon checking this statement after my return to my headquarters yesterday I recalled I had left my headquarters temporarily, for dental treatment at the Post Hospital and while there received the telephonic message directly from my Chief of Staff. The Alert was being announced to the troops when the message reached me. I do not consider this statement as having any major bearing on the information of your committee but I do not wish to allow a misstatement of my whereabouts, even though unintentional, to be recorded.

I am sorry that I have not had the pleasure of seeing a little of you during your stay and trust that before you leave I will have the opportunity to see you again.

With kindest regards, I am

Very truly yours,

(Signed) MAXWELL MURRAY,
Major General,
U. S. Army.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn the hearing until tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock, at Pearl Harbor. The Commission will now go on a visit of inspection to the barracks, posts, and if possible, Pearl Harbor.

(Thereupon, at 3:05 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken to tomorrow, Saturday, December 27, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m., at Pearl Harbor.)

[528]

C O N T E N T S

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1941

Testimony of—

	Page
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, United States Navy.....	529 ¹

[528a] NOTE.—On January 6, 1942, Admiral Kimmel recommended to the Commission a revision of the transcript of his testimony before the Commission given December 27 and 28 in certain specified instances, each of which was set forth in a letter signed by him and dated January 5 and submitted to the Commission January 6. (That letter is quoted in full in the transcript for January 6.) Thereupon the Commission directed that the transcript of Admiral Kimmel's testimony be revised with each of the specified corrections except that one recommended for page 622, line 2 of the transcript, which correction was made by Admiral Kimmel in testimony given before the Commission on January 6 and so appears in the transcript for that day. Each revision now appears in the transcript on a page or pages marked "Corrected" immediately following the page of the transcript where the subject matter of such revision appears and is marked "See following page."

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[529] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1941

LOUNGE OF THE WARDROOM,
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR,
UNITED STATES SUBMARINE BASE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

The Commission met at 9 o'clock a. m., Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding, pursuant to adjournment on yesterday.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Robert, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;
Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Good morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL,
UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral KIMMEL. Would it be possible for me to have Admiral Theobald with me to assist me?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, sir. Let him come and sit [530]
there beside you, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have a statement here.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be very glad to hear that in the first instance, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Shall I read it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. You might sit with me here (addressing Admiral Theobald).

(Admiral Kimmel read from a statement.)

(See following page.)

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you have, gentlemen, a report of the action of 7 December which I signed on 21 December.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we do not have it yet, Admiral. I have not seen it.

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your report to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be glad to have a copy of it. We have not a copy of it as yet.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was informed that you had been given a copy of it.

General McCoy. We asked for a copy but have not received it.

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir; we have not received it, Mr. Recorder?

Mr. Howe. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought you had it.

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir. We have not had it. General Short's report was in Washington before we left, and we obtained a copy of it, and also here we got a copy of it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, this report was made up on the 21st—I signed it on the 21st of December.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we haven't had it yet.

[530 *Corrected A*] The following statement was read by Admiral Kimmel as noted on page 530.

In submitting the report of operations undertaken on 7 December it is pertinent to state that only incomplete and rather hurriedly made reports have been received from Patrol Wing 2 and the task forces which were operating at sea. The staff of the Commander-in-Chief has been continuously engaged in planning for and directing operations which have been undertaken since the attack. If discrepancies exist, as they probably do, in these reports, it is due to a lack of full information, and it will probably be some time before complete reports can be assembled.

It has been our endeavor to get ahead with the war operations and to attend to the multitudinous details of reorganization and reconstruction which arose as a result of the attack, rather than to concentrate on the preparation of reports of what had occurred.

The reports are still coming in from individual ships, and I understand the staff of the Commander-in-Chief is devoting as much time as they can to compiling these reports, which will be submitted in due course, and from them a much more effective reconstruction of events can be made.

[531] Admiral KIMMEL. And that was forwarded by the Commander-in-Chief, and I am sure that I was informed that you had a copy.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been some slip about it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Forwarded to Washington from here, was it, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Here is a report; it is a very short one.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. It gives a narrative of events which we have reconstructed from all sources.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, that would be helpful to us.

Admiral STANDLEY. No, we haven't got it.

The CHAIRMAN. We haven't got it.

Admiral KIMMEL. You haven't seen that?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General McCoy. My remembrance, Mr. Recorder, was that we asked on our arrival here for any reports that the admiral had made to the Navy Department.

Mr. Howe. Yes.

General McCoy. But we have not received them yet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the report had not been made when you arrived?

The CHAIRMAN. When we got here, no.

Admiral KIMMEL. And we got it up very hurriedly, the best we had, and I thought you had the report.

Admiral THEOBALD. I have sent for additional copies.

Mr. Howe. Will you look that up?

Admiral KIMMEL. Perhaps I had better read the report.

The CHAIRMAN. I think perhaps you had. I think that would be a good preliminary.

(Admiral Kimmel read from a report.)

(See following page.)

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all the report proper, but in addition to that we have four enclosures. One is a partial narrative of events occurring during Japanese air raid on

[531 Corrected A] On page 531 Admiral Kimmel read:

Report from Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy to the Secretary of the Navy, dated December 21, 1941 number A16-3/(02088). The subject: "Report of the Action of 7 December 1941." Copy of this report appended marked Kimmel exhibit number —.

[532] Pearl Harbor of 7 December, second is the damage to ships, and the third is a supplementary partial report of damage to ships, and the last one is disposition of all known forces, sortie from harbor, and conduct of the search.

Now, this narrative of events occurring during the Japanese raid on 7 December has been reconstructed from dispatches received and from the reports received from individual ships, and this narrative does not represent the information that I had at the time. This is reconstructed afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might say that the first word I had personally of any untoward incident was about 7:30. I was telephoned at my quarters that an attack had been made on a submarine near Pearl Harbor. We have had many reports of submarines in this area. I was not at all certain that this was a real attack. I had issued orders about the 27th of November that all submarine sound contacts were to be considered hostile and they were to bomb them, and that was a distinct change from the policy we had been following before that time. We had prohibited ships from bombing hostile submarines except in the defensive sea area, which was about three miles from the shore line. That procedure was approved by the Navy Department. I reported last February that I would be delighted to give orders to bomb, to depth-charge any submerged submarine that we didn't know about, and I was told that the former policy was the one

that should be followed. The Navy Department never changed that. I changed it on my own responsibility and informed the Navy Department of all I had done, and that was the reason that these ships promptly made the attack on the submarine when it was discovered in the operating area. However, as I say, there were a great many false contacts, and I was not convinced at that time that there was an actual attack. You will see that that is pertinent as this investigation goes on.

[533] At 6:18—Shall I read this?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if you will, sir. Yes, please.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is quite long.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it will orient us, I think, in the whole situation. Don't you, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it will assist, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Admiral Kimmel read from document entitled "Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese Aid Raid on December 7, 1941.")
(See following page.)

* * * * *

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

0745 Avocet. Moored at Berth F-1A, NAS Dock, Pearl Harbor. Bomb explosion and planes heard and sighted attacking Ford Island hangars.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, that means that at 7:45 your information station or your headquarters received that message from the steam Avocet; is that it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What does the "Avocet" mean?

Admiral KIMMEL. Avocet is a mine sweeper converted for use of the aircraft, as an aircraft tender.

The CHAIRMAN. Ship moored?

Admiral KIMMEL. Ship moored at Berth 1A, Naval Air Station Dock, Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. And at 7:45 there was a bomb explosion on her?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh.

Admiral KIMMEL. She heard a bomb explosion, and she heard the planes and sighted them attacking Ford Island hangars.

The CHAIRMAN. And she reported that at 7:45?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. No, sir. This report is taken from the report made by the Avocet.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. After the fact.

[533 Corrected A] (On page 533 Admiral Kimmel read from document entitled "Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941.")

Add the following:

This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941 is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December, 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 24, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088), and is appended to the record as enclosure (A) to Kimmel Exhibit Number —.

[534] Admiral KIMMEL. After the fact, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have reconstructed it now?

Admiral KIMMEL. We are reconstructing here.

The CHAIRMAN. In order of time?

Admiral KIMMEL. In order of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what we are trying to do.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand it.

Admiral KIMMEL. These reports were not prepared by me, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I get it now.

Admiral KIMMEL. At this time they had no time to make reports.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading) :

The Tucker was nested alongside the Whitney. 5-inch gun No. 3 could not be fired. All other guns and .50 caliber machine guns fired at attacking planes during all attacks. No loss of personnel or material. It is believed this vessel shot down three or four enemy planes.

This is the Tucker's claim, you understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I understand.

Admiral KIMMEL. This is what the Tucker claims.

Admiral STANDLEY. She is a destroyer?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, she is a destroyer.

(Admiral Kimmel read further.)

(See following page.)

* * * * *

Admiral KIMMEL. The Tracy is a destroyer, by the way.

* * * * *

Now, I might interject here that, while these times are the best they can get, they were taken under stress.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And you have got to evaluate that, but this is the best that we have.

[534 *Corrected A*] (On page 534 Admiral Kimmel read from document entitled "Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941.")

Add the following:

This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941 is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December, 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 24, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088), and is appended to the record as enclosure (A) to Kimmel Exhibit Number —.

* * * * *

[535] (Referring to item "0755, Raleigh," report p. 11:)

He has covered a considerable period there, and he did not do all that at 7:55.

* * * * *

I might say that the Ramapo was loaded with five motor torpedo boats which were being sent out to the Asiatic station, and they were later on taken off.

* * * * *

(Referring to item "0759, Jarvis," report p. 18:)

The CHAIRMAN. What are BB's, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. And where is Merry Point? Off to the eastward?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

(Admiral Kimmel read further.)

(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. Since you started, Admiral, your aides have handed us a copy of this chronological statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I think that what you have read is sufficient to indicate the onset of the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the balance of it is all here, and as I understand it each ship reports what it was doing at a given hour or a given minute.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I do not believe it would pay us to put the admiral to the burden of reading all that, when we have it here for ourselves if it becomes material. I leave that to the members of the Commission, though. How do you feel about it?

Admiral STANDLEY. It seems to me we could dispense with that and go to the task force report. He has another report there of damage, which is a summation of this, and I think we

[535 *Corrected A*] (On page 535 Admiral Kimmel read from document entitled "Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941.")

Add the following:

This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941 is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December, 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 24, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088), and is appended to the record as enclosure (A) to Kimmel Exhibit Number —.

[536] can dispense with that and go to the task forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that seem a good idea? We shall have all this before us to read, anyway.

Admiral REEVES. If there is any special portion of the narrative that he would like to call attention to, we might have that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Admiral, if beyond what you have read there is any special portion of this narrative that you think it important to call to our attention, we should be glad to hear it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think there is no special portion of the narrative which I haven't—I have covered that in a separate way, and I would suggest that we take up the question now——

The CHAIRMAN. I think this chronological statement is very important for reference.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. But it really does not give us as good a synopsis as perhaps you can give us yourself.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what I was coming to. I have now——

Admiral STANDLEY. He has a prepared statement.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, you have a synopsis statement of your own, Admiral, which you are going to give us.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether you have them or not, but at your convenience we would like to have five copies of this report.

Admiral KIMMEL. The whole thing?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Entire?

Admiral THEOBALD. Five of the entire report.

Admiral KIMMEL. Including everything?

The CHAIRMAN. The narrative.

[537] Admiral THEOBALD. Damage and everything?

Admiral KIMMEL. The narrative? I mean the report with all the enclosures?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, exactly. Then we can use it at leisure, you see.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have one copy, here, Admiral, now.

Admiral THEOBALD. You want four more, then?

The CHAIRMAN. We want four more.

Mr. HOWE. Five more.

The CHAIRMAN. Five more, yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I call your attention to one part of this, sir. I would suggest you take that up next. I have a copy of it here.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, Admiral: Have you a prior running statement covering your communications with the Department in Washington, and so forth, leading up to the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, but I was trying to give you a picture of what had occurred, first.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. I quite understand that.

Admiral KIMMEL. And the efforts just to—

The CHAIRMAN. To repel the attack.

Now, you were coming to the disposition of the attack forces on that morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

(Admiral Kimmel read from report entitled "Disposition of Task Forces.")

(See following page.)

* * * * *

Admiral KIMMEL. Incidentally, I might add at this point that in accordance with the security measures we had in effect it provided that patwing 2 should start this search immediately without any orders from me, and he had already started to do

[537 *Corrected A*] On page 537 Admiral Kimmel read from report entitled "Disposition of Task Forces on December 7."

Add the following:

This report was enclosure (D) to the report of the action of 7 December 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel to the Secretary of the Navy, dated December 21, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088) and it is appended to the record as enclosure (D) to Kimmel exhibit number —.

[538] what he could before he got this order.

(Admiral Kimmel read further.)

(See following pages.)

[538 *Corrected A*] In presenting this statement to the Board, I must emphasize that the picture presented is that of events and actions before the attack had must be considered in that light. It is a common tendency, empha-

sized in this case by the magnitude and effects of the later developments, to judge events in the past by the actualities of the future, thus discounting the assumptions upon which the past actions were based. I cannot overemphasize the point that this entire situation can only be reviewed fairly and intelligently, by divorcing from our minds, to the extent that this is possible, the facts as we now know them, and to concentrate upon the situation as it appeared to the Commander-in-Chief before the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December. In stating this, I would like it understood that I am not attempting to avoid any responsibility which is legitimately mine. I was the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and that Fleet was seriously damaged, with a resultant effect which far transcends the fate or fortune of any individual. However, in justice to myself, to the Navy as a whole, and for the future welfare of our Country, it is vital that events be dispassionately reviewed in their proper perspective. The statements which follow are based upon this premise, and will present as complete a picture as possible of our efforts to get the Pacific Fleet ready for war, to insure its security at its base, and to evaluate and meet by appropriate action, each situation as it was presented at the time.

Underlying all my actions were these basic considerations:—

First. Constantly changing regular personnel, both officers and enlisted, and the induction of new personnel, including a substantial portion of recruits [538 *Corrected B*] and reserves, made it a vital necessity to maintain an intensified training program. This necessitated, if maximum results were to be achieved, confinement of our operations to areas close to Pearl Harbor where target and training services were available.

Second. It was essential to push a material improvement program covering installation, as soon as available, of short range anti-aircraft guns, radar equipment, lookout equipment, additional personnel accommodations, splinter protection and many other incidental alterations.

Third. Maintenance of reasonable security of Fleet units, both at sea and at an exposed base, poorly equipped for its own defense, was vital. Even aside from its defense, the deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as an operating base, presented a difficult problem which had to be met.

Fourth. Under approved War Plans, it was essential to initiate, promptly, offensive action in the Mid-Pacific and beyond, in order to contribute to the defense of the position of the Associated Powers in the Far East and Malaya by relieving the pressure in that theater, which by all agencies, was conceived to be the locale of initial enemy operations. The Navy Department's plan that an early initial offensive be undertaken in that area had a vital influence on my thought and actions in each new situation.

In order to clarify the situation existing in the Hawaiian Area at the time of the surprise attack on December 7, it should be stated that:—

(a) Pearl Harbor is a Fleet base for upkeep, repair and recreation.

(b) The defense of Pearl Harbor rests with the Army, in accordance with Joint Army and Navy action. (Chapter 1, Paragraph 5 (a) (2)).

[538 *Corrected C*] (c) The Navy had definite plans and was ready.

(d) We had an extensive training program to maintain the efficiency of all Fleet units.

My conception of a Fleet base is a haven for refit, supply, and for rest and recreation of personnel after arduous duties and strenuous operations at sea. I knew, as responsible officers have long known, that Pearl Harbor, with its single channel and its congested moorings and industrial facilities is vulnerable as a base for heavy ships, particularly vulnerable to surprise air attack. Air attack at dawn can be guarded against only by a 360 degree search before dark to a radius of 800 miles, and this would require eighty-four planes daily, and three times that number to maintain continued daily flights. We have never had more than one third the latter number of naval patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area. We must depend upon pre-daylight search, radar warnings, and a base defense so effective that a raid can be repelled with certainty. We have not an adequate base defense today.

Before assuming command of the Pacific Fleet on 1 February 1941, I made a survey of the defenses of Pearl Harbor and of security measures in effect in the Fleet. I had been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations that hostilities in the Atlantic might begin at any time and that a war on two fronts was possible.

I was astounded at the existing weakness of the Pearl Harbor defenses, and, collaborated with my predecessor in the preparation of a letter dated 25 January 1941 to the Chief of Naval Operations. This letter pointed out:—

(a) The critical inadequacy of anti-aircraft guns available to defend Pearl Harbor, necessitating during war the constant manning of ships' anti-aircraft guns [538 *Corrected D*] while in port.

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District—subchasers and patrol boats.

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

We recommended that measures to correct these deficiencies take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain. Some remedial progress was made. The War Department provided fighting planes.

My next step, 15 February, was to organize security measures for ships at sea, to guard against surprise attack, submarine or air. The order promulgating these security measures was revised from time to time and reissued in latest form as Confidential Letter No. 2CL (Revised) dated 14 October 1941. Measures prescribed in this order were rehearsed frequently and regularly by forces both at sea and in port. In Pearl Harbor ships were so moored that arcs of fire were allocated by berths, and assurance was made that dispersal of ships permitted best possible anti-aircraft fire in all directions.

All during the period of my command of the Pacific Fleet I had to balance the requirements of training, material upkeep and military alterations of the Fleet against the security measures to be kept in effect. The availability of ships and planes for active war operations was one of my constant concerns. Obviously the maximum security could not be obtained unless we very drastically sacrificed the necessary training to bring and maintain the ships of the Fleet to a satisfactory [538 *Corrected E*] battle condition. Constant personnel changes, both of officers and men, made this training mandatory. This applied to all types of ships and aircraft. My files are filled with the efforts we made and the steps we took to overcome difficulties. Our training program was thorough and I believe produced rapid and effective results. In accomplishing this training we had to accept continually throughout the past ten months a somewhat reduced security against a surprise attack. Had we not accepted this risk, Fleet training would have ceased. Immediately upon taking command I took steps to coordinate as well as my powers permitted, the efforts of the Army and Navy air forces stationed in the Islands.

The Fleet was divided into three Task Forces and the schedule of operations required at least one Task Force at sea at all times, available to strike in the event of a surprise. Often two Task Forces were at sea at the same time but never three. Training operations were intensive, but it is necessary always to provide time in port for overhaul of machinery, against the day when all forces might be called upon for action against the enemy.

We worked out a comprehensive plan to utilize all the forces in Hawaii to the maximum in the event of a surprise attack. Frequent drills were held, deficiencies corrected in so far as possible, and every effort made to perfect the organization by trial and error. Day by day, over several months I had considered when we should establish the maximum security measures and I realized at all times that this would be a difficult decision to make. The despatches and other information we received were carefully evaluated and I kept my principal subordinate Admirals and the Commanding General informed of the situation as it developed. The action I took was [538 *Corrected F*] dictated by my own best judgment after such consultations and I think these subordinates were in substantial agreement with the action that I took from time to time.

War was threatened many times during the past year and I had to consider at all times the physical effect on the personnel of the Fleet of long periods of watch standing in port during peacetime and the result that the demands might not destroy the very vigilance that we were seeking to promote. The security measures in effect in the ships of the Fleet while at sea were of the highest order. We considered a massed submarine attack on the ships at sea in the operating areas as a probability and effective measures were taken to combat this menace. We considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility, but one to be guarded against, and training and plans were made for this contingency to the limit of forces available. Just when to place in effect to a maximum these measures was our problem. From the actions of the Navy Department I believe they shared the opinion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote

possibility. Our correspondence bears this out. At the time the attack took place conversations were still being conducted in Washington. For an attack to be launched on this place the forces had to leave Japan at least two weeks prior to the conclusion of the conversations. Our radio and other intelligence gave no indication of such a move.

From 1 February to the date of the raid, both by official and personal correspondence, I continuously demanded of the Navy Department ammunition, modern planes, more destroyers, patrol craft for the Fourteenth Naval District, sea train vessels for transporting aircraft from the Coast, radar for all ships, IFF for planes, sound detection devices for small craft. My replies [538 *Corrected G*] from the Department almost invariably were to the effect that the major effort would be in the Atlantic. This statement may be verified from the files of the Commander-in-Chief. Many of the most powerful and modern units of the Pacific Fleet were transferred to the Atlantic. Flight deck merchant vessels under conversion and small craft such as subchasers were diverted to the United Kingdom. I asked for more men, and was told that the Atlantic Fleet needs were even more pressing than those in the Pacific, the Atlantic Fleet was under complement also. Although shooting orders had been issued in the Atlantic and in the South East Pacific East of Longitude 100° W., as late as 23 September 1941 I was directed by the Chief of Naval Operations not to bomb suspected hostile submarines except in the restricted area close to Pearl Harbor channel, and was informed that in the event of hostilities with Japan there was no intention to further reduce the Pacific Fleet except for the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month "after Japan and the United States are at war."

Failure to obtain men and materials demanded for the Pacific Fleet is not a defense against having been taken by surprise. I submit, however, that repeated rebuffs of my recommendations and constant insistence of the Navy Department that the major emphasis was to be placed upon operations in the Atlantic strongly contributed to my estimate that an air attack of the nature and force of that delivered on 7 December was not to be expected. Without warning from Washington, I had no reason to consider December 7th as different from other times of diplomatic tension with Japan. Throughout my tenure of office as Commander-in-Chief I have kept my Task Force and Type Commanders informed of the existing situation as presented to me by the Department. I [538 *Corrected H*] believe all of these officers held views similar to mine. It must be evident today to anyone who studied my correspondence with that agency, that the Navy Department up to December 7th did not believe that Japan would make an air attack on Pearl Harbor nor that hostilities were unduly imminent. My frame of mind was necessarily influenced by the action of the Department and the letters and despatches which I received therefrom.

If the President, the State Department, and the Navy Department at any time during the Washington negotiations with the Japanese emissaries gathered a more alarming viewpoint regarding possible Japanese military action against this Fleet, I was never so informed. The absence of such a warning from Washington could not fail to affect most decisively every estimate of the situation which I made up to the time of the attack.

The Commander-in-Chief received but one war warning, dated 27 November. It read as follows:—

"OpNav to Cincpac and Cincaf. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. This is a war warning. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval Task Forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute appropriate deployment preparatory to carrying out defense tasks only assigned in WPL 46. Similar warning being sent by War Department. Guam and Samoe directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."

There was a warning sent to Commander Naval Coastal Frontier info CinCPac on 29 November.

This despatch indicated confinement of original attack to Philippines, N. E. I., and Singapore. On 30 [538 *Corrected I*] November the Chief of Naval Operations sent following despatch to Cincaf:—

'OpNav to Cincaf, info Cincpac. It is indicated that Japan is about to attack points on the Kra Isthmus by overseas expeditions. In order to ascertain the

destination of this expedition and for security, Cincaf is directed to cover by air the range from Manila to Camranh Bay for three days. Instruct planes to observe only. They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked. If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur."

The Secretary of the Navy has stated that a special warning was sent by the Department of Cincaf on the day preceding the surprise attack. The fact that such warning was not delivered to me indicates that the Administration did not expect an air attack on Oahu.

We did expect a surprise submarine attack upon our ships at sea. There have been several such suspected attacks in the past, but no real evidence that they were genuine. We have for ten months been fully prepared for submarine attack. On 28 November, without reference to the Department, I ordered all ships to depth bomb suspected submarine contacts in all of the Oahu operating areas and confined submerged operations of our own submarines to certain limited areas. This readiness to meet the submarine menace is evidenced by the fact that when a submarine was discovered near the entrance to Pearl Harbor early on 7 December, it was promptly attacked by the nearest destroyer. When during the aerial attack on Pearl Harbor a destroyer making emergency sortie sighted a submarine in the channel ahead, the destroyer passed over the submarine and destroyed it by prompt depth charge action.

In the light of what has happened it is easy to state [538 *Corrected J*] that we should have placed in effect all security measures and should have utilized our patrol squadrons to the maximum of their capabilities. At the time of the attack we had one squadron of patrol planes based on Midway and five and one-half squadrons based on Oahu. Of these one squadron had just returned from seven weeks extensive operations based on Midway and four and one-half squadrons had recently been delivered by air from the factory at San Diego. While operable these four and one-half squadrons required considerable work to make them effective. Difficulties were being experienced with this new type and the absence of spares made it highly desirable to economize on their operations in order to have them available in an emergency. The Army was having difficulties with their four-engine bombers and it had been reported within the week that they had only six in operating condition. A flight of Army bombers arrived during the raid, but they had come from the mainland without ammunition. About a month before the raid we had sent two squadrons of patrol planes to the Coast to be replaced. I accepted with reluctance this reduction of our patrol planes but took the risk in order to have the new patrol planes available before delays incident to expected bad winter weather. I cite this as one of the many decisions that had to be made.

At the time of the attack the anti-aircraft batteries of ships in harbor were partially manned and they opened fire promptly on the first attacking planes. Two torpedo planes of the first wave were shot down before they launched their torpedoes and a third plane immediately after launching torpedoes. Only the short range weapons could be used against the low flying enemy planes in the harbor crowded with our ships and this Fleet is woefully deficient in short range anti-aircraft weapons. The use [538 *Corrected K*] of 5" guns on the low flying first attackers would have wrought great havoc on our ships and on the shops and residences of the Navy Yard and nearby settlements. Furthermore, the fuse settings cannot be set low enough to cause the shells to burst in front of these planes when they came into view over the trees and houses almost right on our ships. In spite of that I think they used them.

The Japanese espionage and intelligence service in the Islands was and is excellent. We know now that the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu cabled, over our cable, the daily movements of our ships during the days immediately preceding the attack. Charts taken from enemy planes and a submarine prove that the Japanese knew the berth numbers and names of every ship in the harbor. This intelligence service placed us under a terrific handicap, a handicap that has existed during all the time the Fleet has been based on Pearl Harbor. That Japan was maintaining an effective intelligence service in the Hawaiian Area difficult to apprehend with the peacetime methods has been well known to us throughout our stay in these waters.

On the other hand, the intelligence service available to me was ineffective and inaccurate. I had never been able to obtain from my Government a definite statement of the action it would take in certain eventualities. Correspondence in the Commander-in-Chief's files can be introduced in evidence to confirm this.

Letters and despatches received from the Chief of Naval Operations in the days immediately preceding hostilities indicated a Japanese movement to the Southward. My radio intelligence was misleading as was that promulgated by the Navy Department. On December 1, the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin stating that there were [538 *Corrected L*] strong indications pointing to an early attack on Thailand and that "The major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers." We have evidence now that four or more carriers took part in the attack at Oahu.

The heaviest damage suffered by the Fleet was that delivered by torpedo attack. The Navy Department was convinced that aerial torpedoes would be ineffective in Pearl Harbor and we had discounted that menace. The anti-torpedo baffle had been considered, both by the Commander-in-Chief and by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. In his letter of 15 February 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations had stated:—"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150 feet is desired." The depth of water in and around available berths in Pearl Harbor does not exceed 45 feet.

We knew the international situation was serious, but it had been serious for much more than the 10 months I served in command of this Fleet. Messages which I received from the Navy Department and our radio intelligence gave no indication that anyone considered an air attack on Oahu more than a remote possibility.

I went over each day all despatches and intelligence reports received. My staff were untiring in their efforts. On the Saturday preceding the attack we carefully evaluated the situation. It was appreciated that the situation was growing increasingly critical. Although I did not expect the United States to become involved immediately, a written memorandum, by my direction, was kept available as to the course of action to be taken if hostilities should come. The last revision was made on December 6.

It was felt that the most serious hazard would [538 *Corrected M*] be from submarine attacks and that the most important considerations were to minimize the danger from them and to start offensive action by movement against the Marshalls at the earliest possible moment. This movement involved the advancement of patrol planes to Wake and Johnston and an increase of the number at Midway.

A careful evaluation of the factors involved, the information from the Navy Department, and the concept of the war by the Department as indicated by the Departmental War Plans led very strongly to the conclusion that utilization of patrol planes for searching the Hawaiian Area for a possible but improbable enemy was of much less value than being prepared to immediately advance those planes to our distant island bases. To aid in their protection and to cover effectively the advancement of mobile surface units for offensive operations in the Marshall Area and to support these operations when commenced.

My operating plans, based on the Department's concepts of the war—in which I was in general accord—and its orders had been approved by the Department. I was prepared to commence war operations, and felt keenly that vigorous offensive action should be initiated as promptly as possible after hostilities commenced.

By our operating plans no more than two squadrons of patrol planes were to be retained in Oahu.

The purpose of such planes was primarily to cover the sea lanes toward the Coast and toward the South Seas against enemy auxiliary cruisers, submarines, etc., that might raid our communication lines. It was thoroughly realized that they were far too few in numbers to maintain any effective search around Oahu against enemy carriers. All other patrol planes were to be used in connection with offensive operations.

[538 *Corrected N*] The Department with much more complete information than we had clearly indicated that they discounted the probability of an attack on Oahu. The attitude of our government was evidenced by acceptance of our war plan; by priority given to Europe and the Atlantic Fleet in assignment of aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons and other security installations; by transfer of the greater part of long range bombers from Oahu to the Philippines and by the proposal (which incidentally I did not accept) to transfer fifty pursuit planes from Oahu to Midway and Wake.

Subsequent developments show that all of Washington as well as the Fleet were somewhat prepared for a treacherous initiation of war, if Japan should decide on such a course, but we were all in error as to the date, the direction and the character of that treacherous attack.

I have constantly given serious consideration to the question of the availability of patrol planes when hostilities broke out. As I have previously stated we had 69 patrol planes on Oahu on December 7. Of these 61 planes were in flying condition. Had I started the continuous patrols on November 27, the day the war warning was received, it is probable that this number would have been somewhat less by December 7. Fifty-four of these planes were of the PBY-5 type which had recently arrived from the mainland. There was a practical absence of spare parts for these new planes. Some material difficulties were being experienced and all of these new planes were due to be fitted with armor and leakproof gas tanks, before being entirely suitable for war service.

Maintaining continuous search using all planes in flying condition beginning on 27 November and continuing indefinitely had to be balanced against the probability [538 Corrected O] of attack on Oahu and the desirability of having all our patrol planes in operating condition when war came.

Excluding the PBY-5 type an effective search could not be made with what remained. I therefore determined that our best course was to bend every effort towards getting the patrol planes ready for unlimited war operations than to expend their efforts in partial and ineffective peace-time searches. To insure against a surprise attack from fast carrier-based planes it is necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles on a 360 degree arc. This requires 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours. The pool for a protracted period of searches of this character would require 252 planes. In addition, a dawn patrol to a distance of 300 miles is a further necessity. One hundred patrol planes would be required for this dawn patrol. This would be required for assured security against an attack because any search of 800 miles radius is certain to encounter daily many areas of greatly reduced visibility. Needless to say, had I known of the imminence of an attack on Oahu on or about 7 December, I would have utilized all planes to the limit of their capability accepting the necessary risks of such operations with the new patrol squadrons.

I believe the Fleet was in as an effective state of readiness as it was humanly possible to place it under conditions that existed during the past ten months. I am sure that my files and the testimony of responsible officers in the Fleet will bear out the statement that I left no stone unturned and spared no effort to have this Fleet ready to fight.

[539] I can at the present time present certain exhibits which we have here to show the steps taken in the fleet to obtain the state of readiness which, I think, may be germane to the investigation. Shall I go ahead with them, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Exhibit 10, paragraphs 7 and 9. Even before I assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief, I had collaborated with my predecessor, Admiral Richardson, in preparing a letter to the Navy Department setting forth the inherent weakness of the fleet's base in Hawaiian waters. This letter went forward to the Department over the signature of Admiral Richardson. As it is very important, I shall read the entire letter:

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., January 25, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOC.

References:

(a) Opnav secret despatch 212155 of January, 1941.

(b) Opnav memorandum for Secnav Op-12-GTB of November 12, 1940.

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor enroute to the Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander-in-Chief as to the new situation.

2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor should take priority over the preparation of plans for [540] Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.

3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created.

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

(a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.

(b) War with Japan is imminent.

(c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown.

(d) At least three German raiders are in the Pacific.

(e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form—even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered [541] sidered German or Italian.

(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel, are possible.

(g) Local sabotage is possible.

5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below. Where deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under the tasks will be included.

Waiting Attitude

(1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port.

In the performance of this task, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the existence of certain marked deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and equipment both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in detail later, but are mentioned here in order that certain measures listed below may be more clearly understood.

At present, the following measures, among others, will be required to accomplish the above task:

(a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reinforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One.

(b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as necessary.

(c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit planes; supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes.

[542] (d) Augment Army A. A. defenses with A. A. batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor.

(2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District.

This task will require augmentation of District forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become available to the Commandant.

(4) Protect United States' shipping. This will require the following:

(a) Provide escort for important ships.

(b) Route allied and United States' shipping in the Fleet Control Zone.

(c) Base cruisers on Samoa to cover shipping in the South Seas.

(d) Despatch the Southeastern Pacific Force.

(e) Establish escort and patrol group between Hawaii and the West Coast.

(f) Maintain striking group to operate against raiders (search for raiders might afford opportunity to reconnoiter the Marshall Islands without provoking Japan).

(5) Protection of outlying islands. This will require the following:

(a) Establish defense battalions at Midway and Samoa and smaller units at Johnston, Wake, Palmyra and Canton.

(b) Maintain submarine patrols at all the above-mentioned islands, except Samoa.

(c) Despatch two submarines, plus the ORTOLAN, for the defense of Unalaska.

[543] (6) Adjust U. S. Fleet training to war conditions.

(7) Make initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and raiders in the Northern Pacific.

(8) Establish submarine patrols in the Marshall Islands, withdrawing them from own outlying islands as necessary.

(9) Make early reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. Thereafter conduct a general surveillance of that area and make raids on forces, material installations, and communications therein.

(10) Make periodic sweeps toward the Marianas and Bonins.

6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcements. If a carrier is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the LEXINGTON class should be selected due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu and in the local defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet guns and Fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men and [544] material can not but result in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the Fleet are:

(a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A. A. guns while in port.

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, necessitating detail of Fleet units to this duty. The detail of Fleet units to this duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the availability of important vessels, but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable characteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is particularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and [545] material aid to Great Britain.

9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reinforcements re-patched as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not be referred to in paragraph 2103 (a) (5) of W. P. L. 44 (advance copy) be des-embarrass the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its later operations.

10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, as well as my own, views.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

Exhibit 11. In view of the fact that by far the most important damage received by vessels of the Fleet in the attack of December 7, 1941, was inflicted by torpedo action, I desire to read into the record at this time a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, the subject of which was: "Anti-torpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks, Pearl Harbor", dated February 15, 1941. (See following page.)

I will read this letter in part:

FEBRUARY 15, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you read that again?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. He did not get that. Read it again.

[545 Corrected A] The letter referred to on page 545 was prepared in the Navy Department after the attack at Taranto and all the quoted matter on pages 546-547 was a part of the same letter.

[546] Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

That is about all there is to it. That is the crux of it.

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes.

General McCoy. Was that since the British attack on Taranto?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

General McCoy. Was that prior to the attack on the Italian ship in Taranto?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not find it out.

Admiral THEOBALD. I think it is.

General McCoy. What is the date of that letter?

[547] Admiral KIMMEL. February 15th.

The CHAIRMAN. February 15, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. February 15, 1941.

I think this was, yes, sir.

(Reading:)

As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 1300 yards from the battleships, but the depths of water in which the torpedoes were launched were between 14 and 15 fathoms.

The CHAIRMAN. That is 90 feet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

(Continuing reading:)

The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire.

I have Exhibit 12 here, which is a chart of Pearl Harbor showing that 45 feet is the maximum depth in the harbor. That is something that you can verify.

The CHAIRMAN. We have it here on the board.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think everybody knows it anyhow.

I might say that the torpedo business was a complete surprise to me. Had it not been for the torpedoes I think the damage would have been enormously less.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, had there been any communications from the Chief of Naval Operations or from the Navy Department later than February 15 modifying the content of that letter about the depth of water?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know, no, sir. I will [548] search for it and make certain.

Admiral STANDLEY. Before I left Washington I saw a copy of a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance under date of July in which they referred to this letter stating that they found they could fire torpedoes at a lesser depth. I wish you would see if you have any such information from any source.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I asked them to do that for me.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us take a recess now for about five minutes.

(There was a brief recess. The following then occurred:)

Admiral KIMMEL. I recall a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance on that subject, but it did not greatly modify this letter.

Admiral STANDLEY. I did not see the original letter, but I saw the second letter.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Because I particularly asked about it, but I am not sure it modified that letter to any extent.

Admiral KIMMEL. As a result of these facts, under date of March 12, 1941, I wrote the Chief of Naval Operations a letter accepting the fact that torpedo baffles not be installed in Pearl Harbor until a light efficient torpedo net could be developed and supplied to the area. It is an unfortunate fact that by December 7, 1941, the light efficient net had not been made available to Pearl Harbor for the protection of the vessels moored therein, and the endorsement on the investigation made

(See following page.)

by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District:

In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area.

[548 *Corrected A*] On page 548, line 7 from bottom:

Delete the word "investigation" and insert the word "recommendation."

[549] That was on the basis of that.

In the letter of the Bureau of Ordnance which modified this, I particularly stated that I did not take it in, and after this the thing was thoroughly gone over. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, sir.

(See following page.)

Under date of 20 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bloch, Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, wrote a letter to the Department on the subject: "Anti-torpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks."

Paragraph 3 of that letter read as follows:

In view of the foregoing the Commandant does not recommend the use of baffles for Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District.

That is the essence of the letter.

From the day I assumed command of the U. S. Fleet, February 1, 1941, the security of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters was a matter of earnest concern to me. I immediately initiated a study of this subject and under date of February 15, 1941, I issued an order to the Fleet entitled "Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas."

Admiral THEOBALD. I do not think you need to read "G", as it is in the next one.

Admiral KIMMEL. I put that in to show that we started on this immediately.

Exhibit 16. After eight months' experience as Commander-in-Chief, I decided on certain revisions and elaborations of my original order on this subject, and under date of October 14, 1941, I issued another order on the subject of security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas. This order covered the subjects of Continuous Patrols, Intermittent Patrols, Sortie and Entry, Security in Operating Areas, Security of Ships at Sea, and Defense Against Air Attack. Further subjects covered were: "Action to be Taken if Submarine Attacks in

[549 *Corrected A*]

REVISION

On page 549, line 2, delete "In the letter of the Bureau of Ordnance which modified this, I particularly stated that I did not take it in, and after this the thing was thoroughly gone over. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, sir." and insert, "I have some recollection of such a letter but its contents left me with the conviction that we were safe from torpedo plane attacks in Pearl Harbor. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, sir."

On page 549, line 14 from bottom:

This order was submitted as exhibit 15 by Admiral Kimmel and is appended as part of the record herein as Kimmel exhibit number —. [550] Operating Area." That I was not unmindful of the possibility of a surprise attack upon the Fleet is evidenced by paragraph 2 (b) of both my security orders. In both these orders this paragraph 2 (b) read as follows:

That a declaration of war may be preceded by: (1) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, (3) A combination of these two.

I think it may be well for me to read this security order in toto. I will read the whole thing:

From Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference: (a) to (h).

Enclosure:

(A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors.

(B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

General McCox. What is the date of that, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is dated October 14 and this supersedes the order covering the same ground issued on February 15, 1941. We is-

sued an order and after eight months we gathered together the evidence that was in the original order and made a revision.

The CHAIRMAN. That security order will be placed in the record.

(See following page.)

(Admiral Kimmel read from the security order paragraph (G) on page 4 of the order and paragraph (3) found on page 6 of the order.)

Admiral KIMMEL. There are various other provisions which I had, covering the actions to be taken by the various commanders at the time of the air attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless the Commission desires otherwise, I suggest that Admiral Kimmel's report of December 21, 1941, be marked "Kimmel No. 1" and attached to each of the copies of

[550 Corrected A] On page 550, line 10 from bottom:

This order was submitted as exhibit 16 by Admiral Kimmel and is appended as part of the record herein as Kimmel exhibit number —. [551] the notes of this day so that it will be in the same copy as the Admiral's testimony.

It is also suggested that this order of October 14, 1941, be attached to each page of the notes of this day as "Kimmel No. 2," so that we will have it in the same testimony and under the same cover.

Is that all right, gentlemen?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

(The order of October 14, 1941, Kimmel No. 2, is as follows:)

(See following page.)

[551 Corrected A] Here include printed copy of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) dated October 14, 1941.

Five printed copies to be supplied by Admiral Kimmel. Number printed copy page 551 Corrected A.

[551b] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cinepac File No.

A2-11/FFI/

A4-3/QL/(0271)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., February 15, 1941.

Confidential

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CL-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: FLEET.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference:

- (a) U. S. Fleet Conf. Letter No. 8CL-40.
- (b) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
- (c) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 9L-40.
- (d) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (e) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
- (f) Section 4, Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may reasonably be based on two assumptions:

(A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

- (1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor,
- (2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel,
- (3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(B) That a declaration of war might be preceded by;

- (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
- (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
- (3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part or in their entirety as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) *Maintain continuous patrols:*

- (1) Channel Entrance plus a ready duty destroyer moored near coal dock.

[551c] (2) Boom.

(3) Harbor.

(B) *Intermittent patrols:*

(1) *Patrol Wing TWO* shall search assigned operating areas and vicinity prior to entry therein by operating forces and in early morning on subsequent days.

(2) *An off-shore destroyer patrol* of three destroyers beginning twelve hours prior to the sortie and/or entry of heavy ships to search that part of the circle of a radius of ten miles from the entrance buoys not patrolled by the Channel Entrance Patrol. This patrol shall be furnished by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, on request of Task Force Commander.

(3) *An air patrol* shall be established at least two hours prior to the sortie of the first heavy ship to search that part of the circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is South of latitude 21°—20' N. This air patrol shall be furnished: for sortie, from ship or carrier-based aircraft by the Senior Officer Present Afloat of unit remaining in the Harbor on the request of the Sortie Task Force Commander; for entry, by the Task Force Commander entering; when a sortie and entry occur in succession, by the Task Force Commander entering.

(4) *Daily sweep.* Sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

(C) *Operating areas:*

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (e).

(2) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and patrol aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available in the priority:

Priority 1—BBs

Priority 2—CVs

Priority 3—CAs

Priority 4—CLs

[551d] (c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wing TWO and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(D) *Sortie and Entrance:*

(1) Comply with instructions in U.S.F. 10.

(2) Patrols outlined in (B) (2) and (B) (3) above, shall be established and commanded by the Sortie Commander except when forces are entering only, in which case they shall be established and commanded by the officer commanding the Task Force entering. When forces sortie and enter consecutively the command of the patrols will be turned over to the entry Task Force Commander on completion of the sortie by the Sortie Task Force Commander. These patrols shall continue until released by the Task Force Commander of the sortie in case of sortie only, or by the Task Force Commander entering in case of entry or successive sortie and entry.

(3) Degaussing coils, if calibrated, shall be energized in water of less than sixty fathoms. Unless the Entrance Channel has been swept for magnetic mines, Commander Base Force shall furnish a tug, minesweeper, or small ship without protection to precede the first heavy ship in which the degaussing gear is inoperative. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(E) *Conditions of ships at sea:*

(1) Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului may be considered

as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(2) Task Force, or Task Group Commanders, if directed by the former, shall maintain inner air patrol for disposition or formations, when in assigned operating areas.

(3) Maintain inner anti-submarine screens insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(4) Maintain condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

[551e] (5) Maintain material condition XRAY, or equivalent in all ships.

(6) Steam darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(7) Restrict use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(8) Maintain horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(9) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(10) Submarine operations, except (9) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarines squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian Area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they will maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(11) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes all operations of submarines other than those covered in subparagraphs (9) and (10) above, shall be on the surface.

(12) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

(13) Commanders of surface task forces, when they have been designated, shall be furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. Commanders of surface task forces shall ensure that all air patrols are properly notified thereof.

(F) *Condition of ships in port*

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (b), (c) and (d).

(G) *Defense against air attack*

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

[551f] (2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) As a basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire, berths in the harbor are assigned to air defense sectors as follows:

Sector I—Berths F2-F8, K2, C1 to C5. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 045° to 190° true from assigned berths).

Sector II—Berths F1, F9, B1-3, Dry Docks, DG Calibrating Buoys, T1-4, WL-2-3, D2-7, X22, X23. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 190° to 270° true from assigned berths).

Sector III—Berths D1, D9, F10-13, X2, X15, X18. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 270° to 000° true from assigned berths).

Sector IV—Berths X3, X4, X5, X6 to X14, X17, C6. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 000° to 045° true from assigned berths).

Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships moored at that sector's berths. But ships at other sector berths may be used to augment fire outside their sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that

they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and will be responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he will:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

[551g] (d) Co-ordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notify all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed: Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships will not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure will be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(2) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(3) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(4) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea advised.

[551h] (b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit.

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require.

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines of action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks, or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

[551i] (c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit will execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) *Action to be taken if submarine attacks in operating area:*

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

(a) *Ship Attacked.* Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F.T.P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing details and

addressed to all ships present in Hawaiian waters. To insure rapid delivery this despatch should be transmitted by the attacked ship to the Task Force Commander, to all ships present in Pearl Harbor on the harbor circuit in effect, and to Radio Honolulu (NPM) on 355 kcs. for Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, and relay on schedule. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

Ships other than one attacked.

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except all aircraft will be placed in Condition ONE, armed. Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available). Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers.* Same as for battleships, except that one-half available aircraft (armed) will be used for own inner air patrol. The second half will be sent to scene of attack, armed, to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers.* Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined defensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

[551j] (f) *Submarines.* Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minecraft.* Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force.* If ship is attacked, tugs in operating areas slip tows and join her at best speed, prepared to tow. Report in code positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wing TWO.* Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft.* Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District.* Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ships(s) for repair.

(l) *SOPA, Pearl Harbor.* Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at sea.* Co-ordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines awaiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

H. E. KIMMEL.

DISTRIBUTION:

(List II, Case 1):

O; X; AA1; AAA1; EN1; EN3;

NA12; ND11AC; ND11-12-13-14.

P. C. CROSEY,

Flag Secretary.

[552] Admiral KIMMEL. Exhibit 18. The close cooperation required between the Army and the Navy in the Hawaiian Area has always been thoroughly recognized by both services. Coordination of effort between the two services throughout my tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet was obtained by cooperative effort between the Commanding General and myself. The weakness of this command setup was finally recognized by the authorities in Washington and this recognition led to the only thoroughly satisfactory type of command in the premises, namely: "Unity of Command." Under date of December 17, 1941, Naval Operations addressed the following despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. I quote herewith a paraphrase of that despatch: "Commanding General, Hawaiian Department informed by UpNav and Chief of Staff that Army of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier is now under C-in-C in Pacific. Obtain an exact copy of the Chief of Staff's despatch to the Commanding General."

General McCoy. What date is that?

The CHAIRMAN. December 17, 1941.

General McCoy. Did you make any recommendations as to the unity of command before the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I made no recommendations on the subject. I talked about it on various occasions. It was a subject that has long been before the two services. I think it was recognized by everyone that the unity of command is essential to any effective effort.

General McCoy. Had you served on the joint board?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

General McCoy. While in the Navy Department had you served on the joint board?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I never served on the joint board.

General McCoy. Did you know that that subject was up before the joint board before?

[552 Corrected A] On page 552, line 1, delete words "exhibit 18."

[552b] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cinpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A4-3/QL/(13)
Serial 01646
Confidential

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 14, 1941.

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CL-41 (Revised).

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference:

- (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.
- (b) Cinpac conf. ltr. file A7-2(13) Serial 01221 of 8 August 1941.
- (c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 1CM-41.
- (d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41.
- (e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
- (f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (g) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
- (h) Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

Enclosure:

- (A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors.
- (B) Measures to be effective until further orders.
1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are cancelled and superseded by this letter.
2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions:
 - (a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:
 - (1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
 - (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.
 - (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.
 - (b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:
 - (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
 - (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
 - (3) a combination of these two.
3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:
 - (A) Continuous Patrols:
 - (1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).
 - (2) Boom Patrols.
 - (3) Harbor Patrols.
 - (B) Intermittent Patrols:
 - (1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol.
[552c] (a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.
 - (b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.
 - (c) One destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice.
 - (2) Air Patrols:
 - (a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.
 - (b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°—20' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.
 - (c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein.
 - (3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) (3), below.
- (C) *Sortie and Entry*:
 - (1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present emergency.
 - (2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel.
 - (3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channels buoys Nos. ONE and TWO; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy No. EIGHTEEN; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards bearing 153° true from Point "A".

(4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie, or Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders.

(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces:

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry and departure, berthing and services.

(b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans.

(c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie.

(d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force will clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear.

(e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B) (1) (b) and (B) (2) (b), above.

(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum speed of 15 knots when within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance.

[552d] (D) *Operating Areas:*

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g).

(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarine squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be on the surface.

(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof.

(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force that may be concerned.

(E) *Ships at Sea:*

(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following:

Priority 1—BBc

Priority 2—CVs

Priority 3—CAs

Priority 4—CLs

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander so directs.

(f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

[552e] (h) Maintenance of material condition XRAY, or equivalent in all ships.

(i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(1) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(2) Ships towing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which requires them to be darkened.

(F) *Ships in port:*

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (e) and (f).

(G) *Defense against air attack:*

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Office Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

[522f] (7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3) and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance).

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

(b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c), above).

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) *Action To Be Taken If Submarine Attacks In Operating Area:*

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

Ship Attacked.

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F.T.P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S.O.P.A., Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

[552g] *Ships other than one attacked.*

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers*. Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available aircraft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack (armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers*. Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines*. Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minicraft*. Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force*. If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join her at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wings*. Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft*. Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District*. Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor*. Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at Sea*. Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

[552h] 4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make these measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A. X.

EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NY8-10,

(A1-Asiatic, A1-Atlantic).

P. C. CROSLY,

Flag Secretary.

[552i] (At this point in the original transcript there appears a map reflecting the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 37, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

[552j] CONFIDENTIAL

MEASURES TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS

(A) (1) Inshore patrols.

(A) (2)

Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3)

Harbor—administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c)

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minecraft, Battle Force; and Minecraft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(B) (2) (a) (b) (c) Daily search opn. areas.

(B) (3)

(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)

(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d)

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)

(E) (2)

(F)

The provisions of reference (e).

(G)

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Enclosure (B)

[553] Admiral KIMMEL, I had heard it was before the joint board on many occasions, and I had heard that in time of war they would probably appoint a man who would have absolute command of the forces in any one area, but I knew nothing had been done, and I knew that in time of peace the probability of getting any action was just about nil.

Exhibit 19. Throughout the time that I was acting as Commander—
(See following page.)

in-Chief of the Fleet the cooperation and coordination of the efforts of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Area were guided by "Joint Action, Army and Navy." This publication was prepared by the Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy. The most vital consideration in all efforts of cooperation was the coordination of the actions and operations of the air forces of the Army and the Navy.

I shall read paragraph d(3) on page 14 of "Joint Action of The Army and The Navy," which reads as follows:

A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

That comes under the heading of, "The specific functions of the Army is coastal frontier defense," and in carrying out these functions the Army will provide and operate or maintain:

A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

Then on page 32 of the "Joint Action of The Army and The Navy," paragraph z:

[553 *Corrected A*] On page 553, line 7, delete the words "exhibit 19."

[554] An aircraft warning service is a communication and intelligence service which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier defense. Its purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants,

public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile aircraft, and to alert Air Corps units and antiaircraft artillery units. It consists essentially of observers, of information centers for plotting the courses and distributing information of approaching hostile planes, and of the necessary communications.

Through verbal agreement with the Commanding General, an agreement for joint air action by Army and Navy forces was drawn up under date of 20 March 1941, and signed by the Commanding General and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who was designated as Naval Base Defense Officer in my Security Orders of 15 February 1941 and 14 October 1941.

I might add that before I took over command, I took steps to talk to the Commanding General and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to my own air people, and I told them that we must get some method of operating the Army and Navy in conjunction with the other, to get some coordinated effort.

As a result of their efforts and a great many other people, Admiral Bloch and General Short ordered a board to consider this method of coordination and efforts with the Army air force, and under date of the 20th of March they got an agreement, and the agreement is laid down here:

20 MARCH 1941

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the [555] threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

2. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.

3. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the [556] tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

4. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

(See following page.)

MAILGRAM

Mailed at:

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 120001 April 1941

From: Naval Base Defense Officer

(Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)

Action to: Cincpac, Pacific Fleet Force Commanders & Type Commanders
Comptwng 2, Dist. Mar. Officer, Capt. Yard. C. O's Dist. Activities & Units
as per distribution list of N. B. D. O. Operation Plan No. 1-41 with annexes
A, B, C, D, & E.

Information:

Cincpac

Comdg., Gen. Hawaiian Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

In accordance with paragraph (X) of naval base defense officer operation plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941, Revision of annex baker (Naval base defense air force operation plan No. A-1-41 dated 9 April 1941) is issued in replacement of annex baker dated 28 February 1941 and the latter will be destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Commander Naval Base Defense Force (Com-
mandant Fourteenth Naval Dist.)

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[556 Corrected A] On page 556, line 7, paragraph "4" the following authentication should appear:

Approved 21 March 1941, signed C. C. BLOCH, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant 14th Naval District and W. C. SHORT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Department.

[556b] C-A16-3/A4-3(5) /ND14(0348)

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE,
PATROL WING TWO,
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,
NAVAL AIR STATION,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., April 9, 1941.

(Confidential)

Annex Baker to Commander Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan—No. 1-41 dated February 27, 1941.

NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN No. A-1-41

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two))*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Patrol Squadrons.
- Shore-based VO-VS units.
- Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
- Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
- Army bombardment squadrons.
- Army reconnaissance squadrons.
- Navy Utility squadrons.

(b) *Air Combat Group (Senior VF Squadron Commander)*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
- Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
- One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.

1. Information:

This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Operations agreement approved and promulgated on 21 March 1941; Joint Estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan; and Pacific fleet confidential letter No. 2CL-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will: Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group; and as a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

Assumptions: As in Addendum I of this plan. Anti-aircraft gun control in the Pearl Harbor area will be coordinated with operations under this plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found necessary.

2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against Oahu or fleet units in the operating areas.

3. (a) Search and Attack Group. (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets; (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

(b) Air Combat Group. (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force.

(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile conditions of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with Addendum II of this plan.

[556d] 4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second Marine Aircraft Group who will make the detail required by this paragraph.

5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-40 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus ten and one half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will be separately distributed.

Addendum I—Joint Estimate.

Addendum II—Aircraft Readiness.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing Two).

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.
Commander Naval Base Defense Force.

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0348)
(Confidential)

MARCH 31, 1941.

Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, Commander Patrol Wing Two, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41.

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

I. Summary of the Situation.

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

[556-e] (b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. Survey of Opposing Strengths.

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be [556-g] used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. Possible Enemy Action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the [556-h] next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The

disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be most would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. Action open to us:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available.

[556i] (c) In the event of an air attack on Oahu, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

(d) In event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(4) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required.

1. Search Unit.

2. Attack Unit.

3. Air Combat Unit.

[556j] Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. Decisions:

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

2. Subsidiary decisions. In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force
(Commander Patrol Wing Two))

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol squadrons.
Shore-based VO-VS units.
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
Army bombardment squadrons.
Army reconnaissance squadrons.
Navy Utility squadrons.

[556k] 2. Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force)
The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Army pursuit squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
One division of shore-based carrier VS planes.
(Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. Search and Attack Group. Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of surface vessel interception.

2. Air Combat Group. Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on Oahu.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:

[556-l] Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

Material Readiness:

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

Degree of Readiness:

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of

the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently [556-m] available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: Condition A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. Conditions B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. Conditions C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

(a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two): an officer experienced in [556-n] VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

F. L. MARTIN,

Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

P. N. L. BELLANGER,

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing Two).

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,

Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0348)

(Confidential)

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE,

PATROL WING TWO.

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,

NAVAL AIR STATION,

Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

Addendum II to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41.

Conditions of readiness and readiness reports:

1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

Material Readiness:

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

[556-o] D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

Degree of operational readiness:

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed in these.

3. Readiness Reports:

(a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows:

(1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two).

(2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(b) These reports shall state:

(1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber, fighter, etc.

(2) The number of each type in material readiness [556p] for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above.

(c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and Commander General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail and any changes therein.

Now, based on that the air officer commanding Patrol Wing 2, Commander Bellinger, and General Martin, Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force, got out an operating plan which was effective on the date that the attack took place.

General McCoy. Admiral, these agreements between Admiral Bloch and General Short, signed by each one of them, were they approved by you as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were approved by me as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, yes, sir. Whether I signed them—I don't recall that I actually signed them, but I knew all about it and I did approve of it.

General McCoy. Admiral Bloch was the responsible officer for the defense of Pearl Harbor on that day?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. Admiral Bloch was not responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor; he was responsible for certain elements of the defense.

General McCoy. He was?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was.

General McCoy. He was responsible for the security of the Navy Yard. Doesn't that also include Pearl Harbor? How is that exercised where you were present?

Admiral KIMMEL. As you stated it, sir, you said Admiral Bloch was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor. Of course, Pearl Harbor, (See following page.)

by agreement and by joint action of the Army and the Navy, was the responsibility of the Army, and

[556q Corrected A] On page 556o, line 2 from bottom, before the words "Pearl Harbor" insert the words "the defense of."

[557] Admiral Bloch was responsible for the naval elements that could be made available for the defense of Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. That is to say that in the event of an air raid the responsibility on Admiral Bloch was to turn over whatever was available to the Hawaiian Air Force to be used in connection with its own forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. For destroying planes over Oahu, yes, sir.

General McCoy. The call to be made on you by him for the Army command?

Admiral KIMMEL. Subsequently, that is in the operating plan, but we ran into some difficulty in the practical operation as to making this available. We got that all ironed out by the time of the attack, or long before the attack took place. That is, the different elements were automatically available in case of an air raid. That was, I think, well understood by all elements.

General McCoy. Well, for instance, when an attack was over Oahu, my understanding would be that the Navy forces would go to the Army automatically, and by request vice versa, if you wanted them for patrolling over the seas, and they would go to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is just the point. In the drills with them we found that it took entirely too long to get a communication through. That provision was subsequently taken care of in the operating plans, and those forces that were available became immediately available.

The CHAIRMAN. That is to say, Admiral Bloch would not wait for a telephone call from General Martin, since he knew what he had available for the Army, for General Martin, and would put his command at the disposal of General Martin?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And vice versa?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. That was the way it worked out [558] practically, which followed that we had to hold onto some of his stuff, (See following page.) you see?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. But in a working agreement they had this right to hold it back, but practically—I am now giving you what I believe to be a fact, and you can determine that more thoroughly from Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Bloch here.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. I have heard, and this is hearsay—I wish to make that clear—that orders were issued by Admiral Bellinger and how and where he wanted his bombers to go. He immediately asked which bombers would be available, and when he was told he told them where he wanted them to go.

No, there is a discrepancy that never may be definitely located—I don't know—in all the testimony that is given here as to the events of this particular day. You can realize that people were laboring under a terrific stress and surprise which was so great that this thing had occurred, and the damage done, which was quite substantial, and we are bound to run into discrepancies of this kind in the testimony.

I believe that everyone is trying his best to tell the truth.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure of it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me ask a question there, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Following this policy or this understanding that you said had been arrived at between the two force commanders, that was the procedure that was to be effective in case of an attack or an emergency; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. But in the event or prior to the

[558 *Corrected A*] On page 558, line 1, after the word "practically" delete "comma" and insert "period" and delete remainder of sentence.

[559] emergency where, as you have previously stated, there was a lack of sufficient force of whatever kind or nature to perform the tasks assigned, do you know whether the Commander of Patrol Wing, Admiral Bellinger, had asked the Army to supplement his offshore patrol?

I understand it is the Navy function to provide the offshore air patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And there were not sufficient patrol planes to accomplish that effectively with the forces at that time. Had Admiral Bellinger made any request on the Army to supplement his forces to take care of that situation? Do you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, so far as I know, he had not, but the only real effective patrol planes that the Army had were big bombers, and these big bombers within a week—it was reported to me that only six of them were in operating condition, and they had some twelve available at that time. We had—and my figures may be slightly in error—but we had approximately twelve of those bombers here, but all but twelve had been flown to Midway, Wake, and then by way of Australia to the Philippines.

We were daily expecting somewhere in the neighborhood of sixty additional long-range bombers to come through here, and they were scheduled to go on to the Philippines. Shortly after that there were to be a hundred, I think. The exact figures escape me, but it was a large number. The Department was much concerned about the situation of Wake Island, and I thought we would be able to get these bombers through from Wake all the way to the Philippines.

We had previously put the guns on Wake, and we sent two submarines out to assist the defense, and we had just sent out these twelve fighting planes at the time that the attack took place. We were attempting to secure Wake as well as we [560] could.

The construction of these bases on the outlying islands has been under the most adverse conditions. We were faced with the necessity of building bases and of protecting them at the same time. We had a limited supply of water and water-making facilities, food, and refrigerator facilities, and the total number of men on each one of the islands could not be exceeded. You could take your choice as to whether they should be military personnel or construction personnel at all times.

When we sent guns and the Marines to Wake, we had to withdraw some of the working force. When the Department wanted to send out a much smaller number of guns than I did, I sent a despatch to the Department in which I suggested more guns be sent, and they

approved of it. About two weeks later they told me they did not want all those guns out there and they wanted to send considerably fewer. I told them it was too late, that the guns were already there, and that I could not very well get them back.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did all these preparations and plans interfere with the requests or with the planes carrying out patrolling between the Army and the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Admiral STANDLEY. My question was concerned with the fact if Admiral Bellinger did not make any requests upon the Army to supplement his offshore patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. About the request of Admiral Bellinger on the Army for planes to carry on offshore patrol, that could have been made, but so far as I know, it was not made; but I desire to point out in that connection that we had maneuvers shortly before this in which all the ships of the fleet took part, and we wanted the Army to take part in that maneuver. We invited them to, but the Army could not do it because they were engaged in ferrying these planes to the [561] Asiatics and in getting their planes in a ferrying condition here. I realized that the chance of getting any assistance from the Army was very small inasmuch as they had only six of these bombers which could fight this week before. They had their problems too, you understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. However, if you had anticipated the emergency which developed, would you have had any hesitancy in asking the Army for its help?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not the slightest.

Admiral STANDLEY. The answer is that the emergency was not anticipated, and therefore the other work took precedence over the condition you did not anticipate?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir, but I would like to point out one thing and that was that we really had more ships out than the operating plans called for, and we made some changes in it from what the operating plan originally called for. We had no striking force to put this patrol out, and we had no striking force to go after them after we found them.

(See following page.)

General McNARNEY. At this point I would like to read into the record the following figures from the statement of General Short as to the planes in and out of commission on December 7, 1941:

Reconnaissance planes in commission.....	6
Reconnaissance planes out of commission.....	7
Bomber planes in commission.....	39
Bomber planes out of commission.....	33

Admiral REEVES. That agrees with the Admiral's testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that General Martin and Admiral Bellinger had worked out some cooperative plans pursuant to the master plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is so. I will submit that as

[561 Corrected A] On page 561, line 18, delete the words "We had no striking force to put this patrol out, and we had no striking force to go after them after we found them." and insert the words

"We had not sufficient air force to maintain this patrol and if the patrol had been sent out we had no air striking force left to go after the enemy when we found him."

[562] an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Submit it as "Kimmel 3" and we will include that with your testimony so that we will have it before us.

You could probably furnish us copies.

(The document above referred to is as follows:)

(See following page.)

[562 *Corrected A*] The document referred to on page 562 is quoted in this transcript on pages 556-A to 556-O inclusive.

[563] Admiral KIMMEL. Exhibit 19. This is a fortnightly summary of current national situations, a bulletin issued by the Director of Naval Intelligence under date of 1 December 1941. I will read from "The Japanese Naval Situation" on page 9 of the fortnightly summary of the Office of Naval Intelligence, dated 1 December, 1941:

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the combined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction [564] material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

Exhibit 22 contains communications between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul at Honolulu. The vital importance which Tokyo obviously attached to a knowledge of the ships in Pearl Harbor and the manner in which they guarded against the departure of those ships without immediate warning of that departure appears conclusive evidence to the effect that Japan had no intention of attacking Pearl Harbor in the absence of a large number of our battleships and aircraft carriers. Elaborate arrangements were made to report to Japanese submarines and Japanese vessels at sea the departure of the aircraft carriers and battleships from Pearl Harbor by:

- (1) Broadcast advertisements over KGMB at 0945 daily.
- (2) A system of lights from a house on Lanakai and Kalama during the night and visual day signals at Lanakai from a star boat during daylight.

- (3) Further visual warning of the absence of aircraft carriers and battleships was a bonfire to be shown on the Island of Maui near the Kula Sanatorium.

The codes of the Japanese Consul were seized on 7 December and it was not until 9 December that by using these codes the messages were broken down and the translation available to me. Had the information contained in exhibit 22 been known to me on 6 December I would have ordered all units to sea, because the best dispositions against surprise air attack can be effected with the fleet at sea.

However, the initiative as to the time of attack prior to the declaration of war rested entirely with the Japanese and if the fleet did proceed to sea, it had eventually to return to port for fuel, provisions, minor repairs to machinery, etc. In that event, the Japanese would have awaited the time when a considerable portion of the fleet was again in Pearl Harbor.

[565] The CHAIRMAN. Do you have knowledge of a message from the Consul here seized after the consular office was seized?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was seized when? On the 7th or 8th?

Admiral KIMMEL. The 7th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no information of these secret codes before that day?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, which I got on the 9th.

The CHAIRMAN. It wasn't broken down until sometime after?

Admiral KIMMEL. It took a couple of days to break it down, yes. I do not think it is necessary to read these messages.

The CHAIRMAN. This will be off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to read them now?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Why the fleet is in Hawaiian waters: All the senior officers of the Navy have recognized the increased possibility of surprise attack against the fleet when that fleet is operating and based in the Hawaiian waters. These facts were forcibly brought to the attention of the authorities in Washington by my predecessor, Admiral Richardson. In answer to a letter of his, the Chief of Naval Operations, under date of 27 May 1940 wrote Admiral Richardson as follows:

Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph—.

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies.

And further in the same letter:

I realize what you say about the advantage of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation, but at this time that is out of the question. If you did return it might nullify the principal reason for your being in Hawaii. [566]

Now, those same conditions obtained up to the time of the attack here on the 7th of December. I knew that the Navy Department and the Administration in Washington insisted on keeping the fleet out here. I knew of the vulnerability of the fleet here. I thought it was appreciated in the Navy Department as well as by me, but it was one of the things I felt was beyond my power to change. I had the choice of saying I would not stay and to get another commander-in-chief, or to remain. Naturally, I wish I had taken the other course at the present time, but I did not. I did the best I could with what I had and under the conditions existing.

I have here Exhibits 1 to 8 which may be of interest. These are the steps which we took in the Pacific fleet to improve the efficiency of the fleet and to further the training program and to render the fleet as secure as possible.

I will read to you the titles which I think perhaps will give you all that is necessary, and you can go into them more thoroughly if the question arises in your minds as to the efforts that we made to bring this fleet up to a proper fighting efficient order.

The first one is on the question of anti-submarine screens, which was submitted on the 16th day of September, 1941. You can realize that all these represent the latest revisions we made of the orders which had been in effect prior to this time. It speaks of inner, intermediate, and outer anti-submarine screens. It speaks of general maneuvers, patrol stations, and a number of other questions that are germane to the subject, together with a number of diagrams.

Exhibit 2 is the tentative radar doctrine. The last revision was dated September 7, 1941. This is annex E to

[566a]

UNITED STATES FLEET

A16/(0828)

U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

S-E-C-R-E-T

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 26 May 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Survey of Conditions in Pacific Fleet.

I. Personnel.

(a) *Stability.* A most important, perhaps the most important factor in the day by day readiness of the Pacific Fleet is the question of stabilizing personnel—both officers and men. The Fleet is doing all it can, and is making good progress, in absorbing new men and training new officers, but facts are facts and neither the Fleet nor the individual ships can be a coordinated war machine if the present rapid turnover of personnel is continued.

(b) *Permanency of Officer Personnel.* Regular and experienced officers have been detached at an alarming rate. Cooke, for example, who came to the PENNSYLVANIA the latter part of February, is fourth on the list of twelve battleship captains in time on present billet. Executive officers are going, if anything even more frequently. The situation is no better in cruisers. There appears to be a tendency to give priority in importance to short duty over sea duty; witness, transfer of officers skilled in fire control and gunnery to production and inspection jobs ashore, and the all too frequent detachment of commanding and executive officers and heads of departments from ships of all types. Expansion of the Forces Afloat does call for sacrifice in permanency of assignment in the Fleet, but we cannot afford to replace our experienced officers with reserves, most of whom are untrained, if we are to be ready for serious business. It does seem that much can be done toward stabilizing the experienced personnel we now have. Ordering captains, executives and heads of departments of the various types, well knowing that they will be eligible for selection and promotion within six months is an example of a condition readily susceptible of correction.

(c) *Permanency of Enlisted Personnel.* The situation is well known to the Department, as indicated by a recent directive to take full advantage of the law and retain men whose enlistments expire outside the continental limits of the United States. The drastic trend in reduction of reenlistments in the Navy as a whole in the month of April is of serious import to the Fleet. Even in the Pearl Harbor area the wages offered ashore are so attractive and the jobs are so many that skilled men whose enlistments expire are tempted not to reenlist. A recent survey of Battleship Division THREE indicates that of the men whose enlistments expire between 1 June and 31 August 1941, 68.9% *do not intend to reenlist*. This is in line with a recent report of the Bureau of Navigation showing a reduction in reenlistments for the month of April from 83.09% to 69.53%. The Commander-in-Chief has requested the Bureau of Navigation to initiate legislation to hold for the duration of the war all men now enlisted in the Navy. He [566b] does not look with favor upon the directive mentioned in the first sentence of this sub-paragraph. It is discriminatory and does not apply equally to all Fleets or even to all ships of the Pacific Fleet, since some ships overhaul on the Coast while others overhaul at Pearl Harbor.

The Fleet must and gladly will train and provide men for new construction and outlying stations to the limit of its capabilities, but it should be unnecessary to assign to short duty so many experienced petty officers as we now find ashore. There is an urgent necessity that a continuous supply of recruits be furnished for training. It should be pointed out that since September, with new men started coming in in large numbers, all vessels have had to absorb recruits in a large proportion. In the Fleet as a whole, complements are now made up of over 25% of men with the maximum of a year's service, and in some ships the figure approaches 50%. In the case of newly acquired transports, cargo ships, tankers and the like, the complements are almost 100% reserve, with little previous training. Present conditions are worse rather than better when new ships in large numbers are added to the Navy. The situation will be extremely acute if we are then at war. It is obvious that there are limitations on the capacity of active ships for supplying the large numbers of officers and men required to man the Navy now building, unless the immediate fighting capacity of the ships is seriously crippled.

Long range planning, with reasonable foresight as to future needs, is an imperative necessity. It would appear that training activities ashore must be greatly expanded, as the physical capacities of the ships limits the number that can be trained in the Fleet. The possibility that we may have to provide and quarter, ashore, a pool of trained men for new construction should be carefully examined, and provision now made for it, if found necessary.

A problem of immediate importance is brought about by a recent letter from the Bureau of Navigation which states that between now and September some 3,080 men, more than half of whom are rated, will be taken from the Fleet for new construction and for this purpose allocations are made in the ratio of 72% Pacific Fleet to 28% Atlantic Fleet. Unless a readjustment is made in these figures to correspond to the recent readjustment in the relative strengths of these Fleets, the Pacific Fleet will be seriously stripped of experienced men and may be unable to furnish some of the ratings demanded.

(d) *Health and Morale.* The desirability, if international conditions permit, of health and recreation trips to the Coast by Task Forces, each of which shall be no more than one-fourth of the strength of the Pacific Fleet as now constituted must be given serious consideration.

(e) *Assignment of Flag Officers.* It is particularly desired that Vice Admiral Pye be retained as Commander of the Battle Force. Admiral Pye is able, vigorous, and loyal; and is an officer whom I would select, above all others, as Commander Battle Force.

[566c] (f) *Uniform.* There is too much change and experimentation at this time. It is not important whether rank is shown on the sleeve or on the shoulder of a khaki uniform, nor is it important whether the eagle of the cap device faces to left or to right. As for the khaki working uniform the Commander-in-Chief is convinced that it lessens the dignity and military point of view of the wearer and has a tendency to let down the efficiency of personnel. Reports from the aircraft squadrons are to the effect that from any considerable altitude they are unable to detect the color of the uniform on ships at sea.

II. Aviation.

(a) *Aviation Training.* The following requirements for aviation have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:—

(1) Newly graduated pilots for carriers, battleships and cruisers should first be ordered to San Diego for indoctrination in Fleet squadron work and familiarization with latest types of planes.

(2) Replacement carrier groups should be built up at San Diego, for indoctrination of new graduates and for rotation with groups already in carriers.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Radioman should be established.

The following requirements are in process of correction but progress is too slow:—

(1) The level of experience of pilots in the Fleet is very low and the total number is too low.

(2) The level of experience of aviation ratings in the Fleet is low and the allowances are not filled.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Bomber, though approved, has not yet been established.

(b) *Aviation Material.* The following items which apply to aviation are in process of correction but progress is too slow:—

(1) Carrier torpedo planes are obsolescent and spare carrier torpedo planes are too few.

(2) Replacement of other carrier planes with more modern types is not yet completed and the replacement planes are not yet fully modernized.

(3) There are not yet enough spare carrier planes of the new types and the stock of spare parts and engines is too low.

(4) Deliveries of ordnance and radio equipment for new planes have been too slow.

(5) Cruiser planes are obsolescent and deliveries of replacements have been too slow.

(6) Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area and there is no early prospect for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area.

(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol planes, corresponds to RADAR [566d] for ships, which will enormously increase the potentialities of these planes.

(8) There is a serious shortage of aircraft machine gun ammunition.

(9) No armor-piercing bombs, antiaircraft bombs or aerial depth bombs are yet available.

(10) There is a very serious shortage of aircraft torpedoes, and of equipment for their maintenance and overhaul.

(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow.

(12) Provision for bombs and for refueling planes at outlying bases is sketchy.

(13) There has been serious delay in deliveries of equipment under the cognizance of other Bureaus than Yards and Docks in connection with the construction of new air stations and bases.

In addition to the afore-mentioned items the following have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:

(1) Aircraft overhaul at N.A.S., Pearl Harbor, now limited to patrol planes, should be expanded to provide for all planes now based in this area. Transfer to and from West Coast for overhaul is impracticable.

(2) Additional barracks should be established at N.A.S., Pearl Harbor.

(c) *Separate Air Force.* This ever present question is again being brought to the fore, in view of Mr. Scrugham's recent utterances. It is vital that the Navy's air service remain as it is. Our naval aviation is generally recognized, throughout the world, as being the best equipped, best trained, and most advanced of any naval air service. This has been brought about by the mutual recognition of the intimate relationship between air and surface sea forces, particularly in far-flung operations distant from established bases. Effective cooperation, in naval operations, between air and surface craft requires the closest kind of coordination, predicated upon precise knowledge of each other's capabilities, limitations, and tactics. This can only be attained by day-by-day operations, association, and exchange of ideas as an integral part of one organization. It is vital that this relationship continue, even at the expense (though this feature is greatly exaggerated) of some duplication of effort between the Army and the Navy. Mr. Scrugham's chief complaint, which deals chiefly with duplication of facilities at coastal air stations and the proximity of those stations to each other, is not a valid one. The services perform separate functions; the Army in extending the range of coastal batteries and the Navy in extending the mobility and coverage of ships in off shore search. The proximity of the fields to each other is largely a matter of the vagaries of Congress and the availability of land. The United States, due to its physical separation from its most probable enemies, has less need for a concentrated, offensive, air-striking force than other nations. [566e] The present GHQ air force, however, amply supplies this need. It may be noted, in passing, that, in spite of the fact that the Air Corps is a part of the Army, the strong tendency within that Corps for separation, has prevented the development of effective cooperation between ground and air forces. A separate air corps would make the situation much worse—for the Navy it would mean the death of naval aviation.

The British have found it necessary to place their coastal air command under the direct control of the Navy. Aside from discoordination of operations, this command was suffering from lack of proper types.

III. Material, General.

(a) *Priorities.* The Navy is at present suffering from a shortage of material and is experiencing difficulty in having this shortage corrected. The principal

items, and those that directly affect our early readiness, are (1) small arms and machine gun ammunition for airplanes and the Fleet Marine Force; (2) airplanes, especially those equipped with modern armor and armament; (3) close-range anti-aircraft guns, especially at 1.1'', Bofors, and Oerlikon; (4) ammunition in general, particularly adequate reserves, and bombs of all kinds. Our ability to correct these deficiencies is limited by two factors, (1) aid to Great Britain, and (2) rapid expansion of the Army. Both of these limiting factors are admittedly of great importance and are entitled to proper weight in any system of priorities, but, from the point of view of the Fleet, it appears that there is a tendency to overlook the *time* factor. A priority system based on relative quantities needed by the three competing agencies, Britain, Army and the Navy, will prove fatally defective, if the *time* of beginning active operations is overlooked. As the situation appears now, the Navy may be called on for active operations in contact with well equipped opposing forces, yet is prevented from obtaining vitally necessary needs by the magnitude of the needs of Britain and the Army. If we are going into action first, our needs must be filled ahead of the Army's, and those *sine qua non* needs such as small arms and machine gun ammunition, modern airplanes, and modern close-range anti-aircraft guns, must be filled ahead of Britain's. There is a minimum need for the Navy without which it can not fight at all. Irrespective of how small that need may be relative to the quantitative demands of others, it must be filled *first*.

It is important to bring out this point now, since it is understood that the Army is basing its procurement program on a 4,000,000 man Army. If allocation be based on relative quantities, under such a program, the Navy will get little consideration. The imminence of active operations should be the criterion. Of course, the Navy Department is in a better position to judge that than we are, but we've been led to believe we were pretty close to war on several occasions, but we still didn't get the items we need.

(b) *RADAR equipment.* Such excellent results are being obtained from the few RADAR's furnished that we should install now the equipment which will work, and not wait for something better to be developed. Delivery of RADAR should be accelerated.

[566f] IV. Communications.

The need for establishment of confidential call signs is urgent. With the present system of calls the text of a message may sometimes be inferred from the radio calls used. The danger of the present system is that codes may be compromised, as well as information disclosed. The cryptographic aid section of OpNav should immediately get out confidential call signs and more cryptographic aids.

V. Operations.

(a) *Fleet Operations.* With the recent detachment of many of the most modern and effective units, the adequacy and suitability of the forces remaining to accomplish the tasks to which they may be assigned is very doubtful.

In the Pacific, our potential enemy is far away and hard to get at. He has no exposed *vital* interests within reach of Pearl Harbor, and has a system of defense in the Mandates, Marianas, and Bonins that requires landing operations, supported by sea forces, against organized land positions supported by land-based air. This is the hardest kind of opposition to overcome and requires detailed preparation and rehearsal. It also requires a preponderance of light force and carrier strength, in which we are woefully deficient in the Pacific. Our present strength is in battleships—which come into play only after we have reduced the intervening organized positions. They (battleships) will have to be used to "cover" the intervening operations and prevent interference therewith, but their real value can not be realized until the intervening opposition has been overcome and a position obtained from which solid strength can be brought to bear. The Japanese are not going to expose their main fleet until they are either forced to do so by our obtaining a position close enough to threaten their vital interests or it is advantageous for them to do so by our having "broken our backs", so to speak, by going up against their land positions and attrition operations.

The foregoing discussion is brought out to emphasize that the role of light forces, and particularly carriers, in the Pacific, is far more important than a casual evaluation of relative strength would suggest. Under RAINBOW 5, the Pacific Fleet (perhaps justifiably, in view of the Atlantic situation) is so reduced in light force and carrier strength that its capabilities for offensive operations

of a decisive nature are severely crippled. Quick results may only be hoped for—common sense dictates that it is largely hope, based principally upon the idea that Japan will make a fundamental mistake, and that bold action may be able to take advantage of it.

In the Pacific, with enemy vital interests so far away, and no bases of our own within striking distance, the logistic problem is acute. We have not, at present, sufficient ammunition, provisions, cargo ships or tankers to support active operations in the Western Pacific—where the real battleground will be. We are having difficulty, even now, supporting the construction and defense activities of our own outlying bases. More auxiliary vessels are needed, now, for that purpose, and future needs must be anticipated to allow for acquisition and conversion of the ships. Our past experience, in this regard, has not been a happy one—the lag between acquisition and entrance into service being six months to a year. Repair and maintenance facilities at advanced bases can not be created overnight, nor can the Fleet remain long without them.

[566g] (b) *Fourteenth Naval District.* The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more anti-aircraft guns, airplanes, and RADAR equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over Continental and expanding Army needs.

The naval forces available to Commandant are meager to the point of non-existence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resuscitation and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be employed for its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive operations is seriously curtailed—possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and other small craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent. The Fleet must be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the District. The Fleet does not have the destroyers or other vessels to take over those duties. The situation has been brought to the Department's attention by letter. It is now much more serious as many destroyers have been detached from this Fleet.

(c) *Marine.* The necessity for closely coordinated training of Marines and the ships which will support their landing operations is readily apparent. Operations of this character require detailed training and realistic rehearsal. At present, the Marines and their training ground (San Clemente) are in one location and the ships in another, 2,000 miles away. We need a training ground for landing operations and a camp for a substantial portion of the Fleet Marine Force in the Hawaiian area. This need will be worse, if we get in war in the Pacific, because we will not only need a training ground and large camp site for Marines, but also must train and rehearse, as the campaign progresses, Army forces as well.

Kahoolawe is practically undeveloped and can be used as an Hawaiian San Clemente. A camp site for 5000 Marines has been selected and recommended for acquisition. This program should be pushed.

The Sixth Defense Battalion should be brought to Hawaii now in order to relieve the Seventh Defense Battalion at Midway where the latter has been stationed for some months. Equipment for this battalion should be provided as soon as possible. Other defense battalions now in the Hawaiian area are being used for other outlying bases.

(d) *Logistic Support.* Ships to transport men and materials to and from the Coast and to supply the outlying islands is urgent.

There is similar urgency in the need for ships to transport aircraft. Aircraft carriers should not be used for this purpose in peacetime and cannot be so employed in war. Action has repeatedly been requested.

VI. National Policy.

(a) Although largely uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for example, made strong expressions of our intention to retain an effective voice in the Far East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer, as [566h] a diplomatic gesture, but almost simultaneously detached heavy

cruisers to the Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet by wholesale changes in personnel.

We should decide on what we are going to do about the Philippines, now, and provide for their defense, if retained. It is easily conceivable that 50,000 troops and 400 airplanes, on Luzon, might prove a sufficient deterrent to Japan to prevent direct action. We should develop Guam and provide for its defense commensurate with its state of development. It is foolish to develop it for some one else to use.

The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplomatic branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the means available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant weight.

Our Hemispheric Defense policy must comprehend the fullest cooperation between participating nations and our commitments limited by our available force. A strong component of that force is bases. No Hemispheric Defense policy that does not provide for our free use and development of South American bases (and local military and logistic support) can be effective.

VII. Information.

(a) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet [566] impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

VIII. Public Opinion.

(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To back into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion is to court losing it. A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

[561] Pacific fleet operation order No. 31-41.

We had taken vigorous steps to learn how to use the radar. We had a great many exercises in the radar, and we had developed a reasonably good doctrine for its use. We got out on October 28th

instructions for escort commanders and commanding officers of escort vessels.

On 31 October we got out task force organizations and missions. These divided the fleet into three task forces, or rather I should say into a number of task forces, but three principal ones, and it was a revision of the organization previously issued, changing it in some respects and getting it more nearly on a war footing.

It provided for a support force, a covering force, a reconnaissance force, a force to train in landing operations. It divided and established the task force for the Fourteenth Naval District, for the submarines, patrol wings, and a number of other points. It is here in *extenso*.

Exhibit 5 is the aircraft depth bomb alert watch. We had depth bombs in the fleet, and it was necessary to maintain a watch to drop a depth bomb, and I had arrangements for a plane to stand by when the patrol was out and to launch it immediately, to send out a depth bomb into any suspected place.

Battle plan and submarine and patrol planes under bulletin revision U. S. F. 10, which is covering the tactical orders and doctrine in United States fleet, and that was in process of revision at the time of the attack, or rather I should say it had been revised and was in process of printing at the time of the attack. The provisions of that were in effect though.

When I went to Washington in June I presented to the Chief of Naval Operations this survey of conditions in the Pacific fleet, and I took a great many steps hoping to improve the condition of the fleet, and I think we did make some improvements.

(See following page.)

[567 *Corrected A*] The survey referred to in the last paragraph on page 567 was submitted by Admiral Kimmel as his exhibit 9 and is appended as part of the record herein as Kimmel Exhibit No. —.

[568] Those are the principal things there.

Now, there is another thing, and that is the question of radar information, and I think perhaps you heard something about that, but I think it is wise for me to give you what I think and what I know about it.

The Army in the Hawaiian Area have a radar network on the Island of Oahu. On December 7, 1941, no communication was received from the Army authorities by the Naval authorities informing the latter that the Army radar network had unknown planes recorded on their receivers.

At about 10:45 Tuesday, December 9, 1941, Commander Kitts, Lieutenant Colonel Pfeiffer, USMC, two members of my Staff, and Commander Momsen on the Staff of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District were in conference with Army authorities regarding the placing of certain anti-aircraft batteries. At the conclusion of the conference on this subject, Brigadier General Davidson, USA, asked these three naval officers if they would be interested in examining a radar plot of the Japanese planes which was recorded at the Army radar reception center during the forenoon of December 7, 1941. These naval officers did examine this plot and discovered therefrom that the Army radar network had picked up many unknown planes at or about six a. m., December 7, 1941, about 132 miles north of the

Island of Kauai and had tracked these planes to Oahu and back to the northward until they disappeared from the radar receiver about 1059 in the morning. When asked why this information was not transmitted to the Navy, these naval officers were informed that the Army radar network was manned solely for drill on the morning of December 7, 1941, and the officer in charge of the operations thought that the planes which were recorded on the receiver were Navy carrier planes and did not consider it necessary to investigate the subject further. It also developed in conversation that the officer conducting the drill on this Army [569] radar network had departed from the radar reception center at about seven o'clock in the morning and left that center in command of a non-commissioned officer. This was advanced as the probable reason that the information on that Army radar was not transmitted to naval authorities on the morning of 7 December 1941.

The Navy has made no serious effort since that time to investigate this matter. However, even if a non-commissioned officer was directing the radar from seven a. m. until after the attack on Oahu, between the hours of eight and nine a. m. on December 7, 1941, it must be apparent that when the Army alerted at the time of the attack, an experienced officer would take charge of the Army radar reception center. Thus, even if an inexperienced officer or non-commissioned officer on the morning of 7 December 1941 had been the cause of failure to report strange planes to naval authorities prior to eight a. m. required by Joint Action, Army and Navy, it is incomprehensible that immediately following the first attack the officer directing the Army radar reception should have failed to appreciate the importance of the information to the Navy. It should then have been realized that, while this information was too late to prevent surprise, the Navy still had vital interest in the further movements of the Japanese planes as the Navy surface units were proceeding to sea in the hope of intercepting and destroying Japanese forces.

It is an unfortunate fact that as a result of the failure of the Army radar network authorities to inform the Navy that the enemy planes after the attack had retired to the northward, the surface naval operation which ensued took a westerly direction with their aircraft scouting largely to the southwest. The available Navy planes first scouted in a sector between 280° and 300° true. A second plane scout was between 300° and 000° true to 300 miles. This late forenoon failure in [570] communications between the Army and the Navy contributed somewhat in the escape of the Japanese surface vessels without any damage whatever.

I wish to clarify the status of Lieutenant Commander Taylor, USNR. This officer reported to Commander Aircraft, Battle Force to give the fleet the benefit of his experience which included one year in the Royal Navy and one year in the Royal Air Force. He had had considerable experience in radar operations. As a matter of courtesy he delivered a series of lectures to the Army on the subject of radar. The Army was so impressed with Lieutenant Commander Taylor's knowledge of the operational aspects of the radar system that on about November 17, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in behalf of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, requested

the service of Lieutenant Commander Taylor as technical advisor to the Army Air Forces in the Hawaiian area in connection with organization of the Army radar system. Without written orders Lieutenant Commander Taylor was loaned to the Army for this duty. It will thus be seen that his status was entirely one of a technician and in no sense was he a liaison officer.

The Army was responsible for communicating radar information to the Navy both before and after eight a. m. December 7, 1941, and this should have been recognized as a matter of paramount importance. With the Navy fully alerted by five minutes past eight on that day, several channels of communication—telephone circuits, messenger, etc., were open for this purpose. The Navy's lack of this knowledge of the retirement courses of the Japanese destroyed the last possibility that existed on the forenoon of December 7, 1941, that the attacking Japanese forces could be brought to decisive action.

Now, in order to show the condition of readiness of the various ships of the fleet at the time of this attack, we have reports from a large number of them, and it indicates that [571] watertight integrity report was what we call considerably better than XRAY provides for closure of all watertight compartments except those in the living compartments and for opening storerooms and such places as that in order that they may get some stores from the storeroom. However, a higher degree is when they close everything below the second deck, and the highest degree is when everything is closed up tight.

By my order and with the forces at hand we had ready ammunition on deck and in ammunition boxes, I think the 5-inch and for the (See following page.)

3-inch 50's, and for 1.1, and for the .50 caliber machine guns. On the battleships two of the 5-inch guns had ammunition laid out and the crew near the guns, two of which were the .50 caliber guns and they (See following page.)

were completely manned and ready. In all cases—and this is laid down in some detail here and is available for the inspection of the board—there were considerably more than 50% of the officers and well over 99% of the crew on board at the time of the attack. I should (See following page.)

say it would run to 70% of the officers and 99% of the men. All ships (See following page.)

went immediately to general quarters. Fire was opened, and from the inspection of the reports from the various ships it appears that almost all the ships were firing within two minutes of the first alarm. (See following page.)

We had our other operations fully manned and in full operation and inflicting damage within five minutes of the first alarm as we (See following page.)

know it is pretty well substantiated that in the first flight of the torpedo planes, that three of the first flight were shot down: two before they launched their torpedoes, and one afterward.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be then a total of how many?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. Were there about a dozen in that first flight of torpedo planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, somewhere in that neighborhood.

[571 Corrected A] On page 571, line 9, delete the words "I think" and insert the word "for."

On page 571, lines 12 and 13, delete the words "which were" and insert the words "and they."

On page 571, line 16, delete the words "99%" and insert the words "80%."

On page 571, line 18, delete the words "99%" and insert the words "80%."

On page 571, lines 21 and 22, delete the words "it appears that almost all the ships were firing within two minutes of the first alarm" and insert the words "it appears that almost all the ships were firing with one or more guns within two minutes of the first alarm."

On page 571, lines 11, 10, and 9 from bottom, delete "We had our other operations fully manned and in full operation and inflicting damage within five minutes of the first alarm" and insert the words "We had all guns fully manned, in full operation and inflicting damage within five minutes of the first alarm."

[572] The CHAIRMAN. You got a report on it?

Admiral KIMMEL. It is difficult to say exactly what the number was. I think it is reasonable that it was somewhere between 12 and 20 in the first flight. I think we shot down three of them or maybe more.

All this is, as I say, in considerable detail in the report. I do not think you want to know where every ship was.

The CHAIRMAN. No. I see it is summarized in the appendix to your report to the Navy Department.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This merely assembles it for each ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. It carries it along.

The CHAIRMAN. And what each ship did?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you developed it in order?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but this is a little different from the other. The other is a report of the ship and the action. Some of them didn't even think about reporting this.

(See following page.)

Admiral STANDLEY. What is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Some of them didn't even think about reporting this. They knew their guns were manned and shooting and they didn't even mention it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there a summary there?

Admiral THEOBALD. No, sir, but we can produce the summary, if the Commission would like to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. These percentages are rough approximations?

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but it is laid out in considerable detail here as to organization, training at sea, training in port, security for sortie and entry, security for ships at sea, security for ships in port, duties of task force commander.

[572 Corrected A] On page 572, line 18, delete the words "Some of them didn't even think about reporting this" and insert the words

"Some of them didn't even think about reporting the time they opened fire. This is a special report in answer to a specific questionnaire."
 [573] naval base, air combat guard, watertight integrity in port, condition of readiness, what station, and so on.

I might say at this point something which just occurred to me, and that is that the organization prescribed for all the ships in the fleet provided that for the anti-aircraft battery that there should be a complete crew for the anti-aircraft battery in each watch section on board no matter whether we had the same men or not, that they should be
 (See following page.)

capable of manning a complete anti-aircraft battery.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood that there were skeleton crews and ammunition at the anti-aircraft guns on these battleships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is correct.

(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. That was according to orders?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think they were. They could not have begun firing as quickly as they did, if that wasn't so.

General McCoy. Is that all submitted in toto?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am perfectly willing to, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be very helpful to us if you do.

Admiral KIMMEL. You can ask Admiral Pye if you want to.

The CHAIRMAN. That is really a report to him?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. The Commission would only be concerned with the matter that is pertinent to the happenings on the morning of the 7th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Some of it is in regard to sea maneuvers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Before we forget it for the moment, will you find out when the Navy Department ceased permitting families of officers to come to Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. The exact day I cannot give, but it was after the attack was completed. That is correct, isn't it?

I can answer that but I would prefer to get the despatch

[573 *Corrected A*] On page 573, line 7, delete the words "no matter whether we had the same men or not."

On page 573, line 12, after the words "That is correct." insert the words "Except that two .50 caliber guns were completely manned."

[574] that was sent out when they stopped it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Do it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I know it was subsequent to the attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. Families come here in many instances where they have home yards, but the Department will not furnish them transportation unless their home yard is here, but families could come anyway on their own expense.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I want to amend that, because I misunderstood at first. The Department permitted families to come here but they didn't furnish them transportation.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. They didn't furnish transportation except to families of officers with permanent stations here or whose home ports were here.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have to recess now until two o'clock.

(Thereupon at 1 o'clock p. m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[575] The CHAIRMAN. Had you concluded your statement, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. There are one or two things, sir, that I would like to add to what I already stated.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have here a memorandum from the fleet personnel officer.

To the best of my knowledge Unav has never prohibited dependents of personnel attached to vessels whose home port is Pearl from coming out here on Government transportation. (See following page)

Attached dispatch proves that such dependents were still being authorized on 3 December. Subject to Opnav 98 if home port not Pearl Government transportation is not authorized any time in accordance with regulations except possible special cases about which I do not know.

The only thing that stopped dependents from coming out here was the evacuation order which was issued on 15 December:

Evacuation Hawaii directed for dependents Navy and Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel on the 15th of December.

And on the 15th of December, also, Opnav sent a message 13 12 11 15 Commander in Chief Pacific Incom 14:

In order to reduce number individuals entering Hawaiian Islands to minimum take appropriate action to permit passage only those definitely required that area in interest of national defense. Maritime Commission, State, War, and Treasury office informed and requested to operate.

Off the record, I was a little confused with that evacuation order and the stopping of dependents coming out here. So, strictly speaking, we have got no order to stop dependents there. We had an order to evacuate.

On 22 October we received the——

Admiral THEOBALD. We will find it later.

[575 *Corrected A*] On page 575, line 7, delete the word "Unav" and insert the word "Bunav".

[576] Admiral KIMMEL. At the time of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet we received a message from the Chief of Naval Operations telling us to make appropriate dispositions, because he didn't know whether we would be attacked or not. That was the essence of the message. I haven't an exact copy of it here.

Admiral REEVES. What date was that, sir?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is November. This is October.

Admiral THEOBALD. October.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if that is the message of October 16.

Admiral KIMMEL. October 16. Was that the day, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. There is a message of October 16, I think, both to the Department Commander and to you, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Well, I have——

The CHAIRMAN. One from each department.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have not that here with me, but the essence of the message was to be prepared for anything. And as a result of

the message which we received to make appropriate dispositions, I informed the Department that we were continuing to maintain the patrol of two submarines at Midway. We dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway. We started two submarines for the patrol of Wake. We dispatched the Castor and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional Marines and stores. The Curtiss arrived at Wake with gasoline, lubricating oil, and bombs. We prepared six patrol planes at Midway for Wake, replacing these six by others from Pearl Harbor. We sent additional Marines to Palmyra. We placed on 12 hours' notice the task force under Admiral Pye, then on the West Coast for a recreation cruise. We prepared six submarines to depart for Japanese waters. We placed additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor. We delayed the sailing of the West Virginia for the West Coast until time when she was actually required at Puget Sound. This [577] is back on the 22nd of October.

We informed CNO that every exercise plan finds us short of destroyers and stated that in order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships made effective we required at least two more squadrons of destroyers. Again asked that the North Carolina and Washington or some other battleships be sent here to strengthen the Pacific Fleet. Asked for all long-range submarines that can be sent here. Asked for more cruisers to take care of the Japanese raider activities after the outbreak of war. We asked for another carrier, for sea-train vessels to transport aircraft, and urged to hasten the supply of Radar and made some complaint about the ones that we had received for the Honolulu class being practically of no value, being of the wrong type.

We on 27 November—

Admiral THEOBALD. You have read that already, I think.

Admiral KIMMEL. On 27 November when we received the war warning, we sent one patrol, then at Midway, ordered to Wake and proceeded on 1 December, conducting reconnaissance sweep en route.

Patrol at Midway replaced by patrol from Pearl. Left Pearl 30 November via Johnston, conducting reconnaissance sweep en route Johnston and en route Johnston to Midway. This squadron made daily search of a hundred-mile radius from Midway on three, four, five, and six December. They also made another. They were to (See following page.)

make the daily search, further orders, and because we only had that (See following page.)

one patrol squadron there we sent the Enterprise to Wake with VMF (See following page.)

squadron, departing Pearl on 28 November, landed planes at Wake on 3 December. Enterprise conducted daily reconnaissance flights with own planes. Patrol at Wake then withdrawn, conducted reconnaissance sweep en route Wake to Midway and a similar sweep from Midway to Pearl Harbor.

Lexington proceeded to Midway with VMF squadron, departing Pearl 5 December. Conducted daily reconnaissance flights with [557 Corrected A] On page 577, line 10 from bottom, delete the words "They also made another."

On page 577, line 9 from bottom, after the word "search" insert the word "until."

On page 577, lines 9 and 8 from bottom, delete the words "and because we only had that on patrol squadron there." Change the word "we" to the word "We."

[578] own planes en route. She was 400 miles southeast of Midway when the war broke.

Burroughs despatched to Wake with additional supplies, including Radar and forces, but was short of Wake when war broke. Burroughs departed Pearl 29 November. She returned, incidentally, having landed a barge down at Johnston Island, and she got in safely but did not go to Wake.

They conducted daily reconnaissance flights of VP planes based (See following page.)

on Pearl Harbor, to cover fleet operating areas and approaches thereto.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Patrol plane flights based on Pearl Harbor.

Each day, beginning the latter part of November, 30 November, we got up a memorandum to show what the initial steps would be when war would come, and the last one was made up on 5 December, gone over by me on the morning of 6 December, and this was ready when the war broke. These were steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war, and I read:

Send dispatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.

Send dispatch to task force commanders:

(a) WPL 46 effective (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below). (The submarine and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them.)

(b) Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled.

(c) Raiding and reconnaissance plan effective, modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost despatch to rendezvous to be designated.

[578 *Corrected A*] On page 578, line 8, delete the word "They" and insert the word "We."

[579] (d) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Taskfor 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join Task Force Three.

(e) Lexington land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p. m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in Company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake.

(f) Comtaskfor Three proceed to join Lexington group. Return DMS to Pearl.

3. (a) Do not modify the movements of Regulus at Midway (departing 9th), nor ships bound to Christmas and Canton.

(b) Direct that William Ward Burrows continue to Wake but delay arrival until 10th. Direct that Lexington group send two destroyers to join Burrows prior to her arrival at Wake.

(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.

(d) Provide two destroyers to escort Saratoga from longitude 150° west to Pearl Harbor.

(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from Manila, nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward California or Samoa until further developments occur.

I merely cite that, not that there is any particular merit in what we had planned to do, but to show you that we were alive to the possibility of war. I must state again that I was by no means convinced that we were going to get into the war at this time and that we would become involved immediately. That was, of course, my mistake.

Now, I have here a number of messages which were received, and I don't think it is necessary to read them all, but they can be inspected to show that from 20 January on we periodically received messages which indicated a grave situation. We did [580] not have any one prefaced by the term "war warning," but they might very well have been.

I have also made some extracts from letters from the Chief of Naval Operations in which this state of tension was emphasized from time to time. I think it is hardly necessary to read all those, unless you want something more definite.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask a question there.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Standley wants to ask a question.

Admiral STANDLEY. While you are on the messages you have referred to a message from Naval Operations saying, "This is a war warning."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the date of that message? Have you got that there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the date of that message?

Admiral KIMMEL. That message was 27 November.

Admiral STANDLEY. 27th of November?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Wait a minute now.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Admiral THEOBALD. That is right. Here. I have got it right here.

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

Admiral THEOBALD. There is the original, I mean.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. Shall I read that for you, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. No. I have it. I just wanted to ask you: Is that estimate that you read there as brought up to the 6th of December, and the plans of things to do—is that in the light of this war warning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, in the light of that war warning and general situation.

Admiral STANDLEY. The last of that message says, "Carry out the task. Inform District and Army authorities."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

[581] Admiral STANDLEY. Did you furnish the Army a copy of this message, or do you know?

Admiral THEOBALD. I can help you on that.

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that I sent a copy of the message to be read by the Commanding General and furnished him with a paraphrase of the message.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can amplify: during the recess——

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, suppose I swear you now, and if you answer questions then you will be a witness.

(The oath was administered to Rear Admiral Robert Alfred Theobald in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name?

Admiral THEOBALD. Rear Admiral Robert Alfred Theobald.

General McCoy. I do not think that counsel ought to be asked questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not understand that you were here as counsel.

Admiral THEOBALD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood that you were here to assist the admiral with information.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. So it is understood you are not acting as counsel here?

Admiral THEOBALD. No, sir.

General McCoy. The admiral is not on trial, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. No, this is not a trial of the admiral, in any sense.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can help a little in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral THEOBALD. Because during the noon hour Admiral Kimmel sent out to get this message, and we have got his intelligence officer and his ex-intelligence officer and ex-communication officer outside, but I just interviewed them, and we can bring in his intelligence officer who did deliver [582] this message personally to an Army officer but not to the commanding general, and he doesn't know the name of the Army officer, but he is absolutely certain in his own mind that that officer that delivered it, naval officer, is Lieutenant Layton. He is outside now.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do we want to break—

General McCoy. I think we had better finish with the admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. I should think so. We will hold him in reserve for this message.

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. He did not receive a receipt for it. He said they were not receiving receipts at that time. He delivered the dispatch personally and remembers it of his own knowledge, but did not receive a receipt. That's what he said.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, then, Admiral, with your statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I haven't anything further, sir, I think.

Do you know of anything further?

Admiral THEOBALD. No, I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any message from the Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. 7 December?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, the day of the attack. If your file is complete there I guess it ought to show it.

Admiral THEOBALD. I think this is just a—I had better go out and ask Curts to bring up the December.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we would like to have any telegraphic messages that the Department sent to Admiral Kimmel between October 14 and December 7. We would like to have the complete file.

Admiral THEOBALD. All right, sir. We have here the November file. We haven't got the October file, or the [583] first seven days.

Admiral KIMMEL. We have the November file here, yes; I was just looking up.

Admiral THEOBALD. We have the November file. Here is the original November file.

Admiral KIMMEL. On 7 December, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Apparently your file there ends with November; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; it runs to the 7th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. That file (indicating)?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Oh, I don't know about this one (indicating), but I have here a transcript of what we considered the messages that might be germane to this investigation, and I find no message from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 7 December.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the next one earlier than the 7th of December?

Admiral KIMMEL. And I find nothing on 6 December.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes? What next?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. What earlier than that? What earlier than the 6th?

Admiral KIMMEL. On 3d December we have, "OpNav informs"—this is a paraphrase, you understand, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. "—informs CinC Asiatic, CincPac, Combat 14-16 that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents."

And on 2 December:

"OpNav informs CinC Pacific, Asiatic, and Com-14 and Guam that landing field will not be constructed on [584] Guam because of impracticability of providing effective defense for Guam."

The CHAIRMAN. That was on 2 December?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I can produce my files, of course, sir, and you can examine them.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite all right for you to do it.

Admiral KIMMEL. If I made a mistake here or if it hasn't been put in I want it found.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, quite right.

General McCoy. May I ask the admiral if he—

Admiral KIMMEL. Now may I interject? Excuse me, sir.

General McCoy. May I ask if you received on the 7th or at any time thereafter a dispatch that was sent to General Short by the Chief of Staff of the Army informing him of the danger of outbreak on December 7 and which arrived, as we know, in Honolulu on the morning of the 7th but didn't get to General Short until after the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In the dispatch General Short was directed to furnish you a copy.

Admiral KIMMEL. General Short did furnish me a copy of that. I saw it. But the attack had already taken place, and it was of no use to me. I did not keep a copy of it. That was delivered immediately—some 24 hours after the enemy raid had ended. I think that's wrong. It is a little bit earlier than that, but he did not receive it until after the enemy raid had ended. He sent it to me—he immediately sent it to me, and of course I have no interest in it.

General McCoy. You had not received that directly from the Navy Department, that particular dispatch?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I had not. Now, I was informed by the Secretary when he was out here that a dispatch had been sent to

the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, the purport of which I judged from his conversations was a warning [585] that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed by his Government to deliver his answer exactly at 1 o'clock. I think it was, Washington time, and that indicated that the Japanese were going to make an attack at that time.

That dispatch was never received in my office, sir. We have no record of it, and I am sure that if it had been received I would have seen it. Immediately the Secretary told me that, of course I had a search made in an attempt to discover it. The Secretary asked me if we had intercepted a dispatch. Well, with the number of dispatches that we have to decode we just simply cannot decode everything that goes through the air, and so far as I know the dispatch was never even intercepted.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the Navy routine would a copy of that dispatch have gone to you as Commander of the Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Under the Navy routine, no, sir, not unless it was addressed to me.

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. And generally when a dispatch such as that is sent there is a multiple address; it is addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of Asiatic, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, and any other interested parties. We have two degrees. One is that a dispatch is addressed for action and to other people for information. The information dispatches for general guidance and the action dispatches require something to be done about it.

The CHAIRMAN. So, as far as you know, that dispatch would have been sent directly to the Admiral of the Pacific Fleet and would not ordinarily have passed through your office at all?

General McCoy. Asiatic Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean the Asiatic Fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. The Department sent a great many dispatches and sends a great many dispatches direct to the various [586] commanders.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Even in this fleet the Department may send a dispatch to a subordinate of mine on which he should take action, particularly in matters of materiel and personnel that I have no particular interest in. As Commander-in-Chief I could not cope with all those things, not even with the staff that I have.

General McCoy. Those were really administrative dispatches?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. There are numbers of dispatches that are sent.

The CHAIRMAN. So that, as far as you know, this dispatch saying that negotiations would be broken off probably at 1 o'clock Washington time, December 7, never came to you at all?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Until after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have never received that at all.

General McCoy. He got it from General Short after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, but I am talking about a Navy dispatch. I am not talking about an Army dispatch.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, you were talking about the Navy dispatch.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, as I understand you, the Secretary said that such a dispatch was sent to the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I have never seen that dispatch yet, and all I know about it is what the Secretary told [587] me.

General McCoy. Have you endeavored to find out through communications what happened to that dispatch?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I made no attempt to find out. It would be very difficult to trace it with the meager information that I've got.

The CHAIRMAN. Communication with the Pacific Fleet might be direct from Washington? It wouldn't be relayed from here, would it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. It might be relayed through this station and still never broken down here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in the light of that plan that you made on December 6 resulting from information that you had up to that time, and suppose you had received that message from the Department that you referred to, breaking off relations and delivery of the note at 1 o'clock; suppose you had received that at 7 o'clock in the morning of the 7th of December: would you have made any other dispositions than were then in existence?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral, that is difficult to answer.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, I am just trying to get informally the—

Admiral KIMMEL. It would depend very much on the wording of a dispatch which I have never yet seen. I am unable to answer what I would have done had that dispatch been received. If I had considered that war with Japan was imminent, if I had believed that war with Japan was imminent, I would have taken every step possible, but what my reactions would have been to the dispatch—well, I hesitate to make a statement like that.

Admiral STANDLEY. I am trying to ascertain whether or [588] not the information which you had up to the 6th of December had fixed in your mind the dates which progressively meant decisive action or possible decisive action: dates and hours and times. Had that impression been made in your mind, that various dispatches, and so forth, mentioning dates, had certain significance?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't believe I understand you.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, I understand from the Department that they had referred in their various messages to certain dates: 27th of December. Oh, one, I think—

The CHAIRMAN. November.

Admiral STANDLEY. November. I think there was one in October, and the 29th of November was another, and then at 1 p. m. on the morning of the 7th of December was another, and the message which you never got. Now, I am trying to find out if these messages created

in your mind a progressive move towards a date on which Japan was going to take decisive action. In other words, the message which said 1 p. m. on December 7 meant 1 p. m.—as far as concerns them over at that side, meant that that had a certain significance, and I want to know if it would have conveyed the same significance to you.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it probably would, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That is the only dispatch that mentioned any date.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, they spoke about the 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral REEVES. No, in no previous dispatch have they mentioned the date.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, but Turner has told us that there were certain dates that had made impressions on them; I don't know whether that was a radiogram or not.

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall any specific dates, sir.

Admiral REEVES. There were no dates. The only dispatch [589] which I recall which mentions a date is the one of the 7th of December.

Admiral STANDLEY. That mentioned hours, yes.

Admiral REEVES. That mentioned date and hour.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume, Admiral, you are familiar with what burning the codes and the papers in the consulates means?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, but burning the codes in the consulate—after all, the codes are burned from time to time, and in a time of tension like this we receive a great many scary reports. To be sure, they came from a great many sources. But, again, the Department sent me a message that these codes were being burned, and I feel, while that was good information, that they might very well have enlarged somewhat on what they believed it meant. I didn't draw the proper answer, I admit that. I admit that I was wrong. Nobody can gainsay the fact that if I had drawn different conclusions from what I got we might have changed things. Nevertheless, such a dispatch as that, with no amplification, was not near as valuable as it would have been if they had amplified and drawn the conclusions.

General McCoy. Don't you think it was of considerable moment, having followed the one of November 27, which was given as a war warning, "This is a war warning"; then the next dispatch you got—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but—

General McCoy. —stating that the consulates in London and various other places were burning their codes, and so forth?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And don't you suppose it was sent to you with that in view, that is, in part?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. As an additional warning to the dispatch of the war warning?

[590] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. But again, in connection with the war warning, the war warning was sent with some intelligence in it which very definitely indicated that in the mind of the Department the attack was directed towards Kra Peninsula. Now don't mistake me, gentlemen; I am not trying to evade anything. I am merely trying to let you know what influenced me, what was in my mind.

General McCoy. Well, that is what we are trying to find out, because it is pertinent both to our interview with General Short and with you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. We are not trying to put you on the spot at all. We are just trying to—

Admiral KIMMEL. No, but I don't want to be misunderstood if I can help it.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you quoted from that order made up on December 5 which you say you saw and approved on December 6.

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you turn to that order again?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That was not an order, sir, so much as a memorandum or a reminder.

The CHAIRMAN. Or a memorandum of action to be taken?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, it was a reminder of action to be taken.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right. Now, is there anything in that memorandum that tightens up the defense against a possible air raid on Pearl Harbor? And if there is will you point it out to us?

Admiral REEVES. Let us have the Admiral read the whole memorandum; it isn't very long.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't he read it, Mr. Stenographer?

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you might read it. You need not take it again, Mr. Stenographer. Read it again.

[591] Admiral REEVES. Make a note.

Admiral KIMMEL. Just one moment. I think I can answer you. I think the answer to your question is that in these particular reminders there isn't anything that specifically tightens up on the patrol in Pearl Harbor, but that was in my mind and would have been done automatically.

Admiral REEVES. How long is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Automatically.

Admiral REEVES. I would like to hear it again.

The CHAIRMAN. Without taking it again on the record, will you read it through again?

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

Send despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.

Send despatch to task force commanders:

(a) WPL 46 effective. (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below.) (The SS and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them).

Admiral REEVES. That is very definitely air action, isn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I was wrong about that.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, I thought there was definite air action in this memorandum.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought that—

Admiral REEVES. Your submarine and VP plans.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

plans will become effective without special reference to them.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

(b) Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations—

Is that all you want, sir?

Admiral REEVES. No. I would like to hear it. It isn't very long.

[692] Admiral KIMMEL. "Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled." That was because there wasn't any commerce.

Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows:

Admiral REEVES. Yes; that is another item.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral REEVES. Another item of air, isn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Radio and reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Raiding and reconnaissance.

Admiral REEVES. Raiding?

Admiral KIMMEL. Raiding and reconnaissance plan.

Delay reconnaissance until task forces 2 and 3 are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost despatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated.

Admiral REEVES. What was Task Force 3, again? That contained a carrier, didn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. So you were sending additional support to the carrier east of Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is right.

Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Taskfor 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join Task Force Three.

Admiral REEVES. Task Force 2 had a carrier in it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. "LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p. m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake." [593] The LEXINGTON, you remember, was up there.

(Admiral Kimmel read the remainder of the memorandum of steps to be taken in case of war.)

Admiral REEVES. As I have checked it, there are seven specific items referring to the movement of air force in this memorandum.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That was to be put into effect in the case of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That was the action you took on what date?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was approved by me on the morning of 6 December.

Admiral REEVES. That was the direct result of the warning of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. You took these war preparation measures on that morning as a result of that warning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; as the result of that warning and the general situation I wanted to know—I was keeping a running record of what—

Admiral REEVES. Well, would you say that these measures that you have taken are anti-sabotage protection? Did you have anti-sabotage in your mind when you took these measures to despatch forces all along?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Then, you took the warning of November 27 to mean more than protect yourself against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Did you discuss that with the Army commander?

Admiral KIMMEL. What I was going to do here? I think I didn't show him this. I discussed a great many things with [594] the Army commander.

General MCCOY. Do you remember on what dates immediately prior to the attack you had conferences with General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would be difficult for me to say that, sir, but I think I can look at some of these dispatches and approximate the—

General MCCOY. Now may I help you? General Short made a statement to us that he had conferences with you on certain days. Could you have that looked up, the dates? Would that be here or at the hotel?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is probably at the hotel, General.

Admiral KIMMEL. We had several conferences.

General MCCOY. My remembrance is that he spoke of a prior conference with you.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

General MCCOY. Immediately prior to the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct.

General MCCOY. And we asked him to give us some idea of what you talked about—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. —to see what effect these dispatches had on the two of you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Talking it over together.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. And the dispatch that we had particularly in mind, I think, at the time, was this one that was the war warning on the 27th.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Apparently General Short didn't remember that at all. He had received no copy of it. That is, he had the record looked up. He didn't remember it at all, but he said he felt that you must have mentioned it to him, although he couldn't remember it, and his records and his file over [595] there do not show that it was ever furnished him.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, General, I not only sent that war warning to General Short, to the best of my knowledge and belief, but—

General MCCOY. I understood from your records that you had sent him a paraphrase.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Would that paraphrase use the term "war warning," do you think?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, sir; we had a paraphrase, or he read it, because they were not the same in literal wording, but "war warning" was in both dispatches, the paraphrase and the original.

General McCoy. It made no impression, as I remember, on General Short, however.

Admiral REEVES. No, I don't think it did.

General McCoy. He said, however, that he felt you had shown everything you had received.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was going to add, General, that I believe that in my own office I showed him these dispatches and discussed them with him.

General McCoy. Well, he was of that impression, but he didn't remember that particular one.

Admiral KIMMEL. I believe that with all my might. I mean I am convinced that I did, and in addition to it I am convinced that I sent him a paraphrase of this message.

General McCoy. You remember the nature of your discussions at those conferences as regards your anticipation of what the Japanese would do in case war was suddenly declared or started without declaration?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think that my idea was—I know that my idea was, and I think that I must have expressed it to the General—that I thought the war was getting pretty close. [596] I thought that they were going to go to the Kra Peninsula, and I thought they were going to go into Thailand. I agreed with that, but I believed that we might not get into it for a little while, but we never could tell what was going to happen.

Admiral REEVES. It might help you, Admiral: Do you recall General Short showing you a dispatch of the 27th of November which he received from the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, on this same subject?

Admiral KIMMEL. Could I see it, sir, perhaps?

Admiral REEVES. Yes. (Handing a paper to Admiral Kimmel.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I have seen that before. Yes, sir, I have seen this dispatch before.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, you apparently had a copy of it from General Short on the 27th of November, and of course if you did you must have discussed this dispatch and also the one which you had received.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Yes, I remember seeing—I have seen that dispatch.

General McCoy. Do you remember General Short at that particular conference asking you if you anticipated any attack by the Japanese from the air here in Hawaii at the outbreak of hostilities either by declaration of war or without declaration of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall that now, but we discussed a great many things. It's quite possible he did ask me such a question.

General McCoy. Was there an officer by the name of McMorris with you at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Was he your operations officer?

Admiral KIMMEL. He is the War Plans Officer, yes, sir.

General McCoy. "War Plans." Well, we can ask—

[597] Admiral STANDLEY. He was supposed to have answered the question.

General McCoy. Well, the Admiral, he said, turned to McMorris and——

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, I recall.

General McCoy. Do you remember——

Admiral KIMMEL. McMorris is here and available, sir, whenever you want him.

General McCoy. I mean, do you remember referring, or do you remember that when General Short asked such a question you turned to McMorris and asked his opinion?

Admiral KIMMEL. I very probably did, sir.

General McCoy. You don't remember it, however?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't remember that particular incident, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you really any apprehension between November 27 and December 7 that there would be an airplane raid on Hawaii, on Honolulu?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought it was highly improbable, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that, so far as you know, the opinion of the well-instructed officers in your command?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. They were all, as you were, surprised at the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir. I might state that as nearly as I can recollect the Saturday preceding the attack I went over this situation in the forenoon, and I think Admiral Pye was in the office. I know I went over it with DeLany and McMorris and Smith. We left the office about 1 o'clock, came here to these quarters, where we have our meals, and I think after lunch we sat there and talked for some time about the possibilities of this and that in connection with the situation, and along two or three o'clock in the afternoon I went to my quarters and remained there until about a quarter [598] of six when I went downtown for dinner at the Halekulani Hotel. I left there about 9:30 and came home, turned in about 10 o'clock, and that was the way I spent the day before the attack.

General McCoy. What evaluation of the situation did your staff officers give you at that conference? What was the estimate of the situation at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. The evaluation that they gave me is pretty well summarized in this memorandum of action to be taken. We discussed taking additional security measures and balanced the probabilities against the additional action to be taken, and made the decisions. I had no advice from any one of them—I think I am fair in stating that—to take any measures other than the ones that we had laid down.

The CHAIRMAN. When, if at all, Admiral, had you alerted the command under you against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had been alerted for two years against sabotage, sir, continuously.

The CHAIRMAN. You took no special means or measures after the message of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. At all times, long before I became Commander-in-Chief, we were alerted against sabotage. We had

patrols in the ships, and what I believe to be a very effective organization. I was in the cruisers of the battle force at the time that that was first started; I got a very comprehensive order which remained constantly in effect. I took no measures against sabotage at this particular time because we already had done everything that we could do.

General McCoy. Had there been any sabotage in that period?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

General McCoy. Had there been any sabotage in that period?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can say that there had been no proved [599] cases of sabotage. We had had some things go wrong with some turbines and other gear in the ship, and each time such an incident occurred we made a very thorough investigation, and I don't recall a single instance where it was determined that there was sabotage or even that there was a strong probability of sabotage.

Do you recall any?

Admiral THEOBOLD. No; when I was chief of staff of the fleet the nearest we came to it was the ARIZONA incident, the fire in the ARIZONA, but the F. B. I. could never give us enough evidence to make the then Commander-in-Chief want to take any further action. That was Admiral Bloch's regime. So it just dropped. That is the nearest.

General McCoy. Do you remember being furnished with General Short's Alert No. 1 that he put into effect as a result of that dispatch and conference with you of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have in your files his Standing Operating Procedure?

Admiral KIMMEL. I may, sir, but if I did—I may have seen this (indicating a document), but if I did I never went into it very thoroughly, because that was the Army's mission. I thought General Short was a very competent officer, and so far as I remember I haven't seen this. It's possible that I have, but I don't recall it.

The CHAIRMAN. You will notice that in that telegram from the War Department to General Short of November 27 there is reference to precautions against sabotage.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in the telegram to him.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he inform you what he had done or intended to do with respect to precautions against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, so far as I know he didn't.

[600] General McNARNEY. I think you are mistaken, Mr. Justice. That was on the 28th, sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it? Maybe I am wrong.

General McCoy. With reference to this Alert No. 1 that was furnished the Navy, according to the Army records, as the New Deal, as it were, as the result of the dispatch of the 27th, in this Alert No. 1 there is provision made on the Army air fields for, instead of the dispersion of the planes which had been in force before, a concentration of the planes, which caused their destruction in the attack. Now, was that order of the Army for protection against sabotage of their airships in any way put into effect in the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. As regards land planes of the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. They were dispersed on the——

Admiral KIMMEL. I had no knowledge of the concentration of Army planes.

General McCoy. Well, it is provided for in this Alert No. 1 which was furnished the Navy on the day it was put in effect, according to the Army records.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, it may have been furnished the Navy and I would never have seen it, and I doubt if any member of my staff had time to fully read the whole setup there, and I certainly——

General McCoy. Do you know whether the Navy planes were concentrated for protection at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; so far as I know the Navy planes were dispersed. I had invited attention to the necessity for keeping the planes dispersed, and I know that at Kaneohe, in particular, they had attempted to disperse the VP planes to the extent of anchoring them out to get them away, so as they were widely separated, and after the attack I was informed that every single one of those that had been [601] anchored out in our attempt to disperse them had been completely destroyed, while those that were kept on the ramps and dispersed as well as they could there—that while some of them had been damaged, most of them they had been able to repair and to fly; and due to the fact that those that were dispersed—I am speaking now of patrol planes, which are our biggest problem—those that had been anchored out, they couldn't get at them to fight the fire, once it started, and they were destroyed and sunk at their moorings; while those that were on the beach, they had been able to get at them and fight the fires and had saved some of them, at least.

Now, the condition of the planes at Ewa, which is where the Marines had their planes, I know they had provision for dispersing their planes. Exactly what condition they were in on the morning of the attack I don't know. I haven't found it out. But there was no order given by any authority any higher than the commanding officer of the field to protect against sabotage. Issued no such order.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in that memorandum of things to be done I note you referred to something that was to happen, as I recall, on the 7th of December. I think it was the landing of planes at Midway or Wake.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, Midway.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you refer to just that memorandum there for a minute?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I know what you mean: "LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned afternoon of 7 December."

Admiral STANDLEY. That is, planned afternoon of 7 December?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, that memorandum, then, was prepared on the 6th of December?

The CHAIRMAN. No, it was prepared on the 5th and visaed [602] by him on the 6th.

Admiral STANDLEY. You approved it on the 6th?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right.

Admiral STANDLEY. All right. Now, what would have happened to that memorandum on, we will say, the morning of the 8th if there hadn't been any untoward incident here? We would have revised it? You would have, would you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have revised the memorandum.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, that was a day-to-day—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was a day-to-day plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Keeping it up to date?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I would have revised it. I did revise it. This is the last one; this is not the first one.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is what I want to bring out. It had to be done from day to day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. You have another one underneath there.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I have another one underneath here. It is the same thing; a little bit different. Some days the situation (See following page.) wouldn't change any.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, you did not discuss with General Short what shape his dispositions were in to meet an air attack here?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I did not. That was the Army's responsibility, and I presumed he would carry out his responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not discuss the possible air attack with him?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think, sir, we discussed a possible air attack on many occasions. We held these drills. For a long time we held them weekly, and then there was some diffi-

[602 *Corrected A*] On page 602, line 13 from bottom, delete the words "It is the same thing;" and insert the words "It is the same subject;"

[603] culty about getting all elements to take part in the air-raid drills, so we adopted the scheme of setting a date considerably ahead of time, so all of us, particularly the Army aircraft, could take part to the fullest extent, and that had been in effect for—the air-raid drills started, oh, I should say in March at the latest. [604] They were held as often as practicable thereafter, and we held these dress rehearsals, you might call them, along about once a week and then once every two weeks because we wanted to get the two elements into it without conflicting with the training and the various operations.

Now, about the possibility of an air raid, we did discuss it from time to time. I freely confess and so state that I considered an air raid on this place as a possibility, but by no means a probability.

General McCoy. Do you know yet where the Japanese carriers were at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. From the captured documents and from the planes that we got, all indications point to the fact that they were northward of the island, that they landed their planes some 200 miles (See following page.)

from the island, and that they turned and ran north at as high a speed as they could immediately after launching the planes; and that they launched them around six o'clock in the morning.

I must say that this air raid was a beautifully planned and beautifully executed military maneuver. They knew exactly where every air field in this place was and they knew exactly where every ship in the harbor was supposed to be. They made their attack so that the air fields were attacked shortly before the ships in the harbor, Pearl Harbor, were attacked to insure that they could immobilize the planes on the ground, and they attacked—let us see. There are about nine or ten objectives, I believe, and they must have had a very considerable air force there to do it. I estimate that they must have had in the neighborhood of 250 planes in the attacking group. Now, that is hardly something that I can prove, but I think to carry those 250 planes they had at least four carriers, or probably six. We have documents which reasonably well establish the fact that there were four carriers here; there may have been two more, sir. We have some indications that they were

[604 *Corrected A*] On page 604, line 14, delete the word "landed" and insert the word "launched."

[605] accompanied by two battleships, that these carriers were accompanied by two battleships. I think they were probably back there as a supporting group, some distance away.

Well, that is about all.

General McCox. Were there any patrols out on the morning of the 7th or the night before, in a northward direction?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, not until after the attack. You mean before the attack?

General McCox. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what I thought you meant.

General McCox. You spoke of things happening automatically. Were your patrols automatic and mechanical? That is, did you have some patrols day after day in the same region?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not entirely, so, sir. We were making patrol flights in that direction, but the patrol flights to Midway and to Wake were not normal patrols. We have a system of patrolling the operating areas daily to ascertain that there were no surface ships or submarines on the surface in the vicinity of the operating areas. That was the only patrol that was a day-by-day affair.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you call the operating area? Three miles offshore?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. The operating areas extend 150 to 200 miles to the south and southward.

The CHAIRMAN. To the southward?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And no patrol would normally go to the northward?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you were expecting a raiding force to come from the southward, what would you do?

Admiral KIMMEL. The air raid force on this place would have a better chance, a much better chance to get in from the [606] northward than they would from the southward, but no part could be disregarded.

There are two ways for an expedition to come to this vicinity. One is from the homeland by way of the northern route which would be much

more direct and advantageous, to come in from the northward; and the other would be a much shorter route from the Marshall area where it is about 2,000 miles to the Marshall area as against 3,500 miles to the homeland.

Of course, coming up from the Marshall area that would be some 1,500 miles less, but again, coming from the Marshall area, they would have the difficulties of taking their supplies to the Marshall area and they would have to pass our outlying stations, which are Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and in that area. So, I should say that the probabilities of attacking from the north were probably more than those from the south.

We felt that and our first inclination was to send carriers and other forces that we had at sea to the northward, but we were diverted from that by the, I assume, false reports that we received indicating that they went to the southward.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking of after the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When you made the chase?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCox. That would indicate when you knew the dangerous point was to the north that you didn't expect any air attack from that region?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

General McCox. Because you had no patrols out there. The normal patrols didn't cover the northward point.

Admiral KIMMEL. We did not expect any air attack, and the only justification for the action that I took is that we considered an air attack here improbable at this time, and [607] that the patrols to the northward were not justified with the then state of the planes and the necessity for conserving them, that I thought existed.

General McCox. I take it from your testimony that you had nowhere nearly enough planes to cover the whole circle around Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, not effective, not effective to cover the whole circuit around Oahu. To cover that circuit around Oahu we had to have two or three hundred miles to cover and to insure against a surprise air attack would have taken considerably more than that.

(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. You would have to go about five or eight hundred miles the evening before?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, to be sure. We could run a patrol eight hundred miles the evening before, and it takes in an awful lot of planes.

Now, there are many different ways to run a patrol, but to do anything but what might be called a direct patrolling method leaves a great many hollows, blank spaces on your search, and while some of them looked very attractive on paper, when you sit down and analyze them they are by no means 100% effective.

However, if I had considered the probability of an air attack as if an air attack were anywhere near probable, I would have used everything we had, everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Including what ships the Army could have spared you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. You did not ask the Army to reinforce your patrols at that particular time?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am a layman on these matters, and your description of where your task forces were working does not

[607 *Corrected A*] on page 607, lines 8, 9, 10, and 11, delete sentence, "To cover that circuit around Oahu we had to have two or three hundred miles to cover and to insure against a surprise air attack would have taken considerably more than that." and insert "To cover that circuit around Oahu continuously we had to have two or three hundred planes to insure against a surprise air attack."

On page 607, line 14, delete the words "We could run a patrol" and insert the words "We would have to run a patrol."

On page 607, line 18, delete the words "to do anything but" and insert the words "doing anything other than what."

[608] register very accurately with me. Now, put it into a layman's language.

How many evening patrols were off here the evening of the 4th, 5th, and the 6th?

Admiral KIMMEL. We did not send any evening patrols.

The CHAIRMAN. None?

Admiral KIMMEL. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, there was no sector of the entire circumference that was searched every evening?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that would be the daily procedure at the several points of the circumference to see if an air raid was in the offing?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Do you have radar on any of your ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Do they work?

Admiral KIMMEL. The radar on the ships in port is not effective, due to the presence of large land masses, and the only radar we had to depend on was the Army radar, so far as Oahu was concerned.

General McCoy. Did you have task forces for radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. None of them picked up anything?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Didn't one of them?

Admiral KIMMEL. One of them was within 400 miles of Midway and then out of range of anything, and they could not have picked up anything.

The other one was a little over 200 miles to the westward of Oahu, and it is highly improbable that they would have picked up anything.

Their planes coming, came into the combat, made contact, [609] and they shot down some of the Japanese planes. This was in the midst of the fight, and my recollection is that about four of the planes from the Enterprise were shot down there during the time they were coming in here after they attacked.

General McCoy. Do any of your airplanes have radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. We do not have any radar on any planes, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not used radar planes for patrolling? Is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, we have endeavored to get radar in the patrol planes, and I hope some day we will have them.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any morning patrol on the morning of the 5th?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, the only morning patrol was over the operating area.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean up to 200 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, to Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that be complete?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It would not cover the whole circumference of the island?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would they be? To the southward?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were to the southward, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing in the north?

Admiral KIMMEL. Nothing to the north, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had had the slightest inkling previously of air raid you could have been working that point to the north as well?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you might have gotten news by six o'clock?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is quite possible.

General McCoy. Were you conscious after the war warning [610] of the special dangers of a Sunday?

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

General McCoy. Of a Sunday.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the special dangers of a Sunday?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I did not think it was.

The CHAIRMAN. As you look at it now, the Japanese plans are perfect in that respect also, aren't they?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And Sunday morning was the best morning for them to come in here, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. On account of the number of passes and leaves issued on Saturday?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but so far as the Navy was concerned that had very little effect, very little effect on it, because the ships had ample men on them and used everything that they had.

General McCoy. Were the commanding officers of the ships present.

Admiral KIMMEL. The commanding officers of a great many ships were ashore.

General McCoy. That would be due to it being a week-end? To it being Sunday, would it not? That would be due to it being a Sunday?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, no, sir; not entirely.

Admiral THEOBALD. I might say that two battleship captains were killed on the bridges.

Admiral KIMMEL. They may have been ashore on other days.

General McCoy. There are more absences both of officers and men on Sunday than on any other day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, maybe so, but I don't think appreciably more, certainly not at that time of the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the officers?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is your opinion of that (referring to Admiral Theobald)?

[611] Admiral THEOBALD. The attack started about 7:50, and most of them start back about twenty to eight in the morning, and I think if they attacked on Monday morning there would not have been probably a great many more officers on board. They would have been on the decks, but maybe not on the bridges.

(See following page.) (See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. When your ships are in harbor, do the officers sleep ashore generally?

Admiral KIMMEL. It depends.

The CHAIRMAN. It depends on what is being done to the boat, I suppose?

Admiral KIMMEL. It depends on whether the families are here, and there were a great many officers here who had no families, and they slept on board.

The CHAIRMAN. On board?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, a great many of them, and some of them got in this morning and they were in their quarters available immediately, and a great many others were in the same fix.

I have made no survey but I think it is safe to say that 50 to 70% of the commanding officers were on board at the time the attack took place.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the conditions of such an attack the officers of capital ships would have attempted to get their vessels out of the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. We would have attempted to get them out, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would?

Admiral KIMMEL. As soon as we were able to arrange an adequate submarine patrol we would have gone out from the harbor.

Admiral THEOBALD. In fact, the Nevada actually started.

Admiral KIMMEL. In fact, the order was given and the Nevada was on her way out, and we told her not to go out. We

[611 Corrected A] On page 611 line 5m delete the word "decks" and insert the word "docks".

On page 611, line 5, delete the words "the bridges", and insert the word "board".

[612] delayed it and then it was hit by a torpedo and it beached. (See following page.)

One of them made a circle of the island, of Ford Island, and then by (See following page.)

that time it was fixed up there and she went out.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. When did the two United States battleships come into the harbor?

The CHAIRMAN. We heard it said they came in on the 3rd or 4th or 5th. I do not know whether that is so or not.

Admiral KIMMEL. One came in on the 3rd; 5 or 2 and 4 came in some days before that. Wait a minute.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. What caused them to come into the harbor? Anything affecting this war warning or despatches you had from the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. They came in in accordance with the operating schedule which we had prepared and we hadn't seen fit to depart from that up to this time.

General McCoy. Is it customary to bring two divisions into Pearl Harbor at the same time?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had the fleet divided into three major task forces (referring to a document).

The fleet was divided into three main task forces:

Task force 1 with Admiral Pye in command, which consisted of Batdivs two and four, which was 6 battleships, one of which was in the Navy Yard for repairs, the Colorado, which is still there; Cardiv one less Lexington. 1 CV; Crudiv nine, 5 CL, Desflot one less Desron five, 1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD, Oglala, Mindiv one, 1 CM, 4 DM.

Their primary mission was to organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient covering force available for supporting operations [612 Corrected A] On page 612, line 1, add at end of line, "We delayed the sortie of heavy ships due to the report that mines had been dropped in the channel."

On page 612, line 2, delete the word "them" and insert the words "the cruisers."

On page 612, line 3, delete the words "that time it was fixed up there and she went out." and insert the words "that time the mine report was discounted and she went out."

One page 612, lines 8 and 9, delete "1 came in on the 3rd; 5 or 2 and 4 came in some days before that. Wait a minute." and insert the words "Batdiv-1, consisting of three ships, came in on the third; Batdiv-2 and 4, consisting of five ships, came in some days before that."

[613] of other forces; or for engagement, with or without support, in fleet action.

Task Force Two, (commander aircraft, battle force):

Batdiv one, 3 BB, Cardiv two, 1 CV; Crudiv Five, 4 CA, Desflot two, 1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD, Mindiv two, 4 DM.

Primary mission: To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient Reconnoitering and Raiding Force for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces.

Task Force Three, (commander scouting force):

Crudivs four, six, 8 CA; Lexington plus Marine Air Group 21, 1 CV; Desron five, 1 DL, 8 DD, Minron two, 13 DMS; Trainron four, 6 AP;

2nd Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.

Primary Mission: To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient Amphibious Force for attack, with or without support of other forces, on outlying positions of the enemy.

Task Force Four, (commandant Fourteenth Naval District):

That part of Fourteenth Naval District Activities which involve the Island Bases.

Primary Mission: To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases in order to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations.

[614] Task Force seven, (commander submarines, scouting force):

Subron Four less Subdiv Forty-one, 1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR, 1 DD; Subron six, 12 SS, 1 AS; Subron eight, 6 SS, 1 AS, Subron ten, 4 SS, 1 AS.

Primary Missions: (1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient Submarine Observation and Attack Force for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces. (2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet in order to improve security of fleet units and bases.

Now, of the three main task forces operating out of here, it was provided that one of them should be at sea at all times; but sometimes two of them were at sea at the same time.

We provided for tactics for as large a number of ships as there were in these two forces and then pitted one force against the other. At times there were two task forces that were in port, and this was one of the days and there was no reason at this particular time to change it.

Now, according to this agreement there may have been some change
(See following page.)

in it, but that was when they were supposed to come in, and they came in 29 November and 12 December. Task force 3 was supposed (See following page.)
to come in 26 November.

Admiral THEOBALD. That task force was the one scheduled to be at sea at the time of the attack, I think.

General MCCOY. There was only one task force outside at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I did change that to the extent that we had one task force out. That was Vice Admiral Brown's task force, (See following page.)

and that was the Lexington, 400 miles southeast of Midway, or the Indianapolis with Admiral Brown, but there was another task force out which had gone to Wake Island and

[614 Corrected A] On page 614, 13 lines from bottom, delete the word "agreement" and insert the word "schedule."

On page 614, lines 11 and 10 from bottom, delete the words "and they came in 29 November and 12 December. Task force 3 was supposed to come in 26 November." and insert the words "and they were due to come in, Task Force One on 28 November and Task Force Two on 5 December. Task Force Three was due to depart Pearl on 5 December and to return on 13 December."

On page 614, line 4 from bottom, after the word "had" insert the words "more than."

[615] was on the way back from Wake.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, you had part of one task force out and part of it in?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You had your cruisers and aircraft carrier out of one task force?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and the battleships in, yes. I think the task force was out at Midway in its entirety.

(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. If you had had any suspicion of an air raid on that Sunday morning your ships would have cleared the harbor before they could have gotten here, and you could have gotten them out?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. We would have sent them to sea.

General McCoy. The fact that you had two in here together would indicate that you had no suspicion here of any air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, any immediate danger, yes. As I look back, if I had that information the service then had and they didn't come into port this time and they had been at sea, they could have held off for another chance and tried another time.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. It goes back, I take it, to the fact that the Japanese had perfect information and you had none?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir.

General McCoy. It occurs to me that at that time or previous to that time and up to now that you were without any information about the Japanese; is that not so?

Admiral KIMMEL. We have less now than we had before.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you say that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, perhaps we know more now than we did before.

Well, there is another thing in connection with this raid, and that is the Tatua Maru which was sent out from Yokohama for Los Angeles and Panama to evacuate Americans from Japan and to pick up Japanese in Los Angeles and Panama.

[615 Corrected A] On page 615, line 8, delete the words "was not at Midway" after the words "task force" and insert the words "three was out".

On page 615, lines 16 to 20, inclusive, delete the whole paragraph and insert the words "Yes, any immediate danger, yes. As I look back, with the formation service that we now know the Japanese had, they would not have attacked until our ships came into port. If our ship had been at sea the Japanese would have held off for another chance and tried another time."

[616] I believe from what I have seen that this Tatua Maru embarked and that she sailed. We have been watching that also. (See following page.) (See following page.)

I believe it actually embarked and she sailed, but I don't know where (See following page.)

it went after it went to sea, but they got out, and I doubt very much (See following page.)

whether the captain of the *Tatua Maru* knew anything except the fact that he was going to carry out his mission.

General McCoy. Your information service has failed you then?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I think so, sir.

General McCoy. You knew though that this place was naturally full of Japanese spies?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Apparently neither the Army service nor the Navy service was able to get these spies?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Do you attribute that to the fact that it was a poor service here or to the fact that the Japanese were particularly good?

Admiral KIMMEL. I attribute it more to our laws, our freedom, than to any other factor.

I have been told that the F. B. I. and the Military Intelligence Department and the O. N. I. had their eyes on a considerable number of people here in Honolulu and around here who, when war broke, were promptly seized and they have crippled the Japanese intelligence service considerably.

I think there were a considerable number. I hesitate to make that statement as to the number, but you probably know more about it than I do. It is something that is very easily verified, but I heard the statement made that they had about 2,500 rounded up, I would say. Is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. I think there are about 400 Japanese out at the immigration station, if that is what you mean. That is my understanding. I do not know that to be a fact.

[616 *Corrected A*] On page 616, line 2, after the word "embark" insert the words "American passengers."

On page 616, line 2, delete the word "have" and insert the word "had."

On page 616, line 3, delete the word "it" and insert the words "American passengers."

On page 616, line 4, after the word "sea" change comma to period.

On page 616, line 4, delete the word "but" and insert the word "But."

[617] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think perhaps the proper agencies would know that. I understood it was in the neighborhood of 2,500, but that I do not know. I had no responsible person to tell me.

General McCoy. Did you have any espionage service or counter-espionage service with anyone in Japan to inform you as to what was happening in the Japanese naval bases or rendezvous?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would not know that, sir. That is under the Office of Naval Intelligence. I hope they have, but I have not anything definite about it.

General McCoy. You spoke of the O. N. I. Did your O. N. I. have any espionage agent in Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know, no, sir.

General McCoy. Did they have any representatives in the Mandate Islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Isn't it a very dangerous thing for us to sit here with no one in the Japanese areas and with 120,000 Japanese at our gates here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And it will continue to be dangerous.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I think it is not as dangerous now as it was before, the time before the declaration of war. This is a thing that has been constantly in the minds of a great many naval officers here, a great many of us. Once war is declared and the intelligence service is smashed, we are much safer here than we were before war was declared.

General McCoy. I notice in your operations orders and in your statements that you were under orders to supply certain fortifications or certain detachments and certain defense measures to these outlying posts.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Did you expect these outposts to defend [618] themselves against Japanese attack in time of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. We hoped that they would be able to defend themselves against a small expedition which could be sent there. We knew that Wake was vulnerable. We knew that, that Wake gave a great deal of concern to every one of us, and the steps to be taken at Wake were the subject of considerable correspondence between my office and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Navy Department. We felt that if we could keep Wake reasonably well defended—and I think it was reasonably well defended—it would serve as bait to catch detachments of Japanese, the Japanese fleet coming down there, and we hoped to be able to meet them out there in sufficient force to handle them.

We also wanted to keep the investment. We had quite an investment at Wake, and the Navy Department had ordered it under way and there were extensive improvements established, and there was a flying field which, incidentally, has been used by the Army in ferrying planes to the Far East, and as an observation post.

The wisdom of ever putting anything on Wake is open to very serious question; by "anything" I mean anything more than just enough to handle the commercial planes that could go by there. However, that was something in which the final decision was not with me, and they decided to do these various things at Wake.

Then we had the decision—as I tried to indicate here a little while ago in answer to a question where I got off the track a little bit—that we had to make a decision as to how much defense we were going to put there, if any. Rightly or wrongly, we eventually had there about 350 marines and 6 5-inch guns and 12 3-inch guns and a number of machine guns, and we have four fighting planes there.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. Was that expected to hold out against

[618 Corrected A] On page 618, line 2 from bottom, delete the words "have four" and insert the words "had twelve."

[619] Japanese attack indefinitely?

Admiral KIMMEL. It did for same time, sir.

General McCoy. Was the Navy to play any part in its defense?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. What happened to them?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Navy were to play a part in its defense, but after this affair here the picture changes considerably from what we anticipated.

On the question of profit and loss with respect to Wake, we lost about 350 marines. They sank one cruiser, two destroyers, and a gunboat in one attack. They beached two destroyers up there when they landed, and presumably they were well destroyed before they got away, if they ever did get off. They knocked down and destroyed at least ten bombers which came over them and which attacked them. On the first attack they destroyed eight of the twelve fighting planes that were there with the other four ones that we could replace parts of that could be used.

General McCoy. Didn't you have a task force in the vicinity of Wake at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, there was not.

General McCoy. I thought you said there was a task force there.

Admiral KIMMEL. That task force was about 200 miles away.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. Wasn't there one to the westward at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Returning to Pearl Harbor.

General McCoy. And there was no help sent to Wake from the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is something that was out of my hands.

The CHAIRMAN. How far was this from Wake Island?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was 200 miles from Pearl Harbor.

[619 *Corrected A*] On page 619, line 10 from bottom, after the word "away" add the words "from Pearl Harbor."

[620] Admiral REEVES. How far is it from Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. About 1,800 miles.

General McCoy. Wasn't that in your plan to relieve Wake, to attempt to relieve wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the original plan, yes, sir.

General McCoy. I am just leading up to some of the questions that we hope to put to the responsible commander since you have been relieved.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I explain a little bit about this Wake business?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. One of the principal difficulties at Wake was that of loading and unloading ships there. There is no way to get in the lagoon, and we were working against time, hoping to get things so that when we sent a ship out they could run it in and unload it. Depending upon the weather, it took anywhere from two days to two or three weeks to unload a ship there, which made it very difficult to supply. We also had on that island a number of workmen that the Navy wanted us to keep there. I personally thought they were entitled to some protection, some chance for the white alley.

Now, with respect to operations that have taken place since I was relieved as commander-in-chief, I would prefer not to talk about it.

General McCoy. Yes.

The Secretary of the Navy made a public statement on his return to the United States that the Army and the Navy services were not on the alert and that they were completely surprised. Is that a fact, from your point of view?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the first place, before you can answer that question you have to define the term "alert." There are many different degrees of alerts. I feel that the Navy afloat was alert and that they were ready for attack and [621] that they were as alert as it was practicable to be at the time. They opened fire in most cases within two minutes of the alarm, and in some cases considerable less than that, and I considered them to be alert, in a fair condition.

General McCoy. I think his statement was that they were complete surprised.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

General McCoy. How about the statement he made also that they were completely surprised?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were surprised, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did you investigate, Admiral, how the submarine got into your channel here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How did it get in?

Admiral KIMMEL. The submarine that came in the channel is a boat about five feet in diameter and about seventy feet long. It is fitted with a propeller like a torpedo has. It is run by storage batteries and can travel not more than 200 miles when its charge is exhausted. It carries two torpedoes, which torpedoes, we estimate, cannot run more than a thousand yards, but they carried also from 800 to 1,000 pounds of explosives in each one of those torpedoes. These submarines, according to the blue prints which we have captured, taken from the submarine, can make up to 24 knots under water.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any ship come in that morning? for a very short time. Then can put themselves in the wake of a and that it is just like a torpedo. Of course they can make that only ship and come through with the ship when the gates open.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. Now, wait a minute. I do not want to make a statement without knowing it. I am not sure whether they did or not, but ships were out that morning, and they began to go out. I think it is probable that this sub- [622] marine went down, dove under the net, and came in that way.

Now, we had never anticipated any such submarine as this, as described on the chart which they discovered on this submarine, as to whether they could have laid down a track to come in and where, when it came in the harbor, but there is some curious item about it—and this I have not checked. I have not had the opportunity to check it, but when they sounded into the net where they came in they found that there was a hole in there through which he could have gone.

(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. An ordinary submarine would have gone into the net?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, an ordinary submarine would have gone into the net. It would have indicated it was there.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not found any evidence of the gate being open to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, it is not there.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not there?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, it is not there. The gates are kept closed at all times except when a ship was entering or leaving. That has been definitely established.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us what officer was charged with the duty of seeing that that net was closed that morning. I am not assuming anything, but we want that officer.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we can get him.

I understand that there were two of these submarines which came in, or am I wrong about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had one come in.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the one the Monaghan ran down?

Admiral KIMMEL. The first was. He put a hole through it.

The CHAIRMAN. She rammed it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Rammed it and depth-bombed it. There were some air bubbles there and I did not want to take any chances [622 Corrected A] On page 622, line 2, change comma to period, after "this."

On page 622, lines 3 to 9 inclusive, delete these seven lines and insert, "We discovered a chart on one of these submarines. On this chart a track was laid down. This track, where it passed the net, was later investigated and under the net in wake of this track was sufficient water for this submarine to have passed without disturbing the net. The statement I have made was reported to me but I have not checked it."

[623] so they bombed it again and that finished it.

The other submarine that they got went aground over by Bellows Field on the north side. We got that submarine in time and brought it over here and captured the two men in it.

We all thought that there was another submarine in the harbor at the time, but that was never discovered and I do not think there was another submarine in there. I think that was the only one.

A couple of days later we heard of another submarine in the harbor, and just to be sure, they depth-bombed it, but finally they said there was no submarine there and there hadn't been any. My opinion is that only one submarine got inside. Do you think that is a fact?

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, if your description of that submarine is correct, would she be launched by a plane, or could it be launched from a ship, in your judgment?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would have been launched from a ship.

The CHAIRMAN. Then part of the Japanese fleet would have been within a hundred miles of Oahu that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily. I think it is possible that those small submarines could have been serviced by other submarines. I think it is also possible that they could come alongside other submarines and get charged.

I think they might well have been launched from around here, 50 or 200 miles, and they could have been serviced there, or they might even have been concealed in this neighborhood for sometime.

We made searches for submarines. It is in this report, as I remember it, that they had sunk a number of small submarines over on the coast of Molokai, and that they were servicing them and charging them over there. That was several months ago. We made reconnaissance with searching planes but

[623 *Corrected A*] On page 623, line 5 from bottom, delete "it is in this report" and insert the words "there was an intelligence report some time ago, as I remember it."

[624] were never able to discover any of them.

Of course there are dozens of reports of the most fantastic kind that come in during any war period. We have tried not to overlook any of them, but we had to use some sanity in our investigation. I think one of the two-man submarines must have put one torpedo into the Raleigh. I believe that is all the damage that was done by the two-man submarines. That is not positive. It is not positive that that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that at 7:20 a submarine was bombed outside Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is in the report.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that was the area within which you had determined that you would bomb Japanese submarines if you found one?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had determined that we would bomb Japanese submarines found anywhere in the operating area.

The CHAIRMAN. Within 200 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. Within two or three hundred miles of this place.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the operation was within sight of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I judge so, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That did not come into the situation of an air raid, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, not at that time, and although we had indicated in our order that an air raid might very well be coincidental with submarines, we had so many reports, false reports of submarines in the outlying area, I thought, well, I would wait for verification of the report that an air raid started. Admiral Bloch will also

(See following page.)

develop that and give his reaction, which, I believe, is very much the same as mine.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to what was mentioned before, [624 *Corrected A*] On page 624, line 4 from bottom, insert period after the word "report".

On page 624, line 4 from bottom, delete the words "that an" and insert the words "then the".

[625] do you mean you only knew that the airplane had taken a shot at something?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, not what the airplane shot at. It was shot at something, but I knew the destroyer had depth-bombed a submarine.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. In the air attack you heard about later?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

General McCoy. The air attack on the submarine you heard about later?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sometime later.

The CHAIRMAN. I misunderstood his statement. Apparently the attack was by a destroyer, not from the air.

Admiral KIMMEL. It was from the air, but I did not know that, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. It was both.

Admiral KIMMEL. I mean it has only been put together, everything that we now know. That is not what we knew at the time. I am giving you everything as nearly as we can find out what happened, but not what I knew was happening at that time.

General McCoy. Did they sink that submarine at this time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. It was a large submarine, not a small one?

Admiral KIMMEL. That I am not positive of. I think it was a small one. One, I think the Ward submarine, was a small submarine, according to the Ward report.

General McCoy. According to the Ward report did they ram it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, shot at it and depth-charged it. I think we got a considerable number of submarines, sir. The Japanese admitted the loss of five in the radio broadcast.

The CHAIRMAN. In this action?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, five small ones, they said.

[625 Corrected A] On page 625, line 3, delete whole paragraph and insert, "No, sir, I had no report that an airplane had attacked a submarine. All that was reported to me was that a destroyer had depth bombed a submarine."

[626] General McCoy. To get back to the despatches from Washington, the war warning despatches, and others, that came here successively from October 16, and with respect to a war warning, and General Short said he felt sure you must have shown it to him. Were those furnished to your separate commanders?

Admiral KIMMEL. Were they shown to the separate commanders?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. In general I showed to the commanders of task forces, the three vice admirals, everything that I received in the way of war warnings and of the letters from the Chief of Naval Operations and of the board on the situation. I kept them as thoroughly informed (See following page.) as I could.

In regard to this war warning on the 29th of November I am positive (See following page.) that Admiral Pye had seen it. I think Admiral Brown had seen it, but I am not sure; I would not be positive. Halsey had not because he was at sea at the time it was received.

General McCoy. There was no warning given him by despatch or radio?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, but he was fully prepared for anything when he left here—he was fully prepared for anything that might happen. All he needed was a declaration of war, and I do not believe they could have got Halsey asleep while he was at sea.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask you one question, According to No. 2 CL, 1941, revised, with respect to the defense measures available to be taken against air attacks on Pearl Harbor, it states that the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as navel base defense officer, shall exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack; arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced; exercise supervisory control over naval shore base aircraft, arranging through combatwing 2 for cooperation [626 Corrected A] On page 626, line 11, delete the words "and of the board" and insert the words "that bore".

On page 626, line 13, delete "29th" and insert "27th".
[627] of the joint air effort between Army and Navy.

In other words, that provides that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was the officer who coordinated the air defenses and possibly other defenses with the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then, in General Short's statement he refers to the joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaiian coastal frontier, Hawaiian Department, and the Fourteenth Naval District, and directly under this it is signed by Walter C. Short and C. C. Bloch.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And paragraph 18 says, "Navy. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for (i) distant reconnaissance."

Now, as I take it, for that purpose the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District is under you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. But there is no separate force for the District?

Admiral KIMMEL. There is not enough of any planes for the defense of Oahu and the use of the fleet in the Pacific. Eventually the plans provided for about 175 planes at that time.

(See following page.)

Admiral STANDLEY. They were not attached to the District?

Admiral KIMMEL. And it is my recollection that some 80 of them were turned over to the District.

Admiral STANDLEY. As a part of the coastal defense frontier force?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. To remain here permanently?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. This is what I mean: 185 is the number called for, for airplanes, patrol planes, in this area,

[627 Corrected A] On page 627, line 10 from bottom, after the figure "175" insert the word "patrol".

[628] and offshore patrol planes, 72. I am speaking from memory only, but I think some 80 of those are set for the use of the Commandant of the District.

Admiral STANDLEY. But in the plans they allowed a force that will remain with the District for distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Of a number of planes we had here in the area and with our planes for defense to the westward and the reconnaissance (See following page.)

sance covering the fleet movements to the Marshalls we would have left, as I recall, only two patrol squadrons here. These were plans approved by the Navy Department and the tasks set up.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then there was provision for a force to remain here for distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Two patrol squadrons.

Admiral STANDLEY. Under the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then you have explained that there were not sufficient patrol planes to carry out an effective patrol at any time; is that correct? I mean, an effective patrol against air attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, we find in the Standing Operating Procedure under interceptor command that the interceptor command will coordinate the control and operations of the antiaircraft batteries and will coordinate and control the aircraft warning service.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Which included the interceptor command and the radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. As it developed, which you probably do not know, that radar service was not in operation for service at that time. It was operating as a training service, and while it had certain hours for operation, it was not operating as an

[628 *Corrected A*] On page 628, line 7, delete the words "planes for defense" and insert the words "plans for advance."

[629] effective warning service. Did you have knowledge of that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know that, sir, until I got news of this radar incident which I had told you about.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether Admiral Bloch knew that was the case?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Commanding General did not have advice with regard to distant reconnaissance and of the approach of the large torpedo planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And he did not have the force to do that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was the Commanding General interested in that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think he was, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You are not sure whether there was a discussion or any knowledge of the lack of effective information on the instrument on that board to carry out that part, or the lack of an effective warning service on his part?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, Admiral, we have had several problems out here, and we had clearly indicated to the Army as a result of some of these searches that we had conducted, that we could not maintain a continuous patrol around these islands and over several months ago. At one time in the early stages of our training with the Army I was informed that they had the idea we wanted the patrol out all the time. I know that their minds were disabused of any such thing as

that, and I am quite sure the reasons therefor were set forth by us, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and compating 2, who are the men having to do with the air, and I do not see how they could have failed to know the condition of the state of the affairs at the various exercises, the joint exercises we [630] had with them.

The CHAIRMAN. In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral Standley's question and your answer, if that is correct as I understand it, the Army knew that it was not going to get any warning from your distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you probably knew or should have known that the Army warning service was not in shape to give you a warning, or to give them a warning, of distant airplanes, so there just was not any machinery for warning here; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought that the operations of the radar, Army radar, which was reported to me in the maneuvers, that we had, that they had been able to pick up planes taking off from Maui and picking them up this side from Hawaii and following them all the way in, in these exercises that we had. They told me that they picked up planes from our ships coming in, and we had several attacks on Pearl Harbor where we had them carry out and had the carrier run in and make the attack and the carrier run the planes in.

I had been informed that they had picked them up and that they had followed them in, and I thought the radar warning was in very good shape.

I knew that some of the radar warning net was not what they wanted it to be, and we were pushing in every way we could to get that radar warning net perfected, and within a week before this attack took place I knew that my staff had taken a very effective part in urging the District and the Army to do certain things in connection with it, and particularly the District, and young Taylor, I gave, as I told you about today.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And he had come down and told us also [631] and some other people from the District and from the Army, and we were working on the perfection of the warning net, to get quicker communication, but I was under the impression, a very strong impression, that the radar was in operating condition and that it was in very good shape.

My recollection is, and I give you this for what it is worth—I have not talked to anybody about this since the action—but my impression was that they had, I think, three permanent stations, and I think some seven or eight portable stations around the island, and their big ones were the ones, according to which, I thought that we could have some dependence on.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, while I think your information is incorrect as to that, the fact is that in the week of December 7th and the days prior to that, and on the morning of December 7th, you were quite confident that you would get a definite warning of distant planes; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought we would get some warning of distant planes.

General McNARNEY. And as a responsible officer you did not assure yourself of that fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, except indirectly, but when we had two separate commanders and when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and responsible commanders in the Navy, it does not sit very well to be constantly checking up on them.

General McNARNEY. Let us examine into that. Under the situation you had the system of mutual cooperation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. And in the method of mutual cooperation, is it necessary for one commander to know what the other commander is doing or what his plans are?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. Was there an officer on your staff

[631 Corrected A] On page 631, line 2 from the bottom, delete "no" and insert "yes."

[632] detailed to the radar warning service room to keep you informed?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. How did you expect to be informed?

Admiral KIMMEL. The radar warning service was the function of the Army and the naval base defense officer. I had a staff who were active and trying to do the best. It is a physical impossibility for them to do everything, and I thought that they had developed it and handled it.

If I had it to do again, of course I would check it a good deal more than I did.

The CHAIRMAN. You had the responsibility for the security of your fleet, at least here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And the radar warning service would have been of enormous protection to your fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And you had a warning that war might break out at any time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you tell us that you thought the radar service was working; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. From my experience and from what I knew, I thought I knew the radar service was working.

The CHAIRMAN. And you had no liaison officer with that service at the radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had no liaison officer from my staff with that service.

The CHAIRMAN. But you had loaned Lieutenant Taylor to help them set it up?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And to help them in training?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But he did not report to you or to any member of your staff anything whatever, and that was in the first week of December; is that right? [633]

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't say he reported to any member of my staff; he did not report to me.

The CHAIRMAN. He knew what the conditions were; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think he probably did.

The CHAIRMAN. And as the radar system is now running, there is a naval officer sitting there at the board to inform you of anything that goes on there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you assumed that that was the situation then?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you assume was the situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. During the time or prior to the time of the attack, we had very few officers out here who were competent. Our cry was for competent officers, and that cry was continued, and it seemed we didn't have a sufficient number of officers to divert them to these duties.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that you had no officer who you felt was available and competent to sit and stay there at the telephone and to phone the information to the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I did not think it was necessary to have an officer there.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought that that was the Army's job?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but since the attack we have had some officers on the difficulty of identification of ships, and we put a considerable number with the Army.

(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. You knew that your own planes had no I. F. F.?

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

The CHAIRMAN. You knew that your own planes had no I. F. F. interceptor on them?

[633 *Corrected A*] On page 633, line 6 from the bottom, delete the word "difficulty" and insert the word "duty".

[634] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew, therefore, that the radar detector and the control officer would have to have advice from the Navy as to where your patrol fleets were, or did you assume that such information was being given to the controller on the morning of December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. As to where our ships were?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I didn't assume any such thing as that.

The CHAIRMAN. And you did not know how the Army interceptor service would know whether they were attacking planes or whether they were enemy planes? You did not know how that was worked out?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say that was Admiral Bloch's responsibility to work that out for the Navy, under you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you assumed that he had done his duty?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought he had done the best he could, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that is his duty. I do not think you could expect an officer to do any better than that.

General McNARNEY. For the purpose of the record I would like to call attention and make reference to the "Tentative Manual of Inter-

ceptor Command, Organization, Procedure, and Operations for Air Defense," 27 October, 1941. Paragraph 7 refers to the personnel supposed to be present in the control room and subparagraph (g) reads:

Navy liaison officer. This officer is on the platform and has contact with the naval headquarters in the region. He will be able to identify all naval [635] aircraft flying in the area so as to distinguish them from the enemy. He is also charged with keeping the controller informed of the naval situation so as to aid him in getting a picture of the situation as a whole.

I would like to refer now to the report of General Short on page 22. It states in paragraph 4:

The Navy liaison officer's position within the information center was not manned when I reached the information center at about 8:30 a. m. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCAWH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 p. m., when the position was taken over by naval officers. Further the deponent sayeth not.

(Signed) GROVER C. WHITE, Jr.,
2nd Lieutenant, Signal Corps,
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

I just ask to have that go in to clear this up.

General McCoy. May I ask a question, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. To go back to your memorandum of December 6.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. It was your function on December 6 to put into effect on the outbreak of war certain specific things.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. When war broke out, did you put those things into effect?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

General McCoy. Why not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I could not on account of the losses sustained.

[636] General McCoy. Was not the fleet complete with regard to all forces except battleships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but that was a very big outfit that was cut out.

General McCoy. Did you have any information of any kind about enemy battleships being in this vicinity?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had known that no radar was working on December 5th, 6th, or 7th, would you have altered your distant patrols in any way?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I doubt it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then if no radar was working on that morning, there was no method of warning of a raid on these islands; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct. If I had known that no radar was working it would have been a factor to consider, but what I would have done under those conditions I do not like to state.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought it was working?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the short of it. I thought it was in working condition.

Admiral REEVES. Is it a fact that there was no radar working that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral, my impression is, gathered from the report which I gave here, and the report of Commander Curts and others that the radar was working on the morning of the attack, and I thought it was in material condition to work, and it has certainly worked since then. The manning of it, I do not know about, but the material condition of the radar was, I thought, in very material condition here, in material condition to work, and I thought it was in material condition to work because they did work it.

(See following page.)

[636, *Corrected A*] On page 636, line 3 from the bottom, after the word "very" insert the word "good."

[637] General McCoy. We heard testimony that it was not only in condition to work but that it actually was working.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I did not think there was any question about it.

General McCoy. And that it was not working as a system, but it was brought out that there was no naval officer present but only a soldier who picked up something that morning after the station had closed down at seven o'clock, and that one of the soldiers just happened to pass along and pick it up.

Admiral KIMMEL. However much I should have personally checked into this thing—and God knows now I wish I had—I had a great many other things to do, and whether the Navy liaison officer was present at the radar at the time was something that the officer responsible for the running of the radar should have, it seems to me, looked into.

General McCoy. The warning system wasn't working; it was just a drill and had been exercised through a couple of mobile sets. None of the permanent sets is working yet.

Admiral KIMMEL. None of the permanent sets is working yet?

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know that.

General McCoy. There was a soldier there playing with it, but no responsible officer to see this map that you have heard of in time to follow the attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, there was no responsible Army or Navy officer who heard about it until the next day. Let us be fair about it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to make one point clear. At no time do I wish to accuse any Army officer or anybody connected with the Army of having withheld information which we should have had. I merely cited the incident as it was related to me in order to show what might have happened if they had given us the information which was obtained.

[638] General McCoy. Obtained but not evaluated in time to follow the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I wish to disclaim any idea of putting anybody on the spot. I want now and always to give everyone all the information that I have to tell you in order that you may properly evaluate it.

General McNARNEY. There is some indication in your report that there were indications of enemy action at 6:18, 6:33, and 7 o'clock. If both the Army and the Navy had been on a war footing, would that

information have been communicated to the Army interceptor command?

Admiral KIMMEL. The information which was communicated as available, to certain Navy units at that time, was reported as rapidly as we could, but that information did not reach the responsible command until some time after.

I tried to emphasize the fact that this has only been drawn up from the reports received after the thing was all over, in order to show the sequence of events, as well as we could, and as soon as we could.

It does not show the information that was available. It should not be taken to indicate that the information was available at that particular time nor even that they made reports at that particular time. When a man sees things, before he makes a report he attempts to verify it, but that information was not available. All we had was given to the Army, all we thought was of any interest to the Army, and we gave it to the Army as soon as it was available to us.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we will have to adjourn pretty soon if we are to get back before dark.

General McNARNEY. I have just one or two questions and then I will be through.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General McNARNEY. What was the condition of readiness [639] perfected for the naval base defense on the night of December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you had better get that from Admiral Bloch. He can give you the answer to that.

General McNARNEY. Can he tell me who was the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, he can tell you that.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can tell you that. It was Admiral Pye.

Admiral REEVES. Where did you get this information about the enemy airplanes at 6:30 or thereabouts? Where did you get that information?

General McNARNEY. Enemy action.

Admiral REEVES. Where did you get it? Did anyone know there were any airplanes present at 6:30?

Admiral KIMMEL. I heard they were present.

Admiral REEVES. Why weren't they reported to the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Why wasn't it reported to the Army?

Admiral REEVES. Yes, and how did you get the information about enemy airplanes?

Admiral KIMMEL. I got no information, sir, about any airplanes being present at 6:30 in the morning.

General McNARNEY. Enemy action, it is.

Admiral KIMMEL. The only information I had in regard to enemy airplanes was on the morning of the 7th.

(See following page.)

Admiral REEVES. I am told that the question was "enemy action." I suppose if they were not airplanes, they may have been submarines. Then the question is not pertinent to what we are discussing.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had better adjourn until Monday morning.

Let me say to both you gentlemen that the nature of our discussion is such that we deem it advisable that you do not discuss with anyone anything that has taken place in this room.

[639, *Corrected A*] On page 639, line 10 from the bottom, after the words "of the 7th" insert the words, "When I received the air raid warning at about 7:50 a. m. and immediately after saw the planes attacking the Fleet in Pearl Harbor."

[640-(658)] That is necessary because of the secrecy of these things.

Admiral KIMMEL. I appreciate that, and almost everything I have presented here is of a highly secret nature, but I have no hesitancy in presenting it.

The CHAIRMAN. You need have no hesitancy in presenting it because there will be nothing in our report until the Secretaries of War and Navy see that nothing in our report will be in any way detrimental to national defense. We have no such agreement, but we have an agreement between ourselves that we will protect the national defense in this, so you need not have any hesitancy in anything you say.

(Thereupon, at 5:25 p. m. the hearing was adjourned until Monday, December 29, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m. at Pearl Harbor.)

[659]

C O N T E N T S

MONDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1941

Testimony of—	Page ¹
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, United States Navy—Resumed__	660
Rear Admiral Claude Charles Block, United States Navy-----	733

¹Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[660] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

MONDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1941

LOUNGE OF THE WARDROOM,
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR,
UNITED STATES SUBMARINE BASE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

The Commission reconvened at 9 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on Saturday, December 27, 1941, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission;

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, as you probably have heard, Admiral Reeves is not well. He was taken to the Naval Hospital on Saturday evening, and he is under the charge of Commander Brunson. Commander Brunson states that Admiral Reeves cannot be here today and possibly not tomorrow. We have consulted Admiral Reeves and he is entirely willing to have the testimony go on. We have made arrangements that he will be furnished a [661] transcript of the testimony each day so that he can read it and familiarize himself with it if he wishes to call you or any other witness back for further questions. In that case we shall call you or any other witness back for further questions by Admiral Reeves when he gets back if there is anything that appears to him as important to be developed.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We feel that you are entitled to a hearing before the full Commission, and if you feel that it would be fair to you to

wait until Admiral Reeves can be back here, while I should deplore the delay, I would feel that that was your right, and there would be no prejudice or feeling of prejudice against you if you ask us to wait until Admiral Reeves can be here.

If you would like to consider that matter more, we will give you time to do that and to confer with the admiral here until you come to a decision about it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I need no time, sir. I am very sorry indeed that Admiral Reeves is ill and I know that you will miss him, and I know that I will, but I have every confidence in the judgment of this Commission, and I think that the arrangements that you have made will be satisfactory to me.

The CHAIRMAN. You quite understand that Admiral Reeves will have the opportunity to examine you further if, upon the inspection of the notes, there is something that he thinks should be developed.

Admiral KIMMEL. I expect to be constantly available to the Commission for any such procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much for that decision, and with that understanding we will proceed.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I go ahead now?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[662] Admiral KIMMEL. During my first day's testimony there appeared to be some question as to whether or not the OpNav despatch of November 27th, the war warning despatch, was delivered by me to the Army.

I have carefully investigated the circumstances of that delivery which I have found were as follows:

I gave the despatch to Lieutenant Commander Layton for personal delivery to General Short. Lieutenant Commander Layton misunderstood his orders and gave the despatch to Lieutenant Burr, Navy liaison officer at General Short's headquarters, and left Lieutenant Burr with the orders to deliver the despatch to General Short. When Lieutenant Burr arrived at Army headquarters, General Short and his Chief of Staff were not present. Lieutenant Burr therefore delivered the despatch to G3. He states that the despatch was delivered to either Lieutenant Colonel Donegan or Major Lawton and that Major Horner was present at the time. He states further that he asked the Army officer to whom he delivered the despatch to make certain that General Short received the despatch and that officer said that he would do so. Lieutenant Burr is very sure that this occurred on November 27th 1941 because there was considerable activity at Army G3 in connection with an order for Alert ONE which the Army issued on that date. Lieutenant Commander Layton is very certain that the despatch which Lieutenant Burr carried to Army headquarters was the war warning despatch because that was the only despatch which he gave to Lieutenant Burr. Lieutenant Burr did not read the despatch but states that he had only been required to carry one despatch from the Fleet headquarters to the Army headquarters.

[663] I might enlarge on that a little. This despatch was received in my office late on the afternoon of November 27. I immediately took steps to have that delivered. This despatch was received in my office late on the afternoon of November 27. I immediately took steps to have that delivered to General Short, and I gave it to this officer with orders to deliver it to General Short personally.

I had also attempted to get hold of Admiral Bloch, but Admiral Bloch had gone to see his wife, who was in the hospital. I got hold of his chief of staff, Captain Earle, and Captain Earle brought to me the dispatch which the Army had just received, their warning. I read that and while I was in there, Layton brought in the paraphrase of the dispatch which he had received, on which was written at the top, "War Warning," and it was something that I thought could not be mistaken. I approved of it and told Layton to deliver it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, to deliver it to General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. To deliver it to General Short, yes. As Earle went out of the office he said to Layton, "Give this to Burr. He is going back to Headquarters now, and he will deliver it." And like an idiot, Layton did that. I did not know these details until yesterday when I investigated it.

That is correct, isn't it?

Now, there was another question which came out on Saturday, and that was the torpedo plane baffles. When I started to get up the data for this I told the commanders and my staff that I wanted everything on this subject about aerial torpedoes, and when I presented to you what I did the other day, I thought I had everything. However, Admiral Standley recalled to my mind a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance which was dated in July. I have been unable to locate that letter, but I have located this letter of June 13, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of the various Naval Districts on the subject of anti-torpedo baffles [664] for protection against torpedo plane attacks. A copy of that was sent to me. I will read that letters:

JUNE 13, 1941.

In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles——

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the date reference?

Admiral KIMMEL. CNO letter, 17 February.

Admiral STANDLEY. 17 February?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, 17 February.

(The letter above referred to is as follows:)

[664a]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 13, 1941.

Op-30C1-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Serial 055730

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District.

The Commandant, Third Naval District.

The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.

The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.

The Commandant, Seventh Naval District.

The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.

The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.

The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.
Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be latered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives [664b] of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

Copy to: CinCpac
CinClant
CinCaf
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport
Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo
Comdt. NavSta, Samoa
BuOrd
Op-12

(Copy)

[665] Admiral KIMMEL. I read this, and when Admiral Standley recalled it I had some recollection of some such communication, but when I read this, knowing of the depth of the water in this harbor, the channel, that it is 40 feet, and that there are very few spots where it is more than 45 feet, and knowing that battleships cannot be maneuvered in less than 40 feet, then I thought that if the Department meant that the heavy ships were always subject to attack, then I do not know why they did not say so, because we cannot maneuver ships in less than 40 feet of water. I still assumed that we had a certain immunity from attack in this harbor. Of course, I was entirely wrong.

General McNARNEY. You did not by any chance recover any of the torpedoes which the Japanese had fired?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, we recovered them.

(See following page.)

General McNARNEY. Was there anything peculiar about them?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, they had Whitehead fins. I have not had

(See following page.)

time to go into this myself, but I have been informed that these torpedoes were Whitehead torpedoes. That is subject to confirmation. Understand that I do not know completely what I am talking about

on this, but I understand they were Whitehead torpedoes, manufactured in 1931, these aerial torpedoes.

They had fitted a large fin on the side of them, almost like a diving rudder on a submarine, and when the torpedoes hit, they just skim into the water. They do not go down far.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are there two or four of these fins?

Admiral KIMMEL. Two. One on each side.

Admiral THEOBOLD. It is a shallow dive.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a very ingenious thing. They were evidently built and fitted that way just for this purpose here.

General McNARNEY. Was there any change in the arming device or length of the run necessary?

Admiral KIMMEL. That I would not know. I think Admiral [665 corrected A] On page 665, line 15, after the word "recovered" insert the words "one of."

On page 665, line 17, delete the word "Whitehead" and substitute the word "wide."

[666] Bloch can give you considerable information on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know the name of the torpedo officer who examined it, do you?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. Admiral Bloch would know that. However, I can find it out for you.

Admiral THEOBOLD. The man doing most of this work was Thales Boyd. He did most of the work on the torpedoes. There was one torpedo by the Raleigh, and I got that and examined it, but the one up here blew the head off and I do not think they recovered the head. (See following page.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Bloch talked to me about the arming device, but I think he was talking about the submarine torpedo which we talked about before.

In our reply to the original letter of February 17 we indicated that we still wanted these light torpedo nets and baffles put out. You recall that.

General McCox. What are these out here? What are these nets or baffles in the harbor now?

Admiral KIMMEL. They are improvised and principally target rafts with some nets strung under them.

Admiral THEOBOLD. He may be confused about the baffles at the entrance to the harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. When we were on the tower on Saturday, Admiral, we saw what appeared to be a lot of floats carrying nets. That was in the upper part of the harbor, just what I would call about west of the part near where the floating dry dock is. We thought they were nets that had been put down.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I am not familiar with it.

Admiral THEOBOLD. Admiral Bloch would know about that. They have nets, however, in the channel. They have target rafts there. They got these target rafts out after the attack and strung them across.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to touch on the question of [666 Corrected A] On page 666, line 7, delete the words "there was one torpedo by the RALEIGH and I got that and examined it,

but the one up here blew the head off and I do not think they recovered the head."

[667] the Army Radar network. I have looked through the files of the Commander-in-Chief and found two communications regarding that Army installation. I would like to bring this up with respect to the discussions that took place the other day. The first one is a letter from General Short to Admiral Bloch thanking him for certain Radar training which fifteen key enlisted men had received from four vessels of the fleet. This was forwarded to me by Admiral Bloch. I will read pertinent sections therefrom. (Reading:)

As you are doubtless aware, fifteen key enlisted men and one officer of the Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, have recently gone to sea on cruises on board the California, Chicago, Chester, and Pensacola. While at sea, these men received valuable instruction and experience in the operation of Radar equipment, preparing them for the operation of similar Army equipment. Upon their return, the personnel receiving instructions were unanimous in expressing their gratitude for the consideration accorded them on these cruises and for the opportunity to become associated with the fleet personnel.

It is anticipated that the Army Aircraft Warning Service will be placed in operation in the near future. Due to the interest expressed by the Navy radio operators in the Army equipment, I will cause arrangements to be effected to afford such naval personnel as you may desire to inspect the Army equipment shortly after it has been placed in operation.

Will you transmit to Admiral Kimmel and to the other naval commanders concerned my appreciation for the instructions afforded these men. Both services should reap great benefit in the near future from the security which will be afforded them from the increased efficiency of the Aircraft Warning Service personnel.

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieutenant General U. S. Army, Commanding.

[668] That was forwarded to me by Admiral Bloch on the 19th of June for such action "as you may care to take."

We had sent some air officers up to inspect the Army Radar, and they did derive some benefit from it.

Under date of August 5 General Short sent me a letter on the subject, "Aircraft Warning Facilities for the Hawaiian Department," which I shall read. (Reading:)

The Army's Aircraft Warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department are rapidly approaching completion. Small scale operations is expected in the immediate future. Subsequent to the original setup the AWS has been greatly augmented. The results of this augmentation, however, are not expected to materialize for some months.

The Department Air Warning Service Board, consisting of officers from all instrumentalities associated with the Air Defense, has been reactivated and is now constituted as a liaison and advisory council on AWS affairs. Inasmuch as the Navy has shown considerable interest in the AWS and has initiated plans for a similar system of their own, it seems greatly to the interest of both services to have a Naval officer as contact or liaison officer between Army and Navy AWS activities. I believe that in this manner our efforts along these lines will be highly cumulative and that the prospects for future joint Army-Navy cooperation greatly enhanced.

Accordingly, your assistance would be appreciated in effecting arrangements whereby an officer from your Headquarters be detailed to serve as liaison officer between your Headquarters and mine.

Under date of August 16 I sent the letter:

In reply to the suggestion that an officer of the Fleet serve as liaison officer with your Headquarters, I am pleased to advise you that Commander Maurice E. Curtis, [669-670] U. S. Navy, the Communication Officer on my Staff, has been assigned to that duty.

It will be noted in my reply that I appointed Commander Curts of my staff to act as liaison officer between my headquarters and General Short's headquarters. This liaison duty should not be confused with the liaison duty referred to yesterday by one member of the Commission at the time that he read from a publication on the subject of Radar installation.

If it is possible, I should like to examine this publication which was read from on Saturday.

(General McNarney handed a document to Admiral Kimmell.)

The CHAIRMAN. Take your time to examine it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

When this extract was read it took me completely by surprise, and I thank you very much for letting me see this. I had never seen this manual, and when I left the meeting I tried to find out what it was he was reading from.

I would like to point out one or two things about this. I note that it is dated October 27, 1941, and that it is tentative, entitled, "Tentative Manual of Interceptor Command, Organization, Procedure, and Operations for Air Defense."

This, so far as I know, is not over the signature of any ranking officer in the Hawaiian area. I would like to say that no copy of it was ever received at my headquarters, and so far as I have been able to determine, it has not gone to the people there. I do not know whether it was ever received by Admiral Bloch, but you can ask him that question when he comes before you.

[671] I noted on page 2 of section 3, paragraph 6:

Warning: the writer again wishes to warn the reader that the above is merely a "stab-in-the-dark" and that the organization to be prescribed will be the result of a careful study by a board of officers.

The quotation read at the last meeting by a member of the board was subparagraphs (g) and (h) on page 5 of section 4 of this publication. I had no knowledge that the Army had prior to December 7 requested a naval officer for liaison duty at the A. W. S. reception center. But Admiral Bloch is a witness; the Commission can of course ascertain whether the Fourteenth Naval District had a copy of the manual or was asked by the Army for liaison watch officers prior to December 7, 1941.

I would like again to add the following brief comment: Prior to the events of December 7 I knew the following facts:

The Joint Action Army and Navy required the Army to maintain an Air Warning Service.

The Army had a radar network on Oahu.

On or about 19 November, by my authority, Lieutenant Commander Taylor was loaned to the Army to advise them in the operations setup for their radar network.

In General Short's letter of 5 August, he stated: "The Army aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department are rapidly approaching completion."

After the attack of December 7 I ascertained the following facts. This, incidentally, I found out after I left here the other day:

That the Army radar network was operating for drill purposes only and plotted Japanese planes 132 miles north of Kauai into Oahu and back to the northward until 1059. I had learned that before.

Since the day of the attack Army radar network has been constantly in use. [672]

That upon the day of the attack six Army radar stations were functioning, as follows: one at Fort Shafter, one on Koko Head, one on Kaawa, one near Opana, one near Puaena Point, and one at Wainae.

In reverting to this subject and in presenting again in more detail to this Commission the foregoing facts, I hope that the position which I have tried to maintain from the beginning, namely, that I have no desire whatever to evade the responsibilities which were mine at the time of the events of December 7, 1941, will be fully appreciated by the Commission. However, in fairness to all concerned and as an aid to the future war-making capabilities of our country I feel it incumbent upon me to assure that all factors which in any way contributed to the happenings of December 7 be clearly presented to this Commission. It is with this thought in mind that I have felt called upon to revert to the subject of the Army radar.

After the conclusion of the session on Saturday I thought that a portion of my testimony was not clear and also that there might be some misapprehension as to my underlying attitude. I think I stated in the discussion which took place at the last session that I was convinced there were at least three fixed stations, and by that I meant three stations with communications to the central plotting room and to the central place, by wire, and reasonably secure, and I thought there were more. I find that there were six, and I underestimated. Now I have been informed that each one of these radar stations that was manned was the search type and that they are—what do you call them? Two seventy, wasn't it? Leave that out.

(See following page.)

Admiral THEOBALD. I don't know.

Admiral KIMMEL. It was a search-type radar. And at the places where they are building permanent setups, they propose to put the same type radars that they had mounted in these

[672 *Corrected A*] On page 672, line 5 from the bottom, delete the words "leave that out."

[673] stations to which I referred. I think they are going to make some slight changes in the antennae.

Admiral THEOBALD. They said that they had taken one out of our damaged ship that would give them altitude.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I know.

Admiral THEOBALD. This is only search, and they have only one that gives altitude.

Admiral KIMMEL. We turned one over to them from one of our damaged ships. I know that. It was done at my order.

A member of my staff recalled to me after this session the other day that I had told him that General Short had informed me that he thought he could give us a 200-mile coverage with the radar installations at some time, I don't know exactly when, prior to this; but that was firmly in my mind.

Now, I didn't want to bring up this radar business at all. It is an Army responsibility, and I was trying to keep as clear of anything which appeared to be shoving off on the Army as I possibly could, but when we got into it I felt in justice to myself and to the Navy, which is of much more importance than I, that I should say what I believe to be the truth about it.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask a question, I think, while we are on this: Admiral, does that pamphlet say anything about or refer to a Standing Operating Procedure in the title page? Does it say why that was in there?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't—(turning pages of a document).

Admiral STANDLEY. No. The title page. Does the title page refer to any previous correspondence?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't see it, sir (handing document to Admiral Standley). It may. I don't—

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, have you ever seen that pamphlet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you ever seen that pamphlet (indicating pamphlet, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 5 [674] November, 1941, "Subject: Standing Operating Procedure: To: Distribution 'B', 'L', and 'G' less 1, 2, 3 and 5," signed by Colonel Dunlop)?

(Admiral Kimmel examined the pamphlet referred to.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think he said he had no recollection of ever having seen it.

Admiral STANDLEY. No; that is another one.

Admiral KIMMEL. In answer to your question, sir, I have seen this since the 7th of December, since these proceedings started, and to the best of my recollection I never—I didn't see this before. It is quite possible, and that I can ascertain, that it was furnished to my headquarters; and if you ask me if I read all of it I can tell you I have not. I did not read all parts of it. I have not yet read it all.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, for the benefit of the Commission, will you state what your status as to authority and responsibility was in relation to the Commandant of the Fourteenth District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Fourteenth District is a part of the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet could give directions and orders to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was charged with dealing with the Army in practically all matters of detail connected with the liaison betwixt the Army and the Navy. There were of course certain things that I dealt directly with General Short on, such as these war warnings and things like that, and there were discussions that we had, but in practically—oh, in practically all cases the Commanding General dealt through the Commandant of the District in coordinating the—dealt directly with the Commandant of the District in coordinating, and anything that required my action came through the Commandant of the District to me. The Commanding General had an entirely [675] independent and separate command. Both offensive and defensive arrangements were by the principle of mutual cooperation in accordance with the Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and the Commanding General was in no sense subject to my orders nor to the orders of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

Admiral STANDLEY. In the event of the absence of the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, did the Commandant of the District succeed at any time to direct command of the forces here, or did that devolve upon the senior officer present afloat?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Commandant of the District assumed command in his regular order of seniority.

Admiral STANDLEY. Of seniority.

Admiral KIMMEL. I conceive him at all times to be a part of the fleet, and in my dealings with the Commandant I tried to consider him just as one of the subdivisions of the fleet. Now, manifestly the senior officer present afloat has certain responsibilities, and those were not changed by the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were not changed by the letter, did you say?

Admiral KIMMEL. Those were not—I didn't mean anything I said to change that. I didn't write any letter, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you mean this, Admiral: that even though the Commandant of the Fourteenth District by virtue of seniority was in command here, even under those conditions the senior officer present afloat had certain responsibilities as to the ships afloat here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I might say that Admiral Bloch so far as I recall during this period of time—well, he may have been for a few days, but in a vast majority of times, almost always, there was at least one task force commander in port, who was a vice admiral and therefore senior to Admiral Bloch.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who is a rear admiral.

[676] Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Who is a rear admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Who is a rear admiral, yes, sir.

Does that answer?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I think you misconceived some of the questions that I put near the close of the last session. What I was trying to do was not to fix any responsibility on you or anybody else in the premises, but what I was trying to do was to find the net situation with respect to information as between Army and Navy as to warning devices in operation at the date of the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I understood that, and I have absolutely no complaint to make to you or anybody else about the way I have been treated.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right, sir.

Now, to summarize it, without going into the question of whose fault it was, whether it was the fault of lack of equipment, lack of personnel, defective exchange of information, or whatnot, the fact was that on the morning of December 7 you knew that there was not any distant patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought that there was a radar information service operating?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. More or less complete?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I thought so.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was the state of your information and belief on that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask, before we leave this subject of the radar, a question premised on the fact that the radar on the fleet in harbor was not working due to the surrounding [677] mountains; it wasn't expected to work while they were in harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. However, in addition to the drill that was going on that morning by the Army there were task forces at sea supplied with radar on the individual ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did that apply to all ships at sea, all fighting ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, all ships are not equipped with radar. The Chicago—

Admiral THEOBALD. The Lexington.

Admiral KIMMEL. The Enterprise. Lexington wasn't in this area. The Chicago, the Enterprise, and I think the Indianapolis are equipped with radar and—now wait a minute. The Indianapolis wasn't there. I'm wrong. I'm wrong. No, I'm wrong. Cut that out, please. I got two task forces mixed up in my mind. The Enterprise was equipped with radar, and she was about 200-odd miles to the westward, and I am sure her radar was working at the time.

Admiral STANDLEY. The question I was wanting to ask again, or ask in addition: Was there post facto information furnished you such as we and you got as to the Army radar report or chart showing enemy ships operating? Was there also anything developed on any of the ships' radar afterwards that showed that they had any contact with enemy ships of any kind?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, not that I have heard, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. They were all too far away.

Admiral KIMMEL. They were all too far away.

Admiral THEOBALD. Any one of them. The Enterprise.

Admiral KIMMEL. Enterprise was 200 miles to the westward, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And they had no contact with any surface ship or—

[678] Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, none was ever reported to me, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. Too far away, sir. The Lexington and Indianapolis had them, but they were miles away.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, they were way down.

Admiral STANDLEY. What would be the radii of any such instruments on any of these surface ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. The surface ships, it depends on the height of the radar installation on the ship and the size of the ship that they are searching for: the two principal factors.

Admiral STANDLEY. About what would be the normal distance?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am trying to tell you that, sir. Take the Enterprise, and against a battleship, and she could probably be reasonably certain of getting it at 40 to 50 thousand yards, which is 20 to 25 miles. Now, then, against a plane which is well up in the air that could run up to as high as 200 miles. Now, the higher you put the radar installation the more it increases your range for surface ships as well as for aircraft, and—well, does that answer the question, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, in the case of a destroyer, I might add, the radar installation in the Enterprise should be good for, oh, somewhere between 20 and 35 thousand yards, something of that kind.

Is that correct?

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes. The thing about it is that the radar projects the beam and it's rectilinear just like light: as soon as you hit the curvature of the earth the things below that, below the horizon —

The CHAIRMAN. — you don't get.

Admiral THEOBALD. That beam goes over, just like over a hill, and it's no good.

Admiral STANDLEY. Taking height out, is there any limit [679] in power or effect?

Admiral THEOBALD. You had better get experts, sir. I think we have gotten reception on planes well over 100 or 150 miles, and this Army radar followed some planes out, it must have been, over 200 miles before they lost them on that morning, but I am not an expert on that, but I think it's around—I think 200 miles is —

Admiral STANDLEY. — the limit of power.

Admiral THEOBALD. Again, a plane is a simple problem. With a good radar instrument you could get a plane that far.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know how high this Opana installation was, but I suppose it was as high as the highest masts on some of your ships, and they apparently picked up planes 132 miles away.

Admiral KIMMEL. It depends on the height of your planes again, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, again, how high they were.

Admiral THEOBALD. Our planes are now coming to a technique of flying very low when they go out now until they have to go up to see something. I mean our planes are following a principle of getting down close to the water until they get close to something to search for. They have been doing that for some time now, and that is what the Japs did too.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Evidently they flew low along the easterly side of the Island in coming down here.

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke of reports, Admiral, which caused you to send out patrols to the west and southwest.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were any of those reports based on radar information?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, so far as I know, so far as I remember.

Admiral STANDLEY. What type of reports were they which [680] caused the patrols to the south and southwest rather than to the north? That is, after the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. They were false reports, as we found out, and of contacts, and were direction-finder reports.

The CHAIRMAN. There is some belief, is there not, that those were stalls by Japanese boats?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Fishing boats and whatnot?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been told that there was a great deal of radio talking and a great deal of confusion in the signaling after the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. They did as much as they could to confuse everybody.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And you must hand it to them, leaving aside the unspeakable treachery of it, that once they were launched on it they did a fine job.

Off the record:

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McNARNEY. Admiral, do you maintain an operations board here which shows or pictures the location of surface vessels?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. You do not happen to take a photograph of it, do you, day-by-day, so we could see the picture on December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. We have records, I think, which can be——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, on that very line Admiral Standley has just made the suggestion that it would be helpful to us if you could have prepared a large chart, probably on a small scale, which would show us the location of all your forces on the 6th.

[681] Admiral KIMMEL. I think that that——

The CHAIRMAN. Between the 6th and the 7th.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the very thing you had in mind, isn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think if you will call Captain De Lany before you he is prepared to do that now.

Admiral THEOBALD. Captain McMorris.

Admiral KIMMEL. Captain DeLany and Captain McMorris.

Admiral STANDLEY. We would like a large-scale chart.

Admiral THEOBALD. They have the large plotting sheets they kept there on a table longer than this (indicating), and they have it there all the time, which is right in the war plan section at headquarters.

Admiral STANDLEY. It shows the whole ocean?

Admiral THEOBALD. It shows the whole ocean.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might give a brief description of the scheme that we had.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. We kept the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District informed of the movement of all combatant ships, and in his office there was prepared each day a location sheet for the combatant ships as well as for all the merchant ships which we knew anything about, and a copy of that was furnished to my office, an overlay, and they could put it right on the chart, and we had all the merchant ships, and of course we knew where our own ships were, and they had their own ships and they had added on our ships. Now, that was done each day.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand you, you had a permanent chart.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you made a location sheet which [682] you can lay right on top of that permanent chart?

Admiral KIMMEL. Transparent paper.

The CHAIRMAN. Transparent paper, which would locate your vessels on the sea area?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And those are permanent records?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that they could produce the big chart and then produce the location sheets of, say, the 5th, 6th of December?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would be Captain DeLany or Captain McMorris?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, Captain DeLany and Captain McMorris would be the ones to present that, and I think that there should be no difficulty about it.

General McCoy. May I ask if such a sheet, such a chart, was kept as to the Japanese fleet and where it was?

Admiral KIMMEL. That included this, sir. That was included.

General McCoy. On the same chart?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily on the same chart, but there was an overlay for that purpose. There was so much on some of these charts that—

The CHAIRMAN. So much on some of these overlays, you mean.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, so much on some of these overlays that they sometimes split them up and had one at—my recollection now is, we had one for the Japanese and one for our own ships.

Admiral THEOBALD. I would like to say something about that if I may. It is recognized that the Intelligence is not good, but we did have a Radio Intelligence Service that [683] Lieutenant Commander Layton can tell you about, with a main-intercept unit in Washington, one in Cavite, and one here, who did trace by doing nothing but intercepting Japanese traffic and assaying it. They got all the checks. He, I assume, can tell you that; I don't want to. But they went right along, and that's all they actually have as to where the Japanese are. That's the main detections. There is no spy system in Japan; I don't think you can develop it. Layton, on that, will tell you a lot, I mean, and what they have in the way of plots.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have a plot room in which all of this plotting is done, haven't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. You have a plot room, an operations room, in which all of this plotting is done, haven't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would there be any reason why the Commission itself could not go there and look at that plot room?

Admiral THEOBALD. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there anything more secret about that than we get right here?

Admiral KIMMEL. There isn't anything more secret about it, sir, except that they are carrying on work there right now and it is a very busy place.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, we wouldn't want to interfere, I mean, but we could go there and see it in operation.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. I think we could see exactly what they are doing there, to give us a picture that we could not get otherwise.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you have to communicate with the Commander-in-Chief on that, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. The Fourteenth Naval District was [684] doing the same thing, too, as far out as they—they have a large plot in their war plans section.

Admiral STANDLEY. A separate plot, too?

Admiral THEOBALD. Oh, yes, sir, over at Fourteenth Naval District headquarters of the Navy Yard. This plot room that Admiral Kimmel is talking about is right down here in Command-in-Chief's headquarters about two block from here (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be convenient for you to call—

Admiral THEOBALD. To call up and find out?

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be convenient for you to arrange that at 12 o'clock we may be taken—only the members of the Commission; I think no one else ought to go—to those two plot rooms and look over the plotting?

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes, sir. I will get that right under way.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will make that available to us we will adjourn at 12 o'clock and go down and look at that.

General MCCOY. Were any of those information sheets or relays—overlays—of the Navy furnished to the Army? Do you know? Or the substance of the information?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you had better ask Admiral Bloch that, sir.

General McNARNEY. This is not particularly germane to the subject, but just for my own information I would like to ask the Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McNARNEY. In laying out your battle fleet formation, what is the normal position of the carriers in the battle fleet formation, with the whole battle fleet steaming out? I have a sort of smattering of naval formations, but not very much.

Admiral KIMMEL. You have touched on one of the most [685] controversial subjects in the whole field of naval tactics. We felt for some time that the carriers should be separated from the battle line, operating on the hit-and-run principle. I think the latest thought on the subject is that the best place for the carrier is right in the battle line, for the protection of the carrier itself and for the protection of the battleships against air attack. I think it is probable there would always be at least one carrier kept right with the battle line.

Now, then, as to your dispositions, any one expedition would depend entirely upon your mission and upon the number of carriers and surface vessels that you had available for the mission. In this war up to the present there has been no such thing as a fleet action, a fleet in the sense of a large number of ships, and they have been small detachments of ships, and the British I think are pretty firmly wedded to the idea that the carrier stays right with the heavy ships except when they are off on some particular mission. You can protect them with the suitable fast ships to accompany them; because as long as you keep the carriers with the battle line you sacrifice the advantage of speed that the carriers have over the battleships; and if you put some heavy cruisers or even light cruisers with the carriers you give them a much greater mobility than they would have with the battleships.

Does that answer the question?

General McNARNEY. Yes. This is just mostly for my own information.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a very difficult question to answer, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was not the case on December 7? That is, the battleships were without the protection of the carrier on the 7th of December?

Admiral KIMMEL. The battleships that were here?

[686] Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Without the protection of the carrier? Yes, sir, in the sense that the carrier was not in port, but there was one carrier within 200 miles of here at the time.

Admiral THEOBALD. When you are in a port you naturally would depend for your main escort on land-based aircraft anyway.

General McNARNEY. You cannot operate a carrier in port.

Admiral KIMMEL. A carrier in port is just nothing, and we have long held—had a practice here that when a carrier comes into port she flies off her aircraft and puts them at the base, and we provided at each one of these fields ammunition, bombs, and whatnot to arm the planes of the carriers, so that in event of being caught in port those planes could be useful. They were all taken off the carrier the minute it came into port, because they would be vulnerable not only to attack and the destruction of the planes because they couldn't get them off in port, but their planes would be useless too, so we always removed them from the carrier when we came into port.

Admiral STANDLEY. What field did you use here for them, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. We used three fields. The north island.

Admiral STANDLEY. What?

Admiral KIMMEL. I mean Ford Island.

Admiral STANDLEY. Ford Island.

Admiral KIMMEL. Ewa; that's the marine field. And the landing field—mat over here at Kaneohe Bay. I might add that one of the first things that I hammered on when I took command was to get an agreement with the Army whereby we could use all their fields, any or all of them, and whereby they could use any or all of ours, and I issued orders that all Navy planes should by squadrons visit and be serviced at each one of the Army fields, and that was carried out, and they were familiar with all the Army fields, and I am quite sure that the Army [687] were quite familiar with all our fields.

General McCoy. You spoke of one field, Admiral, as—

Admiral KIMMEL. (interposing). Now pardon me.

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I just add one other thing: And when I spoke of the places that we put the carrier planes when they came in, we normally put them at our own naval fields.

Excuse me, sir.

General McCoy. You spoke of one of your fields as Tamarim Bay?

Admiral KIMMEL. Kaneohe Bay.

General McCoy. Kaneohe.

Admiral KIMMEL. Naval air station, Kaneohe Bay.

General McCoy. Where is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the seaplane station over here to the northward of the Island.

General McCoy. On this Island?

Admiral KIMMEL. On Oahu, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You know where Bellows Field is.

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is just over there (indicating).

Admiral KIMMEL. We haven't got a map of Oahu? Have you got a map?

Admiral THEOBALD. This (indicating on a map) is Kaneohe Bay, and this is the naval air station in here (indicating).

General McCoy. Did you have any normal anchorage for the fleet in this archipelago outside of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. When the fleet first came out here we spent a great deal of our time in Lahaina road, anchorage over there.

General McCoy. Where is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is on the Island of Maui. There is a harbor down at Hilo which would take a couple of battleships and a number of smaller craft. Those are the two principal [688] places that we used outside of this.

Admiral THEOBALD. Destroyers can go inside Kahului.

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

Admiral THEOBALD. Destroyers can go inside Kahului.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we haven't used them.

Admiral THEOBALD. We have in the past, destroyers.

Admiral KIMMEL. And at Kahului, too. But when the situation became more tense and we were afraid of submarines, we stopped the practice of anchoring in any of those open roadsteads or in the harbor at Hilo, which is only partially protected by breakwater and subject to submarine attack, and we used Pearl Harbor exclusively as an anchorage for heavy ships. We did permit submarines to anchor and work around Lahaina, and certain of the other smaller craft would from time to time be permitted to go to these other ports, but broadly speaking from the time I took command we had only one anchorage, which was Pearl Harbor. Lahaina, of course, is absolutely open. Lahaina. The anchorage at Lahaina is absolutely open, and studies were made several years ago to mine Lahaina to the extent necessary to make it unsafe for submarines to come in there, and a great many plans were made along that line. There are very swift currents over there, and it was finally decided that if we put mines in the number necessary to protect that harbor there was an enormous area to mine and that we would destroy more of our own ships than we did of the enemy, due to mines breaking loose in those swift currents, certainly after a short time, and that project was entirely abandoned.

General McCoy. When I was here in Hawaii about ten years ago I talked to the admiral commanding the base, only just an informal visit, and he expressed at that time considerable apprehension of the battle fleet being caught in Pearl Harbor, in its very narrow channels, and so forth.

[689] Admiral KIMMEL. That's right. That was an apprehension I shared with him, and it was my constant concern all the time I was here.

General McCoy. At that time, however, he was thinking only of submarines; he was not then concerned with the air. More recently I served with one of your officers who served here up until a few months ago, and in talking to him about it, over the more recent concern of the Navy for defense from the air, he said that when he was out here—I think probably most of his service being before your time—the fleet

kept under way and stayed outside of Pearl Harbor and only went into the harbor by division but kept the main fleet outside of Pearl Harbor, conscious of the new danger from the air.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, General, that's possible during the period of the fleet problem over a month or six weeks, perhaps, but over several months I can see no way by which we could do it.

General McCoy. I take it, then, since you have been in command with the security of the fleet constantly in your mind, that your problem was more concerned with the safety from submarines than from air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I was constantly concerned with the question of submarines, and we took very effective steps, I think, to keep a submarine from getting any surface ships. At least they didn't get any.

General McCoy. At these times of successive warnings from the Department I take it, then, that the fleet was mostly in Pearl Harbor rather than outside?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. We kept them in the operating areas, and we tried to change them around a little bit, and we tried to be constantly on the alert against submarines, but we did not keep them in harbor during all this time. We kept them at sea as much as we thought was profitable for our training and [690] for the preparation for war and maintaining what security we could. We had to accept a submarine menace in the operating areas over a long period of time. We had to accept it, because if you keep a fleet in port you might just as well disband them, quit: they are no good to you.

General McCoy. Could you furnish us with a statement as to the times since you have had command that the fleet has been in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. How many—well, I can give you a very—

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes, you can do it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I can give you a general statement right now which I think will serve your purpose.

General McCoy. Well, that would be satisfactory.

Admiral KIMMEL. When I took over command of the fleet—

Admiral STANDLEY. What date?

Admiral KIMMEL. On February 1, 1941. (Continuing:) Admiral Richardson had placed in operation an operating schedule whereby one-half the fleet went to sea and the other half of the fleet remained in port, and the half that were in port would sortie, and then the other half would come in.

I continued that for something like a month after I took command. It was too strenuous an operating schedule, and we had no opportunity to have upkeep on our ships, to keep up—overhaul the engines and machinery and perform necessary work to keep them going. We had a situation where some of the type commanders would never see a unit of his command at all. I modified that and divided the fleet: instead of two task forces or two operating forces, I divided them into three task forces. At the same time that I divided them into the three task forces I prescribed a mission, a specialized mission for each one, in addition to the general mission of all naval units. I presented that, I think, the other day. We then had one task force

at sea all the time, sometimes two, so I would say [691] that they were at sea about 40% of the time and in port about 60% of the time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, any one ship would be so?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. Except the light forces.

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

Admiral THEOBALD. Except the light forces.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there were times when the light force were kept out 60% of the time and in port 40% of the time, but I had to take very drastic steps to relieve the pressure on the light forces in order to be sure that we could keep them going.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that would mean, then, as I think you explained the other day, that sometimes but a third of the fleet would be in here?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And sometimes two-thirds would be in here?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. And this particular occasion happened to be a time when two-thirds were in?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right.

General McCoy. And that was on the normal operating schedule?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. You can examine those. We have them all, from way back.

General McCoy. Well, I think the statement of the Admiral—

The CHAIRMAN. This is an approximately correct statement, isn't it, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can give you the details, of course, but I don't think it would be profitable.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think we need them.

General McCoy. This is sufficient, I think.

[692] Admiral THEOBALD. You can add this: that about every first time the force went out for ten days, nine to ten days, and about (See following page.)

every second time the force went out nothing whatever stayed at this (See following page.)

end, and we had five days of combined tactical—of minor strategy between the forces out. So that about every second time the force went out it got about a time and a half at sea over and above its 33⅓% at sea.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Sort of staggered the thing.

Admiral KIMMEL. In that connection it might be well to state that during all the time I was in command I made it a practice to invite the Army to take part in the exercises which we were planning, and on a great many occasions they did take part, particularly the air. On other occasions the Army requested that we hold certain maneuvers for them and come in and do this and that, and we tried to meet their wishes to the best of our ability, and I want to say that I think the Army cooperated, and I certainly tried to cooperate, better than any other place that I have ever served. We did try to get together. A whole lot of this stuff is, we lack experience.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. In questioning the Army commander the other day—

Admiral KIMMEL. Will you cut that out? That's all right. I don't—that last saying I would rather not say.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. In questioning the Army commander the other day I asked him what special measures of security for the fleet he took when the fleet was in the harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes?

General McCoy. That is, his responsibility was primarily for the protection of the fleet when it was in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And it was brought out that he didn't know when the fleet was in the harbor and that on this occasion

[692 *Corrected A*] On page 692, line 2, delete the word "first."

On page 692, line 3, after the word "out" delete the words "nothing whatever stayed at this end" and insert the words, "About every second time the ships went out they stayed at sea about five extra days and we had five days of combined tactics and minor strategy by the forces out."

On page 692, line 15 from the bottom, delete the sentence, "A whole lot of the staff is we lack experience."

On page 692, lines 13, 12, 11, and 10 from the bottom, delete the following:

"General McCoy. In questioning the Army commander the other day—

"Admiral KIMMEL. Will you cut that out? That's all right. I don't—that last saying I would rather not say."

[693] when two-thirds of the fleet were in the harbor he had taken no special precautions for the protection of the fleet, even after the war warning.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I say something off the record, sir? I don't want this to go in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Admiral Kimmel made a statement off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me put a question that I think you will answer: Any citizen of Hawaii who had a motor car could find out how much of the fleet was in harbor at any given moment, couldn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All he had to do was drive around the harbor on the road.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And he could count them, couldn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. And we objected to that very much. There was nothing we could do about it.

The CHAIRMAN. You couldn't do anything about it?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was nothing we could do about it; we knew that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me ask, however, following, General (addressing General McCoy), that question: You have previously stated that the movements of the fleet were known to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And were furnished him, all movements of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And they were in his operating room?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether or not that information was disseminated to the forces in this area, Army and Navy [694] alike?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well—

Admiral STANDLEY. The Commandant of the District would know that, wouldn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. He would know that, sir. I couldn't—I don't know what—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you know that there was a port control office or some such thing in which there was an Army liaison officer, don't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That port control office had a record of every ship that came in or out of this harbor, didn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, as far as I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you remember there is a port control office down there? The artillery—

General McCoy. And the artillery commander was conscious of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the artillery.

General McCoy. What I was trying to bring out is that there were no dispositions taken by the Army, change in their normal peacetime procedure, when the fleet was in the harbor or at any time after this war warning—

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General McCoy. — either by the Army or by the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I suppose that in peacetime it wasn't necessary to take any, and I don't know what you could have any more if there were six ships in here or if there were fifteen; the procedure would be just the same to protect that target, I should think, no matter how many or how few boats were in there.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might say in that connection that one of our concerns—one of my concerns was a system of recognition signals that the Army would understand, and we find that—

Admiral STANDLEY. Air or ships? Air recognition or ships?

[695] Admiral KIMMEL. Ship recognition. We never got anything—well, leave that aside. Ship recognition signal. And we finally got that, never entirely satisfactory, as it never will be, but fairly well ironed out.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me ask you this, Admiral: I would like to have you expand a little bit on this. You have spoken of this question of overhaul periods. I would like to have you expand on that a little bit for the benefit of the Commission.

I know the story, but—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like you to get that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. None of our ships can continue operating indefinitely without a chance to overhaul their machinery. Our object was to bring the fleet into the war in tiptop operating condition. We didn't want to have them run down at the beginning of the war. We had an extensive program of alterations. These alterations included

the installation of anti-aircraft guns, the installation of radar, the installation of protection, shields around a gun. What do you call them?

Admiral THEOBOLD. Splinter protection.

Admiral KIMMEL. Splinter protection. I couldn't get the word. Splinter protection around the guns. And can you think of anything else?

Admiral THEOBOLD. Those were the main. We were in general incorporating lessons of the war that were being supplied us.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but those were specific items. I was trying to get specific items.

Admiral STANDLEY. How about the degaussing?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. Degaussing. That was a big item. I knew there was something else. Degaussing. Now, each [696] one of those items required considerable work on a ship.

Admiral STANDLEY. Wait a minute.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Each one of these required work on a ship, and during the periods that they were in port we gave what we call restricted availability at the Navy Yard for as many ships as they could handle and for which material was available to install these items.

Now, the degaussing, incidentally, is a very big job. It is a protection against magnetic mines, and a great deal of that was done right here in this yard on a great many ships.

Oh, yes; there is a listening gear to be put into the smaller type ships, and there was the installation of Y guns which throw depth charges. I know there were a great many other items, and if I had time I could probably get a great many, but I think you have got the general idea now. And by making these ships available during a week or ten days in here we were able to accomplish a great deal in the installation—we wouldn't have had any radar in any of our ships if we had not done that. That was one of the big things. Most of it was installed right here in this yard, some of it on ships which were undergoing overhaul on the coast.

[697] And not only did we prepare for installing the Radar which had been received and the guns which had been received, but we provided the structural work and the wires in the ships, ready to put the Radar or the new guns in the places as soon as they were received in the shortest possible time.

Does that answer your question?

Admiral STANDLEY. I want to develop this question. Was the ship's force engaged in this work in port?

Admiral KIMMEL. The ship's force was engaged in this work in port to the limit of their capacity. Tenders were engaged in this work in port, and the Navy Yard was engaged in this work in port, in addition to the machinery, the permanent installations on the ships, the main motored machinery, and the power, and all working parts for the guns. (See following page.)

One of these ships is a mass of machinery. It is a mass of machinery, and this machinery requires constant overhauling just to keep it in tip-top operating condition.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, over and above any new overhauling?

Admiral KIMMEL. Over and above any new alternations.

Admiral STANDLEY. And over and above your annual overhauling period?

Admiral KIMMEL. Over and above the annual overhaul period,
(See following page.)

which takes about 21 to 24 months between the overhaul.

Admiral STANDLEY. You mean the Navy Yard overhaul?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. An extensive overhaul.

Admiral KIMMEL. An extensive overhaul. This has been constantly in my mind to keep the ships available, to be able to do something when war came and to be sure that they did not run down.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you adopted a policy of preventing breakdowns rather than run the risk of breakdowns?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[697 Corrected A] On page 697, line 13, delete the word "motored" and insert the word "motive."

On page 697, line 12 from the bottom, delete the words, "annual overhaul period, which takes about 21 to 24 months between the overhaul" and insert the words, "extended overhaul period which occurs at intervals of between 20 and 24 months."

[698] Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, to avoid having anything wrong with the battleship at sea, you attempted to discover it during the overhaul period?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. We had a conversation the other night with Admiral Reeves about the trip of the *Oregon* to Santiago in the Spanish-American War. You are familiar with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. And he stated that the *Oregon* progressively became better as they got to Santiago. The machinery was in better operating condition when they got to Florida than when they started.

Now, why was that the case in the *Oregon* when our present ships seem to be so delicate and lack the long-range operations in wartime, when in 1898 the *Oregon* was able to proceed to Santiago and be in better condition than when it left, without any Navy Yard for repairs except for such repairs as they were able to make en route?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the ships of today are much more reliable than the *Oregon* was. In the midst of all this we were convoying, escorting merchant ships from here to Manila and back. We were escorting merchant ships directly across by way of Torres Strait. We had, so far as I can recall at the present time, no breakdowns among those cruisers that they had working, and there were a large number of them, a considerable number of them which made that round trip.

The *Oregon* trip took about two months, I believe, to get to the Battle of Santiago from the time she started until the Battle of Santiago.

General McCoy. I do not think it was that long; was it?

Admiral STANDLEY. It may have been, yes.

Let me answer that question, if I may. The *Oregon* was a brand new ship, just put in commission; and when you put a new ship in commission, it is just like a new automobile. The [699] bearings have to be worn down, the gear has to be tested out, and naturally when it got there it was in better shape than when it started.

Admiral THEOBALD. There is no ship in this fleet which cannot do today what the *Oregon* did, and we can send a ship from here to the East Coast, or to New York, and we will bring them back without any difficulty; that may go along for a year, but at the end of that time you are bound to get your breakdowns. You have to keep them up all the time because you do not know when war is coming.

General McCoy. Under war conditions you could take the fleet over to Singapore?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. And you could take it from here in case the Panama Canal were blockaded, around South America, and deliver it in the Caribbean?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; as long as you had fuel. That is the only thing you would have to supply.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have repair crews right on the fleet, right along with it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

May I point out at this point that the state of tension with Japan has continued since 1937. It certainly has been active for the past two years. I seem to recall in 1937 that we had quite a scare on the West Coast, particularly against submarines.

Admiral Hepburn was in command of the fleet at that time, and he established a patrol of patrol planes, and he ran it for about a month or six weeks.

Admiral STANDLEY. Here or on the Coast?

Admiral KIMMEL. On the Coast. At the end of that time his patrol planes were just about worn out, and he had to stop it because he could not keep it up.

That is my recollection now. I am not sure of all the [700] details because I was not there at the time in the fleet, but that is what I have been told.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can testify to that because I was a battle captain in the fleet. They started in November, and not having a prohibited area, we took some of the sabotage measures that were mentioned. We had some small boats or ships around, and it started in November and lasted until February.

Admiral Hepburn had a patrol about two hundred miles of a search, searching mainly for submarines. He did not have sufficient BP's to run long-range scouts, but scouted only against submarines, on about a 400-mile trip.

At the end of three months, with the losses in life and losses in planes and the breakdown in planes from the scouting operations, it was necessary to stop it sometime in February.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I say this: The British have run their ships through force of necessity, and the ones which have arrived in our yards were badly run down, in a run-down condition, and that after less than two years of the war.

That is the situation in regard to these planes on the Coast.

Admiral STANDLEY. How would you expect to do that in war conditions, having out planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Only by taking battle crews for each plane and by having new planes come in very rapidly.

(See following page.)

General McNARNEY. To get back to the carriers, Admiral, is it considered by the Navy that the carrier is primarily a defense weapon, or is it an offensive weapon?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon.

General McNARNEY. Is it primarily used for defense or offense?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would say it is for offense, sir. You said primarily?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

[700 Corrected A] On page 700, line 4, delete the word "battle" and insert the word "battleship."

On page 700, line 11 from the bottom, delete the words, "Only by taking battle crews for each plane and by having new planes come in very rapidly," and insert the words, "Only by having double crews for each plane and by having new planes coming in very rapidly."

[701] Admiral KIMMEL. We have got to use it for the defense of the battle line against air attack. You must have some fighter planes there, but I think the primary mission of the carrier should be offensive.

General McNARNEY. That is just the point I was trying to establish.

General McCoy. You made a casual remark the other day in connection with these patrol planes, that they did not have the new type of gas tanks on them. Is that a fact now?

Admiral KIMMEL. That the airplanes do not have the new war type gas tanks?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. You are speaking of the leakproof tanks?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. When they fly here from the Coast they do not carry the armor and the leakproof gas tanks on account of the weight. It is a long trip, and this armor and the leakproof gas tanks have to be installed after they arrive here. It cuts down, of course, the radius of operation and action of the planes. That also has been a matter of concern, and it may be that we will finally find that we not have these leakproof gas tanks or the armor because we cannot get the radius when we have them.

General McCoy. How much would the armor and the new tank cut down the radius? Would it be as much as a third?

Admiral KIMMEL. It is considerable. I would say at least 15 or 20%, but that would vary with the different types of planes.

General McCoy. I understand that you are putting them in here now?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, we put them in some of the ships.

Admiral THEOBALD. I was on duty over at Kaneohe Bay and they are putting them in now.

Admiral STANDLEY. When did the fleet personally base in

(See following page.)

[701 Corrected A] On page 701, last line, delete the word "personally" and insert the word "permanently."

[702] Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Admiral STANDLEY. When did the fleet permanently base in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not understand you, sir. You mean, when did they first come to this area?

Admiral STANDLEY. No, but when did they begin to base here continuously?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they began to base in Pearl Harbor continuously when they arrived in this area April a year ago.

Admiral STANDLEY. April a year ago?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. They based in Pearl Harbor. Now, they anchored out for exercise periods, and what not, up until about the first of last January, and about the first of last January they decided they could not anchor in the outlying ports any more.

Admiral STANDLEY. Has the basing of the fleet continually here added or caused or brought about an increase in the facilities of the overhaul and repair and docking of the fleet at this port?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is unquestionably true, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You do not know the extent to which that has been carried on while you have been here? Do you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think you could get that more accurately from Admiral Bloch, but roughly speaking they had about 1,800 employees here in the Navy Yard when Admiral Bloch first arrived. He has something on the order of 8,000 now. I think that is an indication.

I know a great many repair facilities have been added, machine shops, sheet-metal shops, and they have practically added a new dock over here which will dock any ship in the Navy.

Is that what you wanted?

[703] Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, that is what I wanted.

Admiral, you took command of the fleet in February, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, the first of February.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was your assignment prior to that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was in command of cruisers of the battle force, which included new 10,000-ton light cruisers with three divisions: two of the new 10,000-ton light cruisers and one of the old 7,500-tons—one division of over 7,500 tons.

Admiral STANDLEY. Had you prior to being detailed to the command of Commander-in-Chief made any efforts to get command of the fleet or used any influence to get the command of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. None whatever, sir. I would say the only influence I used to become commander of the fleet was to do my job the best I could. I never wrote anybody in connection with it and I never asked anybody anything about it.

When I was informed that I was to be Commander-in-Chief, I had been out playing golf on a Sunday afternoon. I came back to the dock and the first officer from my staff met me and told me that I was to report to the fleet flagship, that they had a communication for me to see. Captain Delaney was with me. He was then my chief of staff.

I went to the flagship and they showed me the message.

Captain Delaney at that time said to me that he had seen me under trying conditions, many trying conditions, and he thought I was going to faint when I read that message.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was your first information of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the first information that I had that I was to be Commander-in-Chief. I would be less than honest if I did not say that I had knowledge that Admiral Richardson, then

Commander-in-Chief, had indicated that he thought highly of me, and also the Chief of Naval Operations, with whom I had served, Admiral Stark, who also thought highly of me.

[704] However, nobody had said anything about my being Commander-in-Chief except to say, "Some day you will be Commander-in-Chief," and that kind of talk from various people.

It came as a complete surprise to me, and I thought that if I ever became Commander-in-Chief it would be much later in time than when I did get it.

Admiral STANDLEY. As Commander-in-Chief, the effectiveness and the efficiency of your fleet depends, to a large extent, upon the morale of the personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that true?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you, as Commander-in-Chief, would be very much concerned with the morale of your personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would, sir; yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you would also be concerned with the conduct of your personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, every one.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were at a party on that Saturday night before December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. On December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Where was that party?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the Halekulani Hotel.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was it a large party?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Leary gave the party. There were about a dozen people there, as I recall it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there other parties there largely attended by Naval personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the Halekulani Hotel?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the only one I saw.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were in uniform?

[705] Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were any Naval officers in uniform?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. From your personal knowledge, what was the conduct of the officers and the men of the fleet here in Pearl Harbor generally?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had some unfortunate incidents, none of them very serious. I considered the conduct of the officers and the men in this area from the time I took command—and when I knew all about it—as of the highest order. I think they obtained and deserved respect and admiration of the people in Honolulu.

Admiral STANDLEY. In the overhaul work that was being done here, were the officers required to supervise and inspect and oversee the work done?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not only by the Yard but by their own personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Were there any special orders to the personnel of the fleet as a result of the war warning as to the percentages that could be absent from duty, and so forth?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Do you know how many captains of ships were aboard the ships in command at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I testified to that, I think, previously.

General McCoy. You spoke about it in a general way, I believe.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can find out. I think there were five. I can give you five of them. I can give you five for the record.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. How many were killed on duty of the commanding officers?

Admiral THEOBALD. Bennion was one.

[705 *Corrected A*] On page 705, line 6 from the bottom, after the word "out." delete the words "I think there were five. I can give you five of them. I can give you five for the record." and insert the words, "I think there were five battleship captains—I can get you a list of them for the record."

[706] General McCoy. There were two captains?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, Bennion and Van Valkenburg.

General McCoy. Were any of the captains of the battleships wound?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not that I know of.

General McCoy. I am conscious of the death of Vice Admiral Kidd. What was his command?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was in the Arizona, sir. He had Batdiv 1.

General McCoy. He was on the ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. He was killed on duty?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I may say that Admiral Calhoun was aboard and Admiral Furlong was aboard.

General McCoy. I would like to have furnished for the record a list of the captains present for duty at the time of the attack and those absent, please.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Did we ask you for the percentages of the personnel on board ship? Did we ask you that on Saturday?

Admiral KIMMEL. I gave that in my testimony, sir, and we had it in considerable detail. I am not sure whether the captains on board would be in that.

General McCoy. Has the Department asked for it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. I noticed in your report to the Navy Department—which was furnished us—that it was of recent date. What date was that, if you recall?

Admiral KIMMEL. 21 December, sir.

General McCoy. Was that the first report you made to the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. I made telegraphic reports in which I included the essential factors of it and I made damage reports and I made casualty reports.

[707] When the Secretary was here I gave him everything we had on the subject, and he took it back to the Navy Department with him.

It will be some time before a complete report of this can be drawn up. I was relieved as Commander-in-Chief on the 17th of December, and since then I have not run the office of Commander-in-Chief.

I did urge them to get some kind of report to submit to this Board. I signed that report in order to get it through. Technically, I suppose I had no business signing a report. It should have been signed by the Commander-in-Chief, but it was forwarded by him.

General McCox. That is the report in question, which we have?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you state for the Commission, Admiral, the procedure in the Navy, on Naval ships, in regard to the granting of liberty to the men, the number required on board, and the condition and state of armament, and the personnel in connection with it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. There must be at all times in port on board at least 50% of the enlisted men and 25% of the officers. I gave an order which was issued that there must be on board a sufficient number of men and officers in each watch to man all anti-aircraft batteries, and they must be men who are trained for the job.

That was one of the first orders that I issued after I became Commander-in-Chief, to make sure that they would always have on board a sufficient number of trained personnel to handle the batteries.

In this port there always had to be on deck a head of the department, a representative of each one of the departments in the ship, required to be on board and ready to do whatever was necessary. They should have on board a sufficient number

[707 *Corrected A*] On page 707, line 4 from the bottom, delete the word "deck" and insert the word "board."

[708] of men to get away, to go to sea, to fight the ship. They must reach a state of efficiency at sea, depending on the number of men they had.

In this particular port we grant liberty from the afternoon until before midnight, when they were all supposed to be back on the ship. I am talking about enlisted men now.

In general, the officers lived on board ship. I had only a few of them who lived ashore in this port, the ones who had their families here, and they were relatively few. Some of the senior officers had their families here, more so than the junior officers because they had more money.

I think I stated previously that we had on board at the time of the attack at least 80% of the men, and probably over 90, and 60 to 75% of the officers. Now, that was by virtue of the fact that we were here at this time in this area, but that was the way it was all the time.

Is that what you wanted?

General McCox. What was your flagship?

Admiral KIMMEL. My flagship was the Pennsylvania.

General McCoy. Where was the Pennsylvania at the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Pennsylvania was in dry dock at the time.

General McCoy. And you were living in your quarters ashore?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I was living in my quarters ashore.

General McCoy. You had your headquarters established ashore?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had headquarters established ashore. I would like to tell you about that.

General McCoy. Was that normal when the first fleet was in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to explain that so that there will not be any misunderstanding about it.

When I knew I was to take command of the fleet, which I [709] knew about three weeks before I was to take command, I immediately started out to find out many things that I did not know about; and among others the one that I was most keenly interested in was the question of war plans or what you are going to do with the fleet, or what the plans of the high command were with respect to the fleet.

I found in the flagship at that time only one commander and one lieutenant who were concerning themselves primarily with war plans.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was no general staff, as we understand it, in the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I am talking about the war plans section of the Commander-in-Chief's staff. Everybody on the staff has to contribute something to the war plans.

I said to Admiral Richardson, the then commander, that I had thought that his number of officers detailed for war plans was entirely inadequate and that I did not see how the work could be done. I did not see how the work required to be done in that particular section could be done by those two men. He agreed with me.

He said he had no more room on the ship to put the people.

I said, "Suppose I put them in some other ship?" I thought that would be very satisfactory. I consulted with him on this for a

(See following page.)

considerable time, and he said, "Something has to be done."

I said, "How about getting quarters ashore at least for the war plans staff?" and he said, "If you stay on ship and they are ashore, you will find that you won't get along very well; you can't split up your staff. If you do, you do not get the work done."

Shortly after that I came to the conclusion that we had to have more people on the staff of the war plans, and I asked for two additional captains to be detailed. Those were Captains McMorris and McCormack.

[709 *Corrected A*] On page 709, line 12 from the bottom, after the word "would" insert the word "not."

[710] I arranged to put them in a place over here ashore where they could spread out in their work and put their charts out and such on the day I took command and to have the equipment and the supplies over here.

I asked the Commandant to prepare the third floor of this place, which was unfinished at the time, and I got the officers' quarters also for the occupation of the staff. I said I did not know whether I was coming ashore or not, but I wanted to be able to do so.

I operated that for about six weeks, and found that this division

(See following page.)

of the staff—and incidentally there were other people coming to the staff such as Naval Intelligence people, which we were unable to accommodate on the *Pennsylvania*—and from time to time when matters of secrecy would come up, I would have to come into port, and I therefore found that that interfered with the training on the *Pennsylvania*.

I finally decided that I could more efficiently run the fleet by establishing an office ashore, more so than I could by remaining on the ship.

That was a drastic step. I knew I would be criticized by some people. I consulted various people on the subject as to the way to solve this problem. Be that as it may, the result was that after about six weeks of operations, I came ashore with my staff and established them here at the Submarine Base.

Of course, I informed the Navy Department of everything I was doing. I arranged it so that my operating staff and the operating files could be put on board the *Pennsylvania* in a matter of a couple of hours and we could leave port.

I tried to go to sea for the tactical exercises that were held, the maneuvers; and I generally succeeded in getting to sea during these tactical exercises, maneuvers, because I did not want to get out of touch with the sea-going end of it. The *Pennsylvania* up to the time of the attack was available for me to go aboard at any time.

[710 *Corrected A*] On page 710, line 10, after the word "that" insert the word "Way."

[711] I found that I could accomplish my job very much better by having my staff ashore in quarters where they could work. I think that the progress we made in training the fleet was very largely due to the fact that my staff were ashore and available to the various forces, top commanders for consultation, and that they were there during all this period.

I think that among the senior officers who understood the situation out here, that there was a general approval of the action that I had taken when they saw the results that were produced by it.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were in a dual capacity?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were in a dual capacity at that time? You were acting in a dual capacity?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Weren't you Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and also—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I was Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And as such you were responsible for the plans which the United States Fleet would use in case of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I was not responsible for the plans that the United States Fleet would use in war; I was responsible for the plans the Pacific Fleet would use in war, but I was also responsible for the tactical doctrines and orders that all fleets would use in the organization and prosecution of the war. Perhaps I should not say organization, but in the organization of the task forces.

You know what the doctrines and tactical orders are.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, of course, but I am just trying to get the information for the Commission.

You as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and [712] as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had a dual capacity?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you had a dual responsibility with regard to each of these?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, I have one other question. Do you recall at one time that we had an independent flagship that had the single purpose of being the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What ship was that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the old—

Admiral STANDLEY. That was the Great Northern, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. A merchant ship.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not a combat ship. The Great Northern, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. It had another name. I think it was the Columbia.

Admiral THEOBALD. It was the Columbia and was changed to the Great Northern.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you recall who the first Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet was who hoisted his flag on that ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Koonce.

(See following page.)

Admiral STANDLEY. No, not Koonce. Koonce never had it. He (See following page.)

went to the Seattle.

But it was the established policy because there was not enough space on board any combat ship to take care of the staff of the United States Fleet Commander, that they used that ship.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir. I might say there, too, just for the record, that in studies before the war, with respect to a war in the Pacific, that there were a

[712 *Corrected A*] On page 712, lines 9 and 10 from the bottom, delete the word "Koonce" and insert the word "Coontz."

[713] number of people who had come to the conclusion years ago that the proper place for the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific was here at Pearl Harbor. Of course, I knew all that. I might add further that the Navy Department was fully informed of what I had done. I announced it at the Secretary's council in Washington in June, and besides I might say that I mean that they all knew it, as I had made representations to the Navy Department for quarters, stating that the quarters in which my staff was housed out here were not adequate and suitable, and they have appropriated or allocated the money for the construction of proper headquarters for the chief of staff out here, and they have broken ground over there for (See following page.) that place.

General McCoy. For the purpose of the record I would like to have you state your age at the time you took command of the fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was born February 26, 1882, and I was just under 59 years of age when I took command of the fleet.

General McCoy. Could you state offhand the number of officers in your command over whom you were jumped when you were made Commander-in-Chief?

Admiral KIMMEL. In my command?

General McCoy. Yes, in your command.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have to think about it.

General McCoy. Well, off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. I can get that for you.

The CHAIRMAN. You can get that from the Naval records.

General McCoy. I think it is pertinent to what might be done to this record to show the whole story.

The CHAIRMAN. Get that information for us, if you will.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. In connection with the description of your staff and its functions ashore, do you know what liaison your staff had with the Army staff? I mean, not through the

[713 Corrected A] On page 713, line 11, delete the words "Chief of Staff" and insert the words "Commander-in-Chief and his Staff."

[714] District but directly. That is, so far as your operations in the War Plans Staff are concerned, did they have direct liaison with the Army staff of General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. In a great many matters we did consult with them freely about many things.

General McCoy. Was there a joint plan of your staff and the Army staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. There was between Admiral Bloch and the Army staff, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. A joint defense plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but my staff interested themselves in a great many matters and matters that were not directly my responsibility, but we were urging the people to do things.

I know that shortly before this attack took place Captain Delaney, the operations officer of my staff, was urging the District to perfect our Radar communications circuits. Whenever we found anything that could be remedied, we consulted freely with the Army and more particularly with the District about the steps which should be taken. A lot of that was verbal, and a great deal of it was very effective. There are no written records of these things.

General McCoy. Admiral. General Short in his testimony before us stated that between the 27th of November and the 7th of December that there had been personal conferences between you and him.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. And there was one of these conferences in which General Short, in answer to our questions about this war warning dispatch and so forth, stated that he felt sure that you must have shown it to him, but he did not remember, but he stated that he had in a talk with you asked your opinion about the imminence or the proba-

bility of an air [715] attack, and that you referred to a particular Captain McMorris.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. And that McMorris had replied—Do you remember that?

The CHAIRMAN. "Admiral, there is no problem."

General McCoy. Do you remember that conversation?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall it, but I presume that it took place.

The CHAIRMAN. At any rate it evidenced your personal state of mind at that time that you thought there was no probability of an air raid?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I have stated that, sir.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, can you give us a résumé of your service, staff, education, and so forth?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have been Commander-in-Chief since the first of last February, as you know. Prior to that I was in command of cruisers of the battle force, which job I held for about 18 months.

Admiral STANDLEY. Comprising what battle force?

Admiral KIMMEL. Comprising three divisions: two of 10,000 tons and one division of 7,500 tons. Prior to that I was in command of a division of heavy cruisers, scouting force, which command I held for about a year. During that time I made a good-will cruise around South America, and I visited Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Calalo.

Prior to that time I was budget officer of the Navy Department for three years. Before that I was chief of staff for the Commander, Battleships Force; and then prior to that I was commanding officer of a battleship. Prior to that I was a director of ship movements in the office of the Director of Naval Operations. The cruise before that
(See following page.)

I was in command of a squadron of destroyers of battle force. Before that I was on duty in the policy and liaison section of the office of

[715 corrected A] On page 715, line 4 from the bottom, delete second "director" and insert "chief."

[716] the Chief of Naval Operations. Prior to that I took a year's course at the Naval War College.

General McNARNEY. What year was that, may I ask?

Admiral KIMMEL. 1925-1926.

Before that, I went to the War College, I commanded a division
(See following page.)

of destroyers, Asiatic Station. Before that time I was production officer at the Naval Gun Factory, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C. Before that I was executive officer of a battleship. Just prior to that I was on the staff of Admiral Rodman in the North Sea during the war.

Do you want me to go any further?

General McNARNEY. No.

General McCoy. I notice that you had no duty with the Air Forces.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I am not an air man, although I have taken a very keen interest in air missions.

The CHAIRMAN. In what year did you graduate from Annapolis?

Admiral KIMMEL. In 1904, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Since this attack on December 7, Admiral, I presume that you have heard gossip and reports to the effect that some of your personnel were not fit for duty due to drink.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never heard that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There have been such reports.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never heard of that.

The CHAIRMAN. What have you to say about that matter?

Admiral KIMMEL. If that is a fact, I would be very much surprised and disappointed.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no knowledge of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no knowledge of any such thing. I saw none and I saw no one who was in any such condition as that.

Admiral THEOBALD. Let me say that no liquor is allowed [716 *Corrected A*] On page 716, line 5, delete the word "that" and the comma following.

[717] on board ship, and if the attack occurred at 7:50 in the morning, very few people would have had any liquor in their system, and if they had been incapacitated for duty, they are normally excused on Sunday; so it is inconceivable that anybody on duty at the time of the attack was under the influence of liquor.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have something similar to the Provost Marshal which is in the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. A shore patrol, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any report from them as to the conditions on shore on that Saturday night?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have seen none, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And who is the officer who was responsible for that report?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the senior patrol officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who that would be?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can find out.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us know who he was. We may want to examine him on that point.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a complete surprise to me.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a great deal of gossip in the newspapers in the States to the effect that both the Army and the Navy had a lot of shore leave and a lot of drinking and that some in the high command were not fit for duty on the morning in question. You heard of no such thing?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have come to your notice if there had been such a thing?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know a man by the name of Wayne Fluger?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a party at his house the night before December 7, that you know of?

[718] Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know a Japanese named Otani, a fish merchant?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know about a party at his place in which Naval men were in attendance?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. I never heard of this second man.

Admiral THEOBALD. Admiral Fletcher is quite familiar with Wayne Fluger. (See following page.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Fletcher was at sea.

This is an amazing statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you might have heard about it, because the Commission has had communications from some organization in the States making such allegations.

Admiral STANDLEY. The same organization; wasn't it?

Admiral THEOBALD. It just staggers me to think of it. It is inconceivable.

Admiral KIMMEL. During the time I have been in Honolulu, which has been ever since the fleet first came out here, my observation leads me to the conclusion that there has been very little drunkenness among the officers and men of this fleet. We have dealt very seriously with the incidents which were reported by the patrol, and they have been isolated instances. I do not mean that the men have not taken a drink or that the officers have not taken a drink, but that drunkenness was something which we would not tolerate; and there was very little of it.

Admiral THEOBALD. May I say something along that line, because I think I can testify to something here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. I spent a great many Saturday nights in public places dancing, such as the Royal Hawaiian, and the night before this attack I was dancing from 8 to 12 at the Pacific Club. A large number of Army and Navy officers frequent those places, and I recognized most of the Navy officers.

[718 *Corrected A*] On page 718, line 8, delete the word "familiar" and insert the word "friendly."

[719] and it would be my duty to send anyone back who was not in a proper condition. I have never seen any such instances where I have recognized the people. I have seen officers who had a drink. I take a drink myself. But I am staggered at the thought that drinking was in any way a contributing factor to what happened on the morning of the 7th.

Admiral KIMMEL. This is the first information that I have had of any such thing, and I am astounded.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume that the patrol officer would know of how many cases of discipline there were that Saturday night?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And also there would be a report of acts of officers which led to inquiry or court martial?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. On that same subject?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get those reports.

I presume there were a great many sailors ashore that night, since you customarily grant leave on Saturday night?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that pay day in the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not think so.

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes, it was right after the 5th. It was right after the 5th, and the 5th is pay day.

The CHAIRMAN. And the men on leave spend more money getting tight right after pay day, I understand?

Admiral THEOBALD. That would be on the 5th, which was pay day.

Admiral KIMMEL. In that connection, sir, I do not know, but it is a fact that since we put in commission this new recreation center for the Navy that the large number of men who formerly went to Honolulu do not get any farther than the [720] Navy recreation center, where they see movies and bowl in the bowling alleys, and they sell beer there, nothing more intoxicating than beer, and they stay there and eat their lunches and drink a bottle of beer, and they have their entertainment there at that recreation center, which is just outside——

The CHAIRMAN. I know where it is.

General McCoy. Who operates that?

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

General McCoy. Who operates that center?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Navy, but there is also a commissioned officer on duty there during all the time there is anyone there.

General McCoy. Is there a hostess there also?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that that recreation center has helped the morale and the habits of the men?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, very definitely.

Admiral THEOBALD. I would like to say something else. I left my house at 10 minutes before 8 in the morning, and I was at the dock about a quarter to 9 when the thing was still going on. There were a large number of officers on the dock. I did not see one single officer on the dock who was not carrying himself in a perfectly proper manner, and there was no evidence of any officer carrying a hangover from the night before, and I must have seen 150 officers there waiting to get to their ships.

Admiral KIMMEL. I saw many officers that day, and I did not see any officer that I had the slightest suspicion of.

The CHAIRMAN. That you had the slightest suspicion of that he was not capable of——

Admiral KIMMEL. That he was not fully capable of performing his duties.

Now, with respect to this report, there may be some difficulty, because it goes to the type commanders, and there [721] were eight of them, so there may be some delay in getting it.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Does the patrol officer make a report?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, the patrol officer makes a report, but you get it quicker than from the people at sea. It may be a little hard to get it.

The CHAIRMAN. The patrol officer is under Admiral Bloch, I suppose?

Admiral KIMMEL. The patrol officer is under the fleet run by the Commander, Base Force, Admiral Calhoun.

The CHAIRMAN. We can find out what action was taken by the Fleet Commander in that report.

It may be better to have the facts, because I do not want to leave any holes open.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, the things you and General Short discussed from November 27 to December 7 were principally the relief of the forces on the outlying islands of Midway and Wake, were they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And there was some thought then that the Army might relieve the Marines out there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; yes, sir, I think that is correct.

[722] The CHAIRMAN. And, as I understand it, reference to this war warning was merely reference to it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Because neither you nor General Short took it as a warning that there would be a raid on Pearl Harbor rather than an aggressive move in the neighborhood of the Philippines or in the Far East?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right, sir. And the Department by their despatches evidenced considerable concern about the security of their outlying bases.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, and I think anyone who reads those telegrams will see that the Naval Intelligence indicated aggressive movements many thousand miles from Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is convenient to you, Admiral, I think we shall adjourn now, as we are going to go and look at these plots in a few minutes, and I think we shall adjourn until two o'clock, sir, if that is entirely convenient to you.

Admiral KIMMEL. You want me to be here again?

The CHAIRMAN. I think there may be a few supplementary questions we shall want to ask you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I think this is maybe the time to suggest; you have already Captain DeLany; you are going to have him over here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Captain McMorris.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, I would suggest you call—of course Admiral Bloch will be before the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We thought of calling him next.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; and then there is Admiral Pye.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

[723] Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Brown, Admiral Halsey, and Admiral Calhoun, and of course anybody else that you want.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. I think, McMorris.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I want to call Captain McMorris.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He is in that planning division?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This just occurred to me, Admiral: I have learned that after the attack there were two Navy officers through the balance of the day up in the radar control room. Was that by your instruction? That is after the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think they were sent up there by Admiral Bellinger, wasn't it?

Admiral THEOBOLD. I think compatwing 2, Admiral Bellinger. Bellinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, we want to call Admiral Bellinger.

Admiral KIMMEL. I guess you want Admiral Bellinger. I forgot him. Admiral Bellinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, I think we shall suspend until two o'clock, then, gentlemen.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I think we shall suspend; until two o'clock?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I might add one thing here, sir, that just occurs to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. In connection with the size of the staff. After the attack took place and Admiral Pye's flagship, the California, was untenable, he came ashore and reported to me with all of his staff; and since that attack his staff, which is a very large one—the commander battle force—and mine have been constantly occupied with the work of running the fleet. Now, to be sure, during this particular period there were an [724] enormous number of things to be done. I think they have done a very fine job, but it indicates very clearly that our previous estimates of what we would require in the Commander-in-Chief's staff are very far short of what we really—

The CHAIRMAN. Of what you needed.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of what we do need.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we shall recess until two o'clock, and it may be we shall have no questions or very few questions for you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But we are always thinking of something else that we have to cover.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Well, I am always available, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Well, we shall not hesitate to call you back if there is anything we think of, but you might report at two o'clock in any event.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

(Thereupon, at 11:50 o'clock a. m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock of the same day.)

[725]

AFTERNOON RECESS

The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., at the expiration of the recess.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, U. S. NAVY— Resumed

Admiral STANDLEY. May we go ahead?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, please.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in connection with your position here and duties and responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, what plans, if any, did you have, and what was your responsibility, for the defense of Midway and Wake Islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the direct administration in command of Midway and Wake under the Commandant 14th Naval District, and of course I was responsible for everything that he did. I was responsible for the defense of Wake and for the defense of Midway, and for putting Marines and guns and all other defensive weapons out there.

Admiral STANDLEY. Originally, as you know, or whether you know it or not, Wake and Midway were developed commercially.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the Navy had nothing to do with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And they were developed during the existence of treaties which prohibited our putting any defense on the islands in that area?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. When was the policy to put armaments on them and make them into offensive and defensive posts and military posts: When was that change made, if you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was at the time of the Hepburn report, the Hepburn Board. Hepburn was the senior member of the Board in the Navy Department, and Marquart was a member of [726] the Board.

Admiral STANDLEY. And Greenslade was on it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know whether Greenslade was on it.

Admiral STANDLEY. At any rate, it was known as the Hepburn Board?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was about three years ago. No, it was longer than that, I guess.

General McCoy. When I retired in the autumn of 1938, it was just about the time the Hepburn report was submitted to Congress.

Admiral KIMMEL. When was that?

General McCoy. In the autumn of 1938 when I retired.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, about three years ago, I should say, that the Board recommended the development of Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and I think also Dutch Harbor, Kodiak, and Sitka.

They started then to get together defense battalions of Marines out there, stationed on these islands for the defense of the islands.

When the situation became tense or became what we might call tense, these Marine battalions were brought out here. We had these Marine defense battalions here long before it was possible or advisable to put them on the islands because the minute you put Marines on the islands you have the supply problem on your hands, and we had to reduce the number of workmen there.

I cannot give you the exact dates—I can find them—but my recollection now is that there were no Marines on any of the islands when I took command; that we sent a few Marines to Midway, to Johnston, and to Palmyra before we sent them to Wake, and the Navy Department urged us to do that. We could not send as many as we wanted to send in the beginning on account of the lack of facilities for supplying them, particularly food and water.

[727] Admiral STANDLEY. Then this was the policy and the plans which resulted in the development in the Department itself and not out here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, it dates back to the Hepburn report. It dates back to the Hepburn report, and they began to prepare these defense battalions, oh, some time ago.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was it your belief that in case the fleet had to move or in case of hostilities that the Marines would be able to defend those islands without the help of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was felt that the Marines on those islands would put up a very good defense, and that it would require a considerable effort on the part of Japan to capture the islands. We had hopes that Midway might do pretty well. In Wake there was a considerable difference of opinion about whether it was advisable to put guns and Marines on Wake, and I thought a long time about it and finally decided that I would recommend that we put guns and the Marines on Wake, because we felt that an expedition to Wake, to attack it, would force the Japanese to expose some of their fleet, which we hoped we would be able to get there to and catch. On the other (See following page.)

hand, having Wake would permit a considerable coverage of the fleet as long as we held it in any advance to the westward that we found it expedient to make in any forays.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, Wake and Midway were part of a plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, Wake and Midway were part of a plan.

Admiral STANDLEY. Which involved the movement of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Has there been any——

Admiral KIMMEL. May I say this?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

[727 Corrected A] On page 727, line 14 from the bottom, before the word "catch" delete the word "and."

[728] Admiral KIMMEL. The size of the fleet to be kept out here was a very vital factor in whether or not we should have Midway and Wake. As a matter of fact, the Hepburn Board did not contemplate war in two oceans. The policy in regard to the islands was very much the same even after we had withdrawn something like 25% of the force that we originally had out there.

Admiral STANDLEY. At the time of your release here after December (See following page.)

7, Admiral, was there any effort to relieve the garrison at Wake or Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. I answered a question similar to that the other day with the request that you question my successor on the subject.

Admiral STANDLEY. After December 7 was my question.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not want to answer that, but I will since you press me.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would you rather that this answer not go on the record?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will answer it, and then you can put it in the record or not as you please.

I approved a plan which sent a carrier, three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers, accompanied by a tanker, TANGIER, a submarine

tender from which I took all torpedoes and things of that kind and loaded with ammunition of known weight. We also put on the carrier (See following page.)

some 15 fighting planes which we felt we could fly off and get onto Wake.

At the same time we sent a similar force down to the eastern Marshalls to create a diversion in the direction of the eastern Marshalls and get this force that was going to Wake within striking distance of Wake, and send in the supply ship with three destroyers to ward off submarines and be prepared either to relieve Wake and supply them with ammunition and other supplies which would enable them to last two

[728 *Corrected A*] On page 728, line 8, delete the word "release" and insert the word "relief."

On page 728, line 10 from the bottom, delete the words "of known weight" and insert the words "and supplies."

[729] or three months longer, or at least a month longer, or to evacuate Wake without landing any supplies, depending on the conditions as we found them there.

The orders that we issued were to reinforce Wake and evacuate some 650-odd civilians.

Now, we still have a problem out here, or still had a problem at Wake to get a channel in there where you could run a ship into it, and we hoped against hope that we might be able to continue the work sufficiently to get the channel in there and make it easier to supply. In my mind the decision as to whether it should be evacuated or not was to be made when we found the conditions there. I reported the plan, that I had placed in execution, to the Navy Department and got back a message saying that it was heartily concurred in, or words to that effect.

Then I turned the command over. Perhaps you had better get the rest of the story later.

If you want that in the record, all right. I might add one thing more for the information of the Commission. I received—I think it was on the 16th—a message from the Navy Department saying that I was to be relieved very shortly and that Admiral Pye was to be my relief, and directed me to inform Pye.

When I received that message, Pye had been in the office with me and knew everything that was going on. He immediately came over when the attack occurred and became my personal advisor there, as I told you before.

So, I decided that the best thing for me to do in view of this force that I was setting in motion was to permit my successor to handle his operations, because I did not want to be relieved right in the middle of it. I sent a message to the Navy Department in which I said that Admiral Pye was thoroughly familiar with the details and the operations under way and planned.

[730] Of course, the Department did not know that, as I had not told them before, and stated, "In view of your message I recommend that I be detached immediately in order that my successor can make a decision in regard to these operations," and the next day I got

orders detaching me. I went down and turned over the whole command to Admiral Pye.

As I say, I did not want to put that in the record, but since you insist, that is a fact. Those are the facts.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, the same day that you received that message, "This is a war warning," to wit, on the 27th of November—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). —General Short received a long telegram from the War Department.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he show it to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that was sent down to me.

The CHAIRMAN. You remember that telegram (handing document to Admiral Kimmel)?

Admiral KIMMEL. I remember that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did General Short discuss that telegram with you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say yes; but I cannot swear to it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did General Short tell you that he interpreted that telegram as meaning that he should take measures against sabotage rather than take measures on what we call his Alerts 2 and 3, which would put his troops in war positions and alarm the civilian population? Was there any discussion on that between you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no recollection of his having told me what he proposed to do.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember his discussing that [731] with you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Against sabotage? No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That he was going to put his troops on a war footing?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I do not remember that at all. I have no recollection of it.

I may say that on the afternoon of the 24th of November I received (See following page.)

the so-called war warning, and when I tried to get hold of Admiral Bloch and instead got Captain Earle. He brought this dispatch and I read it. I received the same dispatch from the Navy Department a couple of days later saying that this warning had been transmitted to various places. So I had it twice, as a matter of fact, the same message; this message that the War Department had transmittted. Burr gave it to the Commandant of the District, and Burr was bringing it to me when I asked for Earle. My recollection is that Earle and Burr both came over to my office, but I never saw Burr. That is my recollection, but I did see the dispatch.

The CHAIRMAN. In that (indicating) General Short says that he had conferences with you on November 27, December 1, December 2, and December 3, and all of them with reference to the relief of the Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake and with reference to his communications with his superior officers about that matter, the relief of the Marine garrisons.

Admiral KIMMEL. There was a great deal about that, and in addition to Midway and Wake, Canton and Christmas.

The CHAIRMAN. He says that on December 4 Major Fleming of his staff saw Colonel Pfeiffer, Fleet Marine Officer, about ordnance that was to be sent to Canton Island. That would be in accordance with your understanding?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, had the Navy Department any telephone service to your headquarters? Or was it that you had to depend only on the Navy radio?

[731 *Corrected A*] On page 731, line 7, delete the word "twenty-fourth" and insert the word "twenty-seventh."

[732] Admiral KIMMEL. The Navy Department in Washington?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never have used the telephone, but during the attack and afterward Admiral Bloch told me that he talked over the telephone to Admiral Stark.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that be a public telephone?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I think so; I think so.

General McCoy. You had no scrambler telephone?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is a scrambler.

General McCoy. You had a secret scrambler phone here?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, there is not, so far as I know. I have never heard of any Navy telephone between here and the Navy Department. I think the only telephone to the mainland is a commercial telephone set. You could get that information from Admiral Bloch, who would know better than I would.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I have no more questions. Do you, General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. No.

Admiral THEOBALD. You asked for these papers this morning. That shows those junior to Admiral Kimmel on the permanent Rear Admiral's list, and the second shows those detached from the fleet at or about the time that Admiral Kimmel assumed duties of Commander-in-Chief.

(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. That will be inserted in the record.

(The documents above referred to are as follows:)

[732 *Corrected A*] On page 732, line 7 from the bottom, strike out entire paragraph and insert the following: "You asked for this paper this morning. It shows the Admirals at sea who were senior to Admiral Kimmel and who were jumped by him when he became Commander-in-Chief."

[732b]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

ADMIRALS AT SEA JUMPED BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL WHEN HE BECAME CINC.

A & CinC, U. S. Fleet

Admiral T. C. Hart—Class of 1897.

Admiral E. J. King—Class of 1901.

Rear Admiral D. M. LeBreton—Class of 1904.

Rear Admiral A. C. Pickens—Class of 1904.

As CinC, Pacific Fleet

Admiral C. P. Snyder—Class of 1900. (2)

Vice Admiral W. S. Pye—Class of 1901.

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews—Class of 1901. (2)

Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey—Class of 1904. (1)

Rear Admiral A. P. Fairfield—Class of 1901. (2)

Rear Admiral W. N. Vernou—Class of 1901. (2)

Rear Admiral E. J. Marquart—Class of 1902.

Rear Admiral G. J. Rowcliffe—Class of 1902. (2)

Later reported as junior to Admiral Kimmel in Fleet Organization although senior on Rear Admiral's List :—

Vice Admiral Wilson Brown—Class of 1902.

Rear Admiral Walter Anderson—Class of 1903.

NOTES :—

(1) Junior to Admiral Kimmel on permanent Rear Admiral's List.

(2) Detached from the Fleet at or about the time that Admiral Kimmel assumed duties of Commander-in-Chief.

[733] Admiral THEOBALD. Most pay days are on the 5th. The men are paid between the 1st and 5th of each month, with the majority paid on the 5th; so that a vast majority of the crew was last paid on the 5th of December. Admiral Kimmel had issued an order staggering the pay days.

The CHAIRMAN. For some reason the Army had also contemplated a similar staggering of the pay days, which, I think, had just gone into effect then.

Admiral KIMMEL. Our orders had not gone into effect. They were due to go into effect in January.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything more from Admiral Kimmel at the moment?

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we will excuse you for the time being.

General McCoy. I think the Admiral should know that we may probably want to call him back after we have heard the subordinates.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I will be here, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Call Admiral Bloch.

(Rear Admiral Bloch and Commander Momsen entered the hearing room.)

Admiral BLOCH. May I have permission to bring Commander Momsen in here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

**TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CLAUDE CHARLES BLOCH,
U. S. NAVY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name, Admiral?

Admiral BLOCH. Claude Charles Bloch, Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you graduate from the Academy, Admiral?

[734] Admiral BLOCH. January, 1899.

The CHAIRMAN. From that time on will you briefly give us what your duties and your services were in the Navy?

Admiral BLOCH. I left the Naval Academy and went to the West Coast and joined the U. S. S. IOWA, on which I served for a period of three months during the Spanish War. From the IOWA I went

to the Philippines and served in the Philippines and in China in the OREGON and the S. S. WHEELEY, and in the WHEELEY to Alaska; detached from the WHEELEY, and I came to the West Coast and joined the PHILADELPHIA.

I cruised on the West Coast and South and Central America for a period of about a year. Then I went to Samoa and served there for three years, approximately. Then I went back to Washington and took a post-graduate course in ordnance. I left there in 1906 and joined the U. S. S. VIRGINIA, on which ship I served over a year and then became staff lieutenant on the staff of Admiral Sebree on the U. S. S. TENNESSEE. I served in the Pacific with Admiral Sebree until 1909.

I then went to the Navy Powder Factory at Indianhead in charge of the Powder Factory. I served there until 1911. Then I joined the DELAWARE in that year as gunnery officer, and subsequently became navigator. I was detached from the DELAWARE in 1913 and went to the Bureau of Ordnance in charge of the armor and projectile division.

I served there until July, 1916, and went to sea in the MASSACHUSETTS as executive, and subsequently to the ARIZONA as navigator and as executive afterward.

I was detached from the ARIZONA in April or May, 1918, and went to the transport force in command of the U. S. S. PLATTSBURG. I served on this ship until October, and I then took command of the old battleship MASSACHUSETTS. Then I went to the office of the Chief of Operations in Washington, where I served for two or three months, from which I was made Assistant Chief of Ordnance. I served as such until [735] 1921. I came to Hawaii in command of a mine squadron at Hawaii, with the BALTIMORE as flagship. I stayed there approximately seven months, and then I was chief of staff of battleships, Pacific Fleet.

I served in that capacity until 1923, when I was made Chief of Ordnance. I held this position for four years and then I went to sea in command of U. S. S. CALIFORNIA. I served there two years and then went to the War College for one year and then as Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., and then to sea in command of the training squadron.

I served there about nine months and then as Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force, Cruiser Division 3; detached in 1933 to the Navy Department as budget officer. I served as budget officer one year and then as Adjutant General of the Navy until 1936, when I was ordered to sea in command of battleship division 2; in January, 1937, in command of battle force; January, 1938, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet; detached from this detail in January, 1940, and then to Hawaii, where I have served since April, 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. As Commander of the 14th Naval District?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, and as Commandant of the Navy Yard.

The CHAIRMAN. You had for a time the same command that Admiral Kimmel held on December 7, 1941?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it, or not, Admiral, always a matter of concern that the Japanese might stage an air raid on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. It has been a consideration, but in all estimates of the situation that I am familiar with, while this course of action was mentioned among us which might be taken by the enemy, it was considered remote.

The CHAIRMAN. After you became Commander of the 14th Naval District, what, if any, measures were taken to protect against such a raid?

[736] Admiral BLOCH. When I became Commander of the 14th District, the District had no force of its own. This question has been vigorously pursued, and the result has been that we have gotten one division of destroyers, four destroyers, only one of which has any listening gear, and one division of four mine sweepers.

On occasions I have written letters to the Department pointing out the weakness of our local defenses and have been informed that they were doing everything possible to supplement our forces and were unable to do anything more, and later on they would do something both in the air and surface.

Somewhere about a year ago, or it may have been about eight months ago, I felt that the anti-aircraft protection of Pearl Harbor was weak. I discussed the matter with the then Commander in-Chief, Admiral Richardson. Admiral Richardson discussed the matter with the then Commanding General, General Herron, and General Herron made a survey of what they had and gave me the numbers of aircraft and anti-aircraft guns that were in the possession of the Army, and as a result of this information I wrote a letter to the Navy Department informing them of what I considered to be the weakness in the pursuit planes, bombing planes, and anti-aircraft guns. In a few paragraphs of the letter I expressed the fact that our cooperation here was of a very high order, and as it was necessary to be on good terms I desired that they not disclose the source of the information, because I did not want the Commanding General to think that I was doing anything or telling tales out of school, so to speak. That letter, I think, he has.

[737] The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that letter, gentlemen?

General McCoy. I think that we might have a look at it and see if we want it in the record.

Admiral BLOCH. Well, you know the letter I mean.

Commander MOMSEN. I will make a note of it.

Admiral BLOCH. As a result of this correspondence, I assume, and conferences in Washington between General Marshall and Admiral Stark, the Army separately dispatched a large number of pursuit planes to this area and started to send out some heavy bombers, 4-engine bombers. If my memory serves me correctly I believe we received—we transported here on Navy carriers 102 pursuit ships of the latest type, and 25 heavy bombers came out under their own power, flew all the way here. And there were no anti-aircraft guns forthcoming; they had none to send out here.

Admiral Kimmel succeeded to command about February, 1941. The matter, the question of security measures here, was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and myself and a number of other officers in the fleet and the Army. Admiral Kimmel asked me if I would take the duties of the security—the base defense command here, and I represented to him that I already had a multiplicity of duties, but I would willingly

do anything that was possible. And we discussed the matter with the Army Air Force and the Commanding General, and Admiral Kimmel issued his order, his naval base defense order, which is No. 2 CL-41, at which time he made me a task force commander for the naval base defense force, of the force to be used in this defense force. The first order was the anti-aircraft batteries, secondly the planes and gear that belonged to the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Belonged to what?

Admiral BLOCH. To the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. To the fleet.

Admiral BLOCH. On the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[738] Admiral BLOCH. And the third was certain facilities for harbor entrance patrol and certain facilities for the sweeping. The only forces that really belonged to me, my forces, were the mine sweepers and the destroyers on the channel entrance.

The CHAIRMAN. General, Commander Momsen has gone for that letter.

Admiral BLOCH. Admiral Kimmel's order was quite explicit in dividing the ships into sectors. He gave all the Navy planes of the fighter type that were on the ground to the base defense, and they were in turn turned over to the air commander of the base defense, Admiral Bellinger, and we then had a joint meeting with the Army, and we made a joint agreement whereby it was agreed that in the base defense all fighting planes of the Navy on the ground were to report to the Army for the defense of Oahu, as fighters; and all the heavy bombers the Army had were to report to the Navy for offshore bombing. That agreement was signed by General Short and myself, took effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Now, in that agreement I believe it was specified that you would be responsible for distant reconnaissance?

Admiral BLOCH. The Navy was to be, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Navy was?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As I read it, it says that the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District shall provide that (i.) distant reconnaissance.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the reason I said "you."

Admiral BLOCH. We accepted that in the J. C. D. also, distant reconnaissance. J. C. D. is Joint Coast Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe the Army by that agreement was to provide for an inshore patrol or an offshore patrol, I guess [739] they call it.

Admiral BLOCH. An anti-submarine.

The CHAIRMAN. Inshore?

Admiral BLOCH. Inshore. Inshore patrol. Anti-submarine patrol; is that correct?

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir, inshore patrol.

The CHAIRMAN. That means a patrol around the belt of 15 or 20 miles from the shore, doesn't it?

Admiral BLOCH. We thought somewhat further out, sir; probably 25 to 50 in the submarine zone.

The CHAIRMAN. 25. Now, do you happen to know whether prior to December 7 the Army did conduct any inshore patrol?

Admiral BLOCH. I can't state positively now, no.

The CHAIRMAN. You cannot?

Admiral BLOCH. It is my belief they did not; I don't know, though. And about the reconnaissance, the distant reconnaissance, in Admiral Kimmel's order of 2 CL-41 the patrol planes were reserved to him. I had no patrol planes for distant reconnaissance; I had no force.

The CHAIRMAN. They were reserved to the Commander-in-Chief, were they?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so. You will find that in the order, sir.

Have you got that order (addressing Commander Momsen)?

The CHAIRMAN. No, we haven't seen that order.

Admiral BLOCH. Let's see that order, will you please (addressing Commander Momsen)?

I had no patrol planes, sir.

Commander MOMSEN. 2 CL.

Admiral BLOCH. The continuous patrols provided are, which I wanted to do: the inshore patrol, the boom patrol, and the harbor patrols. The intermittent patrol was a destroyer offshore patrol which I did not have the force to do; and the air [740] patrols, which were the Commander-in-Chief's or his force, were daily search of operating areas as directed by aircraft scouting force.

The CHAIRMAN. Who had command of the aircraft scouting force? (e)?

Admiral BLOCH. Rear Admiral Bellinger under the scouting force, and another chain of the command as the commander-in-chief, commander scouting force, and commander air force scouting force. That is the echelon.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you were out of line of command?

Admiral BLOCH. I was out of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, does that correspond to distant patrol, to distant reconnaissance?

Admiral BLOCH. Not distant—

The CHAIRMAN. I am a layman.

Admiral BLOCH. It would not be distant as the capabilities of the planes, but he specified in this security order what reconnaissance was to be carried out, and that was what he was set to do, the thorough search of the operating areas.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you call the operating areas?

Admiral BLOCH. We had many areas. This whole sea around this place was divided into squares or irregular areas which we numbered, and when a ship went out for target practice or a division of the fleet went out for maneuvers they were told to go to a certain operating area, A-1 or A-2 or A-3, and that was their baseball diamond for them to play on, and nobody would interfere with them while they were there. Now, there were certain ones of those which were occupied each day by ships, and I assume that the object of this daily reconnaissance of the operating areas was for the purpose of ascertaining if there were hostile submarines or vessels in that area, so the ships would know they were secure while they [741] were working there.

The CHAIRMAN. Keep your voice up, Admiral.

Admiral BLOCH. Excuse me, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At a guess, how far distant from the shores of Oahu was the exterior boundary of any of those operating areas?

Admiral BLOCH. How far would you say it was (addressing Commander Momsen)?

The CHAIRMAN. I only want an approximation, of course.

Admiral BLOCH. Hundred miles?

Commander MOMSEN. About, I was going to say, 75 miles.

Admiral BLOCH. 75 to a hundred miles.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, that order which you have before you did not provide for any reconnaissance out to a point 800 miles from Oahu, or anything like it?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir. Those were ordered specifically as occasion demanded, if and when occasion demanded it.

The CHAIRMAN. In peacetime was it, or not, in your judgment as a naval man, necessary to maintain such patrols?

Admiral BLOCH. That, of course, would be based on the information that you had at hand, as a necessity. I remember on one occasion, I think it was in June, that the relations were strained, and I discussed with Admiral Kimmel if he didn't think it would be advisable to go out 300 miles on an arc directly toward Jaluit, and we discussed it at some length, and he did put a patrol in at that time for that. I thought—I had some reason to believe—there were some submarines moving there; I have forgotten what it was; something that came in in Intelligence, and I thought there might be some submarines and that if we went out 300 miles we might see them.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, would or would not such a distant patrol be important if one suspected carriers in the offing?

Admiral BLOCH. I should say it would be very important.

The CHAIRMAN. Very important. Now, what is the fact as [742] to your consciousness on December 6 and 7: had you any notion that there might be carriers in the offing?

Admiral BLOCH. No notion whatever, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were acquainted with the fact that the situation was desperate so far as the maintenance of peace went, weren't you?

Admiral BLOCH. Not immediately, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you were present at some conferences at which General Short was present at which telegrams received from the Army headquarters and the Navy headquarters were discussed, were you not?

Admiral BLOCH. On November 27—I think that's the correct date.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is the date.

Admiral BLOCH. —Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from the Department. It was not addressed to me. General Short received a despatch the same day, I understand, from the War Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BLOCH. Admiral Kimmel sent for me to come over. I happened to be at the hospital at the time when he sent for me, and my chief of staff came and was present when Admiral Kimmel showed him this despatch, and he sent me a paraphrase copy of the despatch, which I saw the next morning. The substance of that despatch, as I recall it, was to the effect that negotiations had ceased in Washington, and this was a warning.

The CHAIRMAN. It used the phrase, "This is a war warning"?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. "This is a warning," and the substance of the despatch, as I recall it, was to the effect that they expected moves in the Far East towards Kra Peninsula and certain places in the Far East, and that certain people had been apprised on the mainland to take steps against sabotage. I saw that despatch.

Acting on that despatch what I did was: some two days [743] subsequently, maybe one day subsequently, a conference of all of the destroyer commanders of the inshore patrol, which is my force, was called in my office by the commander of the inshore patrol, and he put them on notice that something might happen, and he wanted them to be on the alert; and the Commander-in-Chief, I think on November 29, issued an order that any submarines seen close in to this island should be depth charged, and they were told that they were to do this and they were to be on the alert.

I felt that the situation was such as to justify the putting of an inshore patrol at Honolulu harbor. I have a coast guard under the Navy at Honolulu harbor, and I directed the commander of the coast guard at Honolulu to put vessels outside to run up and down and listen for submarines, to protect for submarines there.

This despatch, as you recall, sir, stated that negotiations had ceased.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I don't think it said that. Did it say "ceased"? I think it said that they would cease. Perhaps I am wrong.

Admiral BLOCH. "Had ceased."

The CHAIRMAN. "Had ceased." Well, perhaps that is right.

Admiral BLOCH. I had that file this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. We haven't got that Navy despatch here, I think. "appear to be terminated." Yes. "appear to be terminated." Something of that kind.

Admiral BLOCH. Subsequent to that date negotiations were reopened. Highly technical discussion. I have no idea of introducing anything like that. They had ceased, and then they had reopened.

Steps that I took are as I have described them, and they remained in effect, and I am very happy to say that at 6:57 on the morning of December 7 one of these destroyers commanded by [744] one of these men who had been put on the alert sighted a submarine, and he opened fire on it, and he sank it. So he was on the job, and that part of the alert was satisfactory, and I wish it had been with everything else, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as you know, then, distant reconnaissance was not attempted about the Island of Oahu except when some occasion arose to make it necessary in some particular direction?

Admiral BLOCH. I have inquired of Admiral Kimmel since this December 7 as to what reconnaissance patrol was out on the morning of the 7th. There was a reconnaissance that went out daily. I didn't know always exactly where they were going, but I knew there was one going, and I heard the planes take off. They take off at early day, and I heard them come back. I lived very close to their take-off area, and there were planes that took off that morning, and I asked Admiral Kimmel where they went; and, as I recall what he told me, there were ten planes sent out to check to the southward.

The CHAIRMAN. Correct. And I think he told me three or four hundred miles. I am not sure of that distance. I think that is very nearly accurate.

Admiral BLOCH. I think that is what he told me. I asked him if any had gone north, and he told me none had gone north.

The CHAIRMAN. In your judgment, sir, was there material here adequate to have conducted prior to December 7 a day patrol effective in practically all directions to the extent of seven or eight hundred miles from shore?

Admiral BLOCH. On December 7, specifically, there were two squadrons of planes absent from here. One had been to Midway and one had been to Wake. They were absent.

The CHAIRMAN. That was on carriers?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir; they were sea planes.

The CHAIRMAN. They were sea planes?

[745] Admiral BLOCH. They were sea planes. One had been to Midway—one was at Midway, and one had been to Wake and was on its way back, and I think it was actually in Midway, was starting back from Midway at the time the thing happened. That took 24 of the planes away from here. We had, as I recall it, six squadrons at the time: 72 planes. That reduced them to 48.

Now, I understand that about 12 planes were under overhaul at the time, and that's hearsay purely and simply, and I know nothing of my own knowledge except what I have been told. That reduced it further to 50 planes. Unquestionably 50 planes still could have gone out over 360 degrees. They wouldn't have been very thick on the outer edge of the circumference, but they could have gone out. But to continue them to go every day for a long period of time would cause more and more of them to have to fall out, and maybe some more would come in, and the question of the efficacy of the search is very questionable.

The CHAIRMAN. Your view is that, to make an efficacious search, there would have had to have been a great many times more available planes over a period of weeks?

Admiral BLOCH. I was commander-in-chief in 1938, and I was on the forces opposing this Island. They had the patrol planes here. They endeavored to make the 360-degree search with the planes they had, and we had a tremendous number of casualties. I think in a few days we lost something like four or five planes, and two of them lost all the crews, but the others recovered personnel, but we lost the planes. I merely give this incident to show an actual experience of where these planes were going out long distances every other day.

The result of this maneuver was that we learned that to conduct a search efficiently and to maintain it required a large number of planes, and they had to be operated more or less day on and day off, so that one day they would go out; [746] the next day they could rest. In other words the strain on the personnel was greater than it was on the matériel.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give me your best judgment then, Admiral Bloch, as to whether on and prior to December 7, even if war had then been declared, there would have been a sufficient force here to conduct an effective reconnaissance out to 800 miles beyond Oahu for, let us say, two weeks hand-running?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not think it was possible with the forces at hand.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in touch with the progress of the newly installed air warning service of the Army?

Admiral BLOCH. Only in general terms as a result of the conversations that I had with the Commanding General from time to time.

The CHAIRMAN. At or before December 7, 1941, had you been apprised that that service was working steadily and sweeping the confines of the Island?

Admiral BLOCH. I knew that the installations had been completed, was of the very definite opinion that they had had a great deal of difficulty and that there were many peculiarities and things to be ironed out before they would feel that it was fully effective. I knew generally that the Navy had tried to help the Army train the radar operators. I knew generally that an officer who was supposed to be an expert in radar was here in the fleet and that Admiral Kimmel had sent him up to help the Army get the bugs out of the installation, but I did not know that they operated 24 hours a day, and I did not know that they swept the entire horizon.

The CHAIRMAN. Was anything said to you by the Army, or was it brought to your attention from any source, that they were operating only for the purpose of training the personnel, up to December 7, and that the stations were off the air a good [747] many hours of every 24?

Admiral BLOCH. I did not know that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Admiral BLOCH. I had no knowledge of hours.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been ever requested to detail a Navy liaison officer to the interceptor command of the Army?

Admiral BLOCH. Not that I know of, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would know of it, wouldn't you?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am informed that two Navy officers did appear in the Army control center at, say, about 8:30 on the morning of December 7 and remained there to convey information to the Navy from that time on until some time at night. Did you make the detail of those officers?

Admiral BLOCH. I have no knowledge of their going. Do you?

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir. We sent Lieutenant Commander Marks up.

Admiral BLOCH. We did send one.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps I am in error about 8:30. I believe that the Army testimony is that they appeared about 4:30 that afternoon.

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir. They asked for an officer in addition to the one that was already up there, Lieutenant Burr.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant Burr may have appeared about 8:30.

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir. Lieutenant Commander Marks was later in the day. Lieutenant Burr was probably 8:30.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney calls my attention to the fact that the testimony of the Army is that it was manned by a sergeant at the Navy telephone until the Navy officers appeared at 4:30 in the afternoon. What do you know about that?

[748] Commander MOMSEN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the Navy officers were sent earlier in the day?

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Commander MOMSEN. They were not.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not?

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. I sent that—

The CHAIRMAN. The Army testimony is that the position was taken over about 4:30 by Naval officers.

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. I think we should clarify the status of Lieutenant Burr. In the exchange of liaison officers between the Army and the Navy I sent the best available material I had, who was Lieutenant Burr, Naval Reserve, to the Commanding General's office, as a liaison officer. He was not sent to the Aircraft Warning Service. He was sent to General Short's office, and he was placed to deal with me and the General and transmit information. He had not—he is not a very experienced officer.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Admiral BLOCH. He is not a very experienced officer. He is a bright fellow, very loyal, very willing, but not a very experienced officer, but he represented the best that I had to send.

Lieutenant Commander Marks is an officer who is not an air warning man or a technical man, but he was one of the watch officers in the operating room at my headquarters. When the Army asked for another officer, Commander Momsen tells me he was sent up there that afternoon to General Short's office.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if I get your testimony correctly, Admiral, it is to the effect that you had no definite information on or before December 7 as to what the Army Warning [749] Service was in fact doing.

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I don't know whether this is a sensible question or not, in view of what you have already said, but if you had had any suspicion of a Japanese carrier attack you would not have been depending on any Aircraft Warning Service to have advised you of its approach or of the planes' approach from it, if you didn't know anything about it?

Admiral BLOCH. If we had had any suspicion that there would have been and likely to be hostilities begin or a carrier raid, I think it's fair to assume that we would have done our best, me or anybody—I mean collectively we would have done our best to have made reconnaissance to find out what the Army Air Warning Service could do, to use it to its fullest, to use our own Radars that we have on our ships to get as much warning—I think we would have done everything that would have been humanly possible to detect it if we had had any remote idea of the possibility of such a thing at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Gentlemen?

General McNARNEY. Admiral, according to the orders here you appear to be responsible for exercising with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, which includes exercising supervisory control over Naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through commander patrol wing 2 for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy. That is on paper, but you actually did not have the troops to carry out that mission; is that your testimony?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. Based on Admiral Kimmel's order setting up the base defense I had out my task order—got out my order, and in my order we had several task forces. We had the destroyers at the harbor entrance, we had the mine sweepers sweeping the channel, we had the nets operating, we had the boom patrol, we had the harbor patrol, and the [750] air force commander—my task force commander—was Rear Admiral Bellinger. Commander patwing 2, and he was directed to make all of our land-based carrier planes, which were fighters, available to the Army for operations over shore; and General Martin's order made all of the Army bombers available to the Navy.

Is that the question you wished answered?

General McNARNEY. That is the plan, but who had—

Admiral BLOCH (Interposing.) That was actually done, sir.

General McNARNEY. Yes?

Admiral BLOCH. Admiral Bellinger was the Air Force Commander. We had a drill practically once every week. In the inception of it our great difficulties were communications and cooperation, but we finally ironed it out. There was not the slightest doubt in my mind that this Air Force was well drilled, well-prepared, and well trained for this purpose.

General McNARNEY. Yes. I don't think you quite get my question. As I remember your testimony, you said that the patrol wing 2, which was the only force available for distant reconnaissance—

Admiral BLOCH. Distant reconnaissance.

General McNARNEY. —was not under your control.

Admiral BLOCH. That was not under my control, sir.

General McNARNEY. But still you were charged on paper with the responsibility for it?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, sir.

General McNARNEY. You had been given the responsibility without the necessary force to execute it?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, sir. On paper I had been given 108 patrol planes for that specific purpose, none of which had ever arrived; not one of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Had ever arrived?

Admiral BLOCH. Never. They have not been—they are never here for that purpose.

[751] The CHAIRMAN. What was being used for patrol?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I am talking about the District patrol that was supposed to cover the District reconnaissance if the District had to do it, and the building program—

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see what you mean.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That they never were put under your command.

If there were any of them here, somebody else was controlling them; is that it?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, a little bit different from that, sir, if I may clarify it. We had a plane-building program, and on that plane-building program the assignment of the 14th Naval District was nine squadrons of patrol planes and two squadrons of observation planes, and they were the District forces that were supposed to do this re-

connaissance, but there were none of them ever delivered here because they hadn't been built. The only patrol planes that are here are patrol planes that belong to the fleet wing. That is patrol wing 2. They are the only ones here, and they are not under my command and have never been under my command.

General McNARNEY. It was envisioned that in the future you would be able to do it?

Admiral BLOCH. Sir?

General McNARNEY. I believe it was envisioned that at some time in the future you would be able to undertake that responsibility.

Admiral BLOCH. Sometime in the future, and as a matter of fact as late as the last letter—What was the last letter I wrote about reappraisal of forces (addressing Commander Momsen)?

Commander MOMSEN. 14 January, and there is another one—

Admiral BLOCH. That is 14 January.

Commander MOMSEN. 7 January, '41.

Admiral BLOCH. There is another letter that followed [752] this letter up, and we got a reply back telling us about war plans, remember?

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir. 14 May.

Admiral BLOCH. No, I don't think—that isn't the one. It's later than that. Have you the letter the Department wrote to us and told us they didn't have the force to supply it, and then they called our attention to some war plan?

Commander MOMSEN. Yes (referring to papers).

Admiral BLOCH. It is the reply to that letter.

Commander MOMSEN. What was that other letter that you were looking for?

Admiral BLOCH. I think it was written somewhere around May.

Commander MOMSEN. May?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

(A letter was handed to Admiral Bloch by Commander Momsen.)

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, that's it. This is a letter written in May in which I point out the weaknesses of the District forces. That isn't the one, either.

Commander MOMSEN. It runs this way, sir (indicating).

Admiral BLOCH. I called it a reappraisal of District forces. That's general. That isn't the one. This is written by the Department telling us about the war plans.

Commander MOMSEN. I see.

Admiral BLOCH. Admiral Kimmel put a very forcible endorsement on it.

General MCCOY. I think we might take the Admiral's statement without—he seems to remember.

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I remember it. In January I wrote a letter to the Department asking for forces out here, and they replied to me that they were doing the best they could and they didn't have them. and when they had them they would send them to me; and sometime subsequently, as nearly as I can guess [753] about August, I wrote again to the Department, in what I called a reappraisal of District forces, telling them that in the past year they had made no increments to my forces except some net vessels and some sweepers. and that I pointed out the very serious condition, as I visualized

heavy submarine attacks here, and I had to have patrol vessels, and in the final paragraph of it I urged aircraft for District purposes, to which the Department replied again and said that they knew that this condition existed and they didn't have the things to—the planes and the facilities to give us, but as soon as they were ready—and they were doing everything within their power to get them—they would be sent here. The reason I mention that is that General McNarney was asking about the patrol planes for the distant reconnaissance. I didn't have any.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, on page 5 of CL-41 it describes three conditions of readiness. Which condition was in effect on the night of December 6?

Admiral BLOCH. So far as I know, none of them were, sir. I thought on the morning of December 7 that the Condition 3 was in effect, but subsequent inquiry has led me to believe that no condition was ever designated.

General McNARNEY. Are those conditions war-time conditions, or should one or more of them be in effect during normal peace time?

Admiral BLOCH. They are never in effect in normal peace-time conditions unless you are having maneuvers, but Condition 1 is where action is imminent; Condition 2 is where you know that enemy forces are in the waters and it may happen quickly, and you have half your batteries; Condition 3, you have one quarter your batteries but you are in hostile waters.

General McNARNEY. Then were the provisions of subparagraph 4 under g. on page 4 in effect on December 6, which states, "the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor," and so forth?

[754] Admiral BLOCH. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District is a Naval base defense officer, and as such he shall—you are asking about—

General McNARNEY. Well, subparagraph 4 under g., which states that the senior officer embarked has certain duties.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is just above where you were reading, Admiral, little 4 in brackets; it starts, "The senior * * *."

Admiral BLOCH. "informing the task force commander at sea of the attack and attacking aircraft"?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. No. It is under g. Under g. (4).

The CHAIRMAN. There on page 4.

Admiral BLOCH. Oh:

The senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief shall insure that the ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft fire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths are concerned.

The battle ships were not moored singly, but I think they were moored singly as far as they could be. That is my impression. There were a number of them berthed.

General McNARNEY. Well, do you know whether the provisions of that paragraph were or should have been in force on December 6?

Admiral BLOCH. I assume—I think it was. I think they were, sir.

General McNARNEY. Could you tell us who the senior officer embarked was?

Admiral BLOCH. So nearly as I can, I think it was Vice Admiral Pye. He was in the CALIFORNIA present.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

[755] The CHAIRMAN. You were speaking of the submarine net that closed the harbor.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was under your command?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What officer was immediately in charge of the operation of that net?

Admiral BLOCH. We have two officers, sir, one at Honolulu and one at Pearl Harbor; two nets, an officer in charge of each.

The CHAIRMAN. To your best knowledge was either of those nets open on the morning of December 7?

Admiral BLOCH. On the morning of December 7 at the time the attack occurred they were preparing to open the net, to let the ANTARES in, who was coming in and had begun to come in, but she did not enter. The net I believe had been opened once previously to allow a garbage scow to come in.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you are speaking of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your judgment that the little submarine that got in came in when the net was open on one of those occasions?

Admiral BLOCH. I believe it's quite possible. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been some suggestion that that submarine could get under the net as it was constructed.

Admiral BLOCH. I believe she could.

The CHAIRMAN. You do?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. The net is not an anti-submarine net proper. It is an anti-torpedo net, and the object in placing it where it was was to prevent a submarine outside from firing a torpedo into the harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Your investigation indicates that the manipulation of the net on that morning was in accordance with [756] orders and in accordance with correct procedure?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so, sir.

General McCoy. Would it have been possible for a submarine not of this new small type, but of the type that we are accustomed to, to come into this harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. It is our opinion—I refer to my opinion and the Navy Department's opinion—that any submarine, large-size submarine and regular-sized submarine, could not come into the harbor without showing her periscope. She must show her periscope, and she must be detected.

General McCoy. So that you felt reasonably secure?

Admiral BLOCH. So we felt that there was no reason to put in anti-submarine nets, that an anti-torpedo net was sufficient.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, when you received the message of November 27 from the Navy Department, at that time you thought Condition 3 was in effect?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir, I did not.

General McNARNEY. Did you consider placing any of these conditions in effect?

Admiral BLOCH. I can't answer that because I don't remember whether I did or didn't, but I will say this: that all the forces that composed the Naval Base Defense Force were forces that normally were not in my command; they were meant for this task only. They comprised battleships, cruisers, destroyers that were anchored in the berths that formed these sectors for gunfire. All the planes that were in the Naval Base Defense Force were fleet planes that were turned over on occasion of when you had an air-raid drill for this purpose.

I have a very definite feeling now—I say “now,” and I think I should be fair and say “now”—that I could not possibly set a condition of readiness which would interfere with the forces under command of other people and under command of the fleet without apprising the Commander-in-Chief and getting his [757] consent toward having me have him—have him tell me what condition of readiness to take.

I also feel that whatever conditions of readiness I took for the Naval Base Defense Force must be consistent with the conditions and other precautions that are to be taken by other people. I think this is borne out by the fact that since December 7 I sent out a signal prescribing a certain condition of readiness, but I was asked not to prescribe that condition of readiness, that it should be something else, and I changed my dispatch to conform to the desire of the Commander-in-Chief. It is also confirmed by the fact that around November—I guess it was October. Around October 16 or 17 we had another dispatch of some kind, and the outlying islands were placed on the alert, but they were placed on the alert by and with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief. He told me that he wanted them on the alert, and we did place them on the alert.

I also feel that that is borne out by the fact that on at least one occasion some fleet commander wrote a letter to the Commander-in-Chief and said that some of the drills we were having were interfering with certain other exercises he had laid out, and he would get these orders to have a surprise drill on such and such a date, and that he felt that this thing should be laid out ahead of time, and so forth and so on; and I received a directive to do it in advance and to consult everybody, which was very difficult because a lot of them were at sea.

Do you remember who wrote that letter?

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. Somebody wrote a letter and said that it was interfering with something they were doing, and after that General Short and I got together, and we fixed certain days for three months. We fixed two days for October, two days for November, and two days for December on which these drills would be held.

[758] General McNARNEY. Admiral, did you ever see a copy of the Standard Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't identify it. I may have seen it.

Commander MOMSEN. We have it.

Admiral BLOCH. We have this (indicating).

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir, we have a copy of that, sir.

General McNARNEY. Are you familiar with the types of alert which are prescribed therein?

Admiral BLOCH. I am more familiar now than I was before December 7. I was under the impression—I talked to General Short a few days ago—that the Army was in alert condition, and I have since learned that they were on a special alert for sabotage only.

General McNARNEY. Well, on the night of December 6 you had no knowledge of what specific alert status the Army was in?

Admiral BLOCH. I knew they were on the alert, and I thought it meant a complete alert, and I spoke to General Short I think the next day or two days afterwards. I went to his office and told him that—or asked him about the alert, and he told me that he was not on complete alert: he was on the alert that related only to sabotage.

General McNARNEY. Now, under these three conditions there is one sentence in there that states, "Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer." Now, you are the Naval Base Defense Officer, are you not?

Admiral BLOCH. I was the Naval Base Defense Officer, and my subordinate who had the aircraft was Admiral Bellinger. He was my task force commander and had the aircraft.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what the condition of aircraft prescribed on December 6 was?

Admiral BLOCH. I know now. Admiral Bellinger had two squadrons or what he called A-5, and the remainder in what he called B-5.

[759] General McNARNEY. Can you tell us what A-5 and B-5 are?

Admiral BLOCH. As I recall, A-5 means two squadrons will be ready on call and all within four hours after that.

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir. Ten-minute notice.

Admiral BLOCH. Ten-minute notice? I thought that was A-1. A-5.

Commander MOMSEN. Oh, A-5 was——

Admiral BLOCH. I think it's four hours.

Commander MOMSEN. Yes.

Admiral BLOCH. That all planes and all other squadrons were to be ready up to 10 squadrons in A-5 in four hours.

General McNARNEY. That corresponds right closely with the Army.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. They have the same indication, I think.

Commander MOMSEN. It is a joint agreement.

Admiral BLOCH. Same system.

General McNARNEY. Same system.

Admiral BLOCH. I asked Admiral Bellinger how many men he had, and it is my understanding he had 50% of his available men and officers on call to take the air on four hours notice A-5 and B-5, two squadrons in A and the rest of them in B.

Commander MOMSEN. There it is, "readiness," and this is what they had (indicating).

Admiral BLOCH. They had A, is all assigned operating craft available and ready for task, and "five" means all types in four hours.

General McNARNEY. Four hours.

Commander MOMSEN. For 5 at Ford Island.

Admiral BLOCH. They had two squadrons at A-5.

Commander MOMSEN. One at Midway, A-1.

Admiral BLOCH. One at Midway in ten minutes.

Commander MOMSEN. Three in B-1.

Admiral BLOCH. Three in B-1 at Ford Island. That is [760] one-half aircraft. Pursuit and fighters in four minutes. Other types in 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Bloch, were you ever shown this Tentative Manual of the Interceptor Command prepared by the Army (indicating) ?

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir, we have no record of that.

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir, I have no record of it, sir. I have never seen it so far as I know. I didn't know about it. I think it is quite possible that some of our air people might have seen it. I don't know. I never have seen it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any system that was in force on and before December 7 whereby the Navy communicated information as to location of hostile forces to the Army?

Admiral BLOCH. On several occasions when General Short and Admiral Kimmel and I were discussing matters I imagine that we may have discussed what knowledge we had of enemy ships, what our information service showed—our intelligence service showed that we had; but we had no routine for informing them of the location of enemy ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any direct telephone between the 14th Naval District and the Naval Headquarters in Washington?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have to use a public telephone if you wanted to telephone, would you?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, or radio.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Is the telephone to the mainland—the commercial telephone—a radio telephone or is it a cable?

Admiral BLOCH. Radio telephone, sir, with a protection scrambler on it.

The CHAIRMAN. You can put a scrambler on it here in the Navy?

Admiral BLOCH. I think they have a scrambler in the [761] telephone company so that people at sea cannot intercept it.

General McNARNEY. You don't have an additional scrambler here?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Such as the Army has at Fort Shafter?

Admiral BLOCH. We have none.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us what, if any, new security measures have been put into effect since December 7?

Admiral BLOCH. Have you a file of this?

Commander MOMSEN. Of securities?

Admiral BLOCH. I can tell you generally.

Commander MOMSEN. I have base defense orders here.

Admiral BLOCH. We have gotten out a number of orders about base defense, and we have put in an offshore patrol. There were 13 more destroyers turned over to me by the fleet, with a commander to go offshore and act as offshore patrol, in addition to my four Navy destroyers and my Coast Guard vessels.

The CHAIRMAN. How far do they work outward, sir?

Admiral BLOCH. Their stations are some 10 to 15 miles offshore. They are listening posts and attack submarines trying to break

through. They also are called upon to supply escorts for incoming merchant ships and man-of-war through the submarine zone and escort them outgoing. We have practically quadrupled our guard around our plant for internal and external security—oil tanks, and so forth and so on. We sent our Marine defense battalion into the field under the Army for anti-aircraft defense. They had 12 guns, and we put them under the Army, and they have gone out under the Army. We have salvaged a number of batteries, three batteries of 5-inch guns, off of Naval ships, and we have emplaced those at the locations chosen by the Army to be used for anti-aircraft defense, with the expectation that our men will only stay there long enough so that the Army can be trained how to use them. [762] and that they will take them over, as it is their responsibility, anti-aircraft defense. We will give them the ammunition and the directors and the mechanism and the whole works.

Of course, we have the blackout, the efficacy of which possibly is in question. And we have done a great many things towards both internal and external security in various subcommands of mine, all of which I am not familiar with; generally I am familiar with.

Commander MOMSEN. Those orders, most were turned over to the Board by Mays several days ago. I think we have them.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think so?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. I thing they were sent to——

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir. We have copies of our local Naval Base Defense. This is the folder, and then you also have a copy of Naval Defense Orders, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. We organized the mine-bomb watchers to watch for falling bombs and mines dropped in the harbor. We organized a mine recovery unit and a bomb recovery unit. All of the orders are the ones we could get together that related to security since December 7. At the request of Colonel Brown we furnished them to the Board, and this is the jacket that has them (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir. We are permitted to keep this for the time being, at least, are we?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

General McCox. Admiral, just as a matter of interest, have you been able to do anything about this great collection of oil tanks? That is, I take it that a great many of them are empty, but still——

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir.

General McCox. Certain portions——

Admiral BLOCH. We don't keep any empty unless we have to, of course.

General McCox. You mean these exposed tanks are all [763] full, are they?

Admiral BLOCH. Of course we are busily constructing, and have been for the past year, an underground storage to take it all underground. We have a project under way known as the Red Hill Project, where we are putting 16 vaults underground. They have 150 feet of mountain over the top of them. We put them in a mountain. The power lines go into that in a tunnel, pumping plant is in the tunnel, and the only exposed place would be at the pier or the wharf where the oil is received and discharged, and the project is still under way, and we expect to have the first two vaults in operation in March that

will roughly hold about the contents of six of these tanks over here. Now, after two months effort we will put a couple more in until the entire project is finished. Work is going very satisfactorily now, but it won't be until March until we get any of it underground.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, there is something on my chest I would like to get off before we leave here.

Admiral BLOCH. Glad to, sir.

General McNARNEY. I suppose you have been up in your water tower many times?

Admiral BLOCH. No, I haven't been up many times. I have been up once, I think.

General McNARNEY. Have you ever looked over your plant here—the location of your machine shops, your storehouses, your barracks, and your warehouses—from the viewpoint of what a wonderful objective it would make for night aerial bombing?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir, many times. I know all about it, sir.

General McNARNEY. Has any effort been made to disperse any of these things—I mean since December 7 now—in view of the fact that you did get an air raid which you didn't expect, or are you going ahead—and I see you are constructing additional warehouses in the same congested area.

[764] Admiral BLOCH. Well, the underlying consideration of this construction, of course, started many years ago.

General McNARNEY. Yes, I realize that.

Admiral BLOCH. A long time before aircraft came in. We had a limited area. Land is the most difficult thing that we have to acquire. Every time you go to Congress to get some land, other than in a war, you can't get it.

General McNARNEY. That is realized perfectly in time of peace, but we are in a war situation now.

Admiral BLOCH. Now, wherever you have your dry docks the machine shops must be close. Wherever your wharves are that you have your ships to repair, the machine shops must be fairly contiguous or you can't do your work efficiently.

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Admiral BLOCH. We have considered it: How can we disperse, and how long does it take you to disperse? There is no land adjacent to the Navy Yard today that isn't taken. The Navy Yard is hemmed in tightly by Hickam Field, and when the Army went into Hickam Field they took the waterfront down the channel and they took the land that was adjacent to it. You can't go that way without going on Army land.

Somewhere there was a discussion about putting in a new dry dock, and in deciding on the location of that dry dock I put it just as far away from the other dry docks on land that I had that would be fairly close to our railway and our ground and our power and our water and all the facilities needed as it was physically possible to put it. I put it just as far away from it as I can, jammed it right up by the coal dock.

General McNARNEY. Well, these are very—

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Now I suppose you are keen on this scent, but the bell has just rung.

General McNARNEY. Well, I would just like to ask one more question. I feel that I should.

These are very bright moonlight nights at the moment. [765]
Blackout—

Admiral BLOCH. No good.

General McNARNEY. —is no good as far as concerns being able to locate this particular objective.

Admiral BLOCH. The only thing they can't do, they probably can't locate definite buildings.

General McNARNEY. That is correct, but aerial bombing by—

Admiral BLOCH. Mass.

General McNARNEY. —a mass of 40 or 50 planes could pretty well cover the congested area.

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct.

General McNARNEY. What are your new defense measures at the moment?

Admiral BLOCH. New defense measures: Today all guns are manned on all ships that are here. The Army anti-aircraft is in the field. We make this reconnaissance every day. We have the interceptor command ready to go up. We have the patrol planes ready to go out and try to follow carriers, and that is a defense thing, and if the reconnaissance in the daytime does not discover the presence of a carrier, if the Radar doesn't discover the presence of planes coming in, then you don't know it until they get here.

General McNARNEY. That is right.

Admiral BLOCH. And that is just the same as it is anywhere else in the world.

General McNARNEY. But you feel that you are taking all possible precautions with the equipment you have available at the moment?

Admiral BLOCH. With the equipment we have, and within the possibilities of our intelligence, our limitations of intelligence, I think we are doing everything that it is humanly possible to do to protect the place.

General McNARNEY. Well, that is all. I just wanted to reassure myself that you were. This really could be off the [766] record.

General McCoy. I am just wondering, in listening, if there wasn't one other thing that failed in the tragic time, of both the Army and Navy, and that was the complete failure of intelligence. You got no information from the ONI in Washington of the disposition of things from Japan. In other words, the Navy has no secret service from Japan; it has no secret service from the other danger area in the mandated islands. So here you are, sitting at the mercy of an enemy who has all the information about you, and will continue to have, and you have nothing about him until he takes the initiative.

Admiral BLOCH. That's absolutely true, sir.

General McCoy. Isn't that true?

Admiral BLOCH. Absolutely true.

General McCoy. Now, it being true, is there anything we can do about it?

Admiral BLOCH. We certainly can't build up an intelligence service in Japan and the mandated islands now. I don't know how you can do it. We have to rely on our appliances that we have in the way of Radar and reconnaissance, and so forth and so on.

General McCox. But that puts you purely on the passive defense.

Admiral BLOCH. We are back on our heels. Back on our heels. Now, whether the Japanese have any information service left here or not is open to question.

General McCox. Well, that is just why I asked the question, because your local intelligence, both in the Army and Navy, completely failed you.

Admiral BLOCH. I would like to make this statement; I don't think it should go in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us excuse the reporter right now, and then we will be sure not to ask any more questions.

[767] (Whereupon, at 4:05 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until tomorrow, Tuesday, December 30, 1941, at 9:30 o'clock a. m.)

[768]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[769] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1941

LOUNGE OF THE WARDROOM,
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR,
UNITED STATES SUBMARINE BASE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission;

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CLAUDE CHARLES BLOCH,
U. S. NAVY—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Bloch, you were here when General Short came to the command of the Hawaiian Department, were you not?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What have you to say as to the cooperation between your branch of the service and his during his incumbency here?

Admiral BLOCH. Our cooperation has been extremely good, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you feel there has been an effort on both sides to communicate fully the aims and means and to work [770] in full accord, do you?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And if there has been any failure in cooperation it was not one of intent on either side?

Admiral BLOCH. Not of intent.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Bloch, were you at any conferences between General Short and Admiral Kimmel during the last days of November and the early days of December?

Admiral BLOCH. I was not present on November 27, and I believe General Short was not present, either, when this warning dispatch came up. That is hearsay.

I have been present on many occasions when General Short and Admiral Kimmel were in conference. I was invited by Admiral Kimmel to be present. Recently the conferences which I attended had to do with the establishment of certain outlying fields for the Army which required Navy cooperation.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you present at conferences between November 27 and December 7 when there was discussion of substituting the Army units on Wake and Midway for the Marine units out there?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There were such conferences in that period, were there not?

Admiral BLOCH. I remember one, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At that one conference, so far as you know was there any discussion of a possible attack on this island by air, or a raid?

Admiral BLOCH. I can recall no such discussion, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any discussion at that conference of the imminence of hostilities between Japan and the United States?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not remember any definite discussions of the imminence of hostilities. I do have a recollection of some discussion in regard to various warnings that we [1971] had from Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give me the tenor of your discussions?

Admiral BLOCH. The conversation was extremely general, largely on what the nature of the re-opening of the negotiations meant, and whether this country would actually go into the war in case the Japanese effort was directed toward southeast Asia. A good deal of the conversation was pure speculation as to whether we would and what the attitude the Congress would take and the President would take, but never, insofar as I recall, anything relating to the imminence of any hostile attack on this island or on our nation; as a matter of fact, I felt that none of us expected that it was probable that Japan would attack us unless we took hostile action first. I thought, and I think we all thought, the same fact, that her force would be against southeast Asia, and that she would not gratuitously take on another adversary unless she had to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. The men in responsible command in the Navy, particularly in the Pacific, have always envisaged the possibility of a sudden air raid on Pearl Harbor, have they not, Admiral?

Admiral BLOCH. The Navy officers in the Pacific whom I know, and with whose thoughts I am familiar, have always thought that there was a possibility of a sudden attack preceding war by Japan; but an air raid on Hawaii was considered remote. I think it would be fair to say that the consensus of opinion was that we thought that the most likely form of attack would be by submarines against our ships operating out of this port and in close proximity to the Islands.

The CHAIRMAN. If you were planning an air raid by carrier on Pearl Harbor for a hostile force, what part of the day would your choice be for the attack?

Admiral BLOCH. The early morning.

[772] General McNARNEY. May I ask a question here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, is your estimate that the most likely attack would be a submarine attack influenced by the hesitancy which has been evidenced throughout all Navies to risk carriers?

Admiral BLOCH. Not entirely so, sir. My thought is that here we had 5,000 miles of water between us and Japan, and the long period of time required for carriers to traverse this distance. They had to carry fuel enough presumably to come over and go back or to get fuel from tankers at sea, which is a difficult operation. That I did not consider likely that a force could make that passage without some prior knowledge or information.

General McNARNEY. However, it is true——

Admiral BLOCH (interposing). Coupled with that was the fact, or it was a factor, that they would risk their valuable units of the fleet, which they can no more afford to do than we could.

General McNARNEY. It has always been a tremendous factor in Naval strategy for several years that you do not want to run the risk of losing carriers?

Admiral BLOCH. Unless it is profitable. I think we always had that idea, that it should be profitable. In other words, if we lost a carrier, we hoped to get two.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it that you have thought a good deal about this incident since it occurred?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any thoughts come to you as to how the United States could have had better security in Pearl Harbor than it had, and if so, will you detail them for us? In other words, I want to know whether the means available having been used to their best extent—and we know that you did not have all the means you requested here for security—but that aside, have you thought of any strategy or tactical [773] measures, security measures, that could have been taken that you think would make this place more impregnable than it was?

Admiral BLOCH. All measures which could have been taken would necessarily have to be taken on the information which made the means justifiable. In one warning which was received from the Navy Department, Admiral Kimmel was authorized to deploy his forces in such way as he desired to do so, but he was cautioned in this that he must not do anything that would be likely to—and I think they used the words “provoke”—provoke the Japanese.

Now, presume for the sake of argument that you could have placed a task force in the North Pacific to try to cover the area north of Midway to the Aleutian Islands, and by means of that get ample warning of everything along that route, but such a task force might have been considered as a direct threat to Japan. They might have said, “This force is there. We are going to take action.” Then the injunction of our superiors not to do anything to precipitate this thing might have been considered to have been violated.

The CHAIRMAN. That would not have been true of task forces to the southward?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. And to the westward?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so, to the Marshall Islands.

The CHAIRMAN. There were task forces to the southward and westward?

Admiral BLOCH. Not very far. There had been one recently to the base at Midway, and there was one in the Aleutian Islands and other islands in our group here.

General McCox. It has been a matter of public knowledge that the Aleutian Islands and Dutch Harbor have been well known as defense lines of our outposts of ships? It has been well known for years?

Admiral BLOCH. We know all about these navigable waters, [774] and I think possibly some of our ideas are based on how to use them, but for some time we have had certain forces in that area. However, I do not know that I understand your question.

General McCox. In the public print for years they have been talking about these outpost lines. Here is your fleet. You have a fleet here, and there is Dutch Harbor and Midway and Samoa and your other post islands. They have been called stepping stones. They have all been in the public print for years as called outposts, and those waters are naturally patrolled by American Naval ships.

Admiral BLOCH. From Midway to Unalaska—and that is where they are building another air base—I think is some 2,000 miles. If Midway has sufficient reconnaissance force and you had a long range coming 1,000 miles to the north and Unalaska coming 1,000 miles to the southward, that would still leave intermediate patrols where you would have gaps. Besides the gaps you are also confronted with other difficulties. First the plane cannot carry a full military load, go a thousand miles, and come back home. The next thing is the weather conditions in and around Alaskan waters which are very questionable. Lots of times you cannot get away and lots of times you cannot get back on account of the bad visibility and fog in those waters.

General McCox. I was just posing the question just to get your reaction there. I do not think that our fleet operating anywhere between Unalaska and Midway or Hawaii would in itself constitute "provoking," or a threat to Japan. There is some defensive element there, isn't there?

Admiral BLOCH. I hope that the Commission does not believe that my remarks about task forces in that area would indicate that it does counter any force coming through, because if you had a task force at Hawaii, at Midway, and at Unalaska, which is a very long range, they still might miss the enemy coming across there, because that is very rough [775] water. They might have a lot of line squalls this time of year especially, and they have a great deal of fog and dense clouds up there. However, unquestionably, as you look at it in retrospect, it would have been a very lucky thing for us to have found these people.

The CHAIRMAN. Up there?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, up there. Then, had you found them, the Commander-in-Chief would have been confronted with the momentous decision, "What am I going to do about it? We are not at war."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I understand that your thought is that if you had this maintainable and distant patrol covering the whole circumference of 360 degrees, that it would have been a valuable defense measure?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand further your view that a well-equipped radar system which could have swept the whole 360-degree arc would have been a valuable protective measure?

Admiral BLOCH. Unquestionably, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I understand also that your thought is that if both of these warning services had been in operation and if either of them had furnished a timely warning, that the forces on the Island would have given a much better account of themselves than they did give?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, I think so. That is if——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if——

Admiral BLOCH. If these approaching airships were definitely determined to be hostile.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that was implied in my question by saying "a timely warning."

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Have these measures outlined by Mr. Justice been put into effect since the 7th of December?

Admiral BLOCH. Before I answer your question, General, [776] I would like to correct my arithmetic given in the testimony yesterday. I stated that there were 72 patrol bombers available and two squadrons of 24 were at Midway, leaving 48, and 12 under overhaul, leaving 50. I meant 36. My arithmetic was bad then.

If these 36 planes could have maintained a 360-degree patrol as far as their radius of action would permit them to do so, it would have been very thin on the outer circumference.

Does that answer your question?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral BLOCH. Now, since December 7 our strength in patrol planes, in spite of our losses, has been increasing with respect to that original 72 figure. Also, our forces have been increased by certain long-range four-engine Army bombers which arrived here.

Today they are maintained under the directive to the Commander-in-Chief causing them to go on distant reconnaissance. He has only been given this directive about distant reconnaissance since December 7. They have been out each day seven or eight hundred miles with the planes which are available for that purpose. I think it is an efficient search within its limitations, but spread pretty thin on the periphery, and within the limitations of the weather conditions in the area.

General McCoy. I take it, Mr. Justice, that your statement that, also in addition to the Radar and the flying patrols and surface patrols, that you also had in mind with respect to the thinness in the air the offshore patrol and service ships?

Admiral BLOCH. I am not familiar with that, sir.

General McCoy. You had nothing to do with it?

Admiral BLOCH. That is the function of the Commander-in-Chief. It is possible that the information may be in my office and that it has been sent to me, but I am not sufficiently [777] familiar with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, supplementing what the General has said, I suppose if you had sufficient destroyers to allow for your covering a 360-degree circumference and the destroyers could be out about seven

or eight hundred miles offshore, that that would be a very definite protection?

Admiral BLOCH. Mr. Justice, the entire history of the World War indicates that there has never been enough small craft. The British trawlers, British sweepers, and British destroyers during the World War operated for 28 days out of 30 at sea. This fact has been known to us for years, as far back as 1933.

I pressed the Department to put old destroyers in commission. There were a lot of them laid up. Finally they were put in commission, but we do not have them here. We do not have sufficient forces for that kind of search here.

General MCCOY. I take it these waters are covered by Japanese fishing boats in normal times and on the 7th of December?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not think so, sir. There are a lot of Japanese sampans which operate out of this place on fishing expeditions, presumably, but unquestionably some few of them may have had Japanese agents on board; but it is my considered opinion that the great majority of them were bona fide fishermen.

General MCCOY. But a Japanese fishing fleet does cover the Pacific?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, and many times I have sent out and brought in sampans where it was reported to me by the fleet that they were interfering with the operations of the fleet. On only one occasion was there anything discovered. I know on one occasion we found a Japanese on board who had come into this country illegally, and he was turned over to the Immigration authorities for deportation.

General McNARNEY. I would like to ask you a question or [778] two as a Naval officer of long experience. When anything happens such as the attack on December 7, there is a tendency for the pendulum to swing from one side way over to the other. Have you given any thought to the possibility for the use of the fleet, the patrol planes, and all the heavy bombers in a purely defensive mission, and may not that considerably lessen the value to the United States of any prosecution of the war? Of course, we are now talking in terms of higher strategy.

Admiral BLOCH. I have given much thought to it, and I haven't information in my possession to know what our next policy is going to be, or what the United States policy is going to be, whether we are digging in for an attack here on a purely defensive basis, but I am certain that such an attitude will cause defeat. Nothing is more destructive to morale than to be on the defensive. You must be on the offensive. We have a fine Navy, a fine personnel, and I know that you have a fine Army, a fine personnel in the Army. I believe these men want to see the enemy and they want to fight.

General McNARNEY. Do you think the insistence of this Commission in questioning as to why distant reconnaissance was not out and as to why the things were not done may tend to fix in the minds of the people questioned that the policy may be purely defensive and that we may be giving an impression which we should not? Is that the way our questions sound to you?

Admiral BLOCH. I have no opinion to give.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you are entitled to an opinion, Admiral. Please be free and express any opinion you have. We want your help, Admiral, and you can give it to us.

General McCoy. I think we might tell the Admiral that our instructions cover such a thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Both Secretaries have asked us to find out whether there has been anything in the way of a particular outmoded strategy in the Pacific or elsewhere, and while we have no one [779] to instruct, either the General Staff of the Army or the Office of Naval Operations in the Navy, we will render our opinions for what they are worth.

Admiral Bloch. I am very glad to give you my opinion for what it is worth, but I am afraid it is not worth very much, but I am very glad to give you my opinion.

Our whole conception of war in the Pacific has been to be on the offensive, and that we would go on the offensive and that our combat forces, sea forces, would be taken away from here. Our J. C. D. is based on the supposition that the fleet would be away from here and that the Army General and the Commandant of this District would have to defend this place the best they could and with what they had.

That is the reason the Navy Department put in this building program and allowed 108 patrol planes for this place, so that when the fleet went away they would always have something here for distant reconnaissance. However, we never have been able to get on the offensive.

The question arises. Why weren't we able to get on the offensive? Now, a highly ethical question arises, a question which involves national honor and national ethics. Why didn't we do this to Japan before they did it to us?

The CHAIRMAN. Could we have done it?

Admiral Bloch. I think so, sir. If they can do it, we can do it. We are better than they are. There is no doubt in my mind but what we are better than they are. If we can get at them, we can lick them, and if we have the tools to do it with.

General McCoy. We still have.

Admiral Bloch. But some of them are pretty badly dulled.

I may say that my personal discussions on this thing and my personal opinion, which probably are not worth putting down on paper—

The CHAIRMAN. They are very much worth being put down.

[780] **General McCoy.** When you were Cincus you would not have stayed here defending Hawaii, would you?

Admiral Bloch. When I was Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet they would not have found any of our ships here. They would have always been somewhere else, but sooner or later they would come in here on detachment.

The CHAIRMAN. For refueling and repairing?

Admiral Bloch. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And for reconditioning?

Admiral Bloch. Yes. This base here is really a great big service station. Ships which come in here are supposed to be entitled to rest, freedom from watches, and sufficient time to put oil, food, and stores on board, and for hospitalization and recreation, and then to stay here a few days and then to go out. They are not supposed to stay here. The place is supposed to be so defended that they do not have to do that, sir.

General McCoy. Where did you keep your main fleet when you were in command?

Admiral BLOCH. When I was in command of the fleet the normal bases were on the West Coast of North America, in the United States. On one occasion, from the 1st of January, 1939, I was directed to take the entire fleet to the Atlantic, and we took them to the Atlantic. We had our maneuvers and war games in the Caribbean and out in the Middle Atlantic, and at the termination of these activities we all went to ports on the North Atlantic and the South Atlantic Coast. We were here only two days until we got an order to get under way and return to the West Coast. This was in a tense period.

We turned around within two days then and started west and came back to the West Coast and remained there the entire time that I retained command of the fleet.

General McCoy. What year was that?

Admiral BLOCH. I was in command of the battle force for [781] one year and in command of the Fleet for two years.

General McCoy. What year with the Fleet?

Admiral BLOCH. With the Fleet, 1938 to 1940.

General McCoy. 1938 to 1940?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

General McCoy. When did the Fleet come to Hawaii as a fleet and with bases in Hawaii?

Admiral BLOCH. The Fleet came to Hawaii in April, 1940.

General McCoy. After you were relieved as Commander-in-Chief?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. Just after I arrived here as Commander-in-Chief they came here for a two-weeks visit. That was for fleet problems and maneuvers. At the termination of the problems and the maneuvers they came into Honolulu Harbor, and they were then supposed to return to the West Coast.

The CHAIRMAN. Have they ever returned to the West Coast?

Admiral BLOCH. Not as a fleet. They returned, but not a complete fleet.

General McCoy. In other words, the Fleet has been based here since that time?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

General McCoy. Do you remember the habits of your successor as to entering Pearl Harbor with his main striking force, his battle force? In other words, I am trying to make a comparison with respect to this present condition of the whole fleet practically, the battle fleet in Pearl Harbor. Has that been the custom, for the Fleet to come in here, during Admiral Richardson's command, if you remember?

Admiral BLOCH. When Admiral Richardson first arrived in April he thought that he was going to stay two weeks. He had the whole fleet in here for repairs before he went back to the Coast. As time went on he ascertained that his stay here was indefinite. He did not know how long he was going to stay and he changed, altered his plans. [782] He then adopted the practice of having one half of the fleet in and one half out. He had two big units that went to sea, and they would go out for ten days and in for two weeks, and then out for ten days.

It was largely at my request that he had fixed the days for coming in and for going out. The reason being that I desired to economize

on the tug hire, as I desired to have as little interruption with the dredging operations in the channel as possible. He had them going in and out all the time, and that stopped the dredging, and I wanted to have them on certain days.

Then, later on in Admiral Richardson's incumbency I think he began to alter the days of entrance and sortie. He sent back to the coast units of three battleships, nine destroyers, and three cruisers, small forces of the fleet, for a tour of two or three weeks, and then they would come back. In the meantime, half of what was left was still going on.

General McCoy. During that period there were problems whenever the fleet was at sea, I imagine?

Admiral BLOCH. They conducted training to a large extent: gunnery practice, steaming without lights, night gunnery practice, and anti-aircraft gunnery and trying out the various forms of tactics and strategy.

Largely it was training, a training practice. The turnover of the enlisted personnel at that time was quite heavy. The men were coming together, enlisted men, and there were new ones always coming in. It was a constant coming together, and it required constant training of officers and men.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to have the Commission know what the routine of training was throughout the year. Will you explain what it was throughout the year?

Admiral BLOCH. Due to the fact that a large number of [783] officers and personnel was transferred to new duties and to the fleet, we had adopted the annual cycle of training to begin about the first of July. Then we would try to get all the new officers and many of the new men coming in and then we started out with the elemental forms of gunnery, and as we went on we would work up to the more delicate problems as they became more familiar with them. About the first of June every year the fleet was in top form. They had these trained men on them and they would take many of them to sea.

They had the engineering training, searching out boats, firing, repairing the machinery, keeping the machinery going, maintaining high speeds over long periods and running without lights, and so on.

General McCoy. These problems were when the fleet was at sea.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

General McCoy. During this period since you have been District Commander here or since the fleet has been based here, have there been any problems in the harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so, sir.

General McCoy. I mean in the sense of protection against what occurred?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, many of them. Many of them. We had occasion for exercises when the carrier has been sent to sea and has been directed to send its planes and make a raiding attack here from an unknown position. We did not know where it was, and we would sound an air raid alarm, and the Army interceptors would check with the Army bombers, and the Army bombers would take off and the Navy interceptors would report to the Army interceptors, and the patrol planes would take off and make reconnaissance and try to find the carrier. The carrier had a large target and the bombers would

drop bombs on the target. There were numerous instances of those drills.

[784] The CHAIRMAN. And part of that was the manning of the anti-aircraft by such of the fleet as were in the harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, all ships in the harbor manned the anti-aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel had a diagram by which he divided the sectors of fire from the various battleships. There was a drawing.

Admiral BLOCH. I did not know about that. We call this the naval base defense here.

General McCox. Did these movements, that were shown to be necessary in the problems, go into effect automatically when the fleet came in, in these normal movements in and out of the harbor, or while they were in the harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. They were in effect all the time, sir, and we had frequent drills. Once a week we had a blackout drill. Normally we had that on Sunday night. The reason for having it on Sunday night was that that was the only night of the week that we did not have men out under water working in the construction of the drydock, and we did not want to risk their lives, so we had it on Sunday for about twenty minutes or so—9:10 to 9:30, say. We had a lane for everything going in or out, and had the men in the power houses to cut the switches. Once a week in the early period we had these drills.

On one occasion we had a plane come in and drop incendiaries. We were teaching the people about incendiaries and what to do with them. On another occasion we had a plane come in and drop a mine and we had a mine recovery unit and a mine lookout unit, and they were supposed to take this mine, and we showed them what to do with it. We tried to cover all the cases and to drill them for it. We tried to visualize everything.

General McCox. Did you visualize at any time an attack by torpedo planes in the harbor?

[785] Admiral BLOCH. I did not, sir. The best information on that was in the Navy Department, in the Bureau of Ordnance, and among our discussions and in correspondence we had received definite information, a definite statement from the Navy Department to the effect that torpedoes could not be dropped effectively in less than 70 feet of water, and we did not have that much water here, so we did not think it was a problem.

General McCox. Has there been any modification of that communication since then that you are conscious of?

Admiral BLOCH. I have heard of none, sir.

General McCox. To whom was that letter addressed?

The CHAIRMAN. That was addressed to Admiral Kimmel.

General McCox. Did you ever see any letter addressed to Admiral Kimmel which modified that statement of the Department?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir, I do not recall any, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I do not think it modified it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, at the end of that letter they still stated that they thought it was not necessary to put these booms in. They referred to Taranto and stated that although it might modify it possibly, they still insisted that there was no necessity for the booms, under the circumstances.

Admiral BLOCH. I would like to say something on the question of baffles. By "baffles" we mean "nets." This harbor is quite a large harbor and we have a fine channel.

However, when you begin to obstruct it with nets—and one net is not 100% effective, but two nets placed 100 feet apart and 50 or 100 feet from the shipside, that is supposed to be 90% effective. When you place these nets in the harbor off the shipside 200 feet, or 66 yards, you are encroaching very much on the seaplane takeoff.

One of our great difficulties in this place has been not only the clearance for our surface ships but we must also keep the seaplane takeoff clear at all times. We put a buoy in the [786] harbor to aid our ships, to aid them in the takeoff, but every so often one of these seaplanes comes down and hits the buoy and we lose the plane and kill a lot of men.

That has been the constant experience and anxiety and the responsibility of the people here, and we have tried to keep them clear.

General McCoy. That would not be the case with our baffles on December 7th.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. I meant to put it in the form of a question. I did not mean to make it in the form of a statement.

Admiral BLOCH. We had our planes go down a line, like a lane. You could draw a line covering your reasonable clearance on each side, but our planes are like everything else. They get off the road a little to the side of the line, and that question of baffles is being considered in connection with placing the seaplane lanes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are the seaplane lanes on this map?

Admiral BLOCH. This F-2 berth here is a carrier berth, and the seaplane lane passes about 100 yards northeast of Hospital Point and about 100 yards off ship F-2, and then in an easterly direction usually leaving the water about F-4 or F-5 and climbing so as to clear the ships in the sea berths, banking to the left, climbing, and heading out. That is the seaplane area (indicating).

General McCoy. Has that been used now since 7 December?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

General McCoy. I notice that there are baffles there now.

Admiral BLOCH. On this side, sir (indicating).

General McCoy. So far as I can remember, there are some in here (indicating on map) and some in here (indicating).

Admiral BLOCH. We have a baffle here today (indicating) which I put down. It runs from here to here (indicating). We have target rafts there (indicating). The target rafts cross [787] here (indicating). This brings the caissons to these drydocks (indicating). We have tried to close up the target rafts with improvised nets suspended under them, to put this in position here (indicating) so a torpedo could not be fired in there (indicating).

So far as I know, there are no baffles on that side (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the floating drydock?

Admiral BLOCH. The floating drydock is in here (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the observation tower where we were?

Admiral BLOCH. The observation tower is right here (indicating).

General McCoy. This is where the ARIZONA is? (Indicating)

Admiral BLOCH. That is it.

General McCoy. I noticed something in here (indicating).

Admiral BLOCH. There is no baffle there, sir, that I know of, and I think I would know about it. I think the Commandant of the Navy Yard would know about it since I have been relieved of those duties. I have been relieved in that respect to take over other matters.

General McCoy. I noticed that the ships were moored two and two along that mooring. Why was that?

Admiral BLOCH. I can only answer that by saying that I assume that they had two and two to accommodate them. There are three carrier berths for the F-9 and F-10. We tried to always keep this clear for carriers, and sometimes we put a seaplane down on one, which is F-10. Both berths were taken, either singly or doubly, so there were not enough berths for them all to go singly.

General McCoy. That would indicate that there was no thought of any danger from air attack?

[788] Admiral BLOCH. The responsibility, according to Admiral Kimmel's orders, is vested in the senior officer present embarked, as shown in this order on page 4, G-4.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the disposition of the fleet in the harbor was the responsibility of the senior officer in port embarked.

Admiral BLOCH. The mechanics of assigning the berths, as I recall it, was the Commander-in-Chief getting out an order on the subject that certain berths were available to carriers and certain berths were available to battleships, and certain berths were available to cruisers, and certain berths were available to destroyers, and certain berths were available to auxiliary vessels.

In addition, there were two or three berths at the Navy Yard which could be used for battleships or for cruisers if and when the Navy Yard did not need them for repair purposes.

The next step was to tell the various battleship, cruiser, and destroyer commanders where their battleships, destroyers, and cruisers were to go.

General McCoy. If there had been anticipated the danger from an air raid such as occurred, what do you think would have been the proper disposition of the battleships?

Admiral BLOCH. The orders contemplated that in an air raid or the imminence of an air raid, that the fleet sorties to get as many out as they could.

General McCoy. I assume that at the time on the 7th of December that there was no anticipation on the part of the Navy of an air raid?

Admiral BLOCH. Nothing that I know of, sir. I have not discussed it, and I don't think anyone else discussed it or considered that an air raid was possible.

General McCoy. There was consideration given to the fact that while the fleet was in here there was danger from submarines?

[789] Admiral BLOCH. In 1938, when the fleet came to Pearl Harbor, there were no security orders in effect. So, acting as Commander-in-Chief, I directed the Commander of the Base Force and the Commandant, District, to put into effect security measures, the proper security measures.

At that time no carrier had ever come into Pearl Harbor. These carriers normally anchored at Waikiki. Security provisions were put into effect for a channel entrance at Pearl Harbor. One of our most probable forms of attack was a block ship coming in between the fleet and the channel and blocking the ships.

We had a channel entrance patrol listening for submarines and getting instructions on vessels coming in. We allowed for a destroyer at Waikiki to guard the carriers there, and we also made provisions for certain type of weapons, machine guns, and measures were put in force as a protection against sabotaging ships from sampans and small boats on the shore side.

Up until 1941 more or less the same provisions remained in existence. In 1941 Admiral Kimmel decided that he wanted to transfer these security measures from the base force to somebody who was permanently on shore.

He asked me to take it over, and I told him I would do what I possibly could. I felt that I had enough to do already, but I was willing to take it, and that is the inception of this base defense order, the naval base defense order here, or rather this is the fleet security order, which is a modification of the other.

I think it should be understood that the naval base defense order is purely a naval order. That was for the purpose of the security of the fleet not only against submarines and block ships, but the fact that they might possibly stage an air raid at some time, and there would be a provision for it. [790] That is with the understanding that the naval base defense force and the commandant of the district only had a force relating to the channel entrance patrol by mine sweeping, and all the other forces came from the fleet, namely the ships in the sectors and shore-based aircraft over which the commandant only had supervisory control. Under existing danger that supervisory control would be transferred to the qualified fleet rear admiral who had the actual command, and for this aircraft that was Admiral Bellinger, in command of patwing 2, the air base defense officer.

In this defense order, which started and was used as a method of control for a period of months, they tried to get the Army in on it so that if we had a sudden transition from peace to war that the thing would work naturally. I think they did all in their power to do it and they cooperated very well on it.

General McCoy. Before December 7th had you thought it possible for airplanes to put six battleships out of commission in so short a time?

Admiral BLOCH. Not in Pearl Harbor. In the first place, I did not think they could use torpedoes in Pearl Harbor. I think I had definite authority for that then, that they could not use torpedoes. While I knew that bombs are extremely destructive, I did not have very much apprehension that battleships could be bombed enough to penetrate decks and to get into the machinery parts because the battleships are very heavily protected against that form of attack. I knew that there might always be a hit close to a ship which might do underwater damage, but I thought the protection was sufficient to protect against such underwater damage.

General McCoy. Has there been anything in the war up to date before this that would indicate that battleships are so vulnerable to airplane torpedo attacks?

Admiral BLOCH. Only one similar instance, so far as I know, [791] and that is Taranto. I knew the British went in there and made a torpedo attack, and I knew the torpedoes were effective and I

knew that certain Italian battleships were put out of commission, but whether permanently or temporarily, I do not know.

General McCoy. Has this attack shown that the Japanese have some new form of torpedo?

Admiral BLOCH. A much greater power.

General McCoy. Than any others?

Admiral BLOCH. We have recovered some of their torpedoes. The torpedoes themselves from the viewpoint of mechanism are very antiquated. They had torpedoes in use, the steering gear and so forth, that we were using back in 1905 and 1906. They used Whitehead engines and they had very small air flasks and probably a very short range and at a very slow speed, but they carried a tremendous explosive charge. One torpedo that we recovered from the submarine had a thousand pound explosive charge in it.

Now, one of these torpedoes would not destroy a battleship or sink it, but put four or five of those torpedoes close alongside and it will sink it. I am trying to tell you just what has happened.

General McCoy. An examination has not disclosed how many torpedoes hit our battleships?

Admiral BLOCH. Most of our examinations have been made by divers, necessarily, and we have not the information of the damage yet. The best that could be determined by the divers in some of the ships in question is that the damage is quite extensive. I do not know how many torpedoes there were.

General McCoy. Do you know how many torpedoes struck the NEVADA as it was going out?

Admiral BLOCH. My recollection may be wrong, but I think it was two.

General McCoy. Were they from a plane or from a submarine?

[792] Admiral BLOCH. They were from a plane.

Incidentally, that NEVADA incident was one of the incidents which showed very heroic action.

The NEVADA was standing out in pursuance of this base defense order to go out. Either one plane or two planes or three planes attacked it. I think three planes attacked it and torpedoed it, and there were some planes bombing it at the same time. She immediately lost her power, her electricity, and she was helpless and adrift, but two Navy Yard tugs, manned entirely by enlisted men, went out in literally a hail of bombs and machine gunfire and went alongside that ship and took her and pushed her on the beach near Hospital Point. I do not know their names. I am trying to find out, but it was quite a feat, and it gives you great faith in your men.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was to keep her from sinking in the channel?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes. It was in the direction of Hospital Point. I was notified and I directed the men to push her to the Waipio side. The ship is there, chained to the shore, so that she won't slip in the channel because the channel is very deep there. She is resting practically on the bottom and partially afloat.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else?

Admiral STANDLEY. I have a few questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Admiral STANDLEY. Since December 7th you said you had been relieved of your duties as Commandant of the Yard?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that a permanent setup now?

Admiral BLOCH. Immediately after December 7th I found that I had so many additional and arduous duties imposed on me by what had happened that I asked Admiral Kimmel to give me Admiral Furlong as an assistant, inasmuch as Admiral Furlong's flagship [793] had been sunk.

He issued the order and Admiral Furlong reported to me as assistant commandant, and I specifically assigned him to the industrial and the salvage end, and to certain other lines that I did not have time to take care of.

I believe that Admiral Kimmel informed the Navy Department that he had done so, because within a few days orders came from the Navy Department detaching me from the Yard, continuing the duties as Commandant, and then Admiral Furlong took the Yard.

Of course the whole thing is a very difficult thing because of the fact that for thirty years one man has been doing both jobs, and to keep down overhead, clerks, officers, and everything else, and we had only one set of clerks, officers, and so on.

Now they have two, which means two sets of clerks, officers, and two aides, and so on.

Then, in order to save, particularly on the tugs, automobiles, and a hundred other things, I simply directed them to use these things without distinction, so that they could use them as a pool.

First, take the waters in the harbor. The only waters which belong to the Navy Yard are those repair berths, but I only had one captain in the Yard, and if he had the tugs, the same one man would run the gate, and the same one man would run the boilers; so I told the captain to run all the water, and he is still running all the water, so far as I know, because otherwise they have this double set of jobs. They will have to take these vessels and use the vessels; so it will require cooperation with respect to this pool.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the Department has recognized the need for that situation?

Admiral BLOCH. The Department issued an order.

General McCoy. The captain of the Yard is not under you?

[794] Admiral BLOCH. He is under the Commandant of the Navy Yard, yes. He has been all the time except that one man formerly had both jobs.

Admiral STANDLEY. With reference to the discussion of the torpedo attack on this harbor and with reference to the letters from the Navy Department in which they announced the decision not to install anti-torpedo baffles in this harbor, and in view of the fact that you were commander and one time chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, and a graduate of the post-graduate course in ordnance, and somewhat of an expert in ordnance, did your opinion coincide with that of the Department in regard to these baffles?

Admiral BLOCH. When I left the Bureau of Ordnance in 1927, aircraft torpedoes were in their infancy. They were in their infancy then. You had to get quite close to the water to drop them, and they were very erratic; and so, based on my experience I really knew nothing about it and I had to depend on the people who were supposed to be in the know, up-to-date.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, referring to the questions in regard to double berthings, within your knowledge, have the fleet visits to this harbor, their entrance into and berthing in the harbor, been used in order to determine the base needs for the fleet in here?

Admiral BLOCH. I think that all the berthing capacity of the harbor is based on what the fleet might need. There are projects for additional berths. I do not know whether the money has even been appropriated for them. It has been discussed.

Take, for instance, the berths for airplane carriers. When an airplane carrier comes into port for two weeks' repair, if she leaves the planes on deck, the flyers go stale during those two weeks; they cannot fly. So, the provision was that when a carrier came in, the planes would fly away to some shore [795] base so that these flyers can exercise every day. In past days when the fleet was in here for one week or two weeks, the planes were left on board the carrier. But as soon as these short visits of the fleet had become long visits, then we had to make some sort of arrangements to take care of these carrier planes when they were in port.

In sending them to a shore base you run up against the capacity of the field, taxing the field facilities for this large number of personnel, and not only the pilots, but the mechanics and ground crews also. That is, on many occasions we found that these ground crews had to live right close to the berths, and we built a catwalk over one so that they could come ashore every morning.

So we attempted to make more berths here available in order to place the carriers somewhere near the land where the carrier planes would be based. We were considering having carrier seaplanes around here (indicating on map) and around here (indicating).

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, the facilities of this harbor were in a constant state of development, depending on the fleet needs as they developed?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the doubling up in berths was for the purpose of taking care of ships in the harbor as they came in?

Admiral BLOCH. I think you have to say there were on that day two berths vacant. F-2 was vacant and F-9 was vacant, and it was possible to have a battleship at F-2 and it was possible to have a battleship at F-9, and to have the other berths occupied by smaller vessels. These berths are controlled by the fleet.

So, with the UTAH at F-11, a battleship could have gone to F-11 and the UTAH could have gone somewhere else.

The RALEIGH was at F-12. A battleship could have gone to [796] F-12 and the RALEIGH somewhere else. The DETROIT was at F-13. A battleship could have gone to F-13, and the DETROIT could have gone somewhere else. So, you see, it would be possible for the berths to have these battleships and to have the doubling up.

Admiral STANDLEY. But the routine was to have the battleships berthed and doubled up?

Admiral BLOCH. They have doubled up before, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was another incident on the morning of December 7. There was a submarine sunk?

Admiral BLOCH. At 6:57.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that was reported to you immediately?

Admiral BLOCH. At 7:12 I received it.

Admiral STANDLEY. What did you do when you got that report?

Admiral BLOCH. My thought was, Is it a correct report or is it another false report? because we had got them before. I said, "Find out about it."

The chief of staff reported it to me. It was reported to the Commander-in-Chief and reported to me at the same time.

When it came to me the chief of staff was there and I said, "Is this a false report, or do you know anything about it"?

He said, "Well, this is the despatch," and he read the despatch to me. Afterward it was borne out that it wasn't given to him correctly or he didn't understand it; I don't know which.

However, I could not tell whether it was a bona fide report or whether it was a sound contact or whether he had actually seen it. In other words, many times you get a sound contact and it does not turn out to be correct. If you see it, it is usually correct.

I said, "What have you done about it?"

[797] He said, "Commander Momsen," who lived next to him and who is here, "said he will let you know as soon as he finds out."

I did not hear anything until I heard the explosion in close proximity to my house, and that was around 7:55.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether or not any report of that was made to the Army by the Navy?

Admiral BLOCH. I have no knowledge. Commander Momsen just said it was not. It was a naval matter. As justification for this attack, Mr. Justice, you asked me yesterday, "Who started the war?"—well, the President issued a proclamation prohibiting submarines from running submerged within the territorial waters and the area three miles south of the entrance to Pearl Harbor, three miles square, and that vicinity is the area in which all ships are prohibited from entering without the consent of the authority in command. So the legal grounds are sound.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would you give us a list of the recommendations for improvements of the facilities in this harbor? I mean a list of things that have been recommended but are being held in abeyance for lack of funds or priorities. Can you give us such a list?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have many projects here?

Admiral BLOCH. There are a great many live projects here, so far as construction is concerned, but the mere addition, the appropriation of money is no good. I have more money now than I can expend. There is not enough men to get the money working.

Admiral STANDLEY. This is what I would like to get: a list of these items and the reasons why they have not been accomplished, either for lack of funds or any other reason.

General McNARNEY. Could you add the list of priorities [798] under which you are working?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, that is since December 7th?

General McNARNEY. That is what I want.

The CHAIRMAN. We want the new ones. That is what we want.

Admiral BLOCH. Well, along the lines of Admiral Standley's question, I would like to say that my requests to the Department have been

repeated and persistent, about certain things, about getting the necessary ships here for the patrolling of this area.

It is not sufficient to patrol around Honolulu or Pearl Harbor—which is the most important place—but the normal economic life of these islands and the other islands must go on. You must keep the people employed. You must maintain the livelihood of every man who works on a sugar plantation or a pineapple plantation on these other islands.

There are a number of them, what we call nisei. That is first generation Japanese, American citizens.

These men must be kept employed and they must have their means of livelihood or you will have them around your necks. You must patrol with respect to the vessels out of this harbor and the other islands to protect against submarines here; you have to keep the ships going back and forth, bringing your sugar and pineapples back, and the wages and what they are to buy with their wages, and so forth. Today we have not enough ships here.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you furnish us with that list?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes. The Navy Department has it, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. But we would like to have it, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. I would like to read this. The Navy Department said in reply to my requests:

[799] The augmentation of local defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District is proceeding as fast as the availability of the ships, funds, personnel, matériel and priorities will permit.

Now, Mr. Sarnoff, who has something to do with the listening gear, is here, and I got him in the corner and said, "Why could we not get more? Why can't we get these?"

Then about the aircraft. We have a big aircraft building program. In connection with the aircraft building program there are 108 patrol planes which are to be used for distant reconnaissance or for district purposes by the Army when the fleet will be away and they take their force away with them. I think these planes are promised for somewhere during the end of 1942 or the first part of 1943.

In a recent letter to Admiral Kimmell I requested him to please give me some small planes to get out and look around here. The problem was to have some small planes for looking out for submarines.

He told me he had none to spare. He wrote the Navy Department and asked for 24. I urged it. They came back and they had none to give to me.

The Army has by J. C. D. 42 an offshore patrol and an air patrol. It is their responsibility by the joint agreement, but they haven't any planes suitable for that purpose.

I think General Martin told me that he had only three that could be used for that purpose. You cannot use these big planes for that. You cannot use the fighters for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Admiral BLOCH. The fighter is a one-man plane.

The CHAIRMAN. He cannot drop a bomb?

Admiral BLOCH. He cannot drop a bomb. Then they are too big and they cannot see very well.

As I understand it, in the conference with General Martin [800] the last time I talked to him—and I had several conferences with him—I think he said he had only three planes which were useful for this purpose.

I asked and I do not know whether General Martin was here last year, but they came over and arranged with the commander of the submarine force to patrol with them and see what a submarine looked like submerged and on the surface. I think they did that. I think they made an honest effort to try to do these things, but I do not think they had the planes suitable for that purpose.

When was he last time I sent you over to discuss it, Commander Momsen?

Commander MOMSEN. The 25th of November, and they had only two planes then. One of the three had been cracked up.

Admiral BLOCH. None of them had depth charges. They could carry bombs but not depth charges.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you give us a list of your requests that you made?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I do not want the Commission to think that I am complaining, complaining about what I have not gotten, about what the Department has not sent down for me, because I think the Department has done its level best.

General McNARNEY. The same problems have existed in other commands.

Admiral BLOCH. I know all these men in the Department are just as loyal and just as honest and just as conscientious as I am and they are doing their level best. I know they are doing their level best and I have been trying to do my level best. I could not do as well probably, and I do not know anybody who could do better.

I do not know why I should even mention these things except that I have been asked these questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is very important that we should [801] know the conditions, whether it is somebody's fault or nobody's fault.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is the situation. We want to know the conditions.

When I was in London a short time ago I passed an aircraft factory making spare parts, and the factory was located in a sort of rectangle, surrounded on all sides by roads, and over that factory area they had smudge, smoke pots, with apparently a can with a smokestack in it, and the purpose of that was that when there was a raid they would light the smokestacks on the windward side which set up a smokescreen over that whole factory area.

Does it occur to you that might possibly be used here?

Admiral BLOCH. It has been discussed for some time. I suggested to my subordinates—and I am an inventor too—to put some oil tanks over to windward or some oil fuel there, and in case of an air raid you could fire them, make a fire, and cover everything; but then they run into the question of our own fighters. Our fighters must take off in this way over here (indicating on the map). They land the planes and take off here (indicating). The seaplanes here (indicating) and the land planes here (indicating). The Army takes off down here (indicating), and you run into these conditions all over.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the same thing with the balloons?

Admiral BLOCH. We discussed balloons. I recall that General Short had been harangued by the air people and he said he should throw them out. I advised him to put that J. C. D. 42 in, but they left the question of balloons to future consideration and determination. In other words, they left it as an open question.

Is that correct?

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. On April 11th you and General Short signed jointly the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

[802] Admiral STANDLEY. You refer to the method of unity of command as prescribed in Joint Action Army and Navy 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 5. Are the plans for the defense of this area—the plans of the Commanding General and the plans of the Commandant of the District and the Commander-in-Chief—are those plans based on a definite program of defense outlined by the Department?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't know which you are referring to. My Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is dated 11 April 1941.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is right. And paragraph 3—

Admiral BLOCH. 3.

Admiral STANDLEY. —method of coordination.

Admiral BLOCH. Coordination will be by mutual cooperation.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but you speak of Joint Action of the Army and Navy 1935. Are not the plans for this area based upon joint mission and a joint action by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. This whole Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is based on the master plan, which is gotten out by General Short—by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. This is a corollary to the basic plan.

Admiral STANDLEY. This is your plan—

Admiral BLOCH. To support that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your own plan to support the main plan?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. He gets the Naval District and ultimately get the War Department operations order.

Admiral STANDLEY. I know all about the Navy. This is something you fellows don't know about.

Now, in following up this joint agreement in which the Commandant was responsible for distant reconnaissance, and it was to be by mutual cooperation, and so forth, on the 5th [803] of November General Short issued a Standing Operating Procedure?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Covering the duties and responsibilities and operations of his whole command, describing certain alerts for certain conditions, and what not. Have you got any parallel to this for the Commandant of the District?

Admiral BLOCH. We have one. It's—oh, that's different. We have one, but it's a very secret classification. That is our war plan—I don't think this ought to go in the record, sir,—with all of our operating orders and everything.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Now, then, in the development of these individual plans or parallel plans did your war plans and General Short's war plans defense collaborate in working these up?

Admiral BLOCH. I am sure they were collaborating. I don't know whether we had anything to do with the preparation of General Short's standard procedure. That was the procedure. I don't know whether we had anything to do with that. As a matter of fact I could not identify it yesterday until it was shown to me and Commander Momsen said that he had it. I don't know how long—

Admiral STANDLEY. Who is your War Plans Officer?

Admiral BLOCH. Commander Momsen, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, we can call him later.

Admiral BLOCH. He has only been here a very short time. I will say that he has only been here since—August?

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir. October.

Admiral BLOCH. October.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. And do you know whether or not in your war plans in the development of these things there is an exchange of information back and forth?

Admiral BLOCH. I am quite sure there is, certainly.

Commander MOMSEN. Very free.

Admiral BLOCH. What?

[804] Commander MOMSEN. Very free exchange of information.

Admiral BLOCH. I am quite sure there is. My previous War Plans Officer was Captain Gill, and half the time he was at General Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department. And Colonel Throckmorton and various members of the Army General Staff were down in our office. Sometimes I saw them and discussed matters with them, and I know the interchange of information was free and full.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know, sir, what orders General Short had issued as a result of the November 27 message from General Marshall?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir, not specifically. I saw General Short very frequently. We discussed matters of interest. We usually were, both of us, quite busy, and when we saw each other we had something definite to talk about.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know that his order—

Admiral BLOCH (interposing). I knew that he was on an alert. He told me that he was on an alert.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know that his alert was the alert he had provided against sabotage?

Admiral BLOCH. Not until after December 7. After December 7 I went to visit General Short in his office to discuss certain matters with him, and I asked him—I said, "Weren't you on the alert?" That I understood you to tell me, that you were on the alert. He said, "Oh, I was on the alert that related to sabotage only," and he had a number for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes: No. 1.

Admiral BLOCH. Now, you see, maybe he told me Alert 1, and maybe I made a mistake because of the numbers. Our Condition 1 is our highest condition.

The CHAIRMAN. Just the reverse of his.

Admiral BLOCH. You see, our Condition 1 is the highest condition we can go to. Now, I don't know how I got that [805] impression, but I had the definite impression that he was on a real alert.

The CHAIRMAN. A high alert?

Admiral BLOCH. High alert, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, Admiral, in developing your plans for the defense weren't your plans based on a war condition: that is, the condition that would hold if war was declared?

Admiral BLOCH. This whole Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is based on the basic war plan, and the basic war plan is not put into effect until the Navy Department tells us to put it into effect.

Admiral STANDLEY. What I am trying to get at, this procedure here, you see—take the Alert No. 1, the interceptor command, you see: it's a war procedure. Now, you have got an ideal plan there: when war breaks you do so and so. Well, now, what I am trying to get at, there are certain things in both plans that are not in effect until war breaks.

General McNARNEY. One of the messages put it "WPL. 2CL-41."

Commander MOMSEN. That's right; on the 7th, WPL.

Admiral BLOCH. We got this after the order went into effect.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the famous telegram that didn't get through.

Admiral BLOCH. This JCD-42 is based on the basic war plan, and although it says that

This agreement is in effect immediately and will remain in effect until it is renounced or part of it is renounced by one side or the other,

that was only the agreement, because this is a corollary to the basic war plan, and the basic war plan wasn't put into effect until after this thing happened.

General MCCOY. What was your conception of the dispatch of November 27 which started out, "This is a war warning"?

Admiral BLOCH. General McCoy, that dispatch arrived here in the afternoon of November 27, and I had left the Yard [806] to go to the hospital to see a patient at the hospital, and they sent for my chief of staff, Captain Earle, and he went over, and they showed him this dispatch, and while he was there an Army officer came in with the General's copy of the—I think this is correct; I may be wrong, because this is some yarn that I have heard: that an Army officer came in with a copy of the dispatch that General Short had received, and Admiral Kimmel made arrangements. I understood that his dispatch—he was directed to show his dispatch to the military authorities, that he made arrangements that his dispatch was to go to General Short.

Now, I didn't see the dispatch, the original dispatch, but they paraphrased it. Our regulations require that a secret dispatch can be written but one place: one copy, one place. That is for security of the code. But they twist the words around and make new phrases and give you a paraphrase, and that is what was sent to me, and it was in effect a war warning, as I remember the wording, and it also stated, as I remember, that the peace—the negotiations had ceased. I think that was an unfortunate expression in this way: because three or four days later when the negotiations were re-opened they were no longer ceased, and it had the effect of nullifying that dispatch. I think that is a logical conclusion.

General McCoy. Were you conscious of the habit of the Japanese to attack before declaration of war?

Admiral Bloch. I knew of their past history in the Russian War, their attack on Chemulpo; I knew of their attacks in the China incidents of 1932 and 1936. I knew they had—that was their procedure, but I still believe——

General McCoy. And that was also the case in all the Axis attacks on Czecho Slovakia and Austria.

Admiral Bloch. Yes.

General McCoy. And Poland and Russia, and so forth.

Admiral Bloch. But I still believed, as I said earlier in the day, from information that I had received, that this [807] movement of the Japanese which was in the offing would be directed against Southeastern China; and even if they attacked Southeastern China and they attacked the British in Malaya and even if they attacked the Dutch East Indies, I didn't think that they would take on another adversary unless they had to.

General McCoy. Especially as they were still having peace conferences?

Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir. And, furthermore, I didn't feel at all sure what our country was going to do even if they had done all those things. And I thought that the Japanese had their hands full and they had all these things, and they didn't—they probably had decided that we wouldn't do anything, or they had decided something—obviously, they must have decided that we were going to do something, or they wouldn't have made that attack, because I don't think they wanted to go to war with us while they were in all this other trouble. All of my information was to the effect that nobody in Washington was even certain what was to be done.

Of course, you can try to prevent your being influenced by the public press, but subconsciously it gets in its work. It does affect—you read these speeches by various men that are interested in this and interested in that, and talks of disunity and talks of what the probable action will be, and challenges to put this up to Congress to see if they will declare war, and so forth. All of those things may have a subconscious effect on you.

Admiral Standley. Admiral, there have been numerous reports of evidence that certain of these Japanese that had been recovered, either from the submarine or from planes, have had indications that they were graduates of certain colleges, colleges here, in the way of rings and so forth. Have you received any official report to that effect?

Admiral Bloch. No official reports. I have heard it, [808] and probably have been unwise enough to repeat it once or twice, but so far as I know the reports are unsubstantiated.

The Chairman. Have you any further questions?

(There was no response.)

The Chairman. Admiral, we thank you very much indeed, sir.

Admiral Bloch. Thank you, sir, very much, for your consideration and courtesy.

The Chairman. I hope you will observe what I said yesterday about no communications about what has been said here.

General McCoy. We have questioned the Admiral, haven't we, about the conduct of his troops, and so forth?

The CHAIRMAN. No, we have not.

General MCCOY. We did Admiral Kimmel.

The CHAIRMAN. We did Admiral Kimmel. I think we asked you about the shore patrol, didn't we? About whether you had a shore patrol?

Admiral BLOCH. I didn't have the shore patrol.

The CHAIRMAN. He didn't have the shore patrol. If you think it is worthwhile we might ask him about that.

General MCCOY. Well, I think as a matter of record we might have that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral, there have been considerable rumors and communications to this Commission indicating that officers and men of the Fleet were in no condition to serve on the morning of December 7 because they had been to drunken parties the night before. What if anything do you know about that?

Admiral BLOCH. I have no knowledge of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you heard anything that is credible on that subject?

Admiral BLOCH. None at all, nothing whatever. I will say further, speaking generally, that the discipline, behavior, conduct, and morale of the men attached to the Navy and Army here is of the highest possible standard.

[809] The CHAIRMAN. You have had a great deal of experience in a long life of service in the Navy.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the conditions, in your judgment, in Hawaii better or worse than they have been in your past experience at other places?

Admiral BLOCH. Normal. Absolutely normal. For instance, we have the recreation center in the Navy Yard. When that was opened in August probably one quarter of the men who formerly went to town ceased to go to town; they would go to the recreation center, and they would play billiards and pool, and they would have boxing matches and motion pictures. And they also sold beer there. But it had a tremendous effect on keeping men out of town, and that was what we were anxious to do. We had rare cases of misconduct. I don't think that the number of general courts martial that I have ordered in the past year will exceed 45.

Admiral STANDLEY. Men and officers?

Admiral BLOCH. Men and officers. And we have a lot of them. I suppose that we have 3,500 men, something like that. Very small percentage. So far as I know, the conduct of the officers has been good. I suppose there are rare cases of misconduct in the case of officers. In my district I think I have had two cases of officers that I had to court martial for—either court martial or request their resignation for unsobriety. The few men that I have court-martialed have either been for desertion or some man reported in from some ship that left here, and I tried him for desertion. There have been three or four cases of theft; clothing usually, in one case money. But—

The CHAIRMAN. How about drunkenness?

Admiral BLOCH. A few cases of drunkenness, sir.

General MCCOY. Out of how many men?

The CHAIRMAN. 3,500, he says.

Admiral BLOCH. I say that would probably be the average [810] over a year. Just now there are more.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, are there any notorious places in and around Honolulu?

Admiral BLOCH. You mean houses of prostitution?

Admiral STANDLEY. No; I mean in the way of clubs or places where they might give parties, large parties that officers attend where there might be drinking or could be drinking, and a lot of insobriety, and so forth?

Admiral BLOCH. I think there are. I am not familiar with the night life in Honolulu, but I think there are. We have a club in the Navy Yard, an officers' club, that gave a dinner dance every Saturday night, and their capacity for dinner I think was 250 and for dancing about 450. The average Naval officer came to it because it didn't cost him anything. If he came to dinner it only cost him a dollar; if he came after dinner it didn't cost him anything. And they had good music, and those parties only lasted until midnight; I made them close at midnight.

General McCoy. Was there such a party on this particular Saturday night of the 6th?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so. I think they had them every Saturday night. Now, the territorial laws, which I followed in the Navy Yard, in the Naval District, all of the establishments of the Navy, prohibited any liquor being served after midnight, and it was strictly enforced, and we served nothing after midnight.

General McCoy. Has any church association or any temperance association or any woman's club protested to you about any conduct, of unusual or drunken conduct of your men?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't recall any specific complaint. I have an indistinct recollection of somebody writing in about something, and I had it investigated and found it to be unsubstantiated. That was several months ago. I sent it up to our intelligence office and told them to investigate the case, [811] and they reported—

General McCoy. Is there an Army and Navy YMCA in Honolulu?

Admiral BLOCH. Sir?

General McCoy. Is there an Army and Navy YMCA?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, quite a large one. Quite a large one, very well conducted. Very well conducted, very well run.

General McCoy. Is that a usual place of rendezvous of soldiers and sailors, so far as you know?

Admiral BLOCH. A great many of them go there and lounge, and a great many of them spend the night there. Most of the men who were unmarried and had no families here came back to their ships or the station. I should say, as a rough guess, that by midnight or 1 o'clock any given night when liberty men had gone ashore—in the first place, we only allowed about something like a quarter or a half of them to go, maybe a half in the afternoon and a quarter in the evening—that my estimate would be that by 1 o'clock probably 80% of them were back on board ship. They were better off on the ship, and they woke up at their job, and they have their breakfasts on board.

General McCoy. Do you have a hostess on the post here, an official hostess?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is always an officer in charge, I understand, at the recreation center.

Admiral BLOCH. We have an officer in charge there, sir, and my instructions to that officer were that officers would not be permitted to use the recreation center. It was for the enlisted men, and I didn't want to make them embarrassed by the presence of an officer, but there would always be an officer of the administration there to maintain order, and we also had a shore patrol detail there at all times to eject anybody who gave any trouble.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

[812] General MCCOY. May I ask the Admiral where he was on Saturday night?

Admiral BLOCH. I think I went to bed about 8:30, sir. I was very tired, sir. I had played golf in the afternoon. I came home about 5:30 and had my dinner and read a book, and about 8:30 or 9 I think I went to bed.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all. Thank you, sir.

We shall have Captain McMorris.

I have here, gentlemen, the full list of the officers who were on and off the various ships, and the ships are classified in this list by their nature: battleships, cruisers, and so forth.

I have also here the shore patrol reports of the 6th, 7th, and 8th December; also the patrol logs submitted in answer to our request to Admiral Kimmel.

Colonel BROWN. We have Captain DeLany first on the list, and he is here.

General MCCOY. Did I get into the record yesterday how many captains were aboard their ships?

The CHAIRMAN. You got something, but the Navy was not complete. Here it is complete. It is here now.

Will you be sworn, Captain?

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN WALTER STANLEY DeLANY, UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name?

Captain DeLANY. Walter Stanley DeLany, Captain, United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your duty, Captain DeLany, on December 7, 1941?

Captain DeLANY. I was Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As such officer was it part of your [813] function to know and to advise the Commander-in-Chief of enemy operations in the Pacific?

Captain DeLANY. Only partially, sir. My immediate duties as Operations Officer were the employment schedule of the Fleet that would combine the tactical training, the aviation training, the gunnery training, and the material upkeep of the Fleet into a schedule that would permit training for war. I was also responsible for the coordination of Fleet activities to match the plans of the War Section of the staff and for the organization of the Fleet into task forces

that would permit their training to match their missions as outlined by the War Plans Section of the Commander-in-Chief's staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you knowledge of the disposition of the forces on the night of December 6 and morning of December 7?

Captain DeLANY. Our own forces, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Our own forces.

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state what task forces were in harbor at Pearl Harbor on the night of December 6?

Captain DeLANY. May I refer to my notes?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Captain DeLANY. Task Force 1 was in port, and that was two divisions of battleships, five battleships total, one division of light cruisers; four cruisers; 17 destroyers in two squadrons; one destroyer flotilla flagship; one old mine layer, the OGLALA; a division of light mine layers under overhaul; and then the ships of the base force with the ARGONNE flagship, the repair ships, and the incidental vessels of the fleet that normally remain in port for services.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what task forces, in whole or in part, were at sea, and approximately where were they, on the night of December 6, morning of December 7?

Captain DeLANY. Task Force 8 in command of Vice Admiral [814] Halsey, with the carrier ENTERPRISE and a division of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers. They were approximately 200 miles west of Oahu. They were returning from an expedition to Wake Island, where they had landed a squadron of Marine fighters.

Task Force 12, consisting of the LEXINGTON and a division of heavy cruisers, five destroyers. They were approximately 425 miles southeast of Midway on a mission which required them to land a squadron of Marine bombers on that island. There were two submarines patrolling off Midway and two submarines patrolling off Wake, and there were four submarines returning to Oahu or Pearl Harbor from overhaul, and there were three en route from Mare Island and one joining the fleet, a new submarine. On the morning of the 7th there were three patrol planes carrying out the morning search required by the security order in the operating areas to the southward of Oahu.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they Navy planes?

Captain DeLANY. Four patrol planes, yes, sir; four Navy patrol planes preparing to go to Lahaina Roads to operate with the submarines in that area in a tactical exercise which involved the use of recognition between submarines and aircraft, identification of the submarines by aircraft, and training to develop intertype tactics that would permit either type to conduct the other by radio to intercept an attack of enemy forces. There was one heavy cruiser, the MINNEAPOLIS, with four light mine layers, operating to the southward of Oahu in intertype training, and one heavy cruiser, the INDIANAPOLIS, with four of the same type actually operating off Johnston Island to conduct training in reconnaissance of the island by aircraft and actual landing by using surf boats on the island.

I think that is about it.

The CHAIRMAN. That indicates the disposition of all the Naval forces?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir, as I—

[815] The CHAIRMAN. At that time?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Where was Admiral Halsey's task force? I have forgotten that.

Captain DeLANY. About 200 miles west of Oahu, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Headed for Oahu?

Captain DeLANY. Headed for Oahu. And incidentally, in that connection, at 6:15 that morning he had launched a flight of 18 or 19 planes with a directive to search from his launching position a sector of 45—045 to 135 to a distance of 150 miles and then land at Ewa Field on the completion of that flight.

General McCoy. What field was that?

Captain DeLANY. Ewa Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Ewa.

Captain DeLANY. Where the Marines are.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Marines' air field.

Captain DeLANY. The Marine squadron was based there, sir.

General McCoy. Near Barbers Point?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir, between Pearl Harbor and Barbers Point, to the westward of Pearl Harbor along the shore line there, sir, where the old mooring mast is.

General McCoy. When did they land there?

Captain DeLANY. Well, they came in, as I recall, some place around after 9 o'clock, after they had been engaged by the enemy and surprised in the air, as everybody else was.

General McCoy. Did they bring down any enemy planes themselves?

Captain DeLANY. I talked to two of the pilots who came into the operations office soon after they landed and as quickly as they could get over to report the results of their flight and the thing, and they felt that they had. I can't say that definitely.

General McCoy. They were surprised in the air, were they?

[816] Captain DeLANY. Oh, yes, sir, because they had taken off at 6:15 with no knowledge of anything that was happening, and although the warning went out from the Commander-in-Chief very soon after the attack occurred I have no way of knowing whether the planes in the air actually got that word, but I do know from talking to the pilots that came in that they were surprised in the air by the Japanese planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were the tasks of the planes of the ENTERPRISE changed after the receipt of the attack on the ENTERPRISE, or did they continue and land at Ewa?

Captain DeLANY. As I recall it, nine of them came in there, sir, eventually landed, and later on in the day were armed and gassed and sent out on a search mission.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said it was part of your duty only incidentally to know of the probable disposition of enemy fleets?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In what branch of the service is that duty directly placed? War plans?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir. The operational section maintains close contact with War Plans, and War Plans maintains the disposition of the enemy forces more closely than the operational section does, sir, in normal peace-time operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it the War Plans paraphernalia that we inspected yesterday, rather than Operations paraphernalia?

Captain DeLANY. You saw the operational section there, sir, and then I think you went from the operational section into War Plans Section, where they have that long table, that covers the entire Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Captain DeLANY. What you saw in the operational section, sir, was the Coastal Frontier area on which we maintain the 700-mile patrol now, with the positions of all the forces in that area plotted, but in War Plans I think you saw the extension into the entire Pacific.

[817] The CHAIRMAN. Quite so.

Where were you on the evening of December 6, Captain?

Captain DeLANY. I was in my home, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7 when the attack broke?

Captain DeLANY. I was in the bathroom, sir. The staff duty officer called me. I didn't recognize Lieutenant Commander Black, who was the junior staff duty officer; I didn't recognize his voice, and when he told me that there was an air attack on Pearl Harbor I attempted to exchange some light talk back and forth across the telephone until I did recognize his voice and recognized the seriousness of it; and it just so happened at that particular time that the other two members of the operational section were playing tennis on the court right behind the house there, so as soon as I got word I yelled to them on the court, and they changed into their—got out of their tennis clothes and followed me down within a few minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the matter was a complete and absolute surprise to you?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And seemed incredible?

Captain DeLANY. I didn't believe it. As I say, I exchanged a lot of light talk over the telephone before I did recognize the junior staff duty officer's voice.

The CHAIRMAN. There is staff duty officer on duty in your division at all times, or was then?

Captain DeLANY. Not exactly, no, sir; we had a double watch. The senior watch was the senior members of the staff, and the junior watch was the junior members of the staff, and there were two people on duty at all times.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was a watch on at all times?

Captain DeLANY. Oh, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was a duty officer there at all times?

[818] Captain DeLANY. As I say, the senior watch and the junior watch, and they were on continuously, and that of course is in addition to the communication watch officers. I think there are—there were five or six of them on duty at all times in the regular watch.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it part of your duty to discuss with the commander-in-chief the disposition of his forces in the light of the probable location of enemy forces? Perhaps I don't make that very clear. Was it your duty to discuss with the commander-in-chief, if he called you into counsel, the probabilities of enemy action?

Captain DELANY. Oh, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you had any discussions between November 27 and December 7 as to the probability of Japanese Naval action or air action?

Captain DELANY. Never from a point of view of what happened.

The CHAIRMAN. That possibility was not discussed? The possibility of an air raid?

Captain DELANY. No. It was a matter of much discussion among all of us, including the commander-in-chief, about the fact that we were badly protected in the place here; and, as you know, our security order had given a lot of thought to the possibility of an attack, but there had been no indication from anything that we had that would lead us to the thought that the December 7 incident would occur.

The CHAIRMAN. What were deciderata in your view to strengthen the defense of this harbor, this base?

Captain DELANY. Well, above everything else, very suitable anti-aircraft defense.

The CHAIRMAN. And was the anti-aircraft defense, the ground anti-aircraft defense, insufficient to adequately protect the base?

[879] Captain DELANY. In my opinion, very definitely, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I understand requests for additional material had been made and could not be supplied?

Captain DELANY. In numerous instances I know, because I wrote the letters myself and discussed it frequently and at length with the Commander-in-Chief, with War Plans, and I know that the Army and Commandant of the District and everybody else was attempting to strengthen the defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any thought given to the dangers of having large segments of the Fleet berthed in Pearl Harbor in time of war?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir, from my own point of view, and I know from talking with other people that the presence of the big ships in Pearl Harbor was always a matter of grave concern to us, particularly in view of the fact that there were not enough berths in the harbor to disperse them properly, and we were rather snuggled up together there in the very restricted moorings available for the big ships.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nothing to do with the air defense of Pearl Harbor as such, had you?

Captain DELANY. No, sir, except that my Operations Section prepared the security letter which provided for the division of the harbor into sectors, the establishment of sector commands, the provision in the security order that sector commanders were responsible for the berthing of their ships within their sectors in order to secure the maximum anti-aircraft fire from the ships in there. That security letter was, as I say, prepared in my section after discussion with the air people, the gunnery people, and others of the staff.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nothing to do with the aircraft defense of the harbor, had you, the defense by planes against hostile planes?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir, only from the point of view of again having included in our security order and in our training [820] exercise the requirement that frequent air-raid drills would be held, and upon the completion of every drill to analyze our communication difficulties, and the general review of the drill to iron out the wrinkles and get it working smoother always.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in command of the Navy's air here? Admiral Bellinger?

Captain DeLANY. Admiral Bellinger was comtaskforce, and as patwing 2 and as required in the Naval Base Defense Plan Admiral Bellinger is the Naval Base Defense Air Officer, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And he would be more competent to speak of the adequacy and arrangement of that form of defense than you?

Captain DeLANY. I feel sure of it, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral?

Admiral STANDLEY. Captain, you spoke a minute ago of the probability of an air raid. Was that remote in your mind?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the others?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Commander-in-Chief?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you mean remote at any time or remote because of the information you had at this time?

Captain DeLANY. I mean the latter, sir. Remote from—

Admiral STANDLEY. Remote because of the information that you had now?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have the Army and the Navy held exercises more or less frequently where air raids were made on this island?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then the possibility of an air raid was not overlooked?

Captain DeLANY. Oh, no, sir. We went to the point of [821] conducting air-raid drills when, for instance, a carrier was returning with its task force. The carrier would represent the attacking force, and the patrol wings—patrol planes here—and the Army bombers would coordinate.

Admiral STANDLEY. Simulate an air raid?

Captain DeLANY. And the Navy planes, any carrier-based planes in the harbor here, their fighters, would immediately revert to the Army in accordance with the Joint Agreement, and the drill would be carried out even to the extent of having attacking planes drop papers representing incendiary bombs and drop markers in the harbor to represent mines, requiring the ships in the harbor to spot the mines, and also in an effort to iron out the very difficult communication problems that we were trying to get squared away that eventually developed into the warning net as we have it now.

General McCoy. You mean since the 7th of December?

Captain DeLANY. Oh, no, sir. I mean since the 15th of February, sir. The full provisions of that security letter there have been carried out in numerous drills here. The drills even came as surprise, where the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant and the Com-

manding General would by the fleet hook up the drill, and the warning would sound in the harbor, and everybody——

General McCoy. There was no such drill on on the 7th day of December?

Captain DeLANY. I didn't understand you, sir.

General McCoy. There was no such drill on the 7th of December?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir. I think, as I remember it, the last air-raid drill was sometime around the—well, towards the end of November. I don't recall any drills in the first seven days of——

General McCoy. There was nothing occurred in your mind as a result of the warning message of the Navy Department on the 27th of November to alter your dispositions for the [822] immediate future?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir, I didn't attach any significance to the possibility of that dispatch meaning that the attack was going to be made on Pearl Harbor or even that the attack was to be made against the United States, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were familiar with all of the messages—you would be familiar with all of the messages received by Admiral Kimmel?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir, I feel that I am thoroughly familiar with all the messages that came in and all the personal and official correspondence that passed between him and the Navy Department.

Admiral STANDLEY. There is nothing in those messages that changed your views that at that time an air raid was improbable?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir.

General McCoy. Did you prepare a new estimate of the situation as a result of that war warning message on the 27th?

Captain DeLANY. There were—the duty officer was required and he kept with him the action to be taken in the event that there was a declaration of war, just what steps would be taken by the forces at sea and also the forces in port, and that was a standing order from the Commander-in-Chief that was kept in the possession of the duty officer, and as I recall it the last—the change was made—the new estimate was made on the Saturday before the attack was made.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel has read us that; he brought it with him.

Captain DeLANY. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. The last revision.

General McCoy. And it didn't meet the situation?

Captain DeLANY. I didn't understand.

General McCoy. I say, it did not meet the situation of December 7?

[823] Captain DeLANY. No, sir, because nobody had anticipated an act like that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not intended to, was it?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir, there was no intention of that.

General McCoy. It was intended, however, to go into effect on the declaration of war?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir, in accordance——

General McCoy. Did it go into effect?

Captain DeLANY. The position that we found ourselves in on the 7th of December changed the conception of the war from an offensive

one to a defensive one instantly, because our plan as we had been carrying around in our pockets was purely an offensive move.

General McCoy. And you were unable to carry out any of those offensive actions as a result of the attack?

Captain DeLany. That is correct, yes, sir.

General McNarney. Captain, can you tell us how many submarines you had available for duty on November 27?

Captain DeLany. There were nine in the operating area; that is, two at Wake, two at Midway, and five actually in Pearl Harbor. There were four, three from overhaul and another one en route out here, and there were four at San Diego conducting the sound school which were available to be brought out here.

General McNarney. There were nine available in the area on November 27?

Captain DeLany. Yes, sir.

General McNarney. Were there any instructions for their deployment or for placing them in observation, given between the 27th and December 6?

Captain DeLany. I don't believe I can answer that question correctly because I don't recall when the two submarines were sent to Midway and to Wake.

General McNarney. Do you recall of any drills in which the submarines took up locations in observation between Midway [824] and the Aleutians?

Captain DeLany. Midway and the—?

General McNarney. Aleutian Islands.

Captain DeLany. No. I know that there were—if I remember correctly there were five submarines that were supposed to make special engine tests, and that the plan for their tests was to send them about 700 miles to the northward of Oahu and return at a constant speed in order to get certain engine data, but that trip was never completed.

General McNarney. Did your war plans provide for any observation to the northward.

Captain DeLany. Yes, our raiding and reconnaissance provided for that, and in addition to that, light—or heavy cruisers of Taskforce 3 were also assigned to that.

General McNarney. You stated that on the morning of the 7th the whole conception immediately changed from the offense to the defense. What orders were issued reorganizing the task forces, if any?

Captain DeLany. On the morning of the 7th?

General McNarney. Well, on the 7th or immediately thereafter while Admiral Kimmel was still in command.

Captain DeLany. The only order that—well, there was no reorganization of task forces, because the fleet had been in a task force organization since the early summer and then had been further subdivided into task forces sometime around the 15th of November, if I recall the date correctly, and that organization provided for the task forces as they are now operating under different numbers now, but basically the same composition.

General McNarney. Then, the loss of the capital ships did not require the reorganization of the task forces?

Captain DeLANY. No, because the battleships were pulled out of Task Force 1, but there still remained the carrier and the cruisers and the destroyers that were part of the original Task Force 1.

[825] General McNARNEY. Were any plans made prior to Admiral Kimmel's relief for the relief of Wake?

Captain DeLANY. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Will you tell us what they were?

Captain DeLANY. Well, there was a task force sent out there to relieve Wake.

General McNARNEY. What happened to it?

Captain DeLANY. Wake was taken before it got there.

General McNARNEY. When did it leave? Do you know?

Captain DeLANY. I believe that it was the 13th of December. I am not positive. I can't recall the date. I mean I don't have the dates in my head.

General McNARNEY. Will you get that for us, please?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, I will get the information.

General McNARNEY. And also the composition of the force.

Captain DeLANY. I can tell you the composition of the force. It was a carrier and three heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, and it went out there as Task Force 14.

General McNARNEY. Yes. What was its mission?

Captain DeLANY. The relief of Wake.

General McCoy. How many days does it take to get to Wake with such a task force under war conditions?

Captain DeLANY. That force went out with a tanker that could only make 13 knots, because there were no other fast tankers that we could—a fast tanker had been assigned to Task Force 11, which was off in another direction. So at 13 knots that's about 300 and some odd miles a day, which would take almost 7 days to get out there, sir.

General McCoy. Did it engage any Japanese en route?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir.

General McCoy. It didn't proceed to Wake, then?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. When was it recalled?

Captain DeLANY. I can't tell you the dates, sir; I don't [826] have my schedule here, and I can't remember them. I've got the setup on what task force and time at sea and in port in my office; and rather than tell you a wrong date, I would rather give you the information correctly, sir, from my—

General McNARNEY. Did you receive any report that an enemy submarine had been seen off the harbor entrance at 6:18 a. m. on the morning of the 7th?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir. When I got down to the office I was told that, sir.

General McNARNEY. What vessel was that, do you remember, that reported that?

Captain DeLANY. The ANTARES.

General McNARNEY. The ANTARES.

General McCoy. What time did you give the warning to the fleet as to the attack?

Captain DeLANY. 7:52, as I remember the record on the signal from the signal tower here, sir.

General McCoy. Was that acknowledged as received that morning by all the task forces?

Captain DELANY. Oh, yes, sir. The signal tower in the harbor is in plain sight of everybody in the harbor.

General McCoy. No. I mean the task forces at sea.

Captain DELANEY. Oh. Right after 8 o'clock. I don't know the exact time, sir.

General McCoy. As far as you know, they all received it immediately?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Were there any orders given them at all, or were they left at their own dispositions?

Captain DELANY. No, sir. I think it was at 8:15 or some very close time to that, the signal was sent by the Commander-in-Chief for Task Forces 12 and 8 to assemble as directed by Comtaskforce 8, who was the senior task force commander at sea, and that enemy information would be given to them as soon as we [827] could obtain it; and then when the ships in port had sortied in order that they would be organized into a task force and knew who their boss was, and so forth, at sea, they were organized into a Task Force 1 because they contained some of the cruisers and destroyers originally assigned to Task Force 1, which had been in port; and Admiral Draemel in the DETROIT was assigned to command of that task force. So that it gave us three task forces at sea as soon as that task force——

General McCoy. What was their mission?

Captain DELANY. Sir?

General McCoy. What was their general mission?

Captain DELANY. The general mission was, as I stated here, to assemble as directed by Comtaskforce 8 to attempt to locate the enemy, and Comtaskforce 8 was the senior task force commander in the area, and that is the reason why that message was sent that way.

General McCoy. Was there any information of the enemy given them that day?

Captain DELANY. As I remember the sequence of events Comtaskforce 8 sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief and said that: could he depend on him for scouting for enemy, and we sent back and said that there were only 12 VP's available in the area and that we would furnish him such information as they could obtain; and then very soon after that, beginning around 9:50 or sometime along in there, we began to get these messages of carriers being sighted to the southwest of Barbers Point.

General McCoy. Where did those reports come from?

Captain DELANY. One report that we received had the call sign of the MINNEAPOLIS, which was the heavy cruiser that was operating normally in that area. I don't know whether she ever sent that message or not.

General McCoy. I think that ought to be checked up to see, because one of the very points that Mr. Knox asked us to look into was those reports.

[828] The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McCoy. Have you any reason to believe that it was a false report?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir, I haven't any reason to believe that, but I have no knowledge that any particular ship originated the report. I do know that the light mine layers that were operating with the MINNEAPOLIS, very soon after that report was received, came to us with a dispatch and said that she was in the southwest corner of Sail 2, which is the operating area in that section, and as we originally received the message it said that carriers were in sight, and then later on within some very short time after that the ship itself corrected the dispatch to say that they were not in sight.

General McNARNEY. What type of ship is the ANTARES that saw this?

Captain DeLANY. She is a cargo ship, sir. She had been on a mission down around the Canton-Christmas area with supplies.

General McNARNEY. Is that manned by Navy personnel?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Do you know to whom they reported sighting the submarine?

Captain DeLANY. As I recall it, the senior officer on the ANTARES at that time was the commander of train squadron 8 in the base force, who had been sent down on the ANTARES to look over the territory; and, as I remember his telling me, he said he sent the signal to a lower tower—or the signal tower, rather, reporting the thing and asking for an offshore patrol—one of the destroyers in the offshore patrol come out. The destroyer was on the southward—to the southward of Oahu here, performing the natural, ordinary offshore patrol duty.

General McNARNEY. Have you any information as to the time it reached your headquarters?

Captain DeLANY. The duty officer told me that he had [329] gotten it around 7 or 7:15.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander Momsen said 7:15.

General McCoy. Have you definite information of any other losses that you caused the enemy? I have seen reports of our losses, but very vague reports of what you did to the Japanese.

Captain DeLANY. I have no knowledge of that, sir, except what I have seen from our own intelligence section over there and what I have seen in the newspapers.

General McCoy. Who would make the report of losses to the enemy to the Navy Department?

Captain DeLANY. The Commander-in-Chief would, sir.

General McCoy. Aren't those prepared by you?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir.

General McCoy. Who would prepare them?

Captain DeLANY. I think that the combination of the intelligence section and the flag secretary would have that, sir, but I can't give you any figures on it. I don't know what the—I have not seen the report of enemy losses.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it any part of your duty, Captain, to be familiar with the organization and functioning of the interceptor command?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir. I was actively interested in that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your interest?

Captain DeLANY. I mean only from my own point of view and being interested in what I refer to again as the security setup.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. What information did you have as at December 7 as to how the Aircraft Warning Service was operating? Did you know anything about it?

Captain DeLANY. I don't know how it was operating on the 7th because on that day the communications from the Army intelligence center—"Robert," as they call it now—had not [830] been installed in our office at all.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean there had been no wire communications set up between the control room and your office on that day?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And if any information were to come from the control room to your office it would have to go by some circuitous route, would it?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And up to the 7th had any Navy officer been detailed as liaison officer at the control room?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir, I think there's—so far as the operational section of the staff was concerned—we were very much interested in that, naturally. Commander Hitchcock, who had been Naval Attache in London for Air over there, had come back to the fleet and had spent some time with the fleet. We were interested in it because he knew the British setup there very closely. At my request he went out and talked to the Army before he left here and was detached and went back to take his command, and then Taylor came out here, and I would say probably ten days—probably a week before the 7th of December Taylor spent several days in the office there and finally furnished us with a diagram of the setup as it was gradually getting into a working condition; and I was particularly interested from the Navy point of view and called a conference with patwing 2's representative and Taylor and the task representative, and they sat down there and discussed just what had to be done to make this thing effective, and I find out afterwards from talking to some of these people that I had become quite vehement in my discussion, because the thing resulted in everybody sitting around with the district communications people and the telephone people, and everybody just pounding on this thing trying to get it finished.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you were conscious that it wasn't in [831] a very satisfactory operating state on December 7, were you?

Captain DeLANY. Oh, yes, I had known that, and as I remember we had been straining—

The CHAIRMAN. You had been trying to get it.

Captain DeLANY. —and pushing on the thing to try to get the thing set up.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no knowledge of what actual orders for operation had been issued by the Army?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On December 7?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't know whether it was attempting to operate all day or part of a day or what?

Captain DELANY. I knew that for some little time before the 7th December that the station had been operating for practice purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain DELANY. And by our roundy-go-round telephone system we were able to get some information out of it, but we hadn't gotten to the point where our direct lines and complete warning net had been installed.

The CHAIRMAN. Now the warning net is practical?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are on a direct line of warning net with all the interceptor stations now?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You also have a Navy officer sitting in the control room?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To call you?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And advise you?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think probably it is also his duty to [832] claim your ships, isn't it—that Navy officer in there? If they spot a plane and you claim it, how is that done?

Captain DELANY. If the Radar picks up a plane, information goes out to patwing 2 first.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, they claim it?

Captain DELANY. They claim it. If he doesn't claim it, then it comes to the fleet to find out whether we've got anything in the air; and if nobody claims it—

The CHAIRMAN. That settles it.

Captain DELANY. —it is an enemy plane. And the same thing is true as far as a surface ship is concerned: the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Commander gets the first crack at the ship in his particular area; and if he can't claim it then they come to us to determine whether it's a unit of the operating fleet; and if we can't claim it then the sector is placed into a hostile procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your observation? Is the thing now working pretty smoothly and pretty well?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir, it is, and it is getting better all the time.

The CHAIRMAN. As the operators become more expert?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In your understanding, it was not a very substantial reed on which to lean on December 7, was it, Captain, for information?

Captain DELANY. No, sir, it certainly was not, because it had never gotten to the point where we felt that there was anything to it except a very good thing when it was completed. And even now we are hanging on a shoestring, literally, because all our communications are—as you noticed in the office there, sir, there are just little wires running all over the place that act as the chain of communication until we can get the thing built substantially and basically as it should be.

The CHAIRMAN. There is still much substantial construction [833] to be put in of a permanent nature, isn't there?

Captain DELANY. Oh, my, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You wouldn't be surprised if your communications were cut off at any minute by some mishap?

Captain DELANY. No, sir, I certainly wouldn't, and it's a very unfortunate thing that we do have to depend on that.

General McNARNEY. Captain, referring to your security letter 2CL-41, paragraph g. on page 4 gives the directions for security against air attack. Sub 7 lists certain conditions of readiness. Was it normal to have a condition of readiness during time of peace or during these disturbed days just prior to the declaration of war?

Captain DELANY. Well, of course, when you mention "just prior to the declaration of war" that's something that we weren't too sure about, but it was a fact that more attention had been paid to the security of the fleet in the operating areas than in the base where we had to take off the pressure to get material work done and get crews rested up and give them a chance to ease off a bit. But I do feel that a lot of attention has been paid to the security of fleet at sea but not too very much to the security of the fleet in port.

General McNARNEY. Was any one of these three conditions mentioned actually in effect then?

Captain DELANY. Not to my knowledge. I don't recall seeing anything from the Naval Base Defense Officer prescribing a condition of readiness in the harbor.

General McNARNEY. Would it be normal for the Base Defense Officer to contact the Cinc before he placed one of those conditions in effect?

Captain DELANY. I think it would, yes.

General MCCOY. Do you think the fleet is safe in Pearl Harbor now?

Captain DELANY. Do I think the fleet is safe in Pearl Harbor now? No, sir.

[834] The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it can be made safe?

Captain DELANY. For limited operations, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "limited operations"?

Captain DELANY. It's my own personal opinion that this can never be an operating base.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words—and we want you to be perfectly free in your opinion—

Captain DELANY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it is your opinion that the fleet ought not to be based in Pearl Harbor?

Captain DELANY. I have always felt that way, sir. If the command of the coastal frontier or the Commandant of the District will have the forces that are now being used by the fleet, the base may be made reasonably secure, but in my opinion material, personnel, or nothing else of an operating fleet can be used 24 hours a day, 365 days of the year, as would be required here, because they would be required to protect themselves all the time they were at sea; and the same planes, the same guns, the same men that protected the ship while they cruised at sea would then have to come back into port and still protect itself here, and I don't believe that that is possible. Now, as I say, if the forces in the District were such that the fleet could get some relaxation here on their men and material, then it is possible that the fleet could operate from here, but I don't believe the area is big enough to accommodate what the fleet requires and what the base

requires—what the fleet requires for its defense at sea and what the base requires for its defense in port here.

General McCoy. In other words, the fleet would then have to be based on the Coast, the mainland?

Captain DeLany. Yes, sir, I feel that way.

General McCoy. In other words, we would have to give up permanently the defense of the Pacific?

[835] Captain DeLany. Oh, no, I don't feel that.

General McCoy. Well, you would give up 2,000 miles outpost advantage in operating the fleet, wouldn't you?

Captain DeLany. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, you don't see the American fleet, then, being on the offensive any more?

Captain DeLany. Oh, I don't see that point of view at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think you could devise an offensive without basing the fleet in Pearl Harbor?

Captain DeLany. I think it has to be, until Pearl Harbor can permit the fleet to operate from it, sir.

General McCoy. Is that all due to the recent attack and the greater danger from the air?

Captain DeLany. Not in my opinion, sir. I believe it can be shown that—I have been in the fleet for three and a half years, almost four years, on my present cruise, sir, and there has nothing happened that has ever changed my point of view about the inadequacy of Pearl Harbor.

General McCoy. National policy, then, would have to be subordinate to the safety of the fleet?

Captain DeLany. Well, I am not prepared to answer that, sir.

General McCoy. The fleet was sent here by direction of the President, I take it, on lines of national policy rather than Naval policy?

Captain DeLany. That would be my idea.

The CHAIRMAN. As I gather your thought, Captain, it is that by an enormous increase in materiel and personnel in the 14th Naval District it might be possible to make Pearl Harbor a very much safer place for the fleet than it is now and has been heretofore?

Captain DeLany. Oh, yes. Undoubtedly so, yes, sir. In my opinion, if there were enough patrol planes to cover [836] this area continuously as we are doing now with the patrol planes of the fleet and there was an enormous protective force—striking force of Army bombers and an enormous force of combat planes on the Islands well scattered, then I believe that the fleet could stay here, and with very reasonable security, because there would be sufficient warning to permit it probably to sortie, get to the place where it would be at sea ready to fight.

General McCoy. Is it possible to have the fleet remain at sea the major part of the time, say, over at Lahaina or in that region, and only a few ships come in at a time?

Captain DeLany. I think it would be very difficult to protect in an area like Lahaina Roads, even with mine fields. As a matter of fact, our study of that thing shows that it is almost impossible to protect Lahaina and permit it to be used as an anchorage.

General McCoy. A fleet, then, is a very uncertain and unsafe thing anywhere you are at sea, in time of war?

Captain DeLany. No, sir, I don't feel that way.

General McCoy. These same conditions apply to your enemy, don't they? They are farther from their base than you are?

Captain DeLany. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, you are thinking only in terms of security of the fleet from an enemy attack?

Captain DeLany. Oh, no, sir, not by anything; not by any reason, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Our time for adjournment has come, Captain. We shall adjourn until 2 o'clock.

Captain DeLany. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you come back?

Captain DeLany. Yes, sir.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, the nature of our inquiry here [837] is such that we have to ask persons who testify here not to talk over what is discussed here with anyone.

Captain DeLany. All right.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[838]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

The CHAIRMAN. You had some more questions of the Captain?

Admiral Standley. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN WALTER STANLEY DeLANY, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed

Admiral Standley. In your testimony you gave your opinion in regard to the use of Pearl Harbor as an operating base. Will you go further and explain what you mean by an operating base and to what extent you had in mind the use of it as a base of any kind?

Captain DeLany. If I may recall what I meant to state that I said that in practically four years of sea service in this present cruise there has happened nothing to change my opinion of Pearl Harbor with regard to being a safe operating base, and I believe, in response to an inquiry by you, sir, that I said that if any commander of the Hawaiian coastal frontier defense had the forces available to him that the fleet is now supplied with, that it was probable that the base could be made secure against surprise attacks, and that my impression of an operating base was one to which the fleet can come after its operations at sea where they can come freely—that is, freely to come for recreation and liberty and be free from the strains that were attendant upon wartime sea cruising.

I think if Pearl Harbor is able to defend the fleet in here, that then the fleet can continue to operate from here, but under the present situation it is not, as I see it, sufficiently defended to permit the fleet to ease off the strain which is attendant upon seagoing.

General McNarney. If your definition of an operating base is correct, wouldn't it be impossible to conduct offensive operations except from a secure operating base?

[839] Captain DeLany. No, sir, I do not mean to imply that, but I do believe that, as I said before, that the matériel and the person-

nel of the fleet cannot continue to operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, of a campaign, and as I see the fleet operating in Pearl Harbor here and I see the matériel of the fleet being used that way, I felt that the fleet cannot continue to operate during these times under that matériel and personnel strain.

General McNARNEY. Well, I am confused in my mind.

Captain DELANY. There is nothing defensive in my attitude at all. I believe this can be secure enough for the fleet to operate here, but I do not mean to imply that the fleet had to be at a place where there can be no possibility of an attack being made on it.

General McNARNEY. My conception of an operating base is a place from which the fleet can conduct operations and you could conduct operations from any place where you could get fuel, men, and ammunition.

Captain DELANY. That is evidenced by the fact that we are operating from here now, sir.

General McNARNEY. But you have more than that; you have recreation facilities and everything else.

Captain DELANY. Under what circumstances? Apparently I do not understand your point of view on that, sir.

General McNARNEY. Your definition of an operating base is what I would call the main base, well to the rear, where you could go back when there is no possibility of enemy action.

Captain DELANY. No, sir. I do not mean to imply that at all. I do not mean to imply that.

General McNARNEY. I think it is probably just a confusion in the definition of the terms.

Captain DELANY. I do not mean to imply that the fleet cannot operate from here, but I do believe that the fleet [840] cannot operate here for long extended operations if it must use the same measures in port to defend itself as it must use on the high seas.

In other words, if every ship in port must always be in a complete watertight condition to defend itself against torpedo attacks, then in my personal opinion the crew on board cannot recuperate from its operations at sea. If the anti-aircraft battery must be manned continually, and if the ship's complements, ships' personnel must be used to handle all of their operations, ammunition, and so forth, without any opportunity to recuperate when they come into port, then I believe it is not the type of operating base which lends itself to extended operations at the base.

General McNARNEY. You are talking about the piping peace days?

Captain DELANY. No, sir, I am not.

General McNARNEY. But the human animal can stand quite a bit. Do you have three watches or two watches?

Captain DELANY. We have four watches.

General McNARNEY. If you have four watches, why couldn't your anti-aircraft guns be manned for a year at a stretch without any offdays?

Captain DELANY. They can.

General McNARNEY. Admiral Byrd spent a year at the South Pole and he did not come in for relief or recreation. They had nothing. The human animal can stand quite a lot.

Captain DELANY. Yes, I agree with you.

General McNARNEY. I was at the front in the last war with an aviation unit. We were in action for four months and never had any relief or such. The men could do that.

Captain DeLANY. Yes, I agree with you, but I do not visualize this as a four-month war.

[841] General McNARNEY. Well, a year, then. You could do it a year.

Captain DeLANY. I do not believe you could have stayed on operations like that for a year.

General McNARNEY. I am sure we would. We were like the OREGON. We were in better shape at the end than when we started.

Captain DeLANY. I was in Queenstown for 16 months, sir, and we operated on a tough schedule there, but we had protection or we felt we had protection in port, and you can understand the nervous strain of sea operations for 16 months.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let us see if this is what you mean. You say nothing has happened in your four years' service to change your opinion as to the safety of this place as an operating base?

Captain DeLANY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. As I understand it, when you came down here four years ago you felt that Pearl Harbor was not sufficiently protected to give absolute safety or safety for an operating base, in your opinion?

Captain DeLANY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And there has been nothing happened in the past four years which has changed your view?

Captain DeLANY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You still say that safety is not provided for?

Captain DeLANY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You did not intend to say that Pearl Harbor could not be made or could not be used nor that it could not be made a proper operating base?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir, I had no intention of implying that, and if the forces in this frontier are strengthened to the point, almost equal to what the fleet is now giving them, [842] that the fleet will have security, and with our searches, rendering the fleet safe from surprise attack, but I do feel that we are using the facilities, the facilities of the fleet to protect the base, and it is my conception that these fleet facilities must be available for offensive actions in advance of this base, and therefore that we are burning up our personnel and material in defense of the defense and they are not available for our offensive movements from this base.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume that in the war plans, this was not intended as a defensive point, but as a point from which the offensive operations would begin?

Captain DeLANY. This was the first stepping stone in the western advancement of all our war plans, and all our war plans are based on that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything more from the Captain?

General McNARNEY. No.

General McCox. No.

Captain DeLANY. You asked a question on that, sir, about the movements of the task forces.

General McNARNEY. The submarines?

Captain DeLANY. About the question of Wake.

General McNARNEY. Of the movement of task forces to Wake.

Captain DeLANY. May I add this?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain DeLANY. Task force 8, which was the one closest to Oahu on the 7th of December, came in on the 8th of December, and went out on the morning of the 9th, and was stationed in the sector north of Oahu as a covering force.

Task force 11, which had been 12, came in on the 13th and went out on the 15th with the mission assigned as a raid on Jaluit.

[843] Task force 14, which was the SARATOGA and a new task force which was organized because the SARATOGA just got back from the mainland with her planes, and went out on the 16th with the mission for the relief of Wake.

Task force 14 was recalled from that mission on the 22nd of December.

General McNARNEY. This is off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Call Captain McMorris.

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN CHARLES HORATIO McMORRIS, WAR PLANS OFFICE, UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give your full name, please.

Captain McMORRIS. Charles Horatio McMorris, War Plans Office, Staff of Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Captain, were you present at any conferences between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, between November 27 and December 7, last?

Captain McMORRIS. Yes, sir. I can't recall the specific time. They were conversations, rather informal conferences.

The CHAIRMAN. Was one of the topics of consideration at that time the substitution of Army forces for Marines at Midway or Wake?

Captain McMORRIS. Yes, sir. In accordance with the suggestion received from the Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any discussion at any of these conferences as to the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain McMORRIS. In a discussion as to whether to send pursuit planes to Midway and Wake—that was proposed by the War and Navy Departments—the matter of the probability of an [844] air attack on Pearl Harbor was touched upon, and as I recall on that subject, which was fairly brief, Admiral Kimmel asked me when I thought there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor by air, and I said, "Never."

The CHAIRMAN. And of course you believed it?

Captain McMORRIS. Yes, sir, I believed it, unfortunately.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been on duty here at Pearl Harbor, Captain?

Captain McMorris. I came to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief 1 February, when Admiral Kimmel assumed command. Prior to that time I had been in this area for over a year as operations officer for Vice Admiral Andrews, command of scouting force.

The CHAIRMAN. During that time the situation with Japan had been more or less tense, had it not?

Captain McMorris. During a great part of the time, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In that time, did the officers with whom you were in contact professionally discuss the possibility of an air raid on Pearl Harbor?

Captain McMorris. Unquestionably the subject was mentioned from time to time.

The CHAIRMAN. As you gathered the reactions of these professional associates of yours, what was the general view as to the probability or possibility of such an attack?

Captain McMorris. I can recall no officer who felt that there was a serious probability, and that perhaps all of us considered it a remote possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you, as operations officer, on the staff of Admiral Kimmel, conscious of any weakness of the defenses of this port against an air raid?

Captain McMorris. Yes, sir. Both as operations officer in the scouting force and later as war plans officer of the Commander-in-Chief, I participated in various discussions [845] regarding certain weaknesses that we felt to be existent in this place, with particular reference to the limited number of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. Very soon after I joined Admiral Kimmel's staff, strong representations regarding these deficiencies were made.

I accompanied Admiral Kimmel on a trip to Washington in May and June, and that matter was very much on the agenda.

Insofar as I was concerned personally, I felt at that time that it was a proper and necessary thing to know, as I believed, for the conditions which existed at the time, to consider the possibility that we might suffer some severe reverses in which the defense here would be a matter of grave importance.

One of the things that I feared very much was that a considerable portion of this fleet might be moved out of the Pacific when Hawaii would be dependent upon its own defenses, and I felt in that case it would be quite weak.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if I get your thought, the fleet defenses, as long as a large fleet was here, might be used as auxiliaries to the land defenses or harbor defenses?

Captain McMorris. I would put it a little differently but I think the general idea you have is the same. It was my feeling that an offensive division of the fleet could so concern the enemy from shore defenses as it would make it highly inadvisable to separate their own forces and bring them into this area.

That was the fundamental thought I had in my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Up to date, since December 7th, the harbor defenses of Pearl Harbor, as such, are being supplemented by the fleet matériel and personnel?

Captain McMorris. Yes. I am not completely familiar with the details in that connection but I might say also that for some time there have been standing orders and a great many drills held before December 7th in which the ships which were in the [846] port would augment the Army defenses by the use of their own batteries.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

General McNARNEY. The Commander-in-Chief and his staff were not concerned with the joint plan of the Army in the defense of Oahu, were they?

Captain McMorris. No, sir. That is, categorically to say there were discussions as to what the fleet may be doing, but there wasn't any formalized plan for the fleet to be a part of the defenses of Pearl Harbor except as I have outlined with regard to the ships in port taking part in the anti-aircraft defense. I mean the operations between the fleet and the rather meager local defense forces of the District and part of the permanent establishment.

General McNARNEY. As war plans officer of the Commander-in-Chief, were you familiar with the war plans of the Army for the defense of Oahu?

Captain McMorris. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You said you felt that the Army defenses were inadequate. How could you tell that they were inadequate if you were not familiar with what they were supposed to do?

Captain McMorris. In company with General Gardiner and General Herron, I made a brief tour—a Cook's tour, so to speak—of the Island, and I saw something of their planes and the available guns, the searchlights, and so forth, insofar as the anti-aircraft defenses were concerned and taking into account the general knowledge I had, limited though it may be, in regard to the defenses that had been found necessary in Europe.

It seemed that the anti-aircraft protection here was weak and that, I think, I may safely say that that feeling in that connection was shared by the generals in question.

[847] I may say also that the development of the radar had promise of increasing the value of such defenses, and I knew the Army authorities were very anxious and much concerned over the delay in getting some of that equipment; so I meant no criticism or any implication of the Army defenses. That is, I am giving a general impression which, I think, is still quite sound.

The CHAIRMAN. The liaison of the Army and Navy was through District No. 14?

Captain McMorris. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Particularly and specifically the liaison between the Army and the Navy?

Captain McMorris. Yes.

General McNARNEY. With respect to this letter issued for security 2 CL-41, I suppose you are familiar with that?

Captain McMorris. Not in detail, no, sir.

General McNARNEY. Do you know whether or not subparagraph (g) on page 4, and particularly subparagraph (7) on page 55, which defines certain conditions of readiness—do you know whether or not it was in practice to establish certain of those conditions when the fleet was in port or a major portion of it was in port?

Captain McMorris. I am not sure, sir, about the operations of the fleet in that, but you can get that information. I am not prepared to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Your specific charge was war plans?

Captain McMorris. I was looking more to the future than to the immediate present.

General McNARNEY. Can you tell the Commission, Captain, the method, the mental processes of the estimate of the situation or the discussions actually drawn up and the orders for the operations immediately following the attack on December 7? I would like to know what you did. You, as war plans officer, [848] are, I imagine, responsible for making recommendations to the Commander-in-Chief with respect to immediate action against the enemy?

Captain McMorris. If such information is so available, and when I say "we" I mean my particular section, and to make such deductions as we could as to the probable area for those operations.

Our suggestions were made to the Commander-in-Chief or to the operations officer as to the employment of the forces then out; that more specifically on December 7th that they were mostly as to the place of attack and were inclined strongly to believe that the attack had come from both the northward and the southward; and that with the disposition of the carriers at sea we felt that the chance of intercepting the northern route was probably quite remote, while the chance of intercepting the southward route looked, at least, to hold some promise, and the forces we had at sea were already in the southward area; that as these produced no results in the searches in operation, it became necessary as a result, to bring the forces into Pearl Harbor to refuel them, and we had a serious concern about the submarine menace of ships coming and going.

Among our recommendations in the war plans was to use a very considerable portion of light forces for anti-submarine operations and to disperse carriers to the northward of Oahu with a view to intercepting the enemy on its return.

We also advised the utilization of not only patrol planes available but the utilization of planes and such long range planes as might be made available by the Army authorities for making maximum day-light searches.

In the early days, particularly 7 December, we even [849] included in our suggestions more specific recommendations as to the areas for search since the number of available planes limits the arc and radius of the search.

While those were the immediate matters under consideration, we were also formulating plans for offensive operations to be commenced as early as possible, or rather as soon as we felt that the existing situation had clarified.

General McNARNEY. When did you first hear of the attack on Wake?

Captain McMorris. 7 December. I don't recall the hour now, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did your section submit any plans for its relief?

Captain McMorris. Not on that day. The earliest suggestion made with regard to the relief of Wake was on the succeeding Wednesday when the repeated attacks began to give me concern over the possi-

bility that the ammunition supply might become depleted. A cargo ship was in the vicinity of Wake without an escort when the report of the first attack was received.

The Commandant of the District directed the return of that ship, as it seemed improbable that it would be possible to discharge it under the existing circumstances at that time, and another ship was made available for carrying ammunition and stores and reinforcements.

I felt that although the garrison at Wake was small that it would require a considerable effort on the part of the enemy to take that place. I realized the necessity for expediting relief measures if it were to be held for a prolonged period.

The most available ship was deemed to be the Tangier, a seaplane tender, and minimizing the danger there of explosives as well as not to carry into that area valuable stores. She discharged her torpedoes, aviation gasoline, and most of her [850] bombs, prior to loading her equipment for Wake.

General McNARNEY. Was the Tangier one of those converted destroyers?

Captain McMORRIS. She was a 17½ knot ship of about 10,000 tons.

Admiral STANDLEY. A cargo ship?

Captain McMORRIS. Yes. I do not know how much detail you want me to go into, General.

General McNARNEY. No. I think you are covering just what I would like to hear.

Captain McMORRIS. It was felt that such an expedition should have a strong escort in order to insure the relief expedition getting through. It was felt particularly necessary to get additional fighting planes to Wake, and the only ones that could be made available was a squadron of marine planes enroute from San Diego on the SARATOGA.

General McCoy. When did the SARATOGA arrive here with those planes?

Captain McMORRIS. It was originally expected on the 12th but actually arrived here on the 14th.

General McCoy. That is what delayed the relief expedition, was it?

Captain McMORRIS. That was one of the delays, the primary delay. In the departure of the SARATOGA, which required refueling here, there was some delay in that, and the necessity for fueling expedition at sea, particularly the arrival in the vicinity of Wake, and it was further delayed somewhat because the only tanker immediately available was a 13-knot tanker whereas the Tangier could make 17 knots. It was a case of using the cargo ship and the tanker that was immediately available.

At the same time that this relief expedition was under consideration, the war plans section proposed and the Commander-in-Chief adopted a plan for making a diversion in the southeastern Marshalls. It was realized that Wake, even with a strong covering force, that the Tangier would be in considerable danger because it was necessary to discharge her cargo into boats and barges in the open sea, and if the weather should prove unfavorable, she might be delayed there for a prolonged period. I recall one instance where they required 28 days off Wake to discharge a ship.

The contemplated date for the relief expedition to arrive was initially 21 December, but delays necessitated changing the date to 23 December.

I think that is the substance of it.

General McNARNEY. Was it essential to take a tanker along? What was the necessity of refueling?

Captain McMORRIS. Particularly the destroyers, and the hazards of getting 2,000 or more miles away from the base with the fueling of cruisers as well as destroyers depleted, where a strong enemy force might be encountered and high speed required—all that made it imprudent to take that risk, particularly as the time that the force might be required to operate in the general vicinity of Wake was indefinite.

General McNARNEY. What is the cruising range of cruisers? I understood it to be about 10,000 miles.

Captain McMORRIS. They do have about 10,000 miles with clean bottom and when cruising at an economical speed. As speed increases, the fuel consumption rises rapidly. Moreover, where the enemy may be encountered, it is necessary to burn additional fuel so that the reserve boiler power is immediately ready for use in case of contact with the enemy.

General McNARNEY. I take it that the plan was to reinforce and carry on the existing defense on Wake rather than to defeat or search out and defeat the forces attacking them by fleet action?

Captain McMORRIS. Immediately, yes. However, as in all [852] operations, once you are in contact with the enemy, the defeat of that enemy is the primary consideration.

General McNARNEY. Yes, but what strikes me particularly is that I do not see how you could plan to carry reinforcements to Wake, which was under attack, without first defeating the forces making that attack because they would not let you put a cargo ship off there and unload it until you had defeated them first.

Captain McMORRIS. That is true, but the attack coming to Wake was by shore-based planes. Whether they came in from Eniwetok or Rongelap, it was not expedient to attempt first to destroy that base, but with the marine fighting planes established ashore and with the planes from the carrier and the assistance of the carrier radar, it was believed that the hazard from the enemy bombers would not be great.

It had been noted that the daily attacks on Wake came about noon, leading strongly to the belief that they took off about daylight, getting back to their own base by dark, and that the attacks had been made by horizontal bombers.

It was our conclusion that, as the attack came on, that the ship by its own maneuvering and the protection afforded by the fighters would make the chance of relief excellent. Aside from the bombers, if enemy surface craft attempted to interfere, they would have to come to Wake, and initially at least, we felt that the force sent would be ample to deal with such surface craft as might reasonably be expected there.

It was not deemed feasible to attempt a search of the wide ocean areas around Wake before bringing the cargo and carrier in, because the search would have to be made each day, and it would be only moderately effective and dangerous to the cargo vessel. There would be danger from such a source.

General McNARNEY. Do you have any knowledge of the method by which the British used to supply Tobruk in the face of [853] shore-based aircraft?

Captain McMORRIS. I have no detailed knowledge of that, sir. I might say that the offshore-based aircraft that would be approaching Wake would be coming from a base some 600 miles away.

General McNARNEY. Then it would be comparatively more simple at Wake than it was at Tobruk?

(There was no answer.)

[854] General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. General? Nothing?

Admiral STANDLEY. Are you still Admiral Pye's operating officer?

Captain McMORRIS. His planning officer; yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who made the decisions to change the plans for this Wake force? Admiral Pye?

Captain McMORRIS. Admiral Pye, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, we have to request that nothing that goes on in this room shall be discussed outside the room.

Captain McMORRIS. Yes, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Admiral Pye was very busy, but he can be here on five minutes' notice, so he has just been called.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. Stenographer, will you note that the list of commanding officers present on their ships on the morning of the attack is to be marked "Kimmel Exhibit No. 2," and not copied in the notes.

(List of commanding officers present on their ships on the morning of attack was marked Kimmel Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

The CHAIRMAN. Copies of the daily reports of the shore patrol for December 7, and 8, produced by Admiral Kimmel, will be marked Kimmel Exhibit No. 3 and not copied.

(Copies of daily reports of shore patrol, December 6, 7, and 8, were marked Kimmel Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, Admiral?

[855] **TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM SATTERLEE PYE, UNITED STATES NAVY, COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Admiral PYE. William Satterlee Pye, Vice Admiral, United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to December 7, sir, you were in command of what unit of the fleet?

Admiral PYE. Commander Battle Force.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that known as a task force of a particular number?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir. It was a reorganization of the fleet, not as a Navy Department reorganization but by the Commander-in-Chief, into three task forces. The task force of which I was in charge was Task Force 1.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that include all the battleships?

Admiral PYE. No, sir. It included two divisions of battleships; one division of light cruisers, normally five ships; two squadrons of destroyers; and a light cruiser-destroyer-flagship, the Raleigh.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any battleships except those belonging to your command in harbor on the night of December 6?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir. Division 1, the ARIZONA, OKLAHOMA, and NEVADA were part of Task Force 2 but under my command in the organization as Commander Battle Force.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, when had the battleships in your force and those belonging to Task Force 2 come into harbor, if you know?

Admiral PYE. The task force of which I had command entered port on the 28th of November. The Task Force 2 battleships about five days later.

The CHAIRMAN. December 2 or thereabouts.

[856] Admiral PYE. About December 2, as I recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you, sir, on the morning of December 7?

Admiral PYE. I spent the night at the Halekulani Hotel in Honolulu where my wife was staying. Do you wish me to describe what I did that morning, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral PYE. At about 8 o'clock in the morning I had just finished shaving, and I heard gunfire. From one window of my apartment I could view the general direction of Pearl Harbor, and looking out the window I saw bursts of anti-aircraft gunfire projectiles. I said to my wife, "It seems funny that the Army would be having target practice on Sunday morning," and naturally was a little disturbed at the possibility that it might be something else.

I dressed immediately, but before I had finished dressing one of my staff called on the telephone and said he would be by for me in ten minutes. He is living further out and at about that distance from me by car:

I went down to the place where he would meet me. Before he arrived Admiral Leary, who lived in the same apartment with me, came down at just the same time, and we were offered a ride to the Navy Yard by a Mr. Kimball, who is the manager of the Halekulani Hotel, so we left word for my staff officer that I had gone on.

As we approached the Navy Yard there was still considerable firing going on, but when I got to the officers' club landing, the boat which had been ordered for me was awaiting. As I got into the boat the two staff officers, one of whom had telephoned me and another who lived nearby, got out of their car and joined me in the boat. We went directly to the CALIFORNIA.

The CHAIRMAN. She was your flagship?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

[857] On the way across the harbor we saw the damage that had been done to a number of the battleships, including the CALIFORNIA, which at the time that I boarded here had a slight list to port.

I immediately went to the bridge and found my chief of staff there, consulted with him as to the orders which had been given, and found that he had complied with the orders which were included in our battle book, which was always available to the staff officer on duty to indicate to him all that the orders required in such an emergency.

While we were consulting on the bridge another attack developed. When the guns began firing it was impossible for us to continue our conversation, and we walked into the flag conning tower. Shortly after this, possibly not over 10 or 15 seconds, there were a number of bombs fell on and in the immediate vicinity of the CALIFORNIA. There was one definite explosion and at least three which appeared to be near hits, due to the violent movement of the ship as the bomb exploded.

Communications in the flag conning tower were lost about this time. After a few minutes they were restored, and all of the orders necessary for the sortie had been issued, but about this time we received a message from the signal tower of the station saying there was a submarine in the channel. I then issued further orders to the commander of destroyers battle force to detail some of the destroyers which were then making a sortie to sweep the north channel in an endeavor to locate the submarine which had been reported.

Not long after this there was a second bombing attack, but to the best of my recollection there were no direct hits. Although I believe the ship says there were two altogether, I wasn't cognizant of the second explosion. But soon again communications failed. During this period between these first and second bombing attacks the NEVADA, which had gotten under way, passed us in the channel; and, having been informed [858] that there were submarines in the channel, and being afraid that if she were torpedoed there it might block the channel, I sent her a signal not to go out, but about this time she was either hit by a bomb or mine and quite seriously damaged. She was beached just clear of the channel and clear of the entrance to the dry dock, the commanding officer having used considerable judgment and skill in managing to keep her clear of both places.

There were two light cruisers that had gone out just previous to the NEVADA and before I had received this message of the submarine in the channel. There were two other cruisers of this group. There are normally five in the division, but one was away on convoy duty, so there were four present. There were two of these four at piers in the Navy Yard. They had not yet gone out, and I was uninformed as to whether or not they had been damaged; but, believing that the proper place for me was at sea if I could get there in any vessel of my force, I told my chief of staff to get my operating staff officers together and we would shift over to any other ship of the force that could get out. We got a boat alongside, and about this time, before we had gotten into the boat, we received a signal from the Commander-in-Chief that no further ships were to sortie. I didn't know how long this order would be in effect, so I with the staff—my staff members—reported to the Commander-in-Chief to obtain such instructions from him as he might have to give me under the circumstances. He then told me that he had given instructions for no further sortie and directed me to remain with him to assist him until he gave me further orders.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you cognizant of the Navy Department's communication of November 27?

Admiral PYE. I was cognizant of it after it had been received for about four days. My task force was at sea at the time it was received.

[859] The CHAIRMAN. Did you when you learned of it accord it any significance as a warning of a possible air raid on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral PYE. I did not believe that that was probable. In fact, I can say that I didn't think it was of sufficient danger, under the conditions, for changing our regular operating plan. I had been familiar with the advice which we had received as to the probable impracticability—at least, that torpedo planes would not be effective in such shallow water. We had had numerous drills in anti-aircraft raids, and from these I think that there was no question but what we developed the feeling that we would have adequate time to man our guns fully before raiders could arrive.

The CHAIRMAN. Upon what would you in your professional judgment depend for such adequate warning, Admiral?

Admiral PYE. I would have depended to the maximum extent upon scouting by aircraft, but it was reasonable to suppose that with all of the Army observation posts it would be impracticable for enemy aircraft to arrive in this position in such a fashion that we could not fully man our guns.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you informed that the Army Warning Service was in operation?

Admiral PYE. I had no information, because I was at sea 50% of the time and had a definite job to do at sea, and which I was trying to do to the best of my ability.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you assume that the Army's anti-aircraft warning service was in full operation?

Admiral PYE. I assumed that it was in adequate operation to give us the warning, because on these anti-air-raid drills we had so been warned by the warning net, by the Commandant of the District.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the last of those drills in which you had any part, sir?

Admiral PYE. About the date? We can get those, very [860] presumably. I have here the last of the exercises conducted at sea, but I haven't the date of that, sir, but I can get it.

The CHAIRMAN. It may have been in the latter part of November, may it not?

Admiral PYE. Yes, I think it was after we came in that last time, but if I remember correctly it was 7:30 in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Of, say, October 29?

Admiral PYE. I would like to give you that.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean November 29.

Admiral PYE. I would like to give you that definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Commander Covington could get us that supplied.

Admiral PYE. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, do you know whether those messages actually came from the Army Warning Service, or were they canned messages sent by the District Commander?

Admiral PYE. I don't know, because we got our information from the air raid in the District.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you spoke also, Admiral, of a scouting service, distant scouting service. I presume it was no part of your duty to know what scouting service was being maintained at that time?

Admiral PYE. That was not in my task force, and my only information was that it was being done to the maximum capacity consistent with the planes that they had and the necessity for training.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it surprise you to know that there was no day scouting practically at all, either inshore or distant?

Admiral PYE. I should think that that might be considered a surprise, because we could see—whenever we were in the operating areas we were always covered by patrol planes in the morning search.

[861] The CHAIRMAN. You were?

Admiral PYE. All the operating areas as a rule were covered. Now, the number of vessels operating in the areas at the time was very few, because the two task forces with the carriers had gone to the westward.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral PYE. And the three battleships of Division 1 were operating in that area.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, you spoke of the attacks on the flagship as by bombs. Were they bombs or torpedoes?

Admiral PYE. I spoke of, that after I arrived she had been torpedoed in the first attack previous to that.

General McNARNEY. And the second attack was by bombers?

Admiral PYE. The second attack, apparently—

General McNARNEY. Horizontal or dive?

Admiral PYE. I couldn't—I didn't see them. When the guns began firing I was still talking to my chief of staff, and I walked into the flag conning tower. I believe they were high bombers.

General McCoy. Did your ship sink as a result of those bombs or from the original torpedo attack? Do you know?

Admiral PYE. Unquestionably from the torpedoes. There was a bad fire from the bombs, which lasted until fairly well that afternoon, but it was put under control.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, what was the status of your ships—your task force—and your type ships in regard to the percentage of complement on board, officers and men, and their ability to carry on the ship's duties and functions, and also the state of the batteries, particularly your anti-aircraft batteries, manning?

Admiral PYE. Liberty had been granted—could be granted to one half the crew. The officers were in duty section watch. That is one quarter of the officers on board, and each duty section had been organized as an anti-aircraft bat- [862] tery watch complete. We have had anti-aircraft battery watches a watch in four, for some months. In order to do that on a watch-and-four basis it was essential to train additional men in the battleships, taking part of the 5-inch secondary batteries and people from the—a few people from the turrets, to complete the four watches for anti-aircraft defense. We have considered that for anti-submarine work the anti-aircraft guns were equally valuable to the 5-inch 51's, which were the torpedo defense battery; so that in each section there was a complete anti-aircraft watch which had been organized for months and had been constantly trained.

The CHAIRMAN. Then that means that at no time in 24 hours were any of the anti-aircraft batteries lacking in an adequate crew?

Admiral PYE. They had adequate crews on board.

General McNARNEY. How about your damage control crew?

Admiral PYE. -The damage control crew were not particularly specified except that there was a section—we divided the two watches, each watch into two sections, so that one section is always on duty, and then they were the primary people to do the work, but in this Honolulu area the number of men that were ashore at any time was comparatively small. In fact, I have—

(A document was handed to Admiral Pye by Commander Momsen.)

Admiral PYE. I asked for this in order to determine what the percentage of officers and crew were:

The HONOLULU had 50% of officers on board and 98% of her crew.

The HELENA had 78% of her officers and 98% of her crew.

The TENNESSEE had her duty watch section and in addition to that 38 other officers. The entire complement of enlisted men were on board with the exception of 111 men. Her complement was at this time about 1700.

[863] The PENNSYLVANIA had 40 officers on board and all enlisted men with the exception of 32 petty officers on liberty.

The ARIZONA had 37 officers and all of her enlisted men with the exception of about 40—maximum of 40 men.

The NEVADA stated hers in a little different way, stating it with regard to the anti-aircraft officers. There were six of the nine officers assigned to anti-aircraft work on board and 95% of her enlisted personnel.

The CALIFORNIA had 49 officers on board and all but six men of her enlisted complement.

The MARYLAND had all officers of her anti-aircraft battery on board except one, and all of her crew except a few on patrol and special liberty.

The WEST VIRGINIA reports 80% of her officers on board and 95% of her crew.

In the destroyers, officers and men, in addition to the duty section, on board, approximately 50% of the officers, an average, and from 80 to 90% of the crew.

The knowledge that so few people were ashore here made us feel that the ships were really better protected than the particular orders that were in force, because although 50% of the crew were allowed to go ashore they practically didn't go; and they all, with the exception of those who had families here or were given special liberty, had to be back at 1 in the morning.

General McNARNEY. Captain, can you give us a paper showing the number of damage-control officers who were present for duty when the attack started?

Admiral PYE. Well, sir, it would be very difficult to. I can get it.

General McNARNEY. I mean only battleships. I only care about the battleships.

Admiral PYE. Well, you see, it's very difficult to get any records now. I can. Most of the battleships that are in [864] commission are gone. We can see what we can do, but—

General McNARNEY. Well, give it to us for the ones that were sunk then.

Admiral PYE. Well, I mean those officers, some of them, are gone. They have been split all over the place, you know.

General McNARNEY. Well, will not your records show who was the damage control officer?

Admiral PYE. Oh, the name of the man who was the damage control officer?

General McNARNEY. The name of the man and where he was on the morning when the attack started.

Commander MOMSEN. The CALIFORNIA, Lieutenant Commander Little.

General McNARNEY. And possibly I would like to interview one or two of them.

Admiral PYE. Well, I noted that Lieutenant Commander Little was the officer on board, the head department on board the CALIFORNIA. He is the damage control officer and was present, in the place at present. I think we can get him.

General McNARNEY. Perhaps we would like to have a report on all the battleships under your command.

Admiral PYE. Yes, we can get that.

General McNARNEY. And the names of a couple that were present, that we could see.

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, this state of readiness or the condition of your battery had been in existence for some time prior to December 7; is that correct?

Admiral PYE. In port.

Admiral STANDLEY. In port, yes.

Admiral PYE. On November 27 while my task force was at sea we received an order from the Commander-in-Chief to put in effect certain paragraphs of his security order which had not been in effect before that. May I read this: The three [865] paragraphs of this order which were put in effect by the Commander-in-Chief on the night of the 27th of November for ships at sea were inner air patrol for disposition or formations when in operating areas.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that page? What is the number and page?

Admiral PYE. This is a security order.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Ships at sea, d. I have got it.

Admiral PYE. e., f., and g.

The CHAIRMAN. e., f., and g?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir, which required us to go into Condition Readiness 3 on our torpedo defense batteries. Torpedo defense in this sense, though, by Commander-in-Chief's order, had been meant to be the form—the anti-aircraft defense, which was only used for torpedo—

The CHAIRMAN. Condition 3 is the lowest of the three?

Admiral PYE. But that meant a continuous watch on.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral PYE. All guns to be manned. I have also some matter in regard to the guns that were manned and the times that fire was opened by the various ships, if you care to have them introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel has produced a running report from the ships, showing, I think, at what hour and minute each of them got into fire. I am not sure that it covers that, but I think so.

Admiral PYE. I think that is the same report, and that was prepared by my order, but I think he will present it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He attached it to his report to the Department, which he has furnished us as an appendix.

Admiral PYE. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. So I think it is in there.

Commander Momsen produced a document.)

The CHAIRMAN. That is it.

[866] Commander MOMSEN. This was prepared by Admiral Pye, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. That is it.

This is not on the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral PYE. Commander Battleships states with regard to that: he had two machine guns and two 5-inch guns, in reply to my letter asking the situation in the battleships—of course, in the battleships as a task force or a type force commander, rather, who was my subordinate and the commander of those ships. I sent him a letter asking that he report these things, and in his letter he says:

Commander Battleship, Battle Force, on April 29, 1941, made effective the condition of readiness that battleships at anchor as prescribed in his letter on the subject of Security (battleships). Provision is made for the following condition: machine guns 1 and 2; anti-aircraft guns 3 and 4 (or 5 and 6). That is two 5-inch guns and two machine guns, and the anti-aircraft guns had 15 rounds per gun and a crew available at all times. The machine guns were manned continuously.

The CHAIRMAN. That means that there were crews at their stations and ammunition at their hands?

Admiral PYE. In the immediate vicinity.

The CHAIRMAN. In the immediate vicinity.

Admiral PYE. They were not actually at the guns, but near them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are you through?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, you have stated, I think, before, that you did not expect an air raid at that time?

Admiral PYE. We certainly were planning consciously to prevent one if we could, but I can't say that we expected one.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, if you had expected at that time [867] an air raid as being just as probable as you might expect a submarine raid outside when you were at sea, and if you had no knowledge as to the immediate or the exact time that this attack would come, would there have been any different disposition of your anti-aircraft battery guns?

Admiral PYE. It is pretty hard to say, Admiral. Now, I tell you, we are getting right down to the point now. We are at war.

Admiral STANDLEY. I know that.

Admiral PYE. I know, but I mean we have had the guns manned for three weeks now, and the personnel are wearing out. I mean we can't keep that up continuously. Right now there is a question whether we hadn't better cut down the number of guns that are being manned. We don't do anything else but man the guns; and in this particular situation, to my mind, it was more essential to train people and do the work than it was to keep those guns manned when we believed that the

time was such—and which was true—that the time wasn't very great, and if we had ten minutes' more warning everybody would have been there, and we didn't anticipate that they could get in without ten minutes' warning.

General McCox. Do you think they can now?

Admiral PYE. No, sir. I think that, of course, the installation of the Army Radar system is our greatest safeguard against a raid. That, unfortunately, as I have since learned, was not sufficiently developed at the time to be considered absolutely effective. We have given them several additional Radars from the Navy; and now, with the number that they have and with the training of the personnel, I consider that the greatest safeguard that we have.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, before the advent of Radar the ships had been in here about a year, year and a half now, haven't they? Nearly two years?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

[868] Admiral STANDLEY. And how long have you had Radar here?

Admiral PYE. We have had Radar in the CALIFORNIA going back about six months, I should think, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, prior to that time you had no Radar, you had no warning?

Admiral PYE. That's true.

Admiral STANDLEY. You had nothing to warn you, in that sense, of the approach of planes. Was there an effective search conducted every morning by the patrol planes prior to that time, or did that make any change in the situation here?

Admiral PYE. No, I don't think it made any change in the situation, Admiral. The number of planes that they have had out here has been limited at all times. The situation, of course, has been more tense, but the Radar from the ships was not used in port because it must be high enough to obtain the direction of the planes without interception of the hills, so from the port here there is a very limited arc from which any Radar could have been used from the ships. I feel that if we had gone to war a year ago our chances of having a raid of this nature would have just that much greater. The development along the whole line of protection against air attack has been considerable in this past year, and we have very conscientiously drilled at it. We have reams of papers here to show the exercises that we have conducted, and I have been particularly interested in the Radar and in the listening gear for submarines; and when we had these intertype exercises within the task force there has seldom been a time when we haven't had tracking and trailing exercises for the destroyers with submarines and anti-aircraft exercises of various kinds, and particularly in the last few months we have been using the Radar to assist us in destroyer attacks.

The CHAIRMAN. In destroyer what?

Admiral PYE. That is, against destroyer attack.

[869] The CHAIRMAN. Destroyer attacks.

Admiral PYE. The Radar has been quite effective against them. In the exercise that we had immediately preceding this disaster, in which I had one task force in a minor problem, we decided not to use any destroyer screen but to organize our forces in groups and to

attempt to locate the attacking destroyer simply by Radar. We were attacked by 17 destroyers, and so far as we could judge by the results, of course, they were that there was only one attack, one ship, one destroyer that got through into the screen, through the screen, and to attack the train.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, you perhaps think, then, in view of the operation of the Radar at the moment, that the pendulum has swung a little bit too far? In other words, you are using too much of the effective strength of the fleet for purely protective purposes?

Admiral PYE. I am inclined to believe that. Of course I do think that the pendulum always swings from one to the other, and the Department was quite concerned over the lack of pursuit in the air immediately after this December 7; and, as I was given the unity of command, I felt that I was responsible for knowing exactly what the pursuit were doing, and I had a conference with General Emmons and decided upon a policy for the use of the pursuit planes. At that time there were still three battleships in port that would soon be available for use and a task force comprising a carrier and three cruisers. We tentatively decided upon a policy to keep one third of the pursuit planes in the air from a half hour before daylight until about two hours after daylight, to keep one sixth in the air during daylight between 8 and a half hour before dark, to again put one third in the air one hour before sunset until a half hour after sunset. After this policy had been in effect about three days I was informed that it was too strenuous, that both the matériel and personnel were wearing out under it; and [870] although the number of pursuit planes has been now increased to 101, in order to conserve matériel and pilots we have had to reduce the requirements to one squadron, usually about 18 planes, from the period one half hour before sunrise until 8 o'clock, no planes in the air from 8 o'clock until one hour before sunset, but one third on five minutes' notice, and one squadron in the air from one hour before sunset until a half hour after sunset.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what state of readiness is in effect for the pursuits during the hours of darkness?

Admiral PYE. They have one squadron on standby five-minute notice.

The CHAIRMAN. What force is doing the distant patrol now, Admiral?

Admiral PYE. The patrol is being done by a combination of Navy patrol planes and Army B-17's, long-range bomber.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to be able to keep that up as you are doing now with the present personnel and matériel?

Admiral PYE. No, sir. We had to cut it down 70 degrees yesterday. The Army lost one bomber. They are preparing for a special flight which required a certain number, and it is also requiring for a special flight—requires another squadron. So we have had to cut it down, so that yesterday there was about 70 degrees short of the 360. That is made up in the morning from two to three hundred miles by battleship planes from the sunken ships and by utility planes of a smaller radius.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are these, the plans that have been put into effect under this unity-of-command policy by you and General Em-

mons, in the large, in accordance with the war plans previously written?

Admiral PYE. It had been in the war plans many years ago, and during recent years it had been removed from the war plans, and I believe that there was no provision unless it was so [871] specifically designated by the President. There was no unity of command previous to this order.

Admiral STANDLEY. No, but what I mean is: After this order of unity of command and after it was put into effect, you and General Emmons have had a conference, and you have put these defense and protective measures into effect?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were those measures visualized and anticipated in the war plans provided for if you had the force to carry them out previously?

Admiral PYE. Not to my knowledge, Admiral, but I am not as conversant with the plan on shore as I might have been had I been Commander-in-Chief. So far as I know there was coordination—there was discussion, but I never was personally present at any such.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, isn't it within your knowledge that the plans provided for an offshore patrol and search, if permitted?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is, the war plans provided for an offshore patrol, both for surface and air craft if the facilities and equipment permitted?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir, it was, but I didn't quite get your question. I mean I didn't understand exactly what you meant as to whether or not they had actually planned to do any particular thing with them. I did call in the general plan, but what arrangement they had made to do that I don't—

Admiral STANDLEY. No. What I am getting it: It was planned that on the outbreak of war—

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. —these measures would go into effect?

Admiral PYE. That would be certain measures go into effect.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

[872] Admiral PYE. But whether or not there would be unity of command, I don't think—

Admiral STANDLEY. The unity of command was just due to the fact that you had suddenly coordinated command of the post here. But these measures that you put in were not because of unity of command. It is something that has been planned for many years; isn't that true?

Admiral PYE. It is true in a general sense, yes, and specifically I think there was an agreement before this that the Army pursuit command would handle all of the Navy and Marine fighting planes that were available, at the same time that the Navy patrol 2 would handle all the Army bombers that could be made available for search and for attack under certain conditions—under attack on carriers or submarines or anything which did not threaten the coast line of the Hawaiian Islands.

Admiral STANDLEY. But has that agreement now been modified by the present arrangements?

Admiral PYE. No, sir. The only agreement was, in having unity of command I had to know specifically what the pursuit plan was doing because I was being asked from Washington, so I was responsible then to determine with General Emmons, in consultation with him, how much should be done with what we had, and I did too much. I mean in our effort to do the most we could we did more than we should have, than is safe to continue.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is what I am trying to get at, that these plans were conducted——

Admiral PYE. Oh, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. —if you had the force to do them, and even more if you had a force: you would do more than you are doing now?

Admiral PYE. Absolutely.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have another question or two, Admiral, relative to the night of December 6.

[873] The CHAIRMAN. He said he was in bed.

Admiral PYE. At the Halekulani Hotel.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but did you go to a party?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or was it a dinner party?

Admiral PYE. I was at a dinner party that night.

Admiral STANDLEY. At the Hotel Halekulani?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir, at the hotel.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was it a large party?

Admiral PYE. About 20, as I recall, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there other dinner parties and a large party at the hotel?

Admiral PYE. I think there was one other party, about 12; I can't say definitely.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not such, however, that you would consider it a large Naval party?

Admiral PYE. Well, this one was. This one was a Navy party, about 20.

Admiral STANDLEY. About 20. But not such as you would have two or three hundred Naval officers there?

Admiral PYE. No, sir. It was a private party.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you in uniform that night?

Admiral PYE. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not in uniform?

Admiral PYE. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the conduct of the officers on this station as far as you are cognizant of it, with regard to drunken parties, parties at which a large number of Naval officers are drunk, that sort of thing? What is your general observation?

Admiral PYE. I consider the condition has been excellent. I have seen no drunkenness whatsoever.

Admiral STANDLEY. Along the lines that we were discussing there, the unity of command, and so forth, when did the unity [874] of command go into effect?

Admiral PYE. I believe it was the 17th or 18th. I would have to check that.

General McCoy. What day did you take command, Admiral, of the fleet?

Admiral PYE. 17th.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was the day Admiral Kimmel was relieved?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was there unity of command invoked before, prior, or at the time?

Admiral PYE. It was after.

Admiral STANDLEY. After that time?

Admiral PYE. And I think it was the same time, I recall, that same evening, General Emmons reported to me.

Admiral STANDLEY. General Emmons in his report has referred to a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, and he refers there to the joint action. He said, "until and if the method of unity of command is invoked as prescribed in Joint Action Army and Navy 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9b." So that would seem to indicate that unity of command was contemplated in the War Plans 1935.

Admiral PYE. It seems to me it was just about that time it was taken out, if I remember correctly, Admiral.

(At this point the reporter was excused from the hearing room, and later recalled.)

General McCoy. Admiral, I have recalled the stenographer, and I would like to make a record of these last few questions I put to you, for a special purpose.

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And I shall repeat them.

Admiral PYE. All right.

General McCoy. Just the last two or three questions I asked you.

[875] In view of the attack and the serious damage inflicted by it, do you think the usefulness and availability of the Naval station should be restudied?

Admiral PYE. I think, insofar as its protection is concerned, it should be restudied. I do not believe that there is any other suitable base in this area, and if we intend to conduct war in this area this base must be held and used.

General McCoy. It means, then, that the Government must be made aware, if not already so, that it must be held at all costs, and that therefore they must furnish reinforcements of personnel?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Fighting planes and other protective measures?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir, I agree with that absolutely.

General McCoy. Particularly fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns?

Admiral PYE. I think those are among the most essential elements of defense, but the Commanding General I believe feels troops for the defense of the outlying islands are almost equally essential.

General McCoy. I think he has been informed of another division being sent immediately for that purpose.

Admiral PYE. I know he asked for two divisions.

General McCoy. Two?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Would you please go over again the special defenses against aerial torpedoes that have already been installed for the additional protection of ships in the harbor and dry docks?

Admiral PYE. The additional defenses which have been installed since December 7 for the protection of ships and dry-dock caissons comprise a net—an anti-torpedo net in two sections which extends across the harbor in such a manner [876] as to protect the caissons of both dry docks and one major ship berth at pier 1010.

Other protection is afforded to ships moored in berths at North Island by means of long-range practice target rafts which are approximately a hundred feet long and draw 24 feet of water, to the bottom of which has been added an additional 5 feet of steel plate.

General McCoy. Have additional security measures been taken against sabotage?

Admiral PYE. What steps the District Commandant has taken in addition to those that were effective before, I cannot personally say. I do know that they have been increased, but in exactly what respects I am not informed.

General McCoy. Have there been any steps taken to lessen concentration of Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral PYE. Yes, there has been. No ships are kept in Pearl Harbor any longer than absolutely essential for fueling, overhauling, or relaxation of personnel, and to date none has been in port more than 48 hours. That of course applies to the bigger ships, General.

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral PYE. Because the destroyers, the mine sweepers, and things like that, we have to run them in and out all the time, and the offshore patrol work and the harbor entrance work, but the big ships are kept out just as much as possible.

General McCoy. The Secretary of the Navy on his return emphasized the completeness of the Naval and military information in the hands of the Japanese prior to the attack, the meticulous details of their plans of attack. That raises the question of the complete failure on the part of the Army intelligence and of the F. B. I. and the Navy intelligence to inform the responsible commanders effectively of such espionage and such plans of the Japanese. Are you conscious or have you thought of any way to prevent that in the future?

[877] Admiral PYE. No, sir; I think that's beyond me. But in this submarine that ran aground out near Bellows Field there and they got almost everything the fellows had, he had his Navy confidential chart. Now, that was a '37 issue, but things haven't changed very much, but he had down there on every berth the name of a ship, and those ships were in those positions about three weeks before this attack. So unquestionably somebody was watching the ships and informing them of the berths; and it is quite apparent from the berths that were attacked that they knew where the big ships were supposed to be. I think that each pilot was told to attack a certain berth. I don't think he was given any initiative at all as to picking out his ship, because Berth F-9, where there is usually a carrier, was the UTAH, and the UTAH was sunk. Berths at 1010 dock they had marked ARIZONA, but it happened to be OGLALA. And another berth they had marked—there was one—they had two carriers in there and the UTAH—the UTAH or the DETROIT—RALEIGH—was at the other berth.

Now, I don't think those pilots picked out their ships at all. I think each one of them had a definite berth to shoot up here no mat-

ter what was in it, but they hoped that the thing that was there before would be in it then. There would have been no use in their shooting up these things over here (indicating on a map), and they didn't know what the effectiveness of this was going to be (indicating); and in these two here at 1010 dock was where they had the ARIZONA marked, but the ARIZONA really was over here (indicating), but three weeks ago she was going in dry dock there, and she was berthed in that berth for about three or four days awaiting to get her turn in dry dock, and somebody gave them that picture, because that is the only time the ARIZONA had been there.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, Admiral, I think the General's question was whether or not any steps have been taken that [878] would tend to prevent information of that kind getting out from Honolulu.

Admiral PYE. The General informed me that they had arrested for detention about 250 persons who were supposed to be alien sympathizers, probably alien citizens. These are being detained in a concentration camp within the city, and I have not much detailed information as to that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether a copy of that chart that was taken out of the submarine was available here or not? The Secretary I think had a photostat copy of it. Do you know whether one is available or not?

[879] Admiral PYE. I think the chart itself is; should be.

Admiral STANDLEY. The chart itself is?

Admiral PYE. Yes, Sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you make a note of this (addressing Mr. Howe)?

General McCoy. Admiral, there seems to be one other vital danger that is not under your control, but it is perfectly obvious that you have not been informed of any successful espionage on the part of the American agents of what is happening in Japanese naval concentrations?

Admiral PYE. No, sir, we know nothing of it except what we can get by radio direction finder.

General McCoy. That leaves the force here, or any American force, very much at the mercy of the Japanese fleet where it is able to concentrate and take the initiative; and, as you are quite conscious, we are on the defense, so that we are still at the mercy of any initiated enterprise on the part of the Japanese fleet; is that not the fact?

Admiral PYE. Well, it certainly is a fact that we are at a tremendous disadvantage, yes, sir. We have no information actually of their bases. We don't know what they have in the Mandates. We have only reports from various sources, which we hope are correct, that we are not certain of. Of course, I think that that is due, again, to the fact that our country did not see fit to enforce its rights upon the Japanese in visiting the Mandates. We had certain free ports, but Admiral Standley can verify that when we tried to get ships in there we didn't have any luck. They were free ports but not to us.

General McCoy. Well, now, that is a condition, not theory. Don't you think that that ought to be brought plainly to the responsibility of the Navy Department, from your responsibility here lacking that? They know it, of course, [880] but at the same time I think that in your responsible position on the outpost it would seem to me

something that you should forcibly bring to the attention of the Navy Department.

Admiral PYE. Well, I think that is very true, that we need it. I don't think it is necessary to bring it to the Navy Department's attention. I think they are perfectly convinced of it. I do feel that it is up to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific to do what he can about it, just as long as he can, to try to get planes in there; to fly in and—well, we are taking steps to try to get more information than we have.

General MCCOY. I have no further questions.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, is there any radio watch for local transmitters on the islands to see whether anybody is transmitting out?

Admiral PYE. Yes. The minute the military governor was installed they issued an order for all aliens to turn in their radios. They also issued an order that no sending sets would be allowed by anybody except by their authority, and I think there are only four sending sets that have been authorized for use. In addition to that they have made a search by patrol cars and direction finders to locate some of the sending stations that we did know were sending for the first few days after the attack, and at least on one occasion an Army sergeant located one of these, or at least they located for him a house in which they thought there was a sending set operating, and he went to there, opened the door, found a Jap operating a set, and he didn't stop to question; he just shot.

Now, that is the one particular case that I have definite knowledge of, but I have spoken to the General about it. We had a conference on that radio business the other day. The Commandant of the Yard—or the District, really wants to license all radio receiving sets, and the General isn't quite [881] satisfied that that is the best thing to do. There is some advantage in keeping the long-wave sets out if you can stop them from using them on the short wave, because then you can use your own propaganda on your local stations, and they can't get the other, but the difficulty is that it does not take much of an expert to change a long to a short or a short to a long, and you can't be sure that the fellow is not going to change it when you are not looking. But they are studying that proposition. It was put up by the Commandant, and I had a conference with General Emmons about it, because the Army at present desire to have a little counter propaganda in the Japanese language, and that is what you have got to balance it against. You have got to balance whether your counter propaganda is better than to let them have the chance of having what they hear from the long distance. Of course, if you could be perfectly certain that they couldn't receive the Japanese stations and could receive your local stations, why, you would probably be better off, but it is very difficult to be certain that they can't. But there is a very large Japanese population on these islands, and they must know something, and you really have got to feed them something, and it is better to feed them what we want them to hear than for the other fellows to do it.

General McNARNEY. Do you happen to know who gave the original directive for the preparation of plans for the relief of Wake?

Admiral PYE. Well, I think you've got to go back some time for the original relief of Wake. Of course, back on October 22, I believe, when the change of government took place, I was then on the other coast, so I don't know any of the details at that time, but I believe Admiral Kimmel decided to increase the forces at Wake at least by the 12 fighting planes which were afterward landed out there, flown [882] from the Enterprise. At the time, on December 7, the USS BURROUGHS was within two or three hundred miles of it, with various extra stores and radar, more munitions and things that never got there because of the war. The ship was turned around, or turned around; I don't know which. I didn't know anything about it until afterward, and I don't know who gave the order for her to turn around, but she did not get to Wake.

The first connection that I personally had with it was: while I was acting with Admiral Kimmel, before I took over, there was a proposition made to send two destroyers to Wake. That was the day that the Secretary of the Navy was here. I believed it should be done, but it wasn't done.

General McNARNEY. Do you recall the date?

Admiral PYE. I think about the 11th.

Commander MOMSEN. I can look that up.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Secretary arrived at San Diego coming back on Sunday. No. Saturday.

Admiral PYE. Saturday.

Admiral STANDLEY. This happened some time the previous month. The 7th—

Admiral PYE. 14th, 13th, 12th, 11th.

Admiral STANDLEY. Sunday was the 13th when he arrived in San Diego.

Admiral PYE. Well, I think it was the 11th, then. That was not done. We had some difficulty in making any other movement early because of the logistic situation. The ENTERPRISE had been well out to Wake, within two hundred miles of Wake, in order to fly off these 12 fighting planes that went there. On December 7th she was three hundred miles from here, so she had traveled in the neighborhood of 4,000 miles, so she didn't have very much fuel there.

The LEXINGTON group which had gone out toward Midway intending to land some additional material at Midway had not arrived at Midway but was several hundred miles short of it on [883] December 7, and they were immediately directed to return in this direction. They did not get to Midway. It was hoped that the LEXINGTON might be able to fuel from a tanker. Well, the tanker was then down in the direction of the LEXINGTON group to meet them, in hopes that they could be ready again to move out towards Wake with possible relief. It took them—they waited four days before they could get any weather to fuel any ship, and finally the CHICAGO, one of the heavy cruisers was able to get some fuel, but the weather conditions even then were so bad that they did not dare to attempt it with the carrier on account of the tremendous overhang on the bow of the carrier. By that time they were so low in fuel that they decided that they would have to bring them back here as long as they couldn't fuel there. So when the ENTERPRISE came in, say on the 9th, as I recall it, of course things were still pretty uncertain;

we didn't know whether the other people had gone back or not, and the Commander-in-Chief did not want to have that ship in here any longer than possible. So they got in in the afternoon and were told they had to get out at four o'clock the next morning. There was some delay in the tanker getting alongside. The winds were adverse, and the tanker was alongside the cruiser and had difficulty getting away.

So when the ENTERPRISE left at four o'clock in the morning she only had about 65% of fuel instead of being filled up. So we had to get her out so we could get the LEXINGTON in, and we got the LEXINGTON in the next day and fueled her, and by that time the SARATOGA was coming from the West Coast, and she was due, and she had a marine fighting squadron of planes that were suitable for land work but not suitable for ship work. So we decided then to shift from the LEXINGTON to the SARATOGA, bring the SARATOGA in and fuel her and then send her to the westward to relieve Guam with the Tangier, which is an aviation tender which was filled up with gasoline, stores, and ammunition.

[884] The CHAIRMAN. We know the story from there on.

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Admiral PYE. You know the story from there on?

The CHAIRMAN. We know the story from there on.

Admiral PYE. This question of fueling at sea—for a year now every time we have had a week's exercises we have always had some ships fuel, and we have had other ships tow other ships, but when you get out in these broad swells they have here in the broad Pacific it is a difficult job. The logistics of operating these things at 2,000 miles from base, where you can't be sure you will have an open channel in advance, is turning a lot of hair gray, and it will turn lots more before we are through with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else?

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. We shall excuse the stenographer, then.

(At 4:55 o'clock p. m. an adjournment was taken until tomorrow, Wednesday, December 31, 1941, at 9:30 o'clock a. m.)

[885]

C O N T E N T S

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1941

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Rear Admiral William Lowndes Calhoun, United States Navy, Com- mander Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet-----	951
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¹Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[886] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1941

LOUNGE OF THE WARDROOM,
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR,
UNITED STATES SUBMARINE BASE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m., Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Call Admiral Bellinger.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL PATRICK NEISON LYNCH
BELLINGER, UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Please give your full name to the reporter.

Admiral BELLINGER. Patrick Neison Lynch Bellinger.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was your command on and prior to 7 December last?

Admiral BELLINGER. In order that I may not forget some of the titles I held, I would like to refer to a memorandum [887] I made this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral BELLINGER. Command of patrol wing 2, which placed me in command of the patrol squadrons and aircraft centers assigned to patrol wing 2. In addition I was commander, fleet air detachment, which gives control of all aircraft based on Ford Island.

By special directive from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, I was also placed in command for operational control of patrol wing 1, which comprised squadrons patrol wing 1 plus tenders, aircraft tenders attached to patrol wing 1.

Later this force was designated task force 9, and I was commander of task force 9.

In addition I was Commander Naval Base Defense Force, which functioned under the Commandant 14th Naval District and under the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet.

In addition I was liaison with the Commandant 14th Naval District for all aviation development affecting the patrol planes in this area and all outlying islands including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston.

Admiral STANDLEY. I wish you would give me the number of planes and types of planes in your command, as part of your last answer.

General MCCOY. May I insert a question before that?

Do I understand that you have been responsible as chief air officer on duty here in command of everything having to do with the air activities except those pertaining to the fleet itself?

Admiral BELLINGER. With reference to all planes that were under my command directly, which included patrol wing 1 and patrol wing 2 and such planes of the fleet as were shore-based; while shore-based they came under my direction.

They were subject, of course, to the orders of the commands [888] to which they were attached, but while shore-based and as such they were under my instructions.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me understand, Admiral, for my own information: Was patrol wing 1 a part of the fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, and also patrol wing 2.

The CHAIRMAN. And also patrol wing 2?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And those two were land-based?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And while they were land-based, they were under your exclusive command?

Admiral BELLINGER. You are referring to patrol wings 1 and 2?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. They were at all times under my command.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether operating with the fleet or shore-based?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. They were always either shore-based or tender-based. The are large flying ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Not the sort used on carriers?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any responsibility in connection with the planes assigned to carriers?

Admiral BELLINGER. Only when they were shore-based.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would only be when they were removed from the carriers? And based on land?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that involve temporary basing when they would be removed from the carrier?

Admiral BELLINGER. Whenever any planes landed on Ford Island they became a part of the fleet air detachment while they were on Ford Island.

[889] General McNARNEY. Does that include Marine planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Marine planes if on Ford Island, yes. They were attached to and a part of the fleet, and all fleet planes when shore-based came under the fleet air detachment.

The CHAIRMAN. Weren't some of these Marine planes based at Ewa?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they under you?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. At present they are, but since Sunday—you refer to that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. The setup has taken place wherein I have been charged with arranging and controlling with reference to Ewa, Kaneohe, Kauai, and Ford Island.

The CHAIRMAN. So you now have an over-all command which covers those planes at Ewa?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes. May I explain further?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. The planes that are attached to the Marines or to any other portion of the fleet except patrol wings 1 and 2 do not remain permanently under my command. They are only under my command when they are shore-based, and they may be removed from such status at any time by the responsible commander who has charge of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would be the commander who could remove the Marine planes based on Ewa from your command, and how would he do it?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Commander, Aircraft Battle Force, is in command of all carrier detachments. The Commander Battleships is in command of all battleship planes that may be based on shore. The Commander Cruisers is in charge of all cruiser planes that may be based on shore. They come and they go as directed by those commanders.

[890] The Marines are a part of aircraft battle force similar to the carrier groups that are based on carriers.

The CHAIRMAN. Then if the Commander Battle Force, for example, desired a number of planes for a mission somewhere beyond the operating area of the Hawaiian Islands, the planes he would call for for that purpose would automatically be removed from your control for the time being?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And similarly from those other commanders who might call for planes and remove them from a shore base?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the situation prior to December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It was?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then your status in the respective commands has not materially changed since December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Except with regard to the Marine planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. It merely refers to the adding more responsibility in connection with the Maui airport or locating the base on the Ewa base.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me see if we can clear this up a little bit.

Admiral, suppose a carrier comes in and ties up at a buoy and retains her planes on board. In that case, although she is tied up in this harbor, these planes would be under the command of the carrier and you would have nothing to do with them?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct. They would not be shore-based.

Admiral STANDLEY. But if before she comes in her planes take off and land on shore, either at Ford Island or some other place, they are then under your command?

[891] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, under my command.

Admiral STANDLEY. Before the 7th you did not have Maui under your command?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. So it was only in case they landed on Oahu that you had command of those carrier planes if they landed ashore?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You had Marine planes at Ewa?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And with those Marine planes, as long as they were at Ewa, operated by the Marines, would they be in exactly the same status as those carrier planes that are on the deck of the carrier when she is in port?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not exactly, no, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And what is the difference?

Admiral BELLINGER. They operate under the Marines but in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force operations. They can be put by my instructions in operation if and when they are based at Ewa.

May I explain a little off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and make your explanation on the record, Admiral.

Admiral BELLINGER. This [referring to a document] is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2C1-41 revised.

The CHAIRMAN. We have it.

Admiral BELLINGER. As of October 14, 1941.

There was an original one which stated practically the same thing insofar as the air units are concerned, and it was issued several months prior.

This directive places the Commandant 14th Naval District as the Naval Base Defense Officer, and as such, "He shall exercise supervisory control over the Naval Shore-Based Aircraft, arranging through Commander, Patrol Wing 2, for coordination for joint air effort between Army and Navy."

[892] By the authority of this letter and by action resulting therefrom, there was prepared a joint estimate of the situation which affected the Naval Base Defense Air Force operating under the Commandant 14th Naval District.

That joint estimate is dated March 31, 1941, and it is signed by myself and General F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just a minute. Let me get that straight. What is the date of that?

The CHAIRMAN. March 31.

Admiral BELLINGER. March 31, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. That was prepared under the predecessor order.

Admiral BELLINGER. The first one.

Admiral STANDLEY. The first one?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

In arriving at decisions in that joint order there was set up a searching and attacking group under command patrol wing 2, and the following units in accordance with the current conditions of readiness: patrol squadrons, shore-based VOV units; shore-based carrier VV and VT.

Admiral STANDLEY. What does that mean?

Admiral BELLINGER. They are planes on the battleships and cruisers; shore-based carrier VS planes; shore-based Marine VS and VV squadrons; Army bombardment squadrons; Army reconnaissance squadrons; Navy utility squadrons. Then there was the air combat group under the command of Hawaiian Air Force, which included the Army pursuit squadrons, shore-based carrier VF squadrons, and the shore-based Marine VS squadrons, and one division of shore-based carrier VS planes. The latter was primarily for trailing aircraft.

In this estimate of the situation there is a statement:

Aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain for any extended period their bases on [893] Oahu, and a patrol extensive enough to insure that air attack from Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.

The CHAIRMAN. In your judgment did that statement that you have last read continue to apply to the situation to and including December 7, 1941?

Admiral BELLINGER. To and including December 7 and including up to date.

The CHAIRMAN. You were then, as I understand it, setting up an estimate and plan which was an ideal, to be attained if sufficient units were supplied to you?

Admiral BELLINGER. Exactly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had in mind to inform the Commission in what respects and to what extent your available materiel was sufficient on December 7? If you have, you may do it now or when it seems appropriate to do it in your statement.

Admiral BELLINGER. On December 7 the total number of patrol planes available to my command was 81. Of those a total of 72 were available for flight. There were at Kaneohe 33 available for flight.

The CHAIRMAN. Thirty-three what?

Admiral BELLINGER. Thirty-three patrol planes.

At Pearl there were 28 patrol planes available for flight. At Midway there were 11 planes available for flight. Of those at Pearl, 12 planes had returned from Midway on 5 December after arduous duty at Midway and Wake since 17 October.

This squadron was in a relatively poor matériel condition because of its extended operations at advance bases with inadequate facilities for normal repair and upkeep.

That actually gives an availability of 60 planes available for flight at Kaneohe, Pearl, and Midway or 49 at Pearl and Kaneohe.

[894] Of those 60 planes three planes, armed with two depth charges, were conducting a search assigned to the fleet operating area in accordance with United States Pacific Fleet Letter No. 2CL-41 revised.

Three additional planes of that particular squadron were on 30-minute notice. At Midway five planes were conducting search of a sector out to a radius of 450 miles.

[895] General McCoy. I would like to get clear in my mind. He spoke of 12 planes having returned. Now, are those included in the 49 that were reported available for flight at Pearl and Kaneohe?

The CHAIRMAN. These 12 planes that had come back on the Friday, you are not counting those in the 49?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Those are in addition to the 49?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are in addition to the 49. But you would not call them fit for use to repel a surprise attack? Or would you?

Admiral BELLINGER. Their primary use was for search operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Search; that is right. They would not be available, then, for search?

Admiral BELLINGER. The 49 planes?

The CHAIRMAN. No; the 12 that had just gotten back.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I would say they were not. Anything can be done in an emergency.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Or anything is possible.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not like to send them out?

Admiral BELLINGER. Normally speaking, they were not available for continued flight operations.

General McCoy. And they were not in flight that morning?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what else have you got? Now we have got your search planes force detailed as of that morning. What else?

Admiral BELLINGER. Of the planes at Kaneohe, Pearl, and Midway, the following were operating:

Three planes armed with two depth charges, each conducting a search of assigned fleet operating areas in accordance with [896] U. S. Pacific Fleet letter No. 2CL-41 revised.

Three planes at Kaneohe in Condition 2. That is, thirty-minute notice.

Five planes were conducting search of sector 120 degrees-170 degrees, radius 450 miles, departed Midway at 1820 GCT.

Two planes departed Midway at same time to rendezvous with LEXINGTON at a point 400 miles bearing 130 degrees from Midway to serve as escort for marine scouting planes.

Four additional planes armed with two 500-pound bombs were each on the alert at Midway as a ready striking force.

These four planes took off at about 2230 GCT upon receipt of information on the attack on Pearl Harbor and searched sector 060 to 100 degrees, radius 400 miles.

The 12th plane of that squadron at Midway was under repair in the hangar at Midway.

There were four planes from Pearl conducting intertype tactics in area C-5 with U. S. submarines.

General McCoy. That was over at Lahaina anchorage?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. That is in the sea area and operating area at sea which is assigned to submarines. It is in the direction of—in that direction, yes, sir.

General McCoy. That is the way it has been described to us before, I believe.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

All planes except those under repair were armed with machine guns and a full allowance of machine gun ammunition.

There are a lot of details about all this; I don't know whether you want me to go into it or not. I don't want to confuse the issue, but—

Admiral STANDLEY. I think what we want to know is the disposition of your forces at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that what he is giving us in detail.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. So the details of repairs, and that sort [897] of thing, I don't think we need.

Admiral BELLINGER. There is one point I would like to bring out: that replacement of squadrons with new type planes took place as follows; the dates are the arrival of squadrons at Oahu:

VP-11, 12 planes on 28 October, 1941.

VP-24, 6 planes on 28 October, 1941.

VP-12, 12 planes on 8 November, 1941.

VP-23, 12 planes on 23 November, 1941.

VP-14, 12 planes on 23 November, 1941.

These replacement squadrons were patrol planes of the PBV-5 type. They were experiencing the usual shakedown difficulties and were hampered in maintenance by an almost complete absence of spare parts. In addition, a program for installation of leakproof tanks, armor, and modified engine nose sections was in progress. The installation was planned to be a long drawn out affair in order not to place too many planes out of commission at any one time. The leakproof tanks and the armor were considered necessary with reference to readiness for war, as it was expected in accordance with plans that these planes would not remain permanently in the Oahu area but would operate from advance bases in accordance with plans: advance bases, namely, Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnston, and such other bases that might be occupied for strategic reasons wherein the planes would operate from aircraft tenders.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I gather, Admiral that you have given us your total available planes for search?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what planes did you have available for the functions of your command on the morning of December 7?

General McCoy. Before he answers that question I would like to ask him whether these replacements that he has just noted were included in the available planes, of 49, that you have given.

[898] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. You mean when I gave the list out of the dates that the various squadrons arrived? Yes, sir.

The squadrons of older planes were flown to the Pacific Coast, and the squadron took over new planes and flew them back here.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we come to my question as to planes available for other purposes.

Admiral BELLINGER. The marine air group: 18 scout bombers were in commission. Three—

The CHAIRMAN. For what uses—

Admiral BELLINGER. Excuse me. I've got to continue or it doesn't make sense.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral BELLINGER. Three of these 18 were Condition 4; that is, two hours. Ready in two hours.

There were 15 scout bombers in Condition 5; that is, in four hours.

The utility wing comprises planes which are really noncombatant planes and are merely for utility services to the fleet. There were 30 planes of various types in the utility wing, and of these 22 were in Condition 5; that is, ready in four hours.

The report from the Hawaiian Air Force, Commander Hawaiian Air Force—

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. Before you go to that: The utility planes were not of any value in repelling or preventing a surprise attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now go to your Hawaiian Air Force, if you will.

Admiral BELLINGER. I may elaborate just a moment on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. By force of circumstances we are using some of the utility planes for search in a limited sense, and [899] filling out deficiencies that exist.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say you "are" I take it you imply that you were not doing so on and before December 7.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

To continue: The report from the Commander Hawaiian Air Force received on Friday, which was evidently to continue through till Monday, was: 8 B-17's, 21 B-18's, 6 A-20's, all in condition easy five, which means all aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan; can be made ready in four hours.

The CHAIRMAN. On and before December 7 had you, under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan between Army and Navy, dated April 11, 1941, called upon the Army for the use of any of its planes for search purposes?

Admiral BELLINGER. In connection with air raid drills I had.

The CHAIRMAN. But only for those drills?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. And in order that arrangements could be made to get more out of these drills by having more planes take part in them, a schedule of these drills was set up between the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, the Commanding General, and the Commander-in-Chief I think approved. I believe that.

General McCoy. Could you normally—

Admiral BELLINGER (interposing). Leave off that latter. It was set up between the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Force.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what I am interested in particularly is whether you had reinforced the search planes at your command for

the purpose of routine search by calling on the Army for additional ships for distant reconnaissance.

Admiral BELLINGER. In connection with any drills we had had—
[900] The CHAIRMAN. I am not interested in drills. I am in-

terested in routine search.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, I had not.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we were informed by the Army, and I wanted it to be confirmed.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McCoy. Should you take advantage of that reinforcement for distant search, had you authority to call directly on the Army air commander for reinforcement or addition to your own forces?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have control over only what planes are made available.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. If no planes are made available I have none. So in connection with operations, which were as I say drills, between the Army and Navy in these air raid operational drills the number of planes available was limited, and so expressed to me, because of necessity to conduct the training which they had to conduct, and I knew from experience and liaison with them of their difficulties.

General McCoy. I take it, on the morning of the 6th, in the normal operation of the Navy patrols, that you were called upon to make certain patrols and certain liaison with the submarine commands?

Admiral BELLINGER. The submarine activities on the morning of the 7th were purely drill, arranged for as a schedule prior to that date.

General McCoy. I understand that there were two patrols to the south and southwest that you were called upon that morning to undertake and did undertake.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. The search of operating areas in the early morning is what is required by this letter 2 CL-41, and that was done.

[901] General McCoy. You did not, on that morning, call on the Army for help?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, not until after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, is it your understanding that the Joint Coastal Frontier Plan of the Army and Navy and the plan for the naval base defense, to which you have referred,—Is it your understanding that those were in operation prior to December 7, or were they war plans?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were really war plans, yes, sir. For instance, I was set up as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. Plans were made, but I was also scheduled in case of war to base somewhere else, in accordance with plans. In other words, Patrol Wing 2 and Patrol Wing 1, which were definitely under my command, were mobile forces supposed to operate with the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. In case of war?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. And they were not in any plans set up except for perhaps one or two squadrons to remain here, but primarily with reference to forming some sort of relief for the squadrons that may be operating at advance bases. They were considered mobile squadrons and were planned as such in all plans.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these plans—joint plans with the Army, and the base defense plan,—supposed to be in full operation before December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. Merely with what was available.

The CHAIRMAN. Merely with what was available?

Admiral BELLINGER. Merely with what was made available.

The CHAIRMAN. Made available. Now, you have said your force was deficient for the purposes for which it was organized. In your judgment, how far was it deficient? In other words, what additional matériel would you have needed to carry out in routine manner, before the declaration of war, the defense [902] operations that the plans contemplated?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have made considerable study of this situation. I made recommendation—excuse me. May I talk off the record a second? I made a recommendation about something which does not apply definitely to this naval base defense air force business but applies to the command which I was supposed to exercise in connection with—after war was declared.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. And in that plan I recommended as a starter, 180 4-engine land plane bombers and 180 pursuit planes to work under the Navy in connection with operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Are pursuit planes the same as search planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. They are fighting planes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Well, what about search planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. The bombing—the land plane bombers,—

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Land plane bombers could be so used?

Admiral BELLINGER. — on account of their speed, the radius of action, particularly the B-24, is considered superior in every respect to the PBV type of planes which I was operating, which are very slow and ineffectual in many ways. At the present time I have submitted a complete study of this to the Commander-in-Chief; and in that study, which is now I believe in his hands, I am asking for as many B-24 type planes—4-engine bombardment planes—up to 102 at present, to take over the search that is evidently necessary from this Oahu area.

General McCoy. Are they to be assigned to the Army or the Navy?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am asking them for the Navy. The PBV type of plane, as I say, is very slow, takes too long to cover the necessary area. There are other things connected with this number of planes in the way of equipment, such as [903] radar, which is designed to increase the effectiveness of the search, particularly when the weather—when the visibility is not good.

General McCoy. Has that report been made since the 7th of December?

Admiral BELLINGER. That report has been made since the 7th of December. A prior report with reference to the recommendation I spoke about was made—I think I have a record of that here, but perhaps two and a half months ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, I notice that in this summary of the situation under date of March 31, 1941, and your naval base defense plan, under 1-C it is said,

A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As you were a party to this statement, that was your definite view?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that—was this paper [indicating] brought to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief?

Admiral BELLINGER. This paper is part of an operation order dated April 9, 1941, and which was approved by Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, Commander Naval Base Defense Force, who was under the Commander-in-Chief as such.

The CHAIRMAN. I read that statement that I have quoted to you as envisaging that notwithstanding the fact the United States was no at war with Japan a successful raid on Pearl Harbor or Oahu might cripple the United States Fleet's offensive action should such war occur. Am I right in so construing it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, it was a matter of knowledge that a surprise air raid by Japan, either at or just prior to the [904] declaration of war, might seriously cripple the mission of our Pacific Fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In your judgment and knowledge, was that fact and the inability of the command here to meet adequately such a raid brought to the attention of the Navy Department?

Admiral BELLINGER. In answering that question I would like to refer to a letter which I wrote the Chief of Naval Operations through official channels on January 16, 1941:

I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the International situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

War readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on the planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons but also on many operating needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which the Patrol Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements for War Readiness include: spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equipment, squadron equipment, spare parts, stores, material, bombs, ammunition, base operating facilities, overhaul and repair facilities, qualified personnel to man all base facilities and shops, all in sufficient adequacy to insure continuous operating readiness. These cannot be provided overnight. [905] The isolation of this locality from the source of supply, the distance, and time involved, make careful and comprehensive long distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in the past, the average interval between the normal request and receipt of material has been nine months.

A reference to which I refer—I am not quoting this from my letter now—states as follows:

"In about one year practically all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection." unquote.

As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol Wing TWO, this evidently means that there is no intention to replace the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one year and that Patrol Wing TWO will practically be the last Wing to be furnished

new planes. This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to me that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their view.

Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance; certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning patrol plane needs to enable bureaus and offices to take the necessary steps to provide and to anticipate such needs.

If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for patrol planes and undoubtedly much will be expected of them. Considerably more attention [906] will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action taken to provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and offices concerned if patrol planes are to perform according to expectations.

It is therefore urgently recommended that those concerned with War Plans and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and offices view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the International situation in the Pacific; that each bureau and office check and recheck their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emergency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to insure that we may not be "too late."

Then I list a lot of deficiencies. That was practically the first letter I wrote after coming out here. There have been a great many letters, many of which have been equally as strong.

The CHAIRMAN. The thing I fail to find in that letter, Admiral, is any reference to the necessity to protect this base from sudden air raids, anticipatory to war. Your letter as I listen to it indicates the needs for additional materiel in offensive operations when and if undertaken at the outbreak of a war. What if any warning did you or anyone else, to your knowledge, in this fleet and naval district, give to those in Washington of the utter inadequacy to meet a raid, which it is plain all those in command here had in mind?

[907] Admiral BELLINGER. This letter which I read, as I say, was dated January 16, 1941, and prior to the formation of the naval base defense air force. It was merely to indicate the general situation here.

General McCoy. It was your responsibility, however, if the Navy couldn't do what you asked, to be prepared with what you had to meet any surprise attack in a critical situation, was it not, even if they didn't supply what you asked for?

Admiral BELLINGER. It was my job to do the best I could with everything I had. No question of that.

General McCoy. Were you conscious of the fact that from 1905 on, Japan had always attacked before a declaration of war?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Were you also conscious that the Germans had also attacked before the declaration of war?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And usually on a week-end?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did you take additional precautions over week-ends?

Admiral BELLINGER. There have been on some week-ends, yes, sir, but on this particular week-end there were no special precautions taken, no, sir.

General McCoy. Did you not immediately prior to that tragic week-end receive a war warning?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, except what I could glean from papers, newspapers.

General McCoy. Did you not see the despatch that came from the Navy Department on November 27?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Were you not informed of it?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Have you seen it since?

[908] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. When was it shown to you?

Admiral BELLINGER. I read it perhaps five or six days ago.

General McCoy. Had you seen that, would you have been particularly solicitous and taken special precautions as a result of a war warning of that sort?

Admiral BELLINGER. I hope I would have, and I think I would have.

[909] The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, if you had been impressed by it, what measures would have been taken? This is hindsight, sir, but I would like to have your view.

Admiral BELLINGER. It is a question what could have been done continuously with what we had. I will state the situation now as a result of the experience since this 7th, and also from what we estimated prior to the 7th. The question is, with the number of planes and with the number of crews for the planes, how long can you maintain a search operation of so many planes at distances of between seven to eight hundred miles radii?

General McCoy. Were you conscious of any special danger at that time?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have been concerned, conscious of this danger, as this letter indicates, at periods of time, but particularly since arrival here. I also viewed the information gleaned from the newspapers with considerable alarm and interest.

General McCoy. And were you completely surprised on the 7th of December?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, I was completely surprised. I was recuperating. It was to be my first day up since Tuesday with the flu. I heard some noise of planes, which sounded as if they were diving, and I heard the thud of a bomb; and then in about 20 seconds the telephone rang. My operations officer informed me that there was an air raid and that it was a real one.

I arrived in the operations office, I should say, in about 15 or 20 minutes or less while the first bombardment was going on.

I should say that it was a surprise. As a matter of fact it has been expressed—I have heard it expressed by senior officers wondering if an attack of this kind would be made here or would ever be made.

[910] General McCoy. Did you think it possible that such an attack could be made?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, and it is possible today, and the same way almost as on December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. In spite of the prophylactic measures that you have put into operation?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. It is not with any degree of assurance that we can locate and prevent a carrier from coming in here and getting within range undetected, as the last attack.

The CHAIRMAN. And that irrespective of how much of a search force you are provided with by the Department?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. With more planes, more effective planes, a search can be made more effective. For instance, for the commander of a search group to be able to state with some assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away from Oahu and launch an attack without prior detection would require an effective daily search through 360 degrees to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 15-mile radius of visibility, this would require a daily 16-hour flight of 84 planes.

The CHAIRMAN. Which even today you cannot afford?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have not got that many.

General McCoy. Do you have that many with the additional reinforcements from the Army?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. At the present time we are using from 12 to 16 planes from the Army of the B-17 type to assist in the search. We are using from 25 to 30 in that search. We are endeavoring to have a 46-plane search every day from seven to eight hundred miles, but that cannot be kept up.

General McCoy. In other words, that imminence of danger now is due to the fact that you are on the defensive and that the Japanese can take the initiative?

[911] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McNARNEY. In other words, you are not safe without attacking the Japanese in their bases or at a considerable distance from Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Has not the United States Fleet been prepared to do that prior to this time and now?

Admiral BELLINGER. The United States Fleet to attack the enemy in their bases, you mean?

General McNARNEY. Or other defense bases. In other words, you are in the same position as the Japanese. They have defense bases in the Marshall Islands. We have defense bases here on these stepping stone islands. In other words, you do not say the Japanese can do things that we cannot do?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, because I do not say that.

General McCoy. Wouldn't the proper way to stop that be for us to take the initiative and to do the same thing that the Japanese are doing?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

There is one situation that I would like to discuss a little bit on that. That is the Wake Island relation. That is one island sitting out in the Pacific within range of at least three Japanese islands. This puts Wake Island is a little different status than the Japanese islands.

General McCoy. However, our fleet on that day was considered to be much more powerful than the Japanese fleet, was it not?

Admiral BELLINGER. That depends on where our fleet was going to go. To meet out in the open sea is one thing, but to go over there and meet them is another thing.

General McCoy. In other words, we were waiting for an overt attack on the part of the Japanese?

Admiral BELLINGER. Apparently, yes, sir. We were waiting for war to be declared or waiting for an amicable situation to [912] prevail.

General McCoy. Were you familiar with the plans of the Commander-in-Chief to take advantage of an attack on Wake?

Admiral BELLINGER. To take advantage of an attack on Wake?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't think so, no, sir. I do not know whether I understand you exactly. Do you mean whether I am familiar with the plan to take advantage of a Japanese attack on Wake? To take advantage of it?

General McCoy. Prior to December 7, did you ever know of any such plan?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was familiar with the war plan, Rainbow 5, war plan.

General McCoy. But not familiar with the specific proposed action of the task force that if Wake should be attacked that the task force would take advantage of the Japanese Fleet attacking Wake and to dispose of it? Have you heard of that?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I am not familiar with that detail; no, sir.

General McCoy. Did you receive any special instructions from the Commander-in-Chief after the 27th of November that would indicate certain plans for offensive action on the part of the United States Fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. The plans which had to do with the landing of these Marine squadrons at Wake and Midway I was familiar with, and I had knowledge of the patrol planes out there, also. I was familiar with the orders to carry depth charges in patrol planes.

At 7:35 on the morning of Sunday, the 7th, a message was decoded which stated that one of our patrol planes under my command had sunk an enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance.

General McCoy. Did you receive that before the attack [913] from the air?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. When did you get that?

Admiral BELLINGER. I got that when I got down to the office right after the attack.

General McCoy. When had it been received there?

Admiral BELLINGER. At 7:35. At 7:35 the message was decoded and the information received by the staff duty officer. At 7:37 it was relayed to the operations officer. At 7:40 it was relayed by telephone to the staff duty officer of the Commander-in-Chief.

General McCoy. What did your staff do?

Admiral BELLINGER. At 7:50 my operations officer had a search plan drafted. At 7:57 the first bomb was dropped near the hangar on Ford Island.

At 7:58 the message was broadcast to all ships saying, "Air raid, Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill."

I think that identical message was sent by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet also.

General McCoy. Was that the only information you had prior to the attack of the presence of hostile forces of any kind in this vicinity?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. There had been no previous reports of submarines in this vicinity?

Admiral BELLINGER. None that I knew of, sir.

General McCoy. Did any part of your force at any place on this island see any hostile planes in the air prior to the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you, or was the Army to your knowledge, maintaining an inshore patrol on the morning of December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. By "inshore patrol" you mean—

The CHAIRMAN. I mean a patrol around the circumference [914] of Oahu to a distance of 20 or 30 miles out.

Admiral BELLINGER. I am not informed of any patrol of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. I have been informed by the Admiral in charge of 14th Naval District that he had been advised by the Army that they had but two or three planes capable of such work, but he did not know whether they were out on that morning, and you say you do not know?

Admiral BELLINGER. No.

General McCoy. Did you have any conferences with the Army Air Corps Commander, General Martin, on the days preceding the attack and immediately preceding the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have had many conferences with him on joint boards, trying to work out situations to prevent conflicts and to adjust matters for the good of both services.

As a matter of fact, the last one is right here. I think this is a copy of it, which was signed by General Martin and myself. It was the general subject of aviation facilities on Oahu.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the date of that?

Admiral BELLINGER. 31 October 1941.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the nature of that conference?

Admiral BELLINGER. The opening paragraph of this reads as follows:

In compliance with the radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department dated 2 October 1941 and a similar radiogram to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, a joint Army-Navy Board was convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating area for all purposes for the entire Hawaiian Area with particular recommendations on the jurisdiction of Kahuku Point area.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the result of the conference?

Admiral BELLINGER. The idea was to get another field [915] on Oahu for the basing of additional pursuit planes for the Army, and the Navy had a small place at Kahuku Point, and that was being used by the carrier planes for training. The question was whether that place was better for the Army or this place called Kipapa.

Admiral STANDLEY. This was just a question of the regular co-ordination of facilities?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, but it states some fundamentals which might indicate a general situation. So far as the Navy end of it is concerned, it was indicating the necessity of developing every possible site that was suitable for the use of aircraft, for the operation of aircraft both in Oahu and all these islands around here.

General McCoy. Admiral, I have been hearing a great deal on this subject of preparedness and the preparations seeming to be inadequate with what was available and provided for, and the question of human judgment and error not playing a predominant part, but just for the sake of following through that human element and the well known operations that are affected by rank, were you or General Martin the senior?

Admiral BELLINGER. General Martin was.

General McCoy. So far as you remember, did the question of rank in the relations between you two affect the situation in any way?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Since December 7 there has gone into effect the unity of command?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Has it affected your relations in any way so far?

Admiral BELLINGER. Scarcely none, scarcely none. My relations, dealings, are with General Tinker or perhaps General Rudolph when the question is direct with the bombardment wing.

Of course, the situation is quite different now and then [916] in regard to the closer activities that are continually going on.

General McCoy. You spoke about the great danger and the peril still in this base to the fleet that might be in this base. In other words, with all the warning now about the effects and the knowledge that you are in a state of war and prepared, you still feel that there is great peril here from an air attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. With the determined effort to press through this and the probability of supplies, I should say that there is no assurance. Of course, there will be more guns and more people to man the guns and they will be more in a state of alert than formerly. All that will have an effect. The interceptor command is continuously in operation.

General McCoy. Do you have any confidence in that giving a warning?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not fully, sir; no, sir.

General McCoy. And why not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Because planes have come in and have not been detected.

General McCoy. Do you feel that an attack such as was delivered before would come in without being detected?

Admiral BELLINGER. I would not say it is impossible, no, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, war is a state where there can still be errors of judgment and failure of a man or part of the machinery?

Admiral BELLINGER. And also of the mechanics.

General McCoy. But isn't that the case in every war situation?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, but you can't make anything to cure that situation, when there are other people working to try to break it down.

General McCoy. The great danger comes from the other side [917] having the initiative?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, that is a great danger. It occurs to me also, and I feel that there is considerable danger internally.

General McCoy. That is, from the Japanese population here, you mean?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, from the point of view of sabotage of communications and control. We are still in the horse-and-buggy days out here in many ways. There is no question about that. Our method of control of communication, I think, is rotten.

General McCoy. I do not understand what you mean when you say "rotten."

Admiral BELLINGER. Maybe I better not say that, but I have been feeling very strongly about this subject and before the 7th of December.

General McCoy. You mean your material and communications?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McCoy. They are old-fashioned?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Why do you think the Navy Department has not given you the latest type of things that you want?

Admiral BELLINGER. I presume that they have been very busy and particularly busy in the Atlantic.

General McCoy. So that is the case in war, that there are places that cannot be perfectly defended?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McCoy. And the proper national strategy governs?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, we have a very hard problem to face, but in a sense you have to make the best of what you have available.

Admiral BELLINGER. It is a most difficult problem.

General McCoy. Hasn't that always been the case? Have [918] you ever seen a time when the fleet was ready to go to war?

Admiral BELLINGER. A ship may be ready, but there are many other conditions that they have to go to to make them ready.

General McCoy. In other words, this is not an unusual state of affairs where you have an enemy force. They may not be any more ready than we are?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is true, yes, perfectly.

General McCoy. But it all goes around to the circle to the fact that they have the initiative?

Admiral BELLINGER. Any island that is on the defensive where there are aircraft carriers available to come in or where land-based aircraft can reach them, that island is in a very precarious position on the defensive.

General McCoy. It is great gamble for the enemy to send its aircraft carriers into this vicinity, is it not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, and I hope they feel that it is a great gamble.

General McCoy. Isn't it a part of the fleet's duty to prevent that?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Discounting the element of surprise, what do you think your orders to effectively ward off a carrier raid would be?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think you had better ask General Davidson that, because that is his job.

General McNARNEY. Well, you are an air man, and we want your opinion as well as General Davidson's.

Admiral BELLINGER. The question is numbers. That is one thing. Then there is the question of control, and there is no definite assurance that it can be warded off.

General McNARNEY. Weren't you able to ward off your last attack with your planes getting in the air and getting the anti-aircraft guns working effectively?

[919] Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. The planes had no effect in warding off the attack on that Sunday.

The CHAIRMAN. We had understood that the last raid by the Japanese planes did very little damage because they were compelled to fly very high.

Admiral BELLINGER. The anti-aircraft guns were going then.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that they have been effective in keeping off the planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I do think that had some effect, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your fighter planes were not out, you say?

Admiral BELLINGER. There were very few, very few, and I am really only speaking of the Pearl Harbor area where I was, in the center of it.

General McCoy. Were you able to get any fighter planes in the air at all?

Admiral BELLINGER. There were none. All the fighter planes there were were under the fighter commands. I am a little confused on that.

General McCoy. Weren't any under the command of the land-based planes you had?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral BELLINGER. The fighters came under the Army.

General McCoy. Did you have Navy fighter planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Navy fighter planes came under the command of the Army as the Army bombardment planes came under mine.

General McCoy. Had they been put by you under that Army command?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McCoy. Where were the fighter planes of the Navy at that time?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were at Ewa. There were seven [920] fighters, and five in condition, and that means that was the report that went out to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. That is, seven fighters in four hours at Ewa with the Marines.

General McCoy. Did they get into the air?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think they were all destroyed or rather damaged before they could get into the air. None of them were in the air during the attack.

General McCoy. I notice that a number of Japanese planes have been brought down. Was there any damage, so far as you know, done to the enemy by any of your particular commands?

Admiral BELLINGER. Merely from the anti-aircraft guns, or from the aircraft tenders under my command.

General McCoy. Do we have a report of the losses at the different air fields? That is, with reference to the Navy?

General McNARNEY. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. I have seen none.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McNARNEY. Did you know the existing status of the Army Radar system?

Admiral BELLINGER. I knew it was in process of being set up. I had been over to the interceptor command and looked it over. I talked

with the Navy liaison officer about it. I knew that General Davidson had gone to the mainland in connection with getting some first-hand information, and he had just recently come back and was working on that end of it.

General McNARNEY. I think you said you had no information about the message of November 27, which we call a war warning?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, I had no information on it.

General McNARNEY. Did you visit the Hawaiian Air Force or the interceptor command between November 27 and December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. With respect to the Navy fighters, [921] Marine fighters, which were becoming available to the Army, what was the method of passage of command? Was it automatic?

Admiral BELLINGER. Daily.

General McNARNEY. Automatic?

Admiral BELLINGER. It was a daily report. It was the report in the afternoon of the fighters situation and their availability.

General McNARNEY. Did the rendering of that report give General Davidson the authority to order those planes out?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, all General Davidson had to do would be to call up Ewa and give instructions as to what these planes were to do?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. This operations order signed by me and dated April 9 states that it includes all shore-based carrier VF squadrons and all shore-based Marine VF squadrons as part of air combat group, and their orders are to operate as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that a routine operation?

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, the question of the availability of planes always comes into the picture. For instance, when I speak of planes when they land on Ford Island as coming under my jurisdiction, they arrive there for a purpose and under the directions of their commander and to carry out some schedule of operations.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or for repairs?

Admiral BELLINGER. Or for repairs, rest, and training, and the availability of these planes to me is under the Naval Base Defense Air Force with their directives in connection with the commander under whom they are working normally.

General McNARNEY. Then in effect this agreement really meant nothing if the commander of it—

Admiral BELLINGER. (Interposing) The agreement was a [922] coordination agreement, trying to get something out of nothing or something out of very little.

General McNARNEY. Well, practically nothing.

If those five planes that were in commission on that Sunday morning had been given a mission by you, say, to go on patrol, and in the meantime General Davidson had, before they had taken off, sent an order down with respect to a flight disposition which he desired, which order would have taken preference?

Admiral BELLINGER. They would have taken General Davidson's order because that is the setup. They operate under his orders, and the communication is sent up by the squadron commander through the group commander under General Davidson's command.

General McNARNEY. You said with fleet action patrol wing 1 would be operating from advance bases?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, but in connection with a campaign or a plan of campaign, which plans were set up, the patrol planes were scheduled to operate at advance bases.

General McNARNEY. Where would your command be based in that case?

Admiral BELLINGER. At Midway. That was the plan.

General McNARNEY. Under that situation, who took over here as Air Base Defense Officer?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was the question: How was that going to be arranged?

It was something which was of very great concern because it should be the District affair purely rather than a fleet affair.

General McNARNEY. There was no definite plan as to what would take place at the time of such passage of command or control?

Admiral BELLINGER. If the patrol planes moved out, as they were set up to do in our war plans, there would be very little to do it with. [923] Now, the reason I spoke about this agreement, the joint board (indicating a document), is that there was a great deal expressed in that concerning who was going to do what or in reference to future plans.

I would like to talk off the record on this because it brings up a lot of the plan of the Army in this of the defense of this island which is in the statement in here. You may want all this, but I do not know whether you want it or not.

This is the statement which I would like to quote from the joint agreement, or rather from a report signed by General Martin and myself. This statement is the Navy's statement in this report:

The principal joint task assigned to Army and Navy forces permanently based in the Hawaiian Islands is to hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval base. The importance of Oahu in the Hawaiian group is due entirely to the existence of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and its attending activities. The existence of Army forces and Naval District forces in great numbers in the Hawaiian Islands is solely for the purpose of maintaining the usefulness of Pearl Harbor as a base for the various units of the fleet. The value of Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the fleet is in providing the means for fleet units to be maintained and continued in effective operating readiness at a point well advanced to the westward. It therefore appears that any military or Naval air units on Oahu which unnecessarily interfere with the maintenance of proper readiness of the fleet and which are not required on Oahu for the security of Oahu, but are required in the Hawaiian group area, should be based on other islands in the Hawaiian group.

A portion of the statement by the Army representative is as follows:

The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The [924] contribution to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is: 1, to search for and destroy enemy surface craft within a radius of action by bombardment aviation; 2, to detect and intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit plane aviation.

I just read this to give you an idea of it.

General McNARNEY. Were you particularly concerned about the possibility of sabotage?

Admiral BELLINGER. Did I have anything to do with trying to prevent it?

General McNARNEY. Are you concerned about the sabotage of the forces under your control and your equipment?

Admiral BELLINGER. The answer is yes; yes, I am concerned about it, yes. I have been constantly looking for it, as far as it can be done.

General McNARNEY. Did you find any evidences of any actual acts of sabotage?

Admiral BELLINGER. None that I could put down definitely as sabotage.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you make any special disposition of your planes at the various fields on that day to prevent sabotage or to obviate sabotage?

Admiral BELLINGER. We have been constantly on the alert to prevent sabotage and to detect it, but not specifically, especially on that day, especially on the 7th.

Admiral STANDLEY. You did not have your planes removed or dispersed because of sabotage and in order to prevent it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not any more than we had planned. We have been endeavoring to disperse the planes as practicably as possible and still maintain operations efficiently, and at the same time to maintain a watch, and we endeavored to detect the possibility of sabotage internally as well as externally.

Admiral STANDLEY. You had some planes anchored off at Kaneohe? [925]

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that particularly on account of the fear of sabotage?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, on account of endeavoring to find the best methods to disperse the planes in case of an attack. As a matter of fact, that method that was attempted at Kaneohe and Pearl of dispersing the patrol planes by anchoring them out, unless they could have been hidden, almost meant certain losses.

General McNARNEY. There would have been a different condition under high-altitude bombing attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Probably, but not exactly. The answer is that when a plane on the water is sunk, it is ruined, and one piece of shrapnel or several bullets may cause it to be sunk.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or it catches on fire?

Admiral BELLINGER. If it catches on fire there is very little chance to put it out except from just what fire apparatus there is on board.

General McCoy. In other words, battleships at anchor and your planes at anchor are both vulnerable to air attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. The question is where is the best place to secure the patrol planes, whether on the water or on the beach. From our past experience on the 7th and the kind of attack that was made we thought the best place was the beach, because in the water they may be put out of commission permanently, but on the beach they may be put out of commission temporarily and still be able to be repaired.

General McNARNEY. I will ask you to put yourself in the place of a Japanese commander, air commander, and you have gone with one or two carriers to make an attack on Oahu, when would you make that with regard to the time of the month, the time of day, and the method of attack, and assume also that you know [926] the condition of Oahu and Pearl Harbor at the moment.

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, there are many things to be considered. If I had information of the weather I would utilize that in getting into position to make the attack. For instance, there are many conditions out at sea which may enable a carrier, if it knows enough about the weather, to take a position in that area where the visibility is very low and flying is very bad, and get into a position where they could make the attack. That has been done in the war games, to my knowledge, by a ship that I was on.

Whether the Japanese know enough about weather conditions to be able to do that accurately enough, I do not know.

General McNARNEY. What is the direction of the weather from Japan over here? Does the weather move from Manchuria and China in this direction?

Admiral BELLINGER. Southeasterly.

General McNARNEY. Then normally, they should have better information on weather conditions than we have?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is what I thought, but I have taken that up with the meteorologist and he has informed me that he does not think that they know as much about it as we do in this area.

General McNARNEY. We did not think they knew as much about bombing and torpedoing and a few other things, which they seem to have known about. They may know something about this also.

Admiral BELLINGER. Does that answer your question?

General McNARNEY. I would like to have you explain further.

Admiral BELLINGER. Considering the direction of the wind, the carrier had best take a position where when it is recovering the planes, they will be getting away from the island so that the carrier can get to the southeastward and northeastward and those general quadrants.

[227] I think that would place the carriers in a place where they would not be running toward Oahu when they were recovering the planes. They should be running away from here or paralleling here.

Then, knowing that the Radar, at the present at least, has made errors which get into it at the change between day and night, there is a question of an attacking flight coming in at that time.

There is also the question of attacking on moonlight nights, which would carry it into the question of navigating of the planes satisfactorily to come in and make the attack on moonlight nights. Of course, the question of landing on board at night requires planes to be able to find the ship, and for this a certain amount of night light is required on deck, but not very much. There is a special radio homing which is available to some of the carriers and to some of the planes that enables the planes to get together with the ship at night, with the carrier having to make what is called MO.

So, it depends on what the Japanese have in the way of these electrical radio sets and so on, whether they can operate at night or not, or whether they are attacking and have to leave in time so that they can return to their ships during the daylight.

Very probably the early morning daylight attack is one of special consideration, and I would say that is most likely. When I say, "most likely," I mean most likely of success.

General McNARNEY. You do not think a moonlight attack is likely to be the most probable next performance or the next attack that will be made on Oahu?

Admiral BELLINGER. I do not know. I do not know whether these planes can go back to the carrier without making MO. I do not know whether their planes can locate their carrier definitely by this MO.

We have these problems, and I think they must have them too. [928] I do not think they want to lose any more planes than they have, but a moonlight night is something that gives me very much concern, and it might be attempted.

[929] General McNARNEY. I am very much concerned about these nights right now,—

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, I am too.

General McNARNEY. —when the moon is going to be high about an hour before daybreak, and the state of our night fighter defense is, I think, probably very inefficient. Of course, they haven't had any training, and it is a very difficult job for night fighters.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McNARNEY. And it takes months of experience, really, before a pilot gets good at it at all, before he gets an opportunity to actually try it out at night.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we shall adjourn until two o'clock, and will you be back, Admiral, at two?

Admiral BELLINGER. At two o'clock?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We find it necessary to ask all the witnesses who appear before us not to discuss their testimony or what goes on in this room with anyone.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I shall ask you to observe that.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Two o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:05 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[930]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL PATRICK GLEASON LYNCH BELLINGER, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stenographer, will you note that Admiral Pye, in answer to inquiries which he promised to obtain the answers for, has advised the Commission as follows:

That an air raid drill was held 12 November and an air raid drill scheduled but not held 29 November in view of a sortie; that an air raid drill was scheduled to be held again on 13 December.

The Secretary of the Navy arrived at 0700 on 11 December and departed at 1600 on 12 December.

Gentlemen, have you anything more?

General McNARNEY. I have nothing further.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, I want to ask some questions.

Admiral, have you seen that order (handling a document to Admiral Bellinger)?

The CHAIRMAN. Showing the Admiral order—What does it say, Admiral?

Admiral BELLINGER. It says Joint-headed "Joint Air Operations to be included as a part of Annex No. 7 HCF-39."

The CHAIRMAN. That is enough. Is it dated?

Admiral BELLINGER. 30 March, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Now you may answer whether you have seen it.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is the procedure outlined in the first paragraph there as to the availability of planes to each service on the Island of Oahu—is that in effect now?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

[931] Admiral STANDLEY. Then let me see if my understanding is correct: That order prescribes that each responsible officer is, whatever his responsibility, to make available to the other service, without requests from the other service, planes that are under the authority of the other service in time of war. In other words, in emergency or for games and whatnot, you would inform the air general here of the fighting planes under your control which would go to him in the event of an emergency or games or whatnot. He would inform you of the bombers that would come to you, and that would be done without a request from either one of the other. Is that correct?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct, sir, and I would like to elaborate a little bit. This was signed on 20 March. For some time after that was in effect there was a misunderstanding, which was cleared up later, and it was cleared up by a letter I prepared for Admiral Bloch to sign, to send to General Short. What needed clearing up was this point: when so-and-so agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent; in other words, prior to the 7th or, rather, prior to this arrangement which was effective—

Admiral STANDLEY. Of what date?

Admiral BELLINGER. I can't remember the dates. There is a letter on the subject.

Admiral STANDLEY. Prior to December 7, however?

Admiral BELLINGER. Oh, quite prior to that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Possibly in July. I don't remember the date exactly. The point was brought out that in my operation order the fighter squadrons were directed to operate as directed by Commander Hawaiian Air Force. That similar directive was not in effect with reference to the bombardment force. They operated, so to speak, by request of the Navy and were released to operate in that fashion as directed by the Commander Hawaiian Air Force to the bombardment wing or from [932] the Commanding General down.

Admiral STANDLEY. And your letter of that prior date cleared that up?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. So that, what?

Admiral BELLINGER. So that there would be standing orders for them to operate under the Navy for the bombardment, and the—similar to the way that the Navy fighters operated under the Army.

Admiral STANDLEY. And what was your procedure as to availability, as to announcing to each other?

Admiral BELLINGER. Every afternoon at—as of 3 p. m.—let me check that a second, please. (Referring to papers)—a despatch would be sent in from the various units to me, from the Navy, and with reference to the fighters I would send to the Army, and the Army Commanding General would send a similar despatch to me.

Admiral STANDLEY. That procedure was actually in operation on the 7th?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was in operation, and I was reading this morning when you asked a question of planes available; I was reading from despatches that had been received.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in all the testimony that we have had here I get the impression that your plans involved, and had to involve, daily operations and availability—they had to be reconciled with plans which would become effective when war was declared or in emergency, in the event of an emergency. Is that understanding correct?

Admiral BELLINGER. I want to make sure that I understand that question. You mean that these plans to be carried out in whole would only be carried out in an emergency?

Admiral STANDLEY. In their entirety in an emergency.

[933] Admiral BELLINGER. In their entirety, yes, sir, that is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, they provided for search or for operations which could not be carried out under the conditions of training or building or repairs, or whatnot, that you were doing from day to day?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. But they would become effective in toto upon the declaration of war?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or an emergency?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. For instance, at the present time I am exercising authority which I could not exercise before.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is because of the declaration of war?

Admiral BELLINGER. Because—yes, sir, but because of the facts of the case. In other words, the other forces—for instance, like an aircraft battle force under Vice Admiral Halsey—have certain plans for their operations; and when those plans are in here or were in here, seldom were they available because of the operations that were scheduled for them.

Admiral STANDLEY. Training operations, you mean?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now they are available for emergency? For war emergency?

Admiral BELLINGER. As the circumstances permit. For instance, when they come in now they are only in for a very short time, and it is practically necessary that the pilots have rest and recuperation and the planes have maintenance. So that they are not available to me actually because they are here. It is only actually as the facts are.

Say, for instance, when I reported fighting squadrons to General Davidson, I [934] reported, for instance, 50% were available. The others were in a state of maintenance or recuperation of personnel, and that I did not want these 50%, even, that were available, called unless it were necessary to call them, but that they could be made available in thirty minutes, because they needed sleep and recuperation when they took off in the next 48 hours or so to return to the carrier.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then, today the plans that have been evolved here are in as complete operation as they can be with the forces available?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think so. When I say "in complete operation," there is a lot to be done, and a lot of training to do the job. We are calling upon Army aircraft to do jobs which they haven't trained for, and which they are doing very well, considering everything, but they have never been called upon before to do it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, but that is consistent with the forces available?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Isn't that the best training that you could get in war time?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, if we don't make a mistake in the meantime. There is danger involved in all this—considerable. I mean by this, in lack of identification of vessels. And that is a very serious proposition.

Admiral STANDLEY. And under these conditions you still feel that the plans here are not completely effective and did not remove the dangers involved?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, I am not satisfied with them at all. I am not satisfied with the method of control, the communication facilities available, with the types of planes to do the job, and with the numbers available.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are steps still being pursued that would tend to eliminate these shortages? Is everything being done, [935] as far as you know?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have tried many ways to get things done since I have been here, as I showed in that first letter. That was one of the—that letter was designed to paint the picture out here. That has been followed up with reams of correspondence on every—in various ways. I have even told a bureau that that bureau would have to assume the responsibility for lack of readiness if they didn't do such and so. They did it, afterwards.

This is a letter—I don't know whether there is any use of reading this or not, but it is dated 16 August.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it is necessary to read it to us. Tell us the effect of it.

Admiral BELLINGER. The effect of it—or the subject of it is "Regulation communication facilities at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay." I would like to read just a paragraph in that letter:

This situation as well as other similar situations at the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, and at other new developments in this area, including Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra, was visualized many months ago, and reference which was that "shoestring" letter I read this morning—

(a)—was written with the idea of inviting attention of the Navy Department to the impending situation, in the hopes that officers and bureaus concerned would

take such steps in their planning and procurement as to prevent these and other imminent deficiencies. While not singled out for specific mention, the provision of communication facilities at Kaneohe was clearly indicated to be a matter of urgency in that it was an integral part of a more comprehensive necessity. During the seven months that have elapsed since reference (a)—

this "shoestring" letter—

was written, there [936] has been no improvement in the communication facilities at Kaneohe. Now, as then, the most reliable and quickest means of communication between Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe has been a flight between the two stations.

I further stated that unless the improvement in communications took place it may be necessary to abandon Kaneohe as an operating base until they were fixed up.

Now, the communication facilities for control of aircraft are quite extensive, to control them properly. The setup for running this naval base defense air force plan, insofar as communication control—that is, of getting information, having information coming in, and issuing the necessary orders to the various units concerned—is most necessary, and that is something that at present time is set up, but it is telephoned, and it is field type telephone or the normal telephone. There is a makeshift high-frequency radio set we rigged up to try to reach Hickam. That is the bombardment wing. But the telephone is the way we have got to get messages out to most places. Everyone is working to beat the band in assisting to try to get this set up, but they need a great deal of material out here. There is a great deal to be done.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you any questions?

Admiral BELLINGER. May I elaborate a little bit on something that I think I brought out this morning?

General McCoy. Possibly some of these questions will enable you to do that.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. These questions are based on a certain report to the Navy Department:

Its initial success—that is, the attack of the Japanese—which included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of state of readiness against such an air attack, by both [937] branches of the service. Would you answer that with respect to your own command? I would just like an answer yes or no.

Admiral BELLINGER. They came in as a complete surprise. No question of that. And we were unable to locate the carrier afterwards. If you will note, in the setup of the naval base defense force estimate—that is the air estimate—that there is a feeling—or excuse me. There is—wait a minute; let me check it (referring to documents).

General McCoy. I beg your pardon. I just want your own opinion, without any reference to anything, on these questions. You have answered that question. Now I shall pose another one:

There was to a lesser degree the same lack of dispersal of planes on Navy stations, and although the possibility of sabotage was not given the same prominence in naval minds, both arms of service lost most of their planes on the ground in the initial attack by the enemy. Is that correct, from your point of view?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, but—

General McCoy. The Navy regarded the principal danger from a Japanese stroke without warning was a submarine attack, and consequently made all necessary provisions to cope with such an attack. Was that correct, from your point of view?

Admiral BELLINGER. I can't answer that question completely. Our main effort, as far as patrol wing 2, was against submarines.

General McCoy. The Navy morning patrol was sent out at dawn to the southward where the Commander-in-Chief had reason to suspect an attack might come. Is that your understanding?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. It was sent out in accordance with the operating areas assignment, which were used by portions of the fleet, and instructions require the areas that were in use to be searched in the morning early. That is in accordance with this letter.

[938] Admiral STANDLEY. That was searches for what?

General McCoy. We don't want—

Admiral BELLINGER. I have got them listed here in a—

Admiral STANDLEY. What we want to know, Admiral Bellinger, is, what were they searching for?

Admiral BELLINGER. They are searching for submarines primarily, and they reported any unidentified vessel, but at this time particularly for submarines. They were to bomb any submarine sighted, outside of a definite area that was delineated.

Admiral STANDLEY. What were your orders? To report any unidentified vessels?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. That has been the orders for some time.

General McCoy. What proportion of your officers and men were present for duty at the time of the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. There were three divisions of six planes each that were either in the air, operating, or on 30 minutes' notice at their bases; the remainder were on 4 hours' notice.

General McCoy. It being Sunday, were any large proportion of officers and men absent from the station?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't think there were, any more than any other day or any less than any other day, because we had an operating schedule which was in accordance with assignment to duty in the departments.

General McCoy. When you reported to your command post were your staff officers all there?

Admiral BELLINGER. The duty officer and the operation officer were there, and I went down with one, which was assistant operation officer, and the War Plans officer was there inside of about three or four minutes after I was.

[939] General McCoy. You feel that everybody came at the sound of the guns, as it were?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, I do that.

General McCoy. Did I understand that you received the first report of the bombing or torpedoing or destruction of that submarine at seven-ten, sir, somewhere along then?

The CHAIRMAN. No. Seven thirty-five.

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not receive it until after.

General McCoy. I mean was it the first report? Did the report first come into your headquarters or your operating—

General McCoy. Did I understand that you received the first received first report of it.

General McCoy. Was that from one of your planes or from a surface ship?

Admiral BELLINGER. From a destroyer, I think.

General McCoy. Yes. That is all I want to know.

Admiral BELLINGER. Unfortunately, my patrol plane coded the message to the effect that he had sunk an enemy submarine one hour off Pearl Harbor entrance.

General McCoy. Were you conscious, after the attack, of any attempt to jam the communications in the air?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't know whether—excuse me. The telephone circuits and radio all went out of the picture for a while.

General McCoy. Was that due to the attack itself?

Admiral BELLINGER. It was before—

General McCoy. Was that due to the attack itself?

Admiral BELLINGER. I feel very sure that it was due to that. I, to transmit messages down to the operating outfit, went down from the office to see what the situation was and get in touch—in personal touch with the squadron commanders to give orders and see what planes were available. That was between or during the latter stage of the first bombing.

[940] General McCoy. Three waves of enemy air force swept over Pearl Harbor during the assault. As above stated, the first was substantially unopposed. Is that correct, from your remembrance?

Admiral BELLINGER. When I went from my house down to the office—my house is at one end of the island, and the office is at the other, and you can make the trip in about two minutes, between two and three minutes, I assume, and I reached there, I should say, about fifteen minutes, between fifteen and twenty minutes after the first bomb fell—there was considerable firing of anti-aircraft going on from ships, and from then on there was a continuous firing at enemy planes while enemy planes were there.

General McCoy. Well, were you conscious of three distinct attacks during the morning?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. There were two, as far as I know of. There was a high-altitude attack which may be classified as a separate attack, but that was going on during the first low phase, low attack. I saw one squadron myself, or—excuse me—one flight.

General McCoy. What was your estimate—that is, not only your personal estimate but I mean the estimate of your command—as to the number of Japanese planes that made the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am making this estimate entirely from various forms of information which has come in to me, and not from my personal estimate at all, because I had no time to watch them or count them:

There were three high-altitude bombing formations that passed over this area, each one from five planes to nine planes; the one I saw I estimated five planes, hurriedly. I hurriedly estimated five planes. They were about 8,000 feet. There was a slight broken cloud intervening between [941] the planes and the ground, the high-

altitude planes, which made it very good for the planes and not so good for the anti-aircraft fire. The torpedo planes, perhaps 21 or 27. Dive bombing, I don't know. And fighters, I don't know. I have heard some observers state that they thought a hundred planes were over in this area (indicating).

General McCoy. Do you think there was any new explosive or new type of bomb or torpedo that was unusual to your experience in our own service?

Admiral BELLINGER. They used an armor-piercing bomb made of an 11-inch shell—I think it was 11-inch—on some of the planes, at least. That was a little novel, and it did very effective work, apparently. The torpedoes, of course, did most effective work, and in a way that was not supposed to be practicable, in that in the water depths that was available and existed in Pearl Harbor it wasn't thought that torpedoes could be launched without hitting the bottom before hitting the ship.

General McCoy. Have you had any experience as a flying man with launching torpedoes from planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not as a pilot, but in general operations and in observing and studying, yes.

General McCoy. We have some torpedo planes, then, in our service, have we?

Admiral BELLINGER. The planes that I have myself here, the patrol planes, can carry torpedoes.

General McCoy. Have they ever done so?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. We have them available——

General McCoy. Are any of them available now——

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. —of that type for carrying torpedoes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Are there torpedoes available?

[942] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, they are ready with war heads on.

General McCoy. The statement is here made, speaking about the different attacks, that they would indicate an attacking force of somewhere between 150 and 300 planes. You have only given us about 50 or 60 in your estimate. Have you heard this higher estimate?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. You would not think there were anything like 200 or 300 planes in the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Of course, the planes that were delegated to go to the various places like Wheeler Field, Schofield, Kaneohe, Hickam, and Pearl, and Ewa, were all special groups assigned to go to those places, in my opinion.

General McCoy. So that there might have been, all told, a couple of hundred planes, possibly?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. To go back to the torpedo plane: Is it a normal function of training the Navy to use torpedo planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Have you had that training here?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. We have dropped them at sea, and we have planned to drop them, quite a lot of them.

General McCoy. That was developed in the America Navy first, was it not: the torpedo plane?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think Admiral Fiske claims to be the originator of the idea.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask a question just before you leave that?

General McCoy. You may.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the limit, if any, on the height from which we must drop our torpedoes now?

Admiral BELLINGER. The torpedoes that we have endeavored [943] to drop were at 75 feet, not over, and also at slow—at speeds not in excess of a hundred knots; meaner 80 knots. There are torpedoes, though, which I expected to—and maybe these can be changed—which will permit dropping at higher speeds, I think 150 knots, and also from approximately a hundred and fifty to two hundred feet. But actually, in fact, to make the torpedo attack effective I think the torpedo has got to be launched at speeds in excess of 200 knots, at least, and be able to be dropped from 200 feet, at least.

General McCoy. Have you had any indications or information that would lead you to estimate that there will be a renewal of the Japanese attack, probably with landing forces, in the near future?

Admiral BELLINGER. I talked to Admiral Kimmel on the telephone on Sunday about noon, I think, and I said to him then I expected another attack at any time.

General McCoy. Do you still feel that way?

Admiral BELLINGER. That day I thought that they probably would—that they would refuel and come back; and as they didn't do that—I don't know why they didn't, because they had a grand opportunity. I feel that they will come back, yes, and I feel that a great deal more should be done about getting ready when they do come back.

General McCoy. You mean here locally?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Or still dependent upon Washington?

Admiral BELLINGER. It's dependent on Washington.

General McCoy. Can't anything more be done here without Washington? Washington may be somewhat embarrassed for other reasons.

Admiral BELLINGER. Of course, everything as far as we can be—as far as I know about it, with all ingenuity, everybody is working, and with the endeavor to get as ready as [944] possible with what they have.

General McCoy. The statement was made: The Army and Naval commands received a general war warning on November 27. I understood you to say that you did not receive the war warning.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Not even indirectly?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. As I say, the first time I saw it was approximately five or six days ago.

General McCoy. He speaks of the loss of 75% of the Army's air forces on the island and the loss of even a larger percentage of the Navy's air forces in Oahu. 75%. Did you lose 75% of your forces here?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Did you think so at that time?

Admiral BELLINGER. We lost approximately—more than that number were out of commission temporarily. We put back in commission, and probably will be able to put back more in commission gradually, so that—it is very difficult to keep track of these planes now, but I think it probably will be about 48 planes out of 81.

General McCoy. More nearly 50%, then, than 75?

Admiral BELLINGER. It is more nearly about 45%, as far as patrol planes are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you make a memorandum, Admiral, to furnish the Commission the dates of the joint air raid operational drills for the three months preceding December 7 which were conducted on the island?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And just give us a memorandum of the dates?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood from your answers to me that you had not specifically called the Department's attention to [945] the weaknesses of coastal defense against air raid attack, although you had called the Department's attention to the deficiencies of personnel and material for the purposes of the war plans.

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not write a letter to the Navy Department concerning that, no, sir. The estimate of the situation spoke for itself, so I thought. And that went through the regular channels high up.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that estimate does call attention to the offshore patrol as well as your fleet patrol?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't want to repeat. May I speak off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Because I read this this morning.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Have you further questions, General?

General McCoy. Would that indicate to you, Admiral, that the fleet should not come into this harbor except a few ships at a time, and only when absolutely necessary for servicing?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't think that they can feel secure here, no, sir.

General McCoy. You don't think what?

Admiral BELLINGER. I say I don't think that they can feel secure.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have not thought so over this past period of months?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. This has brought the picture very clearly to the front.

Admiral STANDLEY. You mean that you didn't think they were secure in case of hostile attack or hostilities?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. I mean that—now when you speak about ships coming in here, in the light of past experience and [946] the capabilities that have been shown by the Japanese I don't think that a ship can feel secure just because it is in Pearl Harbor base.

Admiral STANDLEY. During hostilities here?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, during hostilities.

The CHAIRMAN. And you didn't think there had to be any means taken to secure them if they were in hostilities; isn't that so?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were not expecting hostilities of this nature, were you?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. Not—no, sir.

General McCoy. Do you think that the fleet should be kept at sea, or go to some nearby anchorage outside of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BELLINGER. The ships will have to come in here to get supplies and to get services and for docking when necessary.

General McCoy. Can't they be taken out to the fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, not the—no, sir, that wouldn't be feasible either, because I should say they would be probably safer in here, maybe, than out in the open.

General McCoy. How about the Japanese fleet? They seem to be able to keep to the open and to supply themselves and to fuel themselves?

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, so are we. Our ships have been doing the same thing as they have.

General McCoy. Why can't they continue to do it when Pearl Harbor is such a dangerous place?

Admiral BELLINGER. There are certain upkeep periods that have to be—upkeep, maintenance work, that have to be done to these ships to keep them going, and they have got to come into port, some port, to get it done.

[947] General McCoy. Haven't you ships that can make repairs at sea?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. I mean that would not be practicable.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, as a matter of fact the Japanese ships don't keep to the sea; they have ports all over the Marshall Islands to go into. They stay out for some periods, but they don't keep to sea. They go into ports just like Honolulu.

Admiral BELLINGER. The fact of the number of Mandate Islands that they have available to go to makes it a situation for them that is quite an advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral. You will get me that data about drills?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

I want to add something to my testimony: I quoted this morning from a joint paper signed by General Martin and myself concerning an agreement, and I would like to bring out, in connection with the statement which was attributed to General Martin in the report concerning the mission of the Army in this area, that the Army air corps was planning and expecting approximately 180-odd 4-engine bombers in this area for carrying out the search and bombardment operations required under the base defense plan.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral STANDLEY. State briefly, for the information of the Commission, the types of planes that you have in connection with your responsibilities here and duty. What I mean is this: I mean the planes of carriers, battleships, cruisers, the utilities, the patrols, and I mean that kind.

Admiral BELLINGER. You want that put that way?

[948] Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, that way.

Admiral BELLINGER. The patrol planes, which are the large flying boats, twin-engine, and at present I have two 4-engine temporarily; the carrier planes, which are divided up into the scouts, torpedo bombers, dive bombers; the battleship planes and the cruiser planes, which are single-pontoon, single-engine planes; and the utility planes, which are various types from amphibian—amphibians, transports, and even an older type of flying boat. We have three of those now. The marine planes are similar in general types to the carrier planes except that they do not have torpedo planes; but all of these planes except the patrol planes are migrating, shifting quantities.

[949] You might change that and say merely a temporary responsibility for longer or shorter periods, as the case might be.

General McNARNEY. Just forget what I said about that.

Admiral BELLINGER. I thought it was in this paper.

General McNARNEY. Because, after searching my memory, I remember that when I left the Department, some time ago, it was 105. I do not know whether they increased it or not. However, I do remember General Martin said he did recommend 184 and he supposed they approved his recommendation because they gave him 180 of the planes that the Army expected to get.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McCoy. May I ask one or two more questions in general?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McCoy. Our report, which has to go to the public, will have to answer certain questions. Among others, the people in the United States are very much interested in knowing the estimate of the situation before this attack with regard to the Japanese forces, and particularly their air forces.

Did you know that the Japanese could put over such an effective attack here, or did you dream that would be possible, prior to December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, I did not think they could pull off an attack like that as accurately and as well done as they did.

General McCoy. Has it been your impression in past years that the Japanese air force was rather a weak one?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, but I had not discounted it at all. I thought they had a good air force because they have had so very much experience and practice in actual warfare, but I did not expect the accuracy with which they did things. Not only have they done things here but also with [950] reference to the reports of what they have done at Wake. For instance, there is the report from Wake about the pattern bombing by planes at 18,000 feet, which is quite remarkable; and also it is reported that they are strafing from 18,000 feet with machine-gun fire, which is quite remarkable. I may state that this is second-hand, from observers, who stated that planes in making their bombing attack on Wake used strafing, machine-gun fire, and they did the bomb run from about 18,000 feet, and they did it accurately.

General McCoy. Have you served in the Asiatic fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Or in Japan?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I have been over there but never served at any time there.

General McCoy. Has the Navy had air officers in Japan in recent years?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McCoy. Have you, as a responsible air commander, been furnished that information by them about the Japanese air force?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, we get reports continuously.

General McCoy. They gave no indication of the strength or effectiveness of the Japanese forces?

Admiral BELLINGER. Oh, yes, the estimates of it, but not the ability and accuracy of the pilots in getting through at the ship. That is the technical skill and the way they launched their torpedoes. For instance, doing pattern bombing from high altitudes and dive bombing. Their dive bombing is more of a glide than a dive bombing, as we understand it, but even so they are accurate.

For instance, these ships were around Ford Island. There was nobody killed on Ford Island, which is lucky, of course; but there were only two bombs dropped on Ford Island. One was deliberately dropped on the hangar, apparently, and one [951] of them was accidentally dropped—or so I say—dropped in the patio in the dispensary. But, I think they were aimed at a ship, which, of course, indicates pretty accurate bombing considering the fact that many of the ships are close to Ford Island.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you, General?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all.

If you think that the agreement between you and General Martin would be informative to us, would you mind sending it to us and preparing six copies?

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not know whether you wanted it or not. I can do that very easily.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose you do that. If it is surplusage, it will do no harm.

Admiral BELLINGER. Because the whole thing is about the Kahuku Point area, and I had to go into the whole policy of the Navy, and I did not know whether I should give it.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, everything that goes into our records is perfectly secret and will not be disclosed.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I will do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Send it to our Recorder at your convenience.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We now have Admiral Calhoun.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM LOWNDES CALHOUN, UNITED STATES NAVY, COMMANDER BASE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name for the record, Admiral?

Admiral CALHOUN. William Lowndes Calhoun, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Commander Base Force, United States [952]
Pacific Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, what is your flagship as such commander?

Admiral CALHOUN. The U. S. S. ARGONNE, moored at 1010 dock, Navy Yard, Pearl.

The CHAIRMAN. What does your command consist of, sir?

Admiral CALHOUN. Auxiliary vessels of the fleet for training squadrons to furnish certain things. First, Squadron No. 2, that furnishes repairing, hospitalization, salvage, and administration; No. 4, that furnishes all transport; No. 6, that furnishes all target practice requirements and in war advance base facilities; No. 8, that furnishes all fleet logistics, fuel, ammunition, food.

Admiral STANDLEY. I just want you to point out where the ARGONNE was here (indicating map).

Admiral CALHOUN. This is 1010 dock here, sir (indicating). That is the same position. That is exactly in the same position as she was the afternoon of Saturday, December 6, and on Sunday, December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on Saturday evening, December 6, Admiral?

Admiral CALHOUN. At my home, 448 Kuamoo, Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not at the Navy Yard that night?

Admiral CALHOUN. No, sir; however, Saturday, December 6, was the first evening I had spent at home for seven days.

The CHAIRMAN. What I had in mind particularly was your possible knowledge of the condition and morale of the men on leave Saturday night. I assume that your commitment was in connection with the transports that took them to and from the docks and their ships.

Admiral CALHOUN. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything about the condition of the forces with reference to the use of liquor that night, or have you heard anything about that?

[953] Admiral CALHOUN. I know considerable by official reports that have come to me from the patrol, which operates under me. I am the senior patrol officer. Furthermore, I run, by orders of the Commander-in-Chief, the boat pool which consists of all boats that are left in by the ships that are absent and the boats that are in by ships that are present that they desire the Commander of the Base Force to care for.

The morale and condition of the liberty parties, both officers and men, as evidenced by their return on Sunday morning, was of the highest, such as would reflect the greatest credit upon the fleet and the nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you, as responsible officer, are cognizant of the fact that there was not any considerable amount of drunkenness or disability from that cause by the return from leave of the enlisted men and officers on this particular night, December 6?

Admiral CALHOUN. Yes, sir, and not only cognizant, but absolutely positive; and that if any drinking had occurred, that it was negligible, and that the men so rose to the occasion that I can state with authority as my considered opinion that none was evidenced, and I am in a broad position to make that statement.

Admiral STANDLEY. What time did you return to the Yard?

Admiral CALHOUN. 8:35 to 8:37 a. m. I was able to make an early return due to the fact that whenever absent from ship I keep a chauffeur nearby, and I caught an Army antiaircraft artillery, which was immediately starting down on the first attack, and I came through

with them in their military police escort and they got me back in short time.

I arrive ahead of practically all the returning liberty party and was on board the ARGONNE and officially was recorded at 8:40.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was the attack going on when you got on board ship?

[954] Admiral CALHOUN. The first wave of torpedo bombing had passed. I arrived just at the beginning of the second wave of high bombing and dive bombing, and again what I would have called the third wave of bombing as strafing, but I saw the second and third waves.

Admiral STANDLEY. In general, Admiral, briefly tell us your observations so far as those two waves of attack were concerned.

Admiral CALHOUN. Moored at our 1010 dock, as shown by the diagram which has been presented to you, the ARGONNE had a broad panoramic view of every ship under attack except the UTAH across Ford Island and the RALEIGH across Ford Island, and the HONOLULU back in the repair basin (indicating on the map).

I observed boats carrying liberty parties from all landings back to their ships with the greatest expedition and in good order. I observed the anti-aircraft fire with the dive bombers attacking the NEVADA, which had gotten under way from Berth Fox astern of the ARIZONA, which had reached a position just off to the entrance of No. 2 dry dock.

I saw them dive-bombing the fleet with three planes coming down, and the anti-aircraft fire of the fleet obliterated the first one, and the second two planes pulled out of their dives and scurried southward without dropping any bombs. I could see this because through my powerful glasses I could readily see the bombs as they were dropped.

As regards morale, my mine force rescued the crew of the UTAH which had been torpedoed near here (indicating), near F11 berth, bringing 200 of them to the 1010 dock where it was moored about 8:42. Fifteen or twenty of these men were as naked as the day they were born. Their clothing was blown off them and they were covered with fuel oil, and some were wounded slightly.

Two 1,500-ton destroyers, lying by the berth in the same [955] slip, just across from the ARGONNE, desired augmentation of the crew to put to sea as some of their men had been returned.

We asked these rescued UTAH sailors for volunteers, and force was necessary to restrain the 200 of them from going where only 55 were wanted. The men were so anxious that they could not wait for the boat; they jumped overboard and they swam over there, the 55 of them.

I observed in detail the anti-aircraft fire of the CALIFORNIA, which had been stricken and had settled to the bottom, but every gun was manned and it was firing under orderly control and with bursts of telling effect on the second and third waves of the attack, that I have previously mentioned.

The TENNESSEE, next in order, which was pinched in behind the overturned OKLAHOMA, was firing in the same manner as the CALIFORNIA.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that was the MARYLAND behind the CALIFORNIA; the TENNESSEE was back of the WEST VIRGINIA.

Admiral CALHOUN. That is right. That is the MARYLAND. That is correct, sir.

The MARYLAND, although slightly damaged, was not maintaining anti-aircraft fire in any more manifest manner than the CALIFORNIA.

The TENNESSEE pitched in behind the WEST VIRGINIA, which at this time had been stricken, settled to the bottom, but was firing under the troubled conditions of the oil fire from the WEST VIRGINIA and the ARIZONA, maintaining a very accurate and hot fire each and every time it was needed.

There can be no question that the conduct of every man in the Pacific Fleet does and did reflect great lustre on any and all of the traditions of the Navy.

A little garbage scow with a crew of five men put its nose against the WEST VIRGINIA, and with these high-powered pumps, which are placed there for cleaning out the garbage [956] receptacles after they got at sea—for 48 hours without relief it maintained its position with its bow against the WEST VIRGINIA and broke up the oil fires that were beginning to form and float in toward the TENNESSEE and the MARYLAND.

I think it accomplished a great deal in saving those two ships from great damage.

On the morning of Sunday, December 7, there were between 300 and 400 bed patients in the Naval Hospital. That night at supper when they got ready to change them, practically every patient who was able to walk was absent. He had returned to his ship or any ship that he could catch and had gone to sea. They did not return to the hospital for several days. That is the official report of my staff medical officer, Captain Michael, who is the commander in charge of liaison between the hospital ashore and the ships of the fleet.

As regards morale and training, I am Fleet Target Practice Officer. I furnish all services for fire, both antiaircraft and surface long-range, short-range, day and night. As gunnery officer of wide experience, having served as gunnery officer on the MARYLAND, the battleship CALIFORNIA, and the battleship MISSISSIPPI. I am very much interested in gunnery and have kept in close touch with the firing of the fleet, all of which goes through the mill in the camera hold of the ARGONNE:

I have held my rank on duty under three Commanders-in-Chief: under Admiral C. C. Bloch, under Admiral J. O. Richardson, and under Admiral H. E. Kimmel; and without any attempt of criticism of the previous regimes, I officially state that the records show that the gunnery of the Pacific Fleet is now at one of the highest peaks that it has ever been since I have been in the Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke of the second and third waves of the attack. Was there any evidence that the third wave did not get home?

[957] Admiral CALHOUN. The third wave?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral CALHOUN. Every evidence in the world. I did not see the slightest damage. Better than that, I know from what I saw that not the slightest damage occurred on the third wave except possibly machine-gun strafing. I am also equally positive that of the second dive-bombing attack, that had the NEVADA not been required to stop, as it was known she had taken a torpedo hit, it might possibly have gone in and obstructed the channel. I doubt that they would have gotten the NEVADA because every bomb dropped at her was missing her until she stopped. They were falling all around her fore-castle. As soon as she stopped they hit the NEVADA's fore-castle. From the inspection and the reports of my salvage officer they show that 7 or 8 medium-sized, small-sized bombs hit on the fore-castle of the NEVADA.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that third wave's lack of damage due to gunfiring, or the plane attack, or what?

Admiral CALHOUN. I believe the third wave was principally sent in to photograph. However, I do not think they got in position to take any good pictures at the battleship line because the anti-aircraft fire of the fleet was well under control and very effective and was driving them off. The only plane that I saw cross the 1010 dock toward the battleship line was shot down by either the ARGONNE or the HELENA and fell in the water just off Ford Island.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was your estimate of the number of planes in the second and third waves?

Admiral CALHOUN. Forty-five or fifty.

Admiral STANDLEY. In the two of them?

Admiral CALHOUN. Yes, in the two. That does not include the torpedo planes. I never saw the torpedo planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. The torpedo planes came over as the first wave?

[958] Admiral CALHOUN. Their damage came first, yes, although I think the high bombers may have preceded, about the same time, for a coordinated attack, but did not reach their position, and their bombs did not fall until long after the torpedoes had done their damage.

Admiral STANDLEY. This is off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Admiral CALHOUN. May I just add one think that I think I should state, sir, on the question of morale?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral CALHOUN. As force commander I have been present at every force type commander conference held by Admiral Kimmel because I have never been absent on tactical maneuvers. With my long knowledge at being present at sea and by hearing, I know that Admiral Kimmel has shown and has required the responsible officers under him to read and to be thoroughly conversant with every letter that has passed between him and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and this also applies to his dispatchers. Every one of us was kept fully informed by the Commander-in-Chief, and I do not believe—and I am a Junior Rear Admiral, as you know, sir—but I do not believe I have every been in a command where constructive criticism has been more welcome than it has been under Admiral Kimmel.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you made acquainted with the contents of the Navy dispatch of November 27 which contains the expression, "This is a war warning"?

Admiral CALHOUN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Kimmel show you that dispatch soon after it was received?

Admiral CALHOUN. I would say sometime around the 29th or 30th of November.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any discussions as to what [959] the meaning of that phrase was as respects the possible hostile attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral CALHOUN. Admiral Kimmel told those present what he was doing, that he was sending—Am I allowed to state it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Everything here is secret.

Admiral CALHOUN. He told me he was sending the ENTERPRISE as a task force to take the planes to Wake and to Midway; that he had dispatched patrol planes to Midway and that he had dispatched submarines on patrol to Midway; but as to any discussion, there was none.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, he told you what steps he had taken?

Admiral CALHOUN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He said nothing about the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor itself?

Admiral CALHOUN. I have been present in Admiral Kimmel's office when the possibility of a torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor was discussed. I can't remember the date, but it should be a matter of official record for this board, and I feel sure it is.

Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel took up the question with Operations, and whether I saw the letter he wrote or not, I did see the answer, and the answer stated that torpedo-plane attacks could not be successful in less than 75 feet of water, and 40 to 45 feet of water was the controlling depth in this harbor and that torpedo-plane attacks were considered negligible.

I remember that discussion, but as to whether that was just prior to December 7 or not would be easy to ascertain as to the date of that letter, which, I know, is in the Commander-in-Chief's files.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We have seen it.

Admiral CALHOUN. I also know, due to the fact that for a year I ran the safety patrol of the fleet, that when it was [960] taken over from me by the Commandant 14th Naval District under the orders of Admiral Kimmel, that I was given and still possess copies of the plans for the defense of Pearl Harbor, and that was thoroughly and full discussed.

With respect to the question of air attack on Pearl Harbor, as we had received so many valuable reports from Great Britain, and very recently had Captain Mountbatten lecture to us, that I feel and I know for myself that a great deal of confidence was placed in the Radar net which we had on our drills, and that they have aided and proved to be successful, and that if any plane ever got in through that net on drills, I have not been informed of it.

That has been discussed by Admiral Bellinger and the Army air representative—I believe General Martin—which I hold in my posses-

sion, but as to any discussion other than on that time the letter went to Operations concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor, I do not have any recollection of it other than that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. It is necessary for our purposes to ask the witnesses not to discuss with any other person what has gone on in this room.

Admiral CALHOUN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We are trying to keep our record absolutely secret.

Admiral CALHOUN. I understand that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Call Admiral Furlong.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM REA FURLONG, UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name for the reporter?

Admiral FURLONG. William Rea Furlong, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Commander Mine Craft Battle Force on [961] December 7, 1941.

I note that there is one chart here, but I will give you the others as well.

The CHAIRMAN. We each have a copy.

Admiral FURLONG. I have them here.

Admiral STANDLEY. How long have you been in command of the Mine Force?

Admiral FURLONG. Since April 10, 1941.

Admiral STANDLEY. What duty did you have prior to being in command of the Mine Force?

Admiral FURLONG. Prior to the Mine Force I was Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was your flagship?

Admiral FURLONG. My flagship was the OGLALA, mine layer, 5,000 tons.

Admiral STANDLEY. Where was she moored on the morning of December 7?

Admiral FURLONG. The OGLALA was moored at this point (indicating) on the chart, which is an extension of No. 1 dry dock, known as 1010 dock outboard of the cruiser HELENA.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you on board the OGLALA on the night of December 6 and the morning of December 7?

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir. I sleep on board and live on board every night, and I was on board that night and the morning of the attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you give the board a brief account of the attack that morning about what you observed?

Admiral FURLONG. Yes. As commander of Mine Craft, in addition to the OGLALA in the position that has just been indicated on the chart, the first division of mine craft was on the eastern side of the harbor in the Navy Yard, which is known as repair basin, which has been designated on the chart under the names of the ships, four vessels: the PRUITT, the SICARD, the TRACEY, and the PREBIE.

[962] On the opposite side of the harbor to the westward was Mine Division 2, all the way over to the Middle Loch position, the

four vessels; namely, RAMSAY, the BREESE, the MONTGOMERY, and the GAMBLE.

From a vantage point on the opposite side of the harbor here (indicating) and between these two divisions (indicating) I was able not only by my own observation but by reports of these two divisions to get a very comprehensive picture of the action.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you asleep or up at the time of the first attack?

Admiral FURLONG. I was up. I was walking on deck at a few minutes before 8 o'clock, and I was waiting for my boy to announce breakfast.

As I walked on deck I heard some—and I am speaking about the OGLALA now—I heard some planes, but we are always hearing planes, and I paid no particular attention to the planes except that as soon as I heard them, almost, a bomb fell on the seaward end of Ford Island.

That is the first bomb, and it fell on the ramp over in this position (indicating). Immediately following that, a plane flew by me from the southward, up the channel between me and Ford Island, and on the chart about there (indicating).

The plane flew just a couple of hundred yards away from me, and because the deck as I stand on it on the OGLALA is a high deck, it was only a couple of hundred yards away. I could have almost thrown something at it and I could have hit it.

As it passed, I saw the rising sun, and I knew it was a Japanese plane. I called out, "Japanese. Man your stations."

But it was unnecessary for me to do that because the men also had heard this explosion and they were busy manning their stations and closing all the doors and manning all the stations immediately and manning the guns. But, to go through and [963] follow the bombs in quick order and not have too many side remarks, I will just follow along the sequence in which some of these things happened.

The second bomb fell within a few seconds after the first bomb fell, and this second one fell a little more in here (indicating), because the first one went on the ramp. The second one set afire a building there, but neither of these bombs destroyed a lot of planes that I observed parked right on the island like they did in the after damage.

Following those two bombs, I noticed bombs and high explosives and water coming up around the battleships moored along the side here (indicating), and many of those were missing and sending up great plumes of water.

Others hit the ships, and directly great flames and smoke filled that whole area from the oil fire in the ARIZONA and in the WEST VIRGINIA, and this oil fire floated on the water.

The smoke was so bad it drifted toward the station along Ford Island, and I had difficulty trying to see something over toward Ford Island on the seaward and where it was told me there was a Japanese submarine, but it was a buoy at that end.

Following these bombs, which occurred about the same time—it is hard to get the exact minute of these because I was busy, but the torpedoes were firing into the battleships, but just the exact sequence of the drops I do not know, but it was very close, about the same time.

Then the next bomb that fell went on the PENNSYLVANIA in the dry dock just over here (indicating). That came down but in-

stead of getting the PENNSYLVANIA in a fullhit, it got her in the bow and got two destroyers, the CASSIN and DOWNES, and burned them up. I knew there was a fire because I saw the smoke.

Following that, the next bomb fell opposite me there (indicating) and the SHAW was at the floating dry dock which [964] is this (indicating) and look here (indicating) at 1010 dock, and the floating dock is over toward Ford Island.

The SHAW is probably marked on the chart, but the SHAW was in the floating dry dock toward Ford Island.

The SHAW was in the dock, and the SHAW was hit and it was set on fire, and she was ruined and wrecked. From the bridge forward was burned entirely.

As for the dock itself, they sunk the dock in order to save it, but it will be all right. It is getting along nicely now, and the SHAW will be taken back to the States with a false bow.

Now, that is about the sequence of what damage was done there. There was a great deal more damage, but it was not serious. There were hits on the dry dock as well as the docks and this fire on the docks, but that is more or less easily repaired.

General McNARNEY. With respect to these first bombing attacks, were they from dive bombers or the level horizontal bombers?

Admiral FURLONG. They were very low. Some of them were 100 feet and some 500 feet, and some as low as 80 feet above the ships. The dive bombing by them was different from the dive bombing in the sense of the American Navy.

General McNARNEY. It is low-altitude bombing?

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, low-altitude bombing.

I will now go back to the OGLALA. After the bombs fell on the battleships, some planes came in and dropped three drops close together. They did not send up any plumes between the OGLALA and Ford Island right in the channel very close to Ford Island, and as I saw these three drops I thought it was a mine, but they were torpedo planes, a torpedo plane or maybe three torpedo planes because they were three distinct drops.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that by one plane or by different [965] planes?

Admiral FURLONG. I could not tell you that, but the planes were there, and there were three drops, and they were very close together, possible from three planes, but they were in formation, because they were very close together, and fell a short distance from the OGLALA.

They dropped at the OGLALA, and a sailor who stood by me at the time pointed and said, "There is a torpedo coming." Of course, I could do nothing about it. The ship was moored, and you could just look at it, but that torpedo went under the OGLALA and hit the OGLALA and the HELENA. It hit the OGLALA inboard, the port side, and also hit the HELENA at the same place at the outboard side.

On seeing this I was not sure but what there might have been some mine under there. So I sent the signal officer and went to the bridge and told them to send and signal the fleet to look out for mines in the channel for any ships going out, as the ships were sortieing, and I myself had taken, as soon as I saw the torpedo, the initiative, and I sent the signal about the sortie.

It was following after that when I had received a radio from the Commander-in-Chief or the Commander of the Battle Force, who also had sent me one, but none of that was necessary because we had seen what was going on.

With respect to the torpedo I did not realize and I did not feel in the OGLALA that we were going to sink. A fireman came from the fire room some few minutes after the torpedo hit us and said that the fire rooms were flooded. The water came up on the flooring and he had to turn off the oil and the heat under the boilers, which was a very good thing because he might have had some troubles with a steam explosion in the boilers. So, he turned everything off and reported that there was a flood in the engine room. So everything was done in that regard and the doors were closed.

[966] The ship did not seem to settle very much, but finally it did settle slowly and gradually. In fact, it settled so slowly and was on an even keel for a while that we had no trouble in keeping up our fire but kept on shooting at any plane within range. When I saw she was settling and the fire room being flooded, I went to the HELENA to get some submersible pumps for the OGLALA. I found that we had not power, and then I thought to clear the HELENA, because the HELENA didn't seem to be hurt, just as I did not know how badly ours was hurt, so I thought I will clear the HELENA and let her get out. [967] So I sent the men on the forecastle to cast off the line and sent more men on quarterdeck to handle lines on the dock, and started to try to heave her astern. I looked across the channel. Very close between us and Ford Island, close enough so that I could hail the men, there was a dredger working, a dredge, with two small contractor's tugs, and by hallooing and motioning I had those tugs come alongside the OGLALA, and we pushed her astern clear of the HELENA so that the HELENA could get out, secured her to the pier astern of the HELENA.

As soon as the tugs had me pushed in—they were very small tugs—a Navy Yard tug showed up to try to help to give another little push, and we secured; and just before that, a few minutes before, I noticed the NEVADA, which you will see on the chart is the ship farthest down there (indicating), had gotten—it was coming out, and she was coming out and came out the channel. I thought of the mines, and I gave her a signal which she received and acknowledged and she said she got—I asked her the next day and she said she got the signal saying there were mines set there—to look out for them, but she was too much under headway and too near it, so that she continued on. When she got in that position a great number of planes—it must have been bombers because there were great numbers of bombs fell in the water all around her, plumes going up, and one hit her on the bow, and I saw her just give quite a heave from that one on the bow, and one hit her on the starboard side and sent up some black smoke.

Well, I thought that there she is in the channel and there is going to be trouble if that ship sinks in the channel, so I took these two tugs that were there with me at the OGLALA, and I told them to go to the NEVADA to get her out of the channel. They went to the NEVADA and assisted her, and she had some power, her own power, and she went over there on her own power to the—over on the other side of the

channel, not on Ford Island but [968] over on—(indicating on map).

The CHAIRMAN. Over here?

Admiral FURLONG. Over there. And she had hard bottom there to go on, but she said this: that the bomb had cut her fire mains and she had no water, and she said it was a great blessing that those tugs were there to help her because the tugs put out her fire, or we might have had another ARIZONA, and the action of those tugs—and it shows the use of the tugs, or something, other than just pushing the ship around, for the use of fire in occasions like that, and we are taking steps in the Yard to get some more fire equipment on the other tugs. But they did that service to the NEVADA.

Now, on the OGLALA there is not much more to say except that the men kept up a fire there. There was attack after attack, from before eight o'clock until the different times up until eleven, and at nine-thirty, though, we had gotten such a list, about 40 degrees, that we couldn't stick to the decks any longer, the men on the top of the deckhouse where the machine guns were, and before that I had to take them away from the 3-inch guns, which were lower. And I told them to abandon ship, and I went off with them, and they slid off the deckhouse out to the dock at about 45 degrees with their guns, and they set their guns up on the dock, and the doctor and many of the crew set up there receiving the wounded and the injured from the battleships that were being ferried over to the dock.

In the OGLALA we had, providentially I feel, only four people wounded, and that was from strafing. The later attacks after the bombing, we received—that I hadn't mentioned before—many strafing attacks, and particularly strafing that came from the east. Apparently after they flew over Hickam Field they continued on. And they strafed the OGLALA and the HELENA.

The HELENA, which was right alongside of us, had eight killed and 58 very severely burned from oil fires when that [969] torpedo hit in the engine room and in the fire rooms of the HELENA. And the only—besides four wounded there was a young man in the OGLALA, a young officer from California, who was a young reserve that we just had, a very fine young fellow by the name of Wilhelm, who was my assistant communication officer; and when I had gone on the forecastle in the beginning of the thing to see that the gun was going in the forecastle, he came up there, and I noticed him standing there, and there wasn't anything he could do, because the others were attending to the fire of the guns. But the reason I mention it is this: that four or five days after the action he just broke down entirely from shellshock and went off his head entirely and has been sent home. But aside from him and the four wounded, that was the only casualties we had.

Now, in Mine Division 1, which is at the Yard, they were quartered in barracks a short distance from where their ships are—their men were. Of course, there were a certain number of them on each—all the ships, but the great bulk were in the Yard because this division was in the Yard for its only annual overhaul, which lasts two or three months, and the machinery was out of the ships, and pieces of the bridge structure were off where the gunnery replacements—new gunnery replacements were to go in, and there was degaussing to go on,

and there was—oh—a great deal of work such as is done once a year in this ship. But those men went immediately to their ships and got there very early in the action, within a few minutes after the thing happened, got their guns set up and ammunition going, so as to meet the second and third and fourth waves, and went into other ships that were nearby that had guns, and served them. Now, in going into those ships and in serving, they lost five men killed.

Those men were three from the TRACY, the commanding officer being Lieutenant Commander Phelan; one from the PRUITT, [970] Commanding Officer being Lieutenant Commander Herron; and one from the SICARD, Commanding Officer Schultze. I can give the men's names to the reporters if they would like them; you probably don't want that detail.

Those boys were killed in manning guns in the PENNSYLVANIA, and they manned guns in the NEW ORLEANS, which was near, and in the CUMMINGS. Some of them went to sea in the CUMMINGS.

To go to the other division on the other end of the channel, Mine Division 2, they took part in the first phase of the action, of the gun action, because many of the planes, the Japanese planes, went out and left right over those divisions there in the Middle Loch going to the west. And so that that division knocked down six planes: five there in Middle Loch and one as that division sortied in the channel, as it came up the channel. One plane flew low coming up the entrance to the channel, and one of the ships knocked it down.

While over there at that place I could see some other division, but will not bother the Commission with the details of it, the exact location of where all the planes fell, the Japanese planes. I had all the officers from both divisions together, so that we wouldn't double up too much on the planes we knocked down, and that we would—four or five people seeing the same plane, we would only call it one plane. But, all of those together, after I went over it thoroughly and checked and rechecked, I found that we had seen in those divisions 18 planes knocked down, a great many of them there in that Middle Loch. For instance, one fell on Pearl City, which is the peninsula there near Middle Loch, on the shore. Another one fell in the water near Pearl City. Others fell on the peninsula called Beckoning Point over here on this side, and burned up. One of the ships knocked the whole head off of a plane with a 3-inch .23 caliber gun that we thought wasn't [971] very good but did knock it down, at very short range, and it fell on Beckoning Point.

When those ships sortied they had an attack in the forenoon around eleven-thirty and up until noon, with two very good contacts of submarines, one off Barbers Point and one down off the entrance to the harbor, Mindiv 2. I think that's about all. I saw two planes myself fall down, one passing over the battleships at about 2,000 feet altitude and one passing over the OGLALA and the HELENA and the PENNSYLVANIA at about the same height, 2,000 feet, coming from the northeast to the southwest, and they went down in flames towards Fort Weaver, and some of them went that far.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, did you observe any high bombing planes, any planes bombing from very high altitudes?

Admiral FURLONG. I personally didn't observe them, anything higher than these two that I saw in flames around two, three thousand

feet, but I have a report from my ships in which there was observed high bombing, and I have it here and can dig it out, the exact person who observed it, and when.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you have a chance to estimate the number of planes that were in the various waves that you speak of: one, two, three, and four?

Admiral FURLONG. I couldn't estimate any more than just as [972] I looked into the air there were probably no more than maybe five or ten visible at any one time, but they came in so many waves that—and one after another; there was a distinct lull at one time around just before nine o'clock in the action, in which for a few minutes there wasn't anything happening, and then the waves came on again, I remember. One of the men that was on watch in one of the destroyers whose duty it was to write down times of waves reported first one coming in from the southeast, a wave, then another dive bombing and high bombing waves from the northeast, and then another one coming in from the east, and there were four or five distinct waves, I know, that came in, and different people in the reports to me have estimated them up as high as 50 to 80 planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, what generally is the condition of your command in regard to sobriety and overstaying liberty, and so forth?

Admiral FURLONG. Oh, it is excellent, Admiral. We don't have any trouble with that. You see, it is so well controlled here, it couldn't happen if they wanted to, because we have all these patrols on shore, and at a certain hour everybody has to be back, and if they are not back they are just picked up and sent back. So there is no trouble.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have many cases of court martial for drunkenness?

Admiral FURLONG. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or anything of that kind?

Admiral FURLONG. Oh, no. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I haven't anything further.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything, General?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy?

General MCCOY. Just as a matter of interest I would like to know what happened to the HELENA, because in the report we [973] have as to the salvage she is not mentioned.

Admiral FURLONG. The HELENA had her starboard engine entirely—it's entirely wrecked, and auxiliary machinery in it is entirely wrecked, and I will read you the official report of the investigation of the HELENA sent to the Navy Department: "Further examination"—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, we don't want that official report.

Admiral FURLONG. Just give him a report, and I won't—you don't need to—

General MCCOY. Will she be salvaged?

Admiral FURLONG. She will be salvaged. Her starboard engine—she will be fixed up here at the Yard, and she will be sent to the States where the engine can be worked upon and new engines obtained.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all we want to know.

Admiral FURLONG. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just one other question, Mr. Chairman: Admiral, you have just come from being Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, you stated?

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you any knowledge of the Bureau's action and opinion as to the use of torpedoes in shallow waters?

Admiral FURLONG. We had contemplated using torpedoes, and we do use torpedoes in all our—both aircraft and ships, and we can set them to go at a very shallow depth. For instance, submarines can shoot at other submarines on the surface.

Admiral STANDLEY. But dropping them from aircraft in shallow water.

Admiral FURLONG. Oh.

Admiral STANDLEY. In restricted waters. Do you know anything of that use of them?

Admiral FURLONG. Well, I have conducted experiments with [974] dropping them at Narragansett Bay, and we of course would drop them from low altitudes such as the Japanese dropped them here, but I feel that possibly some of these Japanese torpedoes may have stuck in the mud, because of the three that came toward us we were hit only by one that I know of, and they do take a dive on going into the water, but they soon get their depth set for—

Admiral STANDLEY. You don't know of any action that the Bureau of Ordnance has taken in regard to that matter, or reports that they have made?

Admiral FURLONG. No. There is—I don't—

Admiral STANDLEY. When you were Chief of Bureau?

Admiral FURLONG. I don't know—well, yes, I know everything that we did about the torpedoes. For instance, one thing, we heard that the British had developed a torpedo along the lines that we were working on at Newport, in which they were able to drop them at a greater height than we were, and that they have certain apparatus that they put on the outside of the torpedo which allowed the—stabilized it in the air and which let it down all right. The Secretary of the Navy asked the British representative for a sample of that torpedo, and I got the representatives of the British that were there to give us the designs of it, so that they were—I am sure that the Bureau—of course they came along after I left. The torpedo arrived, but the designs of the stabilizing fins for the air did not come until after I had left, although they were ordered, and I am sure the Bureau would go along with that, because we were ourselves experimenting on the same thing.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you aware of any letter written by the Chief of Naval Operations in which he stated that the difficulties and obstacles of dropping torpedoes from planes in the harbor here were such that such a contingency was almost negligible and that the placing of baffles for that reason was not justified?

[975] Admiral FURLONG. No, I never heard of that, Admiral.

Admiral STANDLEY. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all, Admiral.

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked all the witnesses here, sir, if they will agree not to discuss what has gone on in this room with anyone.

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Their own testimony or anything else that was said.

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall now adjourn until Friday morning.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

(Whereupon, at 4:20 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until Friday, January 2, 1942, at 9:30 o'clock a. m.).

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